Peyre v. McGarey

Opinion

Case 2:23-cv-00350-DWL Document 45 Filed 05/30/23 Page 1 of 37

1 WO 2 3 4 5 6 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA 8 9 Charles Olivier Peyre, No. CV-23-00350-PHX-DWL 10 Petitioner, ORDER 11 v. 12 Catharine Bliss McGarey, 13 Respondent. 14 15 INTRODUCTION 16 The parties in this action are Charles Olivier Peyré (“Father”), who is a French

17 citizen, and Catharine Bliss McGarey (“Mother”), who is an American citizen. Father and 18 Mother met each other in 2017 when living in Ireland, then moved to France. While living

19 in France, Father and Mother got married and had twins (“the Children”).

20 On June 30, 2022, Mother flew to the United States with the Children while Father 21 remained in France. Much of the dispute in this case turns on the nature of that trip— 22 Mother contends it was part of an agreed-to plan for her to permanently relocate to the

23 United States with the Children as she and Father were considering whether to divorce,

24 while Father contends it was simply a summer vacation from which Mother and the

25 Children were expected to return. (See generally Doc. 23.)1

26 27 1 The abbreviation “Doc.” refers to where the cited document was filed as part of the docket. The abbreviation “Ex.” refers to the exhibit number during the evidentiary hearing. 28 The abbreviation “Tr.” refers to the page number of the hearing transcript, which appears at Docs. 38-44. Case 2:23-cv-00350-DWL Document 45 Filed 05/30/23 Page 2 of 37

1 In November 2022, Father filed a police report with French authorities accusing 2 Mother of wrongfully removing the Children from France. (Ex. 5, Bates 170-73.) The 3 following month, in December 2022, Father filed formal requests for assistance with the 4 French Ministry of Justice (Ex. 15) and the U.S. Central Authority (Ex. 16, Bates 324). 5 Finally, on February 27, 2023, Father initiated this action by filing a verified petition under 6 the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. § 9001 et seq., 7 which implements the provisions of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of 8 International Child Abduction. (Doc. 1.)2 As relief, Father seeks an order “establishing 9 that the Children shall be returned to France, where an appropriate custody determination 10 can [be] made by a French court under French law.” (Id. at 7.) Mother’s primary defenses 11 are that “Father consented and/or acquiesced to removal or retention of the Children from 12 France to Arizona” and that “the return of the Children would expose them to a grave risk 13 of harm based on Father’s domestic violence against Mother and serious abuse or neglect 14 against the Children.” (Doc. 15 at 5-6.) 15 Over the course of five trial days between May 1-12, 2023, the Court held an 16 evidentiary hearing. As explained below, although this is a close and difficult case, the 17 Court concludes that Father is entitled to relief under ICARA. Thus, Mother will be 18 required to return the Children to France. 19 FINDINGS OF FACT 20 I. Background Details 21 Mother is a citizen of the United States. (Doc. 23 at 1.) Mother was born and raised 22 in Arizona and moved to Ireland in December 2016. (Id.) While living in Ireland, Mother 23 met Father, who is a French citizen. (Id.) Mother and Father later moved to France to live 24 together. (Id.) 25 In July 2019, Mother and Father were married in France. (Id. at 2.) In 2021, the 26 Children were born in France. (Id. at 6, 8.) 27 2 See generally In re ICJ, 13 F.4th 753, 760 (9th Cir. 2021) (“The United States 28 ratified the Hague Convention in 1988, and Congress implemented the Convention through the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (‘ICARA’).”).

