Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Hardesty

75 P. 1115, 68 Kan. 683, 1904 Kan. LEXIS 162
CourtSupreme Court of Kansas
DecidedMarch 12, 1904
DocketNo. 13,512
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 75 P. 1115 (Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Hardesty) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Kansas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Philadelphia Mortgage & Trust Co. v. Hardesty, 75 P. 1115, 68 Kan. 683, 1904 Kan. LEXIS 162 (kan 1904).

Opinion

The opinion of the court was delivered by

Mason, J. :

In September, 1901, the Philadelphia Mortgage and Trust Company, a corporation, was the owner of a half-section of land in Harper county, which had been leased to J. P. Hardesty for the year expiring March 1, 1902, for the sum of fifty dollars, due October 1, 1901, for which Hardesty had given his note. J. W. Clendenin and R. H. Lockwood, of Wichita, composing a firm known as J. W. Clendenin & Co., were agents of the Philadelphia company [684]*684with respect to this and other lands, but had no authority to effect a contract of sale, except upon terms to be submitted to and approved by their principal. On September 3, 1901, Hardesty wrote a letter to Clendenin & Co., relative to a purchase of this half-section, and thus began a correspondence on the subject, which continued until October 9, and which he claims resulted in a valid contract for such purchase. The Philadelphia company denied that a contract had been made, and refused to convey the land, whereupon Hardesty sued it and Clendenin & Co. for damages for such refusal, and recovered a judgment against the corporation, which it is the purpose of this proceeding .to review.

The case was sent to the jury upon two principal issues of fact: First, whether Clendenin & Co. had made an agreement with plaintiff for the sale of the land ; and second, if so, whether they had authority to bind the corporation to such agreement. The jury found specially that the agents sold the property to plaintiff without reserving the rent; that they had no authority to make such a sale, but that the corporation had ratified it. There was no evidence of ratification, and therefore these findings would, of themselves, require a reversal if these issues were properly submitted to the jury. But there was no conflict of testimony upon these matters and all substantial evidence affecting them was in writing. Whether the various letters and telegrams established the agency and the contract was purely a question of law. Whatever authority the agents had was derived from a letter written to them by the corporation on September 16, giving a statement of terms on which a sale might be made, concluding with the words, “It is understood that this year’s rents will come to [685]*685us.” The owner of the land, having leased it until the following March, was obviously not in a position to make a contract for immediate sale, without reservation. It was necessary that the matter of possession and rent should be adjusted between buyer, seller, and tenant. The owner did not know that the proposed buyer was the tenant. In view of this situation, it must be held that the words just quoted from its letter constituted, in effect, an instruction to its agents that the sale must be made, if at all, subject to the lease. At any rate, they so limited the other terms of the letter that no authority was granted to make the kind of sale the jury found was made; that is to- say, a sale without a reservation of the season’s rent. The judgment must on this account be reversed, unless it can be said that this finding was immaterial because outside the issues ; that the agents did make with plaintiff such a contract as was within their authority ; that the plaintiff was ready and willing to carry it out, and that the defendant refused to do so.

The correspondence between Hardesty and Clen-denin & Co., regarding the proposed sale, included at least ten letters and telegrams on each side. Various matters of difference arose ; various conditions were sought to be imposed and afterward withdrawn, while in the meantime other questions had arisen. Intelligently to present the question whether at any time the minds of the parties met upon all substantial matters and thus completed a contract, it is necessary to review these writings in some detail.

The negotiation was begun by Hardesty writing to Clendenin & Co., asking the price of the land. They replied, saying that the price was $1200, to be paid half in cash and half on time, at six per cent, interest. [686]*686Hardesty then made an offer of $1100, $600 down and $500 on time. This offer the agents submitted to the owner, who, in the letter already referred to, authorized a sale (subject to the rent, as before noted) at $1200, half in cash and.half by mortgage. This offer was reported to Hardesty by Clendenin & Co., who, however, stated that the rate of interest required was seven per cent, instead of six, the rate mentioned in their correspondence with their principal. Hardesty replied September 20, with a telegram: “Will take land at twelve hundred, six hundred cash six on time, six per cent, interest, as agreed in your letter. Answer at once.” At this stage of the proceedings, it is clear that there was no contract. But Clendenin & Co. immediately sent the following telegram to Hardesty : “Will sell you the land as per telegram 20th instant.” At this point, therefore — that is, upon the sending of the latter telegram — it may be said that there was a definite proposal and acceptance, constituting a completed contract.

The matter of this lease and rent not having been mentioned, the agents may be said to have agreed that a warranty deed should be delivered at once. This would leave the grantor liable to the grantee for the fair value of the use of the land from the time of sale to the ensuing March — in effect accomplishing a division of the season’s rent between the buyer and seller, an arrangement presumably equitable but one not authorized by the agent’s instructions. Had Hardesty at this point offered to carry out the contract according to its very terms, he doubtless would have had a right to insist upon its performance, so far as the agents were concerned.; but this contract, nothing yet having been stated to the contrary, contemplated the payment of the purchase-price at the home of the [687]*687vendor or that of its representatives. (Greenawalt v. Este, 40 Kan. 418, 10 Pac. 803.) It was incumbent upon the purchaser, in order to avail himself of the contract, to comply or offer to comply with that condition. Instead of doing so, on the same day, the 20th, he wrote to Clendenin & Co., enclosing a check for $100 and asking that the deed be made to M. Hardesty (in itself a new condition) and sent to the Bank of Hazelton. These additional requirements authorized the agents of the vendor to consider the matter still open and to impose new conditions on their own part. (Hinish v. Oliver, 66 Kan. 282, 71 Pac. 520 ; Egger v. Nesbitt, 122 Mo. 667, 27 S. W. 385, 43 Am. St. Rep. 596.) On the same day they wrote to Hardesty, insisting upon seven per cent, as the rate of interest, asking to whom the deed should be made, and offering to send the papers to Charles E. Morris, at Anthony. The controversy as to the rate of interest was finally settled by an agreement to pay the full purchase-price in cash. In their letter of the 20th, Clendenin & Co., for the first time, expressed a willingness to make a deed to any one other than Hardesty himself. This letter, therefore, marks the first period in the negotiations when it can be claimed that a contract for a deed to M. Hardesty, the wife of J. P. Plardesty, was under consideration, and to this letter was added: “Of course, you understand that owner expects you to pay the rent agreed on for the land this year, and will have to be paid at the same time that you close up the sale.” This was the first time that Clendenin & Co.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 P. 1115, 68 Kan. 683, 1904 Kan. LEXIS 162, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/philadelphia-mortgage-trust-co-v-hardesty-kan-1904.