Phillip G. Scott v. the State of Texas
This text of Phillip G. Scott v. the State of Texas (Phillip G. Scott v. the State of Texas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-24-00165-CR
Phillip G. Scott, Appellant
v.
The State of Texas, Appellee
FROM THE 207TH DISTRICT COURT OF COMAL COUNTY NO. CR2023-382, THE HONORABLE STEPHANIE BASCON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Phillip G. Scott has been charged by indictment with the offense of
taking a prohibited substance into a correctional facility. See Tex. Penal Code §38.11(b).
Appellant seeks to bring an interlocutory appeal challenging the trial court’s incompetency
Order. See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc. art. 46B.005. Additionally, Appellant has filed a
“Supplement Appeal,” in which he seeks to also appeal the trial court’s decision to appoint him
trial counsel in a different criminal case than the one that is the subject of this appeal. The record
does not include any certification by the trial court that appellant has a right to appeal either the
incompetency order or the determination to appoint counsel in the separate criminal case. See
Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2) (requiring trial court to enter certification of defendant’s right of
appeal each time it enters judgment of guilt or other appealable order); id. R. 25.2(d) (requiring
dismissal of criminal appeal in absence of certification). Further, neither challenged action by the trial court is a “judgment or other
appealable order.” Id. R. 25.2(a)(2) (authorizing appeals in criminal cases only when trial court
enters judgment or other appealable order). Article 46B.005 incompetency Orders are
specifically not subject to interlocutory appeal pursuant to statute. See Tex. Code of Crim. Proc.
art. 46B.011. No statute authorizes an interlocutory appeal of a defendant’s request for
self-representation. See Bayless v. State, 91 S.W.3d 801, 805 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002)
(explaining that “a defendant’s right of appeal is a statutorily created right”); cf. Blankenship
v. State, 673 S.W.2d 578, 583–84 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (addressing denial of right to
self-representation in appeal from final judgment). Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal for want
of jurisdiction. See Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(a)(2), (d).
__________________________________________ Darlene Byrne, Chief Justice
Before Chief Justice Byrne, Justices Smith and Theofanis
Dismissed for Want of Jurisdiction
Filed: May 7, 2024
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