Philippi v. City of Sublimity

650 P.2d 1038, 59 Or. App. 295, 1982 Ore. App. LEXIS 3209
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedSeptember 15, 1982
DocketLUBA 81-078, CA A23238
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 650 P.2d 1038 (Philippi v. City of Sublimity) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philippi v. City of Sublimity, 650 P.2d 1038, 59 Or. App. 295, 1982 Ore. App. LEXIS 3209 (Or. Ct. App. 1982).

Opinion

*297 WARREN, J.

Petitioners seek judicial review of a final order of the Land Use Board of Appeals (LUBA) remanding their subdivision request to the City of Sublimity for further findings. Petitioners assign as error the failure of LUBA to rule that a subdivision permit for a parcel of land, designated in the acknowledged comprehensive plan as residential and zoned as single family residence (SFR), may not be denied on the sole basis of a policy in the comprehensive plan favoring retention of agricultural land.

Petitioners own a ten-acre parcel located within the acknowledged urban growth boundary (UGB) of the City of Sublimity. Their request for approval of a subdivision creating 34 lots was denied by Sublimity through the application of several statements scattered throughout the comprehensive plan. The policies expressed therein are of general applicability and fall into four main categories, although there is some overlap: (1) retention of agricultural land, 1 (2) retention of open space, 2 (3) discouragement of leap-frog development 3 and (4) lessening of the burden on *298 public facilities such as schools, existing traffic corridors and sewage systems. 4 These policies are not explicity identified in the comprehensive plan as criteria for accomplishing conversion of “urbanizable” land to urban uses, pursuant to statewide planning Goal 14, 5 notwithstanding the plan’s acknowledgment by LCDC. In fact, there is nothing in the plan designating any land as “urbanizable.” Neither is there any unzoned land within the UGB.

On petitioners’ appeal, in response to the first of two contentions, LUBA ruled that Sublimity’s findings failed to explain why the facts as found resulted in a conclusion that several policies had not been met by the proposed subdivision. For example, the city had concluded that one of the access streets would not be safe unless it were widened and maintained, because of the hilly terrain, and that that was not presently planned. LUBA also questioned the conclusion that traffic safety would be a problem, given a city report that traffic on the street was below maximum levels, petitioners’ testimony that the sight distance for stopping was adequate and petitioners’ proposal *299 to widen the street in front of their property and install curbs. On a number of points, therefore, LUBA remanded the case to Sublimity for further findings. Petitioners do not quarrel with that remand. See Wes Linn Land Co. v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 36 Or App 39, 583 P2d 1159 (1979).

In response to petitioners’ second contention, LUBA did not, as requested, rule that the plan designation of residential and the zoning designation of SFR precluded Sublimity from denying the subdivision application on the ground that it was agricultural land. LUBA did not directly respond to this contention. LUBA ruled instead that it was permissible to preserve agricultural land located within the UGB and zoned residential until development could be justified under other general policies contained in the comprehensive plan. Implicit in LUBA’s opinion, however, is the notion that the city was entitled to postpone development on land located within the UGB, designated in the comprehensive plan as residential and zoned by ordinance for residential use, on the basis of any general policy, specifically that favoring retention of agricultural land. It is the latter concept that petitioners challenge in their appeal before us.

Land within an acknowledged UGB is either urbanizable or urban; by definition, there is no rural land within the boundary. Willamette University v. LCDC, 45 Or App 355, 368-69, 608 P2d 1178 (1980). Goal 3 provides, in relevant part:

“Conversion of rural agricultural land to urbanizable land shall be based upon consideration of the following factors: (1) environmental, energy, social and economic consequences: (2) demonstrated need consistent with LCDC goals; (3) unavailability of an alternative suitable location for the requested use; (4) compatibility of the proposed use with related agricultural land; and (5) the retention of Class I, II, III and IV soils in farm use. A governing body proposing to convert rural agricultural land to urbanizable land shall follow the procedures and requirements set forth in the Land Use Planning goal (Goal 2) for goal exceptions.”

An exception to Goal 3 was necessarily made when this land was converted from rural to urbanizable by its inclusion within the UGB as specifically residential land. *300 Moreover, the preface to the comprehensive plan explains that Goal 3 is not addressed in the plan because “[t]here will be no agricultural * * * lands preserved within the Urban Growth Boundary.” It would be anomalous for a local government to rely on a policy favoring the retention of agricultural land qua agricultural land as a basis for precluding development within the UGB of land designated and zoned for residential use.

We have said that general policies in the comprehensive plan that speak to overall community planning are more appropriately applied in the planning and zoning process than in the design of any one specific project. Mclntyre-Cooper Co. v. Bd. of Comm., 55 Or App 78, 84-85, 637 P2d 201 (1981), rev den 292 Or 589 (1982). We have also held that, under ORS 92.044 and 92.090, subdivisions must comply with general policies contained in the comprehensive plan, as long as specific requirements are made known to the applicants at least by the time of the tentative plat approval. Commonwealth Properties v. Wash Co., 35 Or App 387, 393, 400, 582 P2d 1384 (1978). In Commonwealth, however, the general policies discussed in the opinion, such as retaining distinctive natural features of a site, or preserving existing vegetation as part of the development, were compatible with the existing plan designation and zoning.

Sublimity argues, and LUBA concluded, that a city subdivision ordinance provision 6 permits the city to deny a request for subdivision approval if the proposed subdivision is not in accordance with the “provisions and intent” of the comprehensive plan; that is, any general statement in the comprehensive plan can be used as a basis to deny the *301 request. We disagree with the broad rule urged by Sublimity and adopted by LUBA. That interpretation would give Sublimity carte blanche to preclude the very uses for which the land is designated in the comprehensive plan and for which it has been zoned, on the basis of any phrase plucked from the entire text of the comprehensive plan.

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Related

Liles v. City of Gresham
672 P.2d 1229 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1983)
Philippi v. City of Sublimity
662 P.2d 325 (Oregon Supreme Court, 1983)

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Bluebook (online)
650 P.2d 1038, 59 Or. App. 295, 1982 Ore. App. LEXIS 3209, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philippi-v-city-of-sublimity-orctapp-1982.