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1 Mother and Father jointly owned, along with their parents, a bar in France called 2 the Garage Bar. The Garage Bar is relevant because, as discussed in more detail below, 3 the parties’ plan to relocate to the United States was, at least at times, contingent on the 4 sale of the Garage Bar. 5 On November 30, 2021, Father applied for a visa to work in the United States. (Ex. 6 39.) 7 On May 24, 2022, Mother bought one-way tickets for herself, her sister, and the 8 Children to travel to the United States on June 30, 2022. (Ex. 40.) 9 On June 30, 2022, Mother and the Children took the flight as planned. They have 10 not since returned to France. 11 II. Pre-Departure Statements Concerning The Plan To Move To The United States 12 Ascertaining the nature of Mother’s trip to the United States on June 30, 2022 is 13 complicated because, although the parties repeatedly expressed plans to relocate to the 14 United States, the details of the plan shifted over time. It is therefore helpful to provide a 15 chronological account of the parties’ description of the plan in the months, weeks, and days 16 leading up to Mother’s departure with the Children. 17 In forming this chronology, the Court has largely focused on the plans and intentions 18 that the parties expressed in writing. During the evidentiary hearing, both parties also 19 sought to offer testimony and evidence about various purported oral admissions the other 20 party made. The Court found that testimony and evidence less helpful than the written 21 evidence, due to the lack of corroboration.3 22 23 3 For example, one of Father’s friends wrote in a declaration that Mother admitted to him during a conversation right before the June 30, 2022 flight “that she was home-sick 24 (the USA)” and “never said that she wanted to stay and live in the USA” and “always stated that she was going for the summer break.” (Ex. 21, Bates 354.) Meanwhile, Mother’s 25 father contends that Father admitted to him, during a vacation in London in April 2022, that Father knew Mother would be “moving to Phoenix with the kids” and confirmed that 26 Father “would be OK to remain in France during the time it took to sell the bar . . . . [Father] compared this arrangement to a military family with a dad out on tour.” (Ex. 50, Bates 27 151.) To be clear, the Court does not question to honesty of the witnesses who provided these (and similar) statements. However, it is difficult to make credibility judgments when 28 presented with conflicting, uncorroborated statements by fact witnesses who are, understandably, sympathetic to their friend’s or family member’s legal position.

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1 A. Father’s November 21, 2021 Email 2 With these clarifications in mind, the first relevant statement was made on 3 November 12, 2021, when Father wrote an email to Mother’s parents that included the 4 following passage: “I don’t know if Katie already told you that we are looking forward to 5 settle in Phoenix soon. We are talking about making it happen for June [20]22. You can 6 guess we will have a lot to discuss during that time!” (Ex. 31.) 7 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, this email does not assist 8 either side’s case. Although the projected arrival date of June 2022 might seem, at first 9 blush, to be helpful to Mother’s position (because that is when she ultimately traveled to 10 the United States with the Children), the email does not provide details about the planned 11 move and does not suggest that Mother and the Children would be leaving Father behind 12 in France. Thus, although the email confirms that, as of the fall of 2021, Mother and Father 13 had a general plan to relocate to the United States in June 2022, it sheds little light on what 14 they were thinking (and had agreed to) when Mother actually left on June 30, 2022.4 15 B. January 5, 2022 Counseling Session 16 The next relevant statements occurred on January 5, 2022. For context, during a 17 trip to Arizona over the 2021 holiday season to visit Mother’s family, Mother and Father 18 decided to meet with a couples’ counselor named Michelle Shahbazyan (“Shahbazyan”). 19 During the evidentiary hearing, Shahbazyan testified about the topics that were discussed 20 during that counseling session.5 21 More specifically, Shahbazyan testified that although Mother and Father jointly 22 agreed, during the counseling session, to a plan to eventually relocate to the United States, 23 that plan was contingent on certain developments occurring first, including Father selling 24 4 For similar reasons, the Court assigns little weight to the affidavit of realtor Matt 25 Cerchiai, who contends that, during a house-hunting session in late December 2021, “Katie and Charles told me they would get back in touch with me when they arrived in Arizona in 26 approximately July of 2022, to begin permanently residing in Arizona.” (Ex. 53 ¶¶ 4, 6.) Although both parties intended, as of December 2021, to jointly move to the United States 27 in the summer of 2022, that plan later changed. 5 28 Shahbazyan also attempted to summarize the discussion in a letter, which was generally consistent with her testimony. (Doc. 48.)

