Phillips v. Deschutes County Assessor

• Court: Oregon Tax Court
• Decided: January 23, 2018
• Docket: TC-MD 160344R
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE OREGON TAX COURT MAGISTRATE DIVISION Property Tax

CHAD E. PHILLIPS, ) ) Plaintiff, ) TC-MD 160344R ) v. ) ) DESCHUTES COUNTY ASSESSOR, ) ) Defendant. ) FINAL DECISION1

Plaintiff appealed the disqualification of property identified as Account 154887 (subject

property) from nonexclusive farm use zone farmland (non-EFU) special assessment for the

2016-17 tax year. A telephonic trial was held on April 6, 2017. Kyle Schmid, of Schmid

Malone Buchanan LLC, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff. Chad Phillips (Phillips), Eric Sexton

(Sexton), and Monte Clouston (Clouston) testified on behalf of Plaintiff. Sexton appeared and

testified on behalf of Defendant. Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1 to 8 were admitted into evidence without

objection. Defendant’s Exhibits A through E were admitted into evidence, without objection,

except for any hearsay statements of Aviv Hadar which were not admitted.

I. STATEMENT OF FACTS

The subject property is 7.50 acres, zoned Multiple Use Agriculture, and located in the

Winston Ranch neighborhood in Deschutes County. (Ptf’s Ex 1.) Prior to the 2016-17 tax year,

6.50 acres of the subject property was specially assessed as non-EFU farm deferral.

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1 This Final Decision incorporates the court’s Decision, entered January 5, 2018, with one change. The word “filed” has been corrected to “field” on page 5. The court did not receive a statement of costs and disbursements within 14 days after its Decision was entered. See Tax Court Rule–Magistrate Division (TCR–MD) 16 C(1).

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 1 Sexton testified that he is a residential property appraiser for Defendant. Sexton testified

that in March or April 2016, he did an inspection of the subject property and did not observe

obvious signs of farm use. He testified that he did not make any notes of the inspection.

On March 31, 2016, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a letter and questionnaire requesting

information about the subject property’s farm use. (Def’s Ex B at 2.) Sexton testified that the

letter was addressed to the last address of taxpayer known to the Assessor: 309 Wisconsin Ave.,

Whitefish, MT 59937 (Wisconsin Ave). The letter states “In the questionnaire I am asking you

for your gross income information from your farm use for 2013 and 2014.” Id. The letter also

states:

“To supplement the questionnaire, documentation such as copies of Schedule F forms, sale receipts, lease agreements, or any income information must be included to support the gross income claims. * * * If you are submitting a Schedule F form as supporting documentation that contains reported gross income, please clarify how that income was generated.”

(emphasis in original.)

The questionnaire included columns for the 2014 and 2015 tax years only. (Def’s Ex B

at 3-4) Sexton testified that the letter had the wrong years but the questionnaire was correct.

The letter stated the deadline for response was May 18, 2016. (Def’s Ex B at 2.) On

May 2, 2016, Defendant sent a letter to Plaintiff explaining that the County had not received the

completed income questionnaire and warning that “[f]ailure to return the questionnaire may

result in disqualification from the Non-Exclusive Farm Use Deferral program under ORS

308A.116(1)(c).” (Def’s Ex B at 5.) The letter demanded a response by May 18, 2016.

Sexton testified that the March 31, 2016, and May 2, 2016, letters were not in strict

compliance with the time limits contained in OAR 150-308-1050(4)(a), but, Defendant thought

that the amount of time given for a response from Plaintiff was reasonable under the

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 2 circumstances. Sexton testified that neither of the letters was returned as undeliverable by the

U.S. Postal Service and that Defendant did not receive a response from Plaintiff by May 27,

2017.

On May 27, 2016, Defendant mailed Plaintiff a “show cause” letter stating its intention to

disqualify the subject property from Non-Farm EFU if the requested information was not

provided within 30 days. (Def’s Ex B at 6.) The letter states “notice is given that the above-

mentioned property has failed to provide the requested information: -Proof the land was and has

been used for farm use [and] -Sufficient gross income information for 3 out of 5 years.” The

May 27, 2016, letter was returned to Defendant by the U.S. Postal Service with a yellow sticker

stating: “RETURN TO SENDER” and included a new address of 165 Vista Dr., Whitefish, MT

59937-7832 (Vista address). (Def’s Ex B at 8.)

