P.H. v. G.S.
This text of P.H. v. G.S. (P.H. v. G.S.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Massachusetts Appeals Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
24-P-1078
P.H.
vs.
G.S.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The defendant appeals from the extension of a harassment
prevention order (order) issued against him pursuant to G. L.
c. 258E, § 3, following a hearing after notice. He argues that
the order was extended in error because the evidence was
insufficient to establish three or more acts of harassment, as
required by G. L. c. 258E, § 1.1 We agree and vacate the order.
Discussion. When reviewing a harassment prevention order
issued pursuant to the first prong of the statute, "we consider
whether the judge could find, by a preponderance of the
1The defendant also seeks review of the ex parte order, claiming a conflict of interest on the part of that judge. Given our decision, we need not address this argument. In any event, that order is not reviewable on appeal. See V.M. v. R.B., 94 Mass. App. Ct. 522 (2018). evidence, together with all permissible inferences, that the
defendant committed '[three] or more acts of willful and
malicious conduct aimed at a specific person committed with the
intent to cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage to property
and that [did] in fact cause fear, intimidation, abuse or damage
to property.'" A.T. v. C.R., 88 Mass. App. Ct. 532, 535 (2015),
quoting G. L. c. 258E, § 1. "The plaintiff bears the burden of
proving that each of the three qualifying acts was maliciously
intended, defined by G. L. c. 258E, § 1, as being 'characterized
by cruelty, hostility or revenge,' and that each act was
intended by the defendant to place the plaintiff in 'fear of
physical harm or fear of physical damage to property.'" A.T.,
supra, quoting O'Brien v. Borowski, 461 Mass. 415, 427 (2012).
Here, the judge found three acts of harassment: the first
occurred in the spring of 2022, the second in the spring of
2024, and the third on April 24, 2024. During the spring 2024
incident, the plaintiff, the former head of a private school,
was picking up a prescription from a pharmacy when the
defendant, whose son was dismissed from that school six years
earlier, spotted the plaintiff standing in the aisle. The
defendant then "ran up toward" the plaintiff, and began a "loud,
profane, extended rant" that lasted a couple of minutes, during
which the defendant said, "You ruined my son's life," and,
"You're a horrible person"; twice called the plaintiff "a piece
2 of shit"; and suggested that the plaintiff was catering to
wealthy donors at the school. The plaintiff testified that this
interaction made him feel nervous, and that it caused the
pharmacist to offer to call the police. The defendant left the
store shortly thereafter.
While certainly upsetting, the defendant's conduct on this
occasion did not amount to harassment within the meaning of
G. L. c. 258E, § 1. See Gassman v. Reason, 90 Mass. App. Ct. 1,
8 (2016). Cf. Seney v. Morhy, 467 Mass. 58, 63-64 (2014)
(evidence that defendant "verbally attacked and threatened to
have [the plaintiff] thrown off the team in front of numerous
other parents" and "attacked [the plaintiff's] personal being in
front of every single parent" insufficient to constitute
harassment). Contrast V.J. v. N.J., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 22, 23-28
(2017) (sufficient evidence of three acts where defendant
grabbed plaintiff from behind across her chest in a "bear hug"
as if attempting to "abduct her"; "verbally assault[ed]" her and
threatened her job; and refused to leave until police removed
him). See C.E.R. v. P.C., 91 Mass. App. Ct. 124, 131-132 (2017)
("boorish and no doubt upsetting [conduct] . . . [does] not
constitute 'harassment' within the meaning of c. 258E").
3 In the absence of three acts of harassment,2 the evidence
was insufficient to extend the order. We therefore remand the
case to the Boston Municipal Court for entry of an order
vacating and setting aside the order dated June 21, 2024, and
for further actions required by G. L. c. 258E, § 9. See F.K. v.
S.C., 481 Mass. 325, 335 (2019).
So ordered.
By the Court (Blake, C.J., Ditkoff & Brennan, JJ.3),
Clerk
Entered: June 6, 2025.
2 As we conclude that the spring 2024 incident does not meet the statutory definition of harassment, we need not address the sufficiency of the remaining two acts.
3 The panelists are listed in order of seniority.
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