Philadelphia Rubber Works Co. v. United States Rubber Reclaiming Works

225 F. 789, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1309
CourtDistrict Court, W.D. New York
DecidedJune 29, 1915
StatusPublished
Cited by9 cases

This text of 225 F. 789 (Philadelphia Rubber Works Co. v. United States Rubber Reclaiming Works) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philadelphia Rubber Works Co. v. United States Rubber Reclaiming Works, 225 F. 789, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1309 (W.D.N.Y. 1915).

Opinion

HAZED, District judge.

Bill for injunction and accounting, alleging infringement of patent No. 635,141, dated October 17, 1899, to Arthur H. Marks, complainant’s assignor, for a process for reclaiming rubber from vulcanized rubber waste. The patent plainly states as an essential of the process a dilute alkaline solution, preferably a 3 per cent, solution of caustic soda, sufficient to completely submerge the finely ground rubber in a sealed vessel, which, when subjected to- great heat, say “from 344° to 370° Fahrenheit, more or less,” for 20 hours, more or less, will devulcanize vulcanized rubber waste and remove therefrom any fibrous substance. The object of the invention was to reclaim rubber in vulcanized rubber waste for re-use, by imparting to it the substantial characteristics of fresh or new rubber. The single claim of the patent reads as follows:

“The described process for devnlcanizing rubber waste, which consists in submerging the finely ground rubber waste in a dilute alkaline solution in a sealed vessel, in heating the contents of the vessel to- a temperature of 344° Fahrenheit, more or less, substantially as specified, and in maintaining said temperature for twenty hours, more or less, substantially as specified.”

[1] The principal defenses are noninfringement, anticipation, and insufficiency or indefiniteness of description. A determination of the adequacy of the last-mentioned defense requires an examination of the specification, with a view to ascertaining whether it could be understood by the skilled in the art and the process practiced from such description. Diamond Rubber Co. v. Consolidated Tire Co., 220 U. S. 428, 31 Sup. Ct. 444, 55 L. Ed. 527.

The patentee states therein-that in the best method known to him for carrying out the process the finely ground rubber- waste is put in a sealed vessel, contained in a tightly closed larger vessel, and submerged in an alkaline solution, for example, a 3 per cent, solution of caustic soda, and subjected to great heat, say a temperature of be[791]*791tween 344° and 370° Fahrenheit, more or less, the pressure being maintained for 20 hours, more or less. Any lack of specificness arising from the difference in temperature, and from the use of the terms “submerged,” “finely ground rubber waste,” “dilute alkaline solution,” and “sealed vessel,” is not of such a nature as to mislead the skilled in the art as to the method of practicing the process. It is presumable that the words “finely ground” included waste cut into small pieces, and that the submerging' solution should vary somewhat in strength and temperature according to the character of the waste material treated.

[3] It is difficult to specify with exactness the strength of a solution, or the degree of temperature, or length of time required for obtaining the best results under varying conditions, and therefore the words “more or less,” found in the claim in connection with the degree o f temperature and the length of time required, must be interpreted as meaning approximately or nearly such temperature or length of time, leaving a reasonable margin to the discretion or judgment of the one practicing the process. The law is that the admixing of certain substances or the heating of certain substances to a fixed temperature is a process; and in Tilghman v. Proctor, 102 U. S. 707, 26 L. Ed. 270, it is said that, if the method of doing this or the apparatus in or by which it can be done is fairly obvious, suggesting itself to a person skilled in the particular art, it is enough if the patent specifies the process to be accomplished^ without giving supererogatory directions as to the apparatus or method employed. See, also, Expanded Metal Co. v. Bradford, 214 U. S. 366, 29 Sup. Ct. 652, 56 L. Ed. 1034. It was also contended that the process was inoperative, because the desired temperature could not be obtained within the inner vessel to achieve devulcanization without applying a stirring apparatus, etc.; but I think there is abundant evidence to the contrary.

According to the proofs, crude rubber in its original state is dense, and, though capable of being stretched, it is nevertheless inelastic; the property of elasticity being imparted to it by the well-known Goodyear process, which combines with the rubber, while in a plastic state, a small proportion of sulphur, which vulcanizes or hardens it, so that it is able to retain its form regardless of variations in temperature. It was testified that in practice, only a portion of the sulphur added to the rubber chemically combines with it during vulcanization, the remainder being classed as free sulphur, and that when rubber articles are depreciated by wear or use the rubber contained therein is reclaimed and restored to a plastic state for revulcanization by the process of devulcanization. Devulcanization removes the free sulphur, or a portion thereof, from the vulcanized rubber, and is attended by a distinct depolymerization, or breaking into smaller aggregations the rubber molecules, which consist of hydrogen and carbon in the proportion of C:> Hs, thus rendering the waste rubber plastic.

Defendant’s counsel questioned the practicability of the depolymerizatiou of the waste rubber, contending that the problem was merely theoretical and had originated in the minds of complainant’s expert witnesses; but their testimony on this point is uucontroverted and indicates that durhig vulcanization there is not only a chemical combination of the rubber and sulphur, but that the reaction of the composi[792]*792tion increases the degree of polymerization of the rubber molecules, a phenomenon present when a given substance takes on larger quantities of the same components. That this results from vulcanizing rubber finds support in various publications to which the witness Weber referred, and in the experiments carried on by him with caustic soda as a solvent, for the purpose of proving that the Marks process in question not only removed the free sulphur and fabric, but also broke into smaller aggregations the molecules of rubber. That the term “devulcanization” implies a change in the state of cohesion of the molecules, as distinguished from mere elimination of the free sulphur, is shown in the Beer patent, No. 12,983, of 1855.

There are a number of patents in the record which clearly describe means for devulcanizing rubber articles, such as boots and shoes, in order to reclaim the rubber for re-use, and in all such patents high temperature was applied to the rubber, both water and steam being used. In the Mitchell patent, No. 395,987, a caustic solution was used as a reclaiming agent, but .the caustic solution was washed out before the rubber was subjected to great heat. Had it been allowed to remain in until after the heat was applied, devulcanization within the provisions of complainant’s patent would probably have resulted. The alkaline solution in prior patents for reclaiming waste rubber was simply used to remove the free sulphur or fabric, and not to effect -devulcanization. It was not suggested in the Mitchell patent, to which further reference will hereinafter be made, that old rubber tires or hose could be efficiently devulcanized and the free sulphur and fabric removed therefrom b'y a single step.

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Bluebook (online)
225 F. 789, 1915 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1309, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philadelphia-rubber-works-co-v-united-states-rubber-reclaiming-works-nywd-1915.