Phillip Rawnsley v. USA
This text of 2016 DNH 198 (Phillip Rawnsley v. USA) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
Phillip Rawnsley
v. Case No. 16-cv-190-SM Opinion No. 2016 DNH 198 United States of America
O R D E R
Petitioner seeks habeas relief under the provisions of
28 U.S.C. § 2255, relying upon the United States Supreme Court's
decision in Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015),
made retroactive to cases on collateral review by Welch v.
United States, 136 S. Ct. 1257, 1268 (2016). Petitioner says
those cases afford him an opportunity to challenge his otherwise
final convictions based upon a newly recognized right, and
triggered a new one-year limitations period from the date on
which the new right was initially recognized. The court
disagrees.
In 2010, Petitioner pled guilty to and was convicted of six
counts of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951,
and one count of brandishing or using a firearm in connection
with a crime of violence (one of the Hobbs Act robberies), in
1 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He seeks to vacate his
§ 924(c) conviction.
Ordinarily, petitioner's efforts to collaterally challenge
his convictions would be time barred. But, in Johnson the
Supreme Court did indeed initially recognize a new right,
thereby triggering a one-year period during which affected
prisoners might seek habeas relief based upon that newly
recognized right. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3); Dodd v. United
States, 545 U.S. 353, 358-59 (2005). Johnson held the residual
clause of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA) invalid under the
Due Process Clause, on grounds that it was unconstitutionally
vague in describing qualifying predicate crimes of violence that
would support enhanced sentencing. Importantly, however,
petitioner was not sentenced under the ACCA. But, says
petitioner, § 924(c) includes a materially indistinguishable
residual clause, so Johnson's new rule applies equally to it.
Consequently, he argues, his petition is timely.
Petitioner's motion for § 2255 relief is premature. As
this court (Barbadoro, J.) explained in Kucinski v. United
States, Civil No. 16-cv-201-PB, (document no. 16), order dated
September 15, 2016, "a substantial number of capable jurists
have reasonably determined after careful analysis that Johnson
2 does not require invalidation of § 924(c)'s residual clause."
(Citations omitted.) Given that circumstance, it is plain that
Johnson does not sufficiently dictate the conclusion that
§ 924(c)'s residual clause is void for vagueness, and so, with
respect to that issue, does not afford petitioner an exception
to the otherwise applicable statute of limitation that bars his
claim. That is, petitioner's motion for relief is too early —
he must await a decision by the Supreme Court invalidating the
residual clause of § 924(c) (and making that holding retroactive
to cases on collateral review) before § 2255(f)(3) will afford
him an opportunity to file a timely petition for habeas relief
on that ground.
Since petitioner's habeas claims necessarily depend upon
Johnson's affording him an opportunity to file a timely
petition, and it does not, the court only addresses that claim.
Conclusion
Johnson announced a new retroactive rule invalidating the
ACCA's residual clause, but that rule does not dictate the
conclusion that § 924(c)'s residual clause is also invalid as
unconstitutionally vague. Consequently, the petition is not
timely under the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), or
otherwise.
3 As in Kucinski, the court concludes that because reasonable
jurists could find debatable whether Johnson v. United States,
135 S. Ct. 2251 (2015), recognized a new right that applies
retroactively to cases on collateral review that extends to
petitioner's conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), such that the
petition would be timely under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3), I grant
petitioner a certificate of appealability with respect to that
issue. See Rule 11, Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
____________________________ Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge
October 28, 2016
cc: Bjorn R. Lange, Esq. Seth R. Aframe, AUSA
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2016 DNH 198, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/phillip-rawnsley-v-usa-nhd-2016.