On June 28, 2016, Defendant mailed Plaintiff letters to the Wisconsin Ave, Vista address,

and to the subject property stating the property has been disqualified from non-farm EFU for the

following reason:

“Currently farmland is lying idle or is no longer in a qualifying use and has been disqualified from the following program:  Non-Exclusive Farm Use, ORS 308A.116(1)(c); Removal of the special assessment by the assessor upon the discovery that the land is no longer in farm use for failure to meet the income requirements under ORS 308A.071 or is no longer in farm use.”

(Def’s Ex B at 9.)

The June 28, 2016 letter provides additional tax information including: summaries of

ORS 308A.706(1)(d) and ORS 308A.724; the dollar amount of potential additional taxes due to

the disqualification; and appeal rights to the Oregon Tax Court. (Def’s Ex B at 9 -11.) The letter

mailed to the subject property was returned by the U.S. Postal Service as undeliverable and

“unable to forward.” (Def’s Ex B at 15.)

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 3 On August 26, 2016, Plaintiff sent an email to CPA Marija Berney asking her to “send

Eric Sexton of Deschutes County the past Schedule F’s of the property.” (Def’s Ex C at 3.) On

August 29, 2016, Ms. Berney sent an email to Sexton including copies of Plaintiff’s Schedule F

for the 2009 through 2015 tax years. (Def’s Ex C at 5-11.) Plaintiff’s Schedule F for the 2009

through 2015 tax years only reported income under the category of “other income.” (Id.) On

August 30, 2016, Defendant sent an email to Ms. Berney asking for clarification of the “other

income.” (Def’s Ex C at 12) Ms. Berney replied the next day “To my knowledge this is income

from allowing others to use land as pasture for their grazing animals.”

On September 2, 2016, Defendant sent an email to Plaintiff asking for information on the

farm use of the property in 2016. (Def’s Ex C at 20.) Plaintiff replied for 2016 it was pasturing

“horses eating the Hay/grass.” (Id.) The reply also states for 2012 through 2015 it was pasturing

sheep, 2011 and 2012 it was horses and 2009 and 2010 it was hay production. (Id.) On August

31, 2016, Plaintiff signed the completed questionnaire and reported Hay income in 2014 in the

amount of $3,900 and for 2015 income in the amount of $4,160. (Def’s Ex C at 23.) The form

also states that a tenant, Aviv Hadar, was using the property for sheep in 2014 and 2015. (Id.)

On August 31, 2016, Sexton performed a site inspection of the subject property and

documented his observations on a “Farm Use Review” form. (Def’s Ex C at 13.) Sexton noted

on the form “No farm use observed. Irrigated pasture, green, numerous weed growing. Did not

appear to have been recently grazed or cut for orchard grass/hay.” (Id.) He noted no

observations of livestock or animals and the only crop seen was grass. (Id.) Sexton took

pictures of the property showing an empty field. (Id. at 14-16.) On September 2, 2016,

Defendant mailed Plaintiff a letter which reaffirmed the June 28, 2016, disqualification and

included in the letter was a copy of the official notice of the disqualification. (Def’s Ex C at 26.)

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 4 On December 7, 2016, Plaintiff sent an email to Defendant stating the income from subject

property was for leasing the field for either raising sheep or horses and prior to 2014 was for hay

production. (Def’s Ex C at 36.)

Plaintiff presented a letter from Great Northern Heights Homeowners Association stating

that persons living in Plaintiff’s housing development, including Plaintiff specifically,

experienced trouble with their mail in spring and summer 2016 due to the developer’s error in

not providing all of the mailboxes necessary. (Ptf’s Ex 8.)

Sexton testified that to meet the income requirement, based on the size of the subject

property, Plaintiff would need to have $650 in gross income from operation of the farm, and if

leased, an additional $152.50 in rental income. He testified that in 2013 through 2015 the gross

income from the lease was in excess of $650 but not the gross proceeds from the farm. He

testified that he reviewed Plaintiff’s Schedule F for five years and did not see evidence of gross

income from farming operations – only from leasing the property.

