Phillips v. Aycock

15 S.E. 624, 89 Ga. 725
Supreme Court of Georgia·Decided August 1, 1892·Published·Cited by 2 cases

Opinion

[725] Judgment affirmed.

“ The defendants” dermrrred because: No cause of action is set forth. The petition shows that the plaintiff' is not entitled to any relief against the defendants, or either of them, and it is not in the power of the court to grant any of the prayers; for the plaintiff' having been present when the bond for title was made and declined to allow his name put into it, hut stood by and allo'wed the obligors to execute it as they did, he waived any right or interest he might have had in the purchase of the land and is estopped from setting up the same. The parol contract sought to be set out by the plaintiff contradicts the bond, and he cannot legally set up the agreement he claims to have had as to what his interest was to have been, it being wholly at variance with the written contract made at the time of the purchase; and he wholly fails to show any legal or equitable rights that would authorize the court to set up the parol agreement in contradiction of the written obligation. This demurrer was sustained and the case dismissed on October 3d, 1891.' On October 22d, the motion to reinstate was made on the ground that at the time the case was heard none of the defendants were making any defence, either by demurrer, plea or answer, nor was any attorney authorized to represent any of them, except Phillips. The motion alleges that, during the argument of the demurrer Halsted Smith, of the attorneys for the plaintiff, stated in open court and in the presence of G-. A. H. Harris, Esq., who argued in favor of the demurrer, that no one of the defendants except Phillips was making any defence to the suit, which statement Harris heard and did not dispute or deny', the plaintiff presented to the judge his bill of exceptions to the sustaining of the demurrer, in which it is recited that no one of the defendants^ except Phillips, made any defence by demurrer, plea or answer. The judge directed the bill to be handed to G. A. H. Harris for examination, who now claims that without authority and voluntarily he represented Trimble, but the only notice he pretends to have given of that fact was by using in his demurrer the plural “ defendants.” Plaintiff’s counsel knew this statement, which by its terms included all the defendants, was incorrect, as Camp, one of the defendants, was in court as a witness ■ for the plaintiff and had stated to plaintiff’s counsel that G. A. H. Harris had been to him and solicited employment in the case, which had been refused. Plaintiff’s counsel had understood all the time that no one was defending except Phillips, and so stated in open court and met with no denial. While they did not notice the use of the plural word as applied to the persons defending, yet they relied upon the fact as it existed and as they were authorized to do under the circumstances. Since the bill of exceptions was handed to Harris, he kept it before offering to return to the court, long enough to go to Trimble and solicit employment, and he now claims to represent Trimble by authority. The demurrer was heard and argued upon a mistake of fact which does great injustice' to the plaintiff; wherefore he prays that the case be reinstated so that the new features being developed by the action of Harris, may be met in a legal manner. ¡) Phillips demurred .to this motion on the ground that it set forth no sufficient legal cause for reinstating the case. The court overruled the demurrer, and Phillips excepted. The assignments of error upon the order of reinstatement are, that the court erred in entertaining the motion for the reason that some of the'defendants were represented by counsel without authority. It is insisted that a plaintiff cannot complain of the unauthorized representation of a defendant, but the party improperly represented can alone complain, and that no party can complain unless he alleges error in the judgment. Further, that it was error to reinstate the cáse on the facts as they appeared in evidence; that Phillips being the real party, and the codefendants being only nominal parties and his privies in estate, he had the right to have them represented; that the demurrer itself was for all the defendants, and the ignorance of only one of the plaintiff’s many, counsel would be no excuse or valid reason for setting aside the judgment ón the demurrer; that that judgment was correct and the only proper judgment under the law and facts, and the motion to reinstate makes no attack on it, and that one of the defendants alleged to have been represented without his authority knew he was being represented, was present at the trial and made no objection; and the other, after being fully advised, made a written ratification of all that had been done for him.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Phillips v. Aycock, 15 S.E. 624, 89 Ga. 725 (Ga. 1892).

15 S.E. 624 (Phillips v. Aycock) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Lawson v. Haygood
43 S.E.2d 649 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1947)
Deen v. Baxley State Bank
15 S.E.2d 194 (Supreme Court of Georgia, 1941)