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1 an apartment he owned in France6 and Father and Mother selling the Garage Bar, which 2 would only make financial sense after the bar became more profitable. Critically, 3 Shahbazyan made clear that the plan discussed (and jointly agreed to) during the counseling 4 session did not involve Mother and the Children moving to the United States without 5 Father: 6 From my perspective it seemed that they wanted to do everything to keep the four of them in the same space as much as possible. Like it wasn’t like, oh, 7 Katie was just going to come here with the kids and just wait and see until 8 he figured things out. It was very much . . . we want to do this together and how do we figure this out together and let’s keep the kids . . . near both 9 parents as much as possible and go step by step so that that can happen. 10 (Tr. 203-04.) Shahbazyan also testified that it was her impression that the relocation 11 process could take as long as “maybe a year” to complete after Mother and Father returned 12 to France, because that was how long it might take to sell the apartment and the Garage 13 Bar. (Tr. 205.) Finally, Shahbazyan clarified that she did “not have the understanding that 14 [Mother] was just going to show up in the U.S. like regardless at the one year mark or 15 something.” (Tr. 215.) 16 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, Shahbazyan’s testimony 17 was more helpful to Father than to Mother. Shahbazyan’s testimony establishes that, as of 18 January 2022, the parties’ plan was to return to France, sell Father’s apartment, increase 19 the profitability of the Garage Bar, sell the Garage Bar, and then (and only then) relocate 20 to the United States as a family. At that time, there was no suggestion, let alone an 21 agreement, that Mother and the Children would move to the United States without Father, 22 and both sides agreed that it might take a year before all of the necessary steps were 23 completed—a timeframe that, as discussed in more detail below, is consistent with some 24 of the parties’ subsequent statements and conduct. 25 … 26 … 27 28 6 Father eventually sold the apartment in March 2022. (Ex. 35, Bates 15.)

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1 C. Mother’s May 27, 2022 Statement 2 As noted, on May 24, 2022, Mother bought one-way tickets for herself, her sister, 3 and the Children to travel to the United States on June 30, 2022. (Ex. 40.) Three days 4 later, on May 27, 2022, Mother and Father got into a disagreement about that trip. 5 Although this conversation was oral, Mother later recounted the substance of the 6 conversation to the French police following a separate disagreement with Father on June 7 20, 2022. She described the earlier disagreement as follows: “[On] Friday May 27 2022, 8 we had . . . we were at home and I asked him on which date he wanted to come to the USA, 9 to check about our return to France, I can’t travel by myself with the two kids as they’re 10 under two years old . . . . I asked him several times and he wasn’t precise, I felt like he 11 didn’t want to come.” (Ex. 5, Bates 146, emphasis added.) 12 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, this statement is helpful 13 to Father’s position. It shows that, as of May 27, 2022, Mother’s upcoming trip to the 14 United States was not viewed by either party as a permanent move with the Children— 15 instead, it was a visit from which Mother and the Children would be returning. Of course, 16 this statement is not dispositive, because there were an array of subsequent developments, 17 but it helps frame the issues—Mother must establish that something changed after May 27, 18 2022 concerning Father’s understanding of, and consent to, the nature of her June 30, 2022 19 trip. 20 D. Father’s May 27, 2022 Email 21 That same day, Father wrote an email to his parents, Mother’s parents, and Mother 22 entitled “Family life and company.” (Ex. 32.) 23 At the outset of this email, Father apologized for not writing in his “mother tongue,” 24 announced that Mother had asked him for a divorce, and also announced that Mother had 25 made a “threat[]” to “not renew her visa in January [2023] and leave France with the kids. 26 I can understand that she is home sick and want[s] to be close to her family, though it [is] 27 still hard to accept.” (Id.) 28 The remainder of the email provided as follows:

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1 The reason why I cannot follow her in January is that we cannot sell the bar 2 so far like she asked me to. The point is that we received the annual balance sheet and right now the garage bar [is] worth 215 000€ . . . . The plan to get 3 back on our feet will last two more years and we can expect selling the garage for a good and decent price after May [20]24. I can explain to you the details 4 of the plan another time if you want to. 5 By the time that we sell our business, our problems of separation we [sic] 6 still there. After few adult discussions without yelling at each other we have talked about arrangements that could “please” everyone: 7 - she leaves first with the kids and I come as much as I can to visit 8 - buy her parts of the bar so she got [sic] the money she needs to settle 9 correctly in the US 10 - you will be in charge financially for the baby day care and help Katie daily with the kids until I get back a year and a half after she left 11 The other option is that we divorce and it’s the end of the adventure for us 12 and the kids will grow without there [sic] dad. In that case I hope that I will 13 receive[] my visa one day to move near by when possible so I can see [the Children] when the judge will let me see them I guess. 14 I hope that with this mail everybody will fully understand what is happening 15 right now. I wish that we will all find an adult and clever solution that will suit[] everyone. 16 17 (Id.)

18 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, this email it is not the

19 smoking gun that Mother sometimes portrayed it to be. To be sure, the email shows that

20 Father’s understanding of the relocation plan had changed since the January 2022

21 counseling session with Shahbazyan—the plan was no longer that the Garage Bar would

22 be sold in the fall of 2022 and the entire family would move to the United States afterward.

23 Additionally, the email reflects Father’s awareness of some potential scenarios where

24 Mother and the Children would be moving to the United States without him. But such

25 awareness is not the same thing as affirmative consent for Mother to move permanently

26 with the Children to the United States in June 2022, and several features of this email are

27 inconsistent with the notion that Father had consented to such a move.

28 First, the email discusses Father’s “reason why I cannot follow her in January.” This

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1 allusion to January is potentially significant because it is consistent with the position that 2 Father has taken in this litigation (and that is expressed in some of the parties’ other written 3 communications), which is that the June 2022 trip was not a permanent move but simply a 4 summer vacation from which Mother and the Children would be returning, with the 5 possibility of a later, permanent move in or around January 2023. If that was Father’s 6 expectation, he did not consent to a permanent move in June 2022. 7 Second, in the middle portion of the email discussing the possible scenario in which 8 Mother would “leave[] first with the kids,” Father suggested that one component of that 9 scenario would be for him to buy out Mother’s ownership interest in the Garage Bar (“buy 10 her parts of the bar so she got [sic] the money she needs to settle correctly in the US”). 11 However, the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing suggests that no such 12 buyout ever occurred. It is therefore difficult to view the May 27, 2022 email as proof that 13 Father understood Mother’s June 30, 2022 trip to be a permanent relocation and consented 14 to it. 15 Third, the penultimate paragraph of the email—which begins with “The other 16 option”—makes clear that Father was not affirmatively consenting to the scenario in which 17 Mother would move to the United States with the Children with his permission but was 18 simply identifying it as one potential outcome. The “other option” identified in this 19 paragraph was that Mother and Father would divorce, at which point Mother and Children 20 would relocate to the United States. However, the paragraph does not clarify whether, in 21 the divorce scenario, Father would consent to such a relocation or whether he simply 22 believed the French courts would inevitably allow Mother to relocate to the United States 23 with the Children. During the evidentiary hearing, Father credibly explained that this 24 phrasing was not intended to signal his consent to such an outcome and merely reflected 25 his pessimistic belief that a French judge would likely favor the mother in any custody 26 dispute. In any event, under either interpretation, the “other option” described in this 27 paragraph is inconsistent with the notion that Father understood Mother’s June 30, 2022 28 trip to be a permanent relocation and consented to it, as neither party had filed for divorce