Phillips testified that the only reason for the appeal was because he was told the

disqualification was due to his failure to respond to the Defendant’s questionnaire. He testified

that he understood Defendant was not challenging his farm use. In 2012, Phillips leased his

property to Hadar with the understanding that he would raise sheep and meet the farm use

requirement. Phillips saw Hadar raising sheep, put 7 acres of cross fencing, and added a corral

and sheep station. He testified that during one period Hadar’s entire herd was taken off the

property for several weeks and a new herd was put on the pasture. He also observed that the

sheep had been sheered on at least one occasion. Phillips testified that “no one invests that kind

of money without intending to farm.” Since that time, Phillips relationship with Hadar has been

strained and they are currently in litigation over damages Hadar allegedly did to the subject

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 5 property. Phillips testified that Hadar was not a credible person and he has breached every

agreement between the parties.

Clouston testified he is a general contractor and lives across the street from the subject

property. Clouston testified that he was aware that Hadar was leasing the property from 2013 to

2015. At some point, Clouston was contacted by the FBI regarding Hadar’s activities. Clouston

stated he saw sheep on the subject property and remembers the sheep being sheered on at least

one occasion.

II. ANALYSIS

The issue in this case is whether Defendant properly disqualified the subject property

from non-EFU special assessment for the 2016-17 tax year. Plaintiff argues that Defendant

waived its challenge to the farm use of the property and should be estopped from asserting that

Plaintiff failed to meet income or use requirements. Plaintiff argues in the alternative that the

disqualification should be overturned because Defendant failed to follow the notice requirement

in OAR 150-308-1050(4)(a).

A. Equitable Estoppel

The court first considers whether Defendant waived its right to argue that Plaintiff failed

to meet income or use requirements. Oregon Courts have recognized that the theory of equitable

estoppel applies to government agencies. Johnson v. Tax Commission, 248 Or 460, 435 P2d 302

(1967) (applying equitable estoppel to tax collector); Pilgrim Turkey Packers v. Dept. of Rev.,

261 Or 305, 493 P2d 1372 (1972) (holding that county assessor was precluded from denying

exemption where assessor provided misleading information); Employment Div. v. Western

Graphics Corp., 76 Or App 608, 710 P2d 788 (1985) (Employment Division estopped from

assessing tax after providing incorrect information to taxpayer). A Plaintiff must prove three

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 6 elements “(1) misleading conduct on the part of the [defendant]; (2) taxpayer’s good faith,

reasonable reliance on that conduct; and (3) injury to taxpayer.” Webb v. Dept. of Rev., 18 OTR

381, 383 (2005).

As to the first element, Plaintiff must submit sufficient evidence to show “proof positive”

that Defendant misled him i.e. misleading written information or misleading conduct. Id. at 384.

Plaintiff argues that Defendant’s disqualification notice did not identify income as a basis for

disqualification from Non-EFU deferral and Defendant should be precluded from presenting

evidence on that issue. That contention is not persuasive because the Notice states “the land is

no longer in farm use for failure to meet the income requirements.” (Emphasis added.)

Defendant’s disqualification letter contained sufficient information to place Plaintiff on notice

for the issues on appeal.

Plaintiff also argues that Defendant’s emails misled him as to the issues he needed to

present at trial. Plaintiff cites to a portion of a letter from Defendant dated February 27, 2017,

which states “Your property was disqualified from farm deferral for the 2016 tax year for failure

to respond to our audit.” (Ptf’s Ex 6 at 1.) The court can understand how that statement could be

confusing to Plaintiff, however, the email goes on to state “Our office does not contest that you

leased your land for the raising of sheep, but we are asking the Magistrate if the information you

submitted after the disqualification meets the requirements of the farm deferral program,

warranting it to be reinstated.” Id. It appears to the court that “information you submitted”

refers to multiple years of Schedule F and information about the tenant’s alleged farm use of the

property. The court does not find Defendant’s email constitutes “proof positive” that it misled

Plaintiff regarding the issues he was required to prove at trial.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 7 As to the second element, the court does not find that Plaintiff reasonably relied on

Defendant’s statements. After the disqualification notice, Plaintiff and Defendant engaged in a

series of communications regarding income from the subject property. Defendant repeatedly

requested specific information about the source of “farm income.” On August 30, 2016,

Plaintiff’s CPA acknowledged the income from the farm was from “allowing others to use land

as pasture for their grazing animals.” (Def Ex C at 12.) At trial, Plaintiff’s Schedule F income

information was presented along with information about farm use of the subject property.

Plaintiff has not demonstrated reasonable reliance of a false assertion by Defendant which

caused harm. Therefore, the court will not apply Plaintiff’s estoppel theory to the analysis of this

case.

B. Non-EFU Special Assessment in General

To promote agricultural production and stewardship of farmland, the Legislative

Assembly established a program of special assessment for land that qualifies as nonexclusive

farm use zone farmland (non-EFU). Non-EFU farmland is “land that is not within an exclusive

farm use zone but that qualified for farm use special assessment under ORS 308A.068.” ORS

308A.053(4).2 Non-EFU property may be disqualified from special assessment for four reasons:

a) by the taxpayer’s request; b) sale or transfer to a ownership exempt from ad valorem property

tax; c) when “the land is no longer in farm use for failure to meet the income requirements under

ORS 308A.071 or is no longer in farm use”; or d) recording a subdivision plat under ORS

chapter 92. ORS 308A.116(1)(a-d). Of these potentially disqualifying events only ORS

308A.116(1)(c) is in issue.

2 The court’s references to the Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) are to 2015.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 8 C. Notice Requirement for Disqualification from Non-EFU Special Assessment

When a county disqualifies a non-EFU property from special assessment it must send a

notice within 30 days and “state the reason for the disqualification.” ORS 308A.718(3). In

addition, unless the disqualification is due to a taxpayer’s request, the notice must include “a

written explanation summarizing: (A) ORS 308A.706(1)(d) (relating to change in special

assessment); (B) ORS 308A.727 (relating to change in use to open space use special assessment

for certain golf courses); (C) The administrative act necessary under ORS 308A.724 to change

the property to another classification described in this paragraph; and (D) The imposition of any

penalties that would result from the disqualification if no requalification or reclassification is

made under one of the other special assessment laws listed in this paragraph.” ORS

308A.718(5)(a). This court has held that failure to give proper notice within the statutory time

limit can invalidate a disqualification. Smith v. Dept. of Rev., 17 OTR 357 (2004).

As discussed in Smith, “the basis for disqualification on which a county proceeds is

important.” Id. at 361. A disqualification under ORS 308A.071, for failure to meet income

requirements, must follow the procedural requirements in OAR 150-308-1050 (renumbered from

OAR 150-308A.071) while a disqualification under ORS 308A.116, for no farm use, must

follow OAR 150-308-1110 (renumbered from OAR 150-308A.116). Id. at 361-62.

1. Procedure under ORS 308A.071 and OAR 150-308-1050

ORS 308A.071 establishes the gross income requirements for non-EFU property.

Plaintiff must show that in three out of five calendar years before the assessment date the

property was part of a farm unit that produced at least $650 from farm uses. ORS

308A.071(2)(a)(A). Defendant asserts that the gross income requirement should be an additional

$162.50 because, in their view, the property was leased and thus “not all under the same

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 9 ownership” under ORS 308A.071(c). The court disagrees because “ownership” for purposes of

that section is specifically defined in ORS 308A.071(7)(c) by to reference ORS

308A.077(2)(b)(A),(B), (D), or (E) and none of those sections defines a tenant as an owner.3

The Department of Revenue created administrative rules for counties to use in assessing

whether a farm meets the income requirement. Under the rules, if on March 1, the assessor lacks

information to determine the qualification for a property it must send notice to the owner, at the

last known address of record, with a questionnaire. OAR 150-308-1050(4). The property owner

must provide the income information by April 15. OAR 150-308-1050(4)(a). If the information

is not provided or is insufficient, the assessor is required to send a notice of intent to disqualify

the property and a statement giving the taxpayer 30 days to show cause why the property should

not be disqualified. OAR 150-308-1050(4)(d)(A), (B). Failure by the taxpayer to provide the

income information to the county assessor “constitutes grounds for disqualification under [ORS]

308A.116(1)(c).” OAR 150-308-1050(3). However, if the county has not provided a taxpayer

with the initial notice on or before March 1 the property owner has “good and sufficient cause

for the owner’s failure to provide timely income information.” OAR 150-308-1050(4)(f).

Plaintiff argues that the notice of disqualification is invalid because Defendant’s letter

asking for income information was mailed after March 1, 2016. Defendant does not dispute that

its letter and questionnaire were late and not in compliance with OAR 150-308-1050(4). Rather,

Defendant argues that subsection (4)(f)(A) provides for relief from a disqualification for failure

to timely provide the financial information if the county fails to send a timely notice. To the

extent that Defendant disqualified Plaintiff for failing to provide timely financial income, that

reason would be excused by OAR 150-308-1050(4)(f). However, Defendant’s notice of

3 A “tenant in common” is a legal term of art used to connote a specific way of holding property pursuant to a recorded deed or other instrument. See e.g. Talarico v. Deschutes County Assessor, 17 OTR-MD 37, 41 n 4 (2001).

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 10 disqualification does not state the basis was for failing to provide timely information – it quotes

the statutory language of ORS 308A.116(1)(c), “discovery that the land is no longer in farm use

for failure to meet the income requirements under ORS 308A.071 or is no longer in farm use.”

Plaintiff cites letters and emails from Defendant after the notice of disqualification which state

the disqualification was “for failure to respond to a proof of farm use and gross income

requirement from farm use audit.” (Ptf’s Ex 3 at 2.) That language was not in Defendant’s

Notice of Disqualification. The court will not add language to Defendant’s Notice of

Disqualification based on subsequent correspondence. Thus, the court will not invalidate the

Notice of Disqualification based on the timing of Defendant’s request for information, rather the

court will analyze whether Defendant properly disqualified the subject property for the reasons

stated in the notice—that the property is “no longer in farm use.”

2. Procedure under ORS 308A.116 and OAR 150-308-1110

ORS 308A.116(1)(c) provides that non-EFU is subject to disqualification from special

assessment “upon the discovery that the land is no longer in farm use for failure to meet the

income requirements under ORS 308A.071 or is no longer in farm use.” The disqualification is

effective as of January 1 if the notice of disqualification is mailed by the county prior to

August 15. ORS 308A.116(7)(a), (b).

OAR 150-308-1110 provides:

(1)(a) Before non-EFU land is disqualified from farm use assessment due to discovery by the assessor that the land is no longer being devoted to a farm use, the assessor must; (A) Make a reasonable effort to contact the owner, owner’s agent or person using the land; (B) Make a site inspection of the property; and (C) Request the recent history of the property’s use. (b) The assessor must make a record of the inspection that includes when the inspection was made, who made the inspection, copy of contact letter(s) or record of other means of contact, information from the person contacted, and notations of

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 11 the conditions found. Notations about the conditions found may include the farm uses being made of the property, areas having no apparent farm use, vegetation on the property and its condition, whether the property is fenced and the fence’s condition, and other conditions of the property that indicate a farm use or lack of farm use. The record of inspection must be retained in the assessor’s office for at least three years. (c) If the inspection indicates a farm activity being conducted which may not provide sufficient income to satisfy the income test, the assessor must demand that the landowner complete an income questionnaire. (2) If property disqualification is effective after June 30, the non-EFU property will remain valued for farm use on the assessment and tax roll until the following July 1. (a) Disqualification for non-farm use occurs as of the January 1 assessment date and is effective as of June 30 if the disqualification notice is mailed on or before August 14. (b) If non-EFU property disqualification is effective on or before June 30 for any reason other than for non-farm use, to be valid the notice must be mailed within 30 days after the date that land is disqualified.

Defendant complied with some of the requirements set forth above. It made a reasonable

effort to contact the owner by mailing multiple letters. It made an informal site inspection and

requested the history and financial information from Plaintiff to make a determination.

However, Defendant did not make a written record of a site inspection until September 2, 2016,

which is after the date of the original notice of disqualification. The court must determine

whether Defendant’s inspection without documentation until after the disqualification notice

renders the disqualification invalid, as was found in Smith, or whether Defendant’s actions

constitutes substantial compliance as was found in Boardman Tree Farm v. Morrow County

Assessor, 20 OTR 361 (2011).

In Smith, the county disqualified a non-EFU property from special assessment. The court

found that the county did not visit the property until after sending the disqualification notice and

the county did not make “a reasonable effort to contact the owner or to request information on

the recent history of the use of the property * * * [which are] both mandatory steps under

governing rules.” Smith, 17 OTR at 362 (citing OAR 150-308A.116(1)(a)). The court also

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 12 stated “[m]ost importantly, the county did not comply with ORS 308A.718(3) in providing the

reason for disqualification.” Id. at 363 (emphasis in original) Thus, the court found the

disqualification invalid. Id.

In contrast to Smith is the court’s decision in Boardman. In Boardman the court

specifically considered whether the county’s actions were sufficient to meet the “inspection”

requirement of OAR 150-308-1100. Boardman, 20 OTR at 365. In considering the rule, the

court utilized the statutory interpretation scheme of PGE v. Bureau of Labor Industries, 317 Or

606, 859 P2d 1143 (1993) as applied in agency rules under Don’t Waste Oregon Com. v. Energy

Facility Siting, 320 Or 132, 881 P2d 119 (1984). Boardman, 20 OTR at 366-67. The court

found the term “inspection” ambiguous and reviewed the rulemaking record for a definition of

the term. Id. at 368. The court found that the Department of Revenue “had two purposes in

adopting the inspection and record-keeping requirements of [OAR 150–308–1100]: (1) to ensure

that a given property is, in fact, no longer entitled to EFU special assessment and (2) to ensure

that a disqualification will be upheld should a taxpayer choose to challenge it.” Id. at 368. The

county’s inspection was performed by viewing the property from the road. Id. at 370. The court

found that entry onto the property was not necessary to constitute an inspection. As to the

record-keeping element, the court found that the parties “engaged in a collaborative effort to

preserve the EFU special assessment [and] [t]hat effort was motivated in large part by [the

taxpayer’s] own knowledge that, in the absence of a legislative remedy, the subject property

would be disqualified.” Id. The county kept records of the parties’ joint effort to change the law

and kept records which included maps and conditions of the subject property. Id. at 372. The

court held that the county “substantially complied” with the rules, and thus the disqualification

notice procedure was upheld. Id. at 373.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 13 Several Magistrate Division cases have considered Boardman. In Exit 282A

Development Company, LLC v. Clackamas County Assessor, TC-MD 120764C, 2013 WL

3948638 (Or Tax M Div July 30, 2013), the county performed an inspection in 2007 and then

five years later mailed a letter notifying the property owner of disqualification. Id. at *1. The

court found that the county’s inspection and documentation were insufficient and thus void. Id.

at *6. In Earth Science Products Corp., v. Clackamas County Assessor, TC-MD 160012N, 2016

WL 7177518 (Or Tax M Div, Dec 9, 2016), the county documented several phone calls to the

property owners and left messages, which were not returned. The county then performed several

inspections of the property from outside the fence and left several notices, but did not keep a

specific written record of the inspections. The county did have notes in its database about when

the inspection was performed. The court found that the county’s call to the property owner was

sufficient to establish a reasonable effort to contact the property owner. Id. at *4. The court also

found that a site inspection from the road was sufficient, citing Boardman. Id. Finally, the court

found that the county’s note in its log showing the date of inspection was “the bare minimum

necessary to satisfy the rule.” Id. at *6.

In the instant case, Defendant asserts it did a site inspection in March or April 2016, but

made no record of the event and no log notes were presented as evidence. If Earth Science, sets

the lowest boundary of sufficiency of record keeping for a site inspection, then the actions of

Defendant in this case falls short of the minimum record keeping requirements. Further, actions

by Defendant after the disqualification notice; inspecting the property and documenting its

inspection, continuing to seek information from Plaintiff about farm use and income for the

property were done too late to disqualify the property for the 2016-17 tax year. OAR 150-308-

1110(2).

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 14 III. CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of the facts in this case, the court finds that Defendant failed

to comply with the requirements of OAR 150-308-1110 prior to disqualifying the subject

property from non-EFU special assessment. Defendant’s disqualification of the subject property

from non-EFU special assessment for the 2016-17 tax year is therefore invalid. Now, therefore,

IT IS THE DECISION OF THIS COURT that Plaintiff’s appeal is granted.

Dated this day of January, 2018.

RICHARD DAVIS MAGISTRATE

If you want to appeal this Final Decision, file a complaint in the Regular Division of the Oregon Tax Court, by mailing to: 1163 State Street, Salem, OR 97301-2563; or by hand delivery to: Fourth Floor, 1241 State Street, Salem, OR.

Your complaint must be submitted within 60 days after the date of the Final Decision or this Final Decision cannot be changed. TCR-MD 19 B.

This document was signed by Magistrate Richard Davis and entered on January 23, 2018.

FINAL DECISION TC-MD 160344R 15