Phillips Petroleum Company v. W. H. Ham

228 F.2d 217
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
DecidedJanuary 24, 1956
Docket15495_1
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 228 F.2d 217 (Phillips Petroleum Company v. W. H. Ham) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Phillips Petroleum Company v. W. H. Ham, 228 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1956).

Opinion

HUTCHESON, Chief Judge.

Brought by Phillips Petroleum Company, hereinafter called “Phillips”, the assignee of the lessee in two oil and gas leases dated February 28, 1944, one, executed under the Relinquishment Act 1 of the State of Texas, embracing the NW/4, the other the S/2 of Section 122 in Block 44, H. & T. C. Ry. Survey in Hartley County, Texas, the suit was for an injunction to prevent lessor from taking gas in kind from the Inez well the lessee had drilled on the S/2 of the Section, and for damages for the gas already taken therefrom.

The claim was that he had been doing and was threatening to do this in contravention of the Relinquishment Act, which gave him no title to the minerals but only an interest in the proceeds 2 *218 realized therefrom, and of the commun-itization agreement 3 executed July 24, 1949, by him and his wife, as lessor, and Phillips Petroleum Company, as lessee and operator, by which the two leases were pooled into one consolidated leasehold estate, the gas produced therefrom to be “treated as an entirety and the proceeds thereof paid to the owner of each tract”, according to the royalty fixed in each lease and in the proportion that its acreage bears to the entire acreage in the pool. (Emphasis supplied.)

The defendant moved to dismiss, for want of jurisdiction, for lack of indispensable parties, and for the failure of the petition to state a claim, but filed no answer. The court, taking the matter up on the motions, received evidence on the motion to dismiss for want of a claim, and, the hearing over, denied the motions to dismiss for want of jurisdiction and of indispensable parties.

Declaring, however, that under the terms 4 of the lease of the NW%, the defendant was “entitled to a Vie part in *219 kind of the gas production referable under the eommunitization agreement to the NW/é of Sec. 122, or to a total of V;i of the gas produced from said section under leases now existing, but the court decides nothing about the additional royalty interest of defendant in the gas produced from Sec. 122 in question”, the court, sustaining the motion to dismiss for failure of plaintiff’s complaint to state a claim for injunction, and “reserving action on the claim for an accounting or money damages”, dismissed on the merits the suit for injunction.

Appealing from that judgment, plaintiff is here insisting that the provisions in clause 2 of the lease to the NW^4, “to deliver to the credit of the lessor as the owner of the soil, free of cost, in the tanks or pipe lines to which wells may be connected, an additional equal Vie part of all oil and gas produced and saved from said leased premises or, at the option of the lessor, Vie of the value of all oil and gas produced and saved from the premises”, on which the district judge relied for his finding and order, does not support it.

In support of this contention, it puts forward two grounds. The first is that the provision for delivery in kind, in recognizing Ham, the agent of the state for the making of the lease, as owner of a part of the gas, was contrary to the Relinquishment Act of the State of Texas, under the authority of which it was executed, and the provision was, therefore, invalid and unenforceable ab initio. 5 6 The second is that if originally valid, this provision has been superseded and displaced by the July 21, 1949 agreement, note three swpra, communitizing lessor’s and lessee’s gas and gas rights, which, on its face and as interpreted by the parties acting thereunder, represented the abandonment by the defendant of the provision for taking gas in kind, and the irrevocable exercise by him of the option provided in the lease to the NW/4 to receive in lieu thereof, “Vie of the value of all oil and gas produced and saved from said leased premises”.

The appellee, opposing these contentions, urges upon us: that the provision in the lease of the NW/4, under which he was accorded the right to take his royalty in kind, is plain, clear and unambiguous, and must be given effect unless the appellant has shown, either that the provision is in violation of law or, if valid, has, as claimed by it, been superseded; and that appellant has entirely failed to show that either is the case.

We find ourselves in agreement with appellee’s first position: that the provision in the lease to the NW/4 for delivery to Ham, as owner of the said Vie part of all oil and gas produced from said leased premises, in kind is clear on its face; that whatever has been said in the decision cited in note 2 supra, or may hereafter be said, as to the rationale of the act and the reconciliation of its provisions with other provisions of Texas law, the provision is not illegal in the sense of being forbidden; that the evidence showing that the lease was approved by the General Land Office and agreed to by the lessee, appellant, as his assignee, would be bound by and could not challenge the provision as illegal; and that, if a well had been drilled thereon, with production had, appellee would, but for the eommunitization agreement, have been entitled to receive said royalty in kind.

Since, however, under the facts e pleaded and testified to, no well was *220 drilled on said lease and no gas was “produced and saved from said premises”, but, on the contrary, the well from which the gas in dispute comes was drilled on, the production was from, another lease, and Ham shares, and has for years, shared, in the proceeds thereof, because and only because of the execution by him of the communitization agreement, we are of the clear opinion that it has superseded and taken the place of the royalty provision for payment in kind invoked by Ham, and that that provision is wholly without application here. Indeed, we think it clear that in executing the pooling agreement and, as he has been doing for many years, taking his share of the proceeds thereunder, the appellee must necessarily have intended to, and in law and in fact did, abandon the provision for taking in kind as no longer in force, to exercise the option reserved to him in the lease to the NW/4 to receive in lieu of gas in kind the “Vie, of the value of all oil and gas produced and saved from the premises”.

Having taken this position and having, by pooling the leases into one, obtained the benefits thereof, we think he cannot some four years later make a claim to receive in kind a ratable proportion of the gas, a claim which conflicts with his agreement to receive proceeds 7 and thus defeats the purpose and effect of the com-munitization agreement, which was to unitize the pool and operate the leases as though they were one, with each lessor taking the ratable part thereof to which the royalty agreed upon in his lease entitles him.

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228 F.2d 217, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillips-petroleum-company-v-w-h-ham-ca5-1956.