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1 at the time of the trip. 2 E. The Parties’ May 27, 2022 Text Exchange 3 At 10:21 am on May 27, 2022, Father sent the following text message to Mother: 4 “I’m calling a lawyer on Monday to start the divorce proceedings.” (Ex. 35, Bates 16.) 5 Mother responded: “What was the whole point of your email saying we have multiple 6 options if you’re just going to text me about a divorce hours later?” (Id.) 7 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, this text exchange helps 8 confirm the interpretation of the May 27, 2022 email set forth in Part II.D above. 9 Specifically, it reflects that even Mother didn’t view the first scenario discussed in the 10 email (i.e., Mother moving with the Children to the United States while Father stays 11 behind) as a course of action to which the parties had agreed. Instead, this was simply one 12 of “multiple options.” Additionally, this text exchange suggests that, after Father sent the 13 email, he decided that he wished to obtain a divorce. This was the other option discussed 14 in the email. 15 F. Madame Carmouse’s May 29, 2022 Letter 16 Another piece of evidence that was the subject of extensive discussion during the 17 evidentiary hearing was an undated letter written by Catherine Carmouse (“Madame 18 Carmouse”), a French attorney. (Ex. 33.) 19 As background, Father’s mother, Annie Claude Peyré (“Annie Claude”), reached 20 out to Madame Carmouse for legal advice after receiving Father’s May 27, 2022 email. 21 Annie Claude testified that she simply forwarded Father’s email to Madame Carmouse, 22 without providing any other information about Father’s situation, and Madame Carmouse 23 responded on May 29, 2022 with the letter. Annie Claude then provided a copy of Madame 24 Carmouse’s letter to Father, which Mother happened to find on May 30, 2022, leading to 25 a disagreement. 26 As for the letter itself, Madame Carmouse provided such advice as “Charles must 27 be careful . . . [and] must not write to Katie any more making or proposing commitments”; 28 “Charles must make a decision. Divorce, or no divorce”; “If Charles decides to divorce he

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1 must do so quickly while the family is in France”; “If she leaves with the children for the 2 USA she will be able to initiate proceedings there and American judges rarely become 3 involved with questions of international competence and the applicable law”; and “even if 4 Charles is very kind, what he does or writes could have consequences for his future life. I 5 recall that not long ago Katie was crying in my colleague’s office because she no longer 6 had a visa . . . and today she is going away with two children in her arms and it is Charles 7 who will pay those consequences.” (Ex. 33.) Additionally, Madame Carmouse advised, 8 with respect to the parties’ ownership interests in the Garage Bar, that “for Charles, it will 9 be better to buy back, without delay, at least Katie’s shares, particularly if the results from 10 the valuation are not very good. To avoid suspicion it is possible to instruct an expert 11 responsible for the valuation of the shares and if they are worth nothing (according to the 12 accounting method) and he wishes even so to contribute something that is his choice, well 13 and good.” (Id.) 14 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, Madame Carmouse’s 15 letter has little evidentiary value. Again, the critical question is whether Father understood 16 Mother’s June 30, 2022 trip to be a permanent relocation and consented to it. The 17 statements in Madame Carmouse’s letter shed little light on that question because she 18 apparently never spoke to Father—instead, she simply reviewed his May 27, 2022 email 19 and then wrote a letter to Annie Claude. 20 At most, Madame Carmouse’s letter imparted notice to Father (after it was 21 forwarded to him) that it was legally risky for him to allow Mother to leave France with 22 the Children before they divorced, because Mother might then be able to initiate custody 23 proceedings in an American court. But being aware that a particular course of action has 24 some risk of an undesired outcome is not the same thing as affirmatively consenting to that 25 undesired outcome.7 26 7 During the evidentiary hearing, Mother credibly testified that her discovery of Madame Carmouse’s letter was very upsetting, in part because she perceived it as an 27 attempt by her mother-in-law to concoct a scheme to cheat her out of the fair value of her ownership interest in the Garage Bar. The Court does not question the sincerity of Mother’s 28 testimony on this point, but that aspect of the letter is distinct from the letter’s bearing on whether Father understood the June 30, 2022 trip to be a permanent move and consented

