PHILLIPS v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedMarch 9, 2022
Docket2:22-cv-00400
StatusUnknown

This text of PHILLIPS v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH (PHILLIPS v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
PHILLIPS v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, (W.D. Pa. 2022).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

JOSEPH D.S. PHILLIPS, JR., ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) ) CITY OF PITTSBURGH, ) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING ) Civil Action No. 22-400 AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, ) COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, ) and RICHARD JAMES, City of Pittsburgh ) Police Officer, ) ) Defendants. )

MEMORANDUM ORDER Presently before the Court is pro se Plaintiff Joseph D.S. Phillips Jr.’s Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis filed on March 4, 2022, (Docket No. 1), along with a proposed Complaint, which was lodged pending disposition of the IFP Motion.1 (Docket No. 1-1). After reviewing Plaintiff’s IFP Motion, the Court finds that he is without sufficient funds to pay the required filing fee. Thus, Plaintiff will be granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Turning to Plaintiff’s Complaint, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) gives the Court the authority to screen and dismiss a complaint if it is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i)-(iii); Brown v. Sage, 941 F.3d 655, 659 (3d Cir. 2019). In analyzing whether a complaint fails to state a claim a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), the Court

1 Plaintiff contemporaneously filed with the IFP Motion the following: Motion for Modifications to Rules; Motion for Midland Credit Management to be Added; Motion for Asylum; Motion for Return of Property; and Motion for Reparations. (Docket Nos. 3-7). applies the same standard governing motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Heffley v. Steele, 826 F. App’x 227, 230 (3d Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). To that end, to survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the well-pleaded factual content in the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable

inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged,” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and also “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). When analyzing a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations should be separated from allegations that merely recite the legal elements of the claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, but legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 210-11. Next, a determination is made as to “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.’ ” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This “plausibility” determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.

Given that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court liberally construes his Complaint and employs less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). However, there are limits to the Court’s procedural flexibility - “pro se litigants still must allege sufficient facts in their complaints to support a claim . . . they cannot flout procedural rules - they must abide by the same rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. Crown Bay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 245 (3d Cir. 2013) (citations omitted).

Plaintiff’s Complaint, which is filed on the form document entitled “Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Non-Prisoner),” is extremely difficult to decipher. (See Docket No. 1- 1). The “Jurisdiction” page lists a number of federal statutory provisions, including 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Id. at 4). Plaintiff identifies 18 U.S.C. § 10912 as the federal statutory right which he claims has been violated by state or local officials relative to his purported § 1983 claim. (Id. at 6). In the “Statement of Claim” section of the Complaint, Plaintiff describes the events giving rise to his claim as “domestic terrorism,” which occurred at a location in Homestead, Pennsylvania

when the United States Supreme Court supposedly was going to hear a case involving Pittsburgh Police Officer Richard James’ murder of Stepahon D. Smith in violation of the Fair Housing Act. (Id. at 7). Plaintiff additionally alleges that he took an oath in the United States Army to defend the Constitution against all enemies, yet the Army put him in prison, gave him opioids and made him a drug addict, but the Army has refused to provide him with treatment. (Id. at 7-8). He seeks damages in the amount of $23,000,000,000,000 from the United States Government and $30,000,000 from the City of Pittsburgh. (Id. at 8). He also requests that the Army upgrade his discharge to honorable. (Id.). As the Court interprets Plaintiff’s Complaint, he presumably seeks to advance a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,3 although it remains unclear against whom that claim (or any other claim he may be attempting to allege) is asserted.4 Section 1983 does not create any substantive rights,

but rather provides a remedy for deprivations of rights created by the Constitution or federal law. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). “To state a claim for relief in an

2 On the Civil Cover Sheet accompanying the Complaint, Plaintiff also lists 18 U.S.C. § 1091 as the “civil statute” under which he is filing the action. (See Docket No. 1-16). As discussed herein, § 1091 is not a civil statute, but rather a federal criminal statute.

3 The Court notes, however, that the Civil Cover Sheet specifies “Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations” as the nature of the lawsuit. (See Docket No. 1-16). Nonetheless, Plaintiff’s Complaint itself makes no discernable reference to any plausible RICO claim.

4 Pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a pleading must contain “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although cognizant that Plaintiff is proceeding pro se, the Court nonetheless notes that his Complaint does not come close to complying with this requirement. As noted, Plaintiff’s Complaint is very difficult to interpret. For instance, he lists four defendants but fails to specify in any discernable manner what his claim or claims is as against each of them.

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Related

City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle
471 U.S. 808 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Federal Deposit Insurance v. Meyer
510 U.S. 471 (Supreme Court, 1994)
Blessing v. Freestone
520 U.S. 329 (Supreme Court, 1997)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Donnell Ponton v. AFSCME, AFL-CIO
395 F. App'x 867 (Third Circuit, 2010)
Kelley Mala v. Crown Bay Marina
704 F.3d 239 (Third Circuit, 2013)
Fowler v. UPMC SHADYSIDE
578 F.3d 203 (Third Circuit, 2009)
Brown v. Philip Morris Inc.
250 F.3d 789 (Third Circuit, 2001)
Joseph Brown v. Sage
941 F.3d 655 (Third Circuit, 2019)

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Bluebook (online)
PHILLIPS v. CITY OF PITTSBURGH, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-v-city-of-pittsburgh-pawd-2022.