Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission

138 A.2d 693, 185 Pa. Super. 588
CourtSuperior Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedFebruary 11, 1958
DocketAppeals, Nos. 170 to 175
StatusPublished

This text of 138 A.2d 693 (Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philadelphia-Pittsburgh Carriers, Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission, 138 A.2d 693, 185 Pa. Super. 588 (Pa. Ct. App. 1958).

Opinion

Opinion by

Hirt, J.,

A partnership operating as Pittsburgh Stores Fast Freight applied to Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission for authority to operate as a freight forwarder for shipment by railroad, motor vehicle, by water or air, between points in the three counties of Philadelphia, Bucks and Northampton, and all points in 13 other counties in Western Pennsylvania including Allegheny County. (All italics throughout this opinion will be ours). The partnership, at the first hearing on September 4, 1952, amended the application by stipulating: “1. Any certificate of public convenience issued in this proceeding shall he limited to the right and privilege of performing service as a freight forwarder as defined in Section 2(11) of the Public Utility Law [as amended, 66 PS §1102]. 2. Any such right and privilege shall not authorize applicants to operate any motor vehicle equipment over public highways in performance of the freight forwarder service to be provided. 3. To provide the actual transportation of shipments moving in freight forwarder service in intrastate commerce between points in Pennsylvania, applicants will utilize only the services of carriers au[591]*591thorized by this Commission.” Twenty-fonr carriers, principally trucking companies, had filed protests to the application and their witnesses were heard at four hearings before the Commission. The testimony of these protestants together with that of the applicant at these hearings comprise 320 pages of the present printed record in this appeal. On July 26, 1954, the Commission by order, dismissed the application “for lack of necessity”. The Pennsylvania Railroad, subsequently, on its petition in support of the application was allowed to intervene and on motion, the Commission reopened the proceeding. On August 11, 1955, the petitioners again amended their application by further limiting its scope thus: “6. The freight forwarder service which applicant proposes to perform is as follows: The transportation of property as a freight forwarder for shipment by railroad or motor vehicle from points in the County of Philadelphia to points in the County of Allegheny.” Further hearings were held on the reopened application in Pittsburgh during the month of August 1955, after notice to all protestants and other parties in interest.

In its final order of April 22, 1957, the Commission, following a review of the testimony, stated: “We find the applicant has met the burden and that the grant of this application is necessary and proper for the service, accommodation and convenience of the public. After consideration of all the evidence, this matter having been duly heard and submitted by the parties and full investigation of the matters and things involved having been had: Therefore, It Is Ordered,: That the order of the Commission of July 26, 1954, refusing the application of A. Kohrman, I. J. Sheer and J. A. Feldmeier, copartners, trading and doing business as Pittsburgh Stores Fast Freight, be rescind[592]*592ed and that the application, as amended, be and is hereby approved, limited to the following right: To operate as a forwarder for the transportation of property (excluding commodities in bulk in tank vehicles) via railroad or motor vehicle from points in the County of Philadelphia to points in the County of Allegheny; . . . [and that the operation, subject to conditions Avith which we are not concerned] is necessary or proper for the service, accommodation or convenience of the public.” Thus, the approved service Avas limited to forwarder service as an adjunct to one-way freight transportation from Philadelphia to points in Allegheny County. These are the appeals of six of the protestants who have intervened in the proceeding and who seek to set aside the order.

In §801 of the Public Utility Law, as established by the basic Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, 66 PS §1301, under the heading “Declaration of policy” it, in part, is said: “It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Legislature to regulate in this act the service of common carriers by motor vehicle and forwarders in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantages of, and foster sound economic conditions in such service, and among such carriers and forwarders in the public interest; to promote safe, adequate, economical, and efficient service by common carriers by motor vehicle and forwarders, and just and reasonable rates therefor Avithout unjust discrimination, and unfair or destructive practices . . .” The statement of policy also recognized the necessity for Commission regulation of the various phases of the “service of common carriers by motor vehicle, forwarders . . .” or other agencies and facilities, because “closely interwoven and interdependent.” By §2(11) of the Public Utility Law, supra, a freight forAvarder is de[593]*593fined thus: “ ‘Forwarder’ means any person or corporation not included in the terms ‘motor carrier’ or ‘broker’, as herein defined, who or which issues receipts or billings for property received by such person or corporation for transportation, forwarding, or consolidating, or for distribution by any medium of transportation or combination of media of transportation, other than solely by motor vehicle.”

The evidence before the Commission disclosed numerous points in Philadelphia County from which forwarder traffic for Allegheny County would originate. The potential shipments covered a wide range in the character of the commodities and in their weight, varying from 20 to as much as 5000 pounds. The applicant undertook to handle any commodity coming within the original classification on file with the Commission. Although a forwarder has the status of a common carrier (§801 of the Act of May 28, 1937, P. L. 1053, 66 PS §1301) and in the proposed service the applicant assumed the responsibility for the transportation of freight from point of origin to destination, yet it was contemplated that freight would be transported not by this applicant but in every instance by certified common carriers operating under authority of the Commission. Applicant undertook to receive, assemble, and consolidate shipments of freight for Allegheny County at its concentration point located in the Shackamason Station of The Pennsylvania Bail-road Company in Philadelphia County; the proposed service to the public normally would start at this concentration point. On request of a shipper the applicant as forwarder would arrange for pick-up by a local certified carrier but only for shipments originating within the County of Philadelphia. Freight brought to its concentration center however, by shippers from [594]*594adjacent counties would be accepted by applicant and would be handled as forwarder on bills of lading originating at Philadelphia. The function of a forwarder is to consolidate pieces of freight of individual shippers into carload or truck-load lots which he offers to a railroad or a motor carrier for movement to the destination area. In this proceeding the applicant undertook to perform that service and, on arrival of the consolidated shipments at its Pittsburgh terminal, to break the bulk and to distribute the freight and make deliveries to the several consignees by means of the services of local certified motor carriers. No authority was sought to operate equipment in the applicant’s name, but as forwarder the applicant would be responsible for the safe transportation of the property moving in its service from point of receipt to point of delivery. Thus a common carrier liability would be assumed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

FURST v. PA. PUC
134 A.2d 435 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1957)
Zurcher v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
98 A.2d 218 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1953)
Hall's Motor Transit Co. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
27 A.2d 428 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1942)
Moderm Trans. Co. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Com.
12 A.2d 458 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1939)
Kulp v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
33 A.2d 724 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1943)
Ruettger v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
64 A.2d 675 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1948)
Garner v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
110 A.2d 907 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1955)
Noerr Motor Freight Inc. v. Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission
124 A.2d 393 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1956)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
138 A.2d 693, 185 Pa. Super. 588, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philadelphia-pittsburgh-carriers-inc-v-pennsylvania-public-utility-pasuperct-1958.