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1 G. Mother’s May 31, 2022 Text Message 2 On May 31, 2022—one day after discovering Madame Carmouse’s letter and 3 getting into a disagreement with Father about it—Mother wrote a series of text messages 4 to Aubrey Richardson (“Richardson”), a close friend. (Ex. 34, Bates 9.) In relevant part, 5 they provided: “Hey girl. I wanted to let you know that Charles asked for a divorce[.] I’ve 6 been wanting to move home, so homesick and hurting without being close to my family. 7 And Charles said he was good with that plan for a while but things have been really bad 8 between us[.] And he wants to keep the bar, I don’t. So looks like I’ll be moving to Arizona 9 with the babies. He wants to give me custody, with visiting rights. But now I need a lawyer 10 so let me know if you have any contacts[.]” (Id.) Later, Mother added: “I told him I don’t 11 want to renew my titre de séjour (expires January) and that I want to go ahead to Arizona 12 then to set up life and he wraps up the sale of the bar. He then said he wants to stay ‘at 13 least’ two more years here for the bar.” (Id., Bates 10.) 14 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, these text messages are 15 too ambiguous to provide much support for either side’s position. On the one hand, they 16 suggest that Father had agreed that Mother and the Children could move permanently to 17 the United States without him. On the other hand, although the first series of text messages 18 suggested that Mother would be “moving to Arizona with the babies,” they did not give a 19 date for the move and also suggested that Father’s expectation was that lawyers would be 20 involved to formalize Father’s visitation rights. (Id., Bates 9.) This is not consistent with 21 Mother permanently moving to the United States less than a month later in June 2022, 22 before any lawyers were involved. In a related vein, during the second series of text 23 messages, Mother identified January 2023 as the date when her French work authorization 24 would expire and then immediately stated: “I want to go ahead to Arizona then to set up 25 life.” (Id., Bates 10, emphasis added.) This timeframe—which was also mentioned in 26 several of the parties’ other communications bearing on the issue of consent—is consistent 27 with the notion that the June 2022 trip was simply a vacation from which Mother and the 28 to it.

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1 Children would be returning, not a permanent move. 2 H. The Parties’ June 2, 2022 Text Exchange 3 On June 2, 2022, Father texted Mother to ask how the Children were doing. (Ex. 4 35, Bates 16.) In response, Mother reported that the Children were “really emotional” and 5 added: “They are picking up on all of this. This is why I can’t come back after summer 6 vacation. It’s not fair for the kids or myself to live in this misery.” (Id.) Father eventually 7 wrote back: “I am very sad to hear that the children are unhappy and are having a hard time 8 with it. I wish it had gone differently. You know that I love them more than anything and 9 that the only thing that matters to me is that they are happy.” (Id., Bates 17.) 10 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, these text messages are 11 too ambiguous, standing alone, to support either side’s position on the issue of consent. 12 On the one hand, Mother’s statement that “[t]his is why I can’t come back after summer 13 vacation” is evidence that she was considering staying in the United States at the 14 conclusion of the trip (and Father was aware of that possibility). On the other hand, 15 Father’s knowledge that Mother was threatening to remain in the United States is not the 16 same thing as Father’s consent to that course of action. Additionally, Mother’s description 17 of the trip as “summer vacation” supports how Father has consistently described it. 18 Mother’s use of this phrase is also relevant for another, perhaps more important 19 reason. When testifying during the evidentiary hearing, Mother flatly denied ever 20 characterizing the June 30, 2022 trip as a “vacation” and seemed to suggest that Father was 21 making up this description in an attempt to bolster his litigation position: 22 Q. In any of your prior discussion with Charles, had there ever been a return date set for you when you left with the children— 23 A. Never. 24 Q. —on June 30? 25 A. Never. 26 Q. Had there ever been a discussion of this was just a vacation? 27 A. No. 28 (Tr. 544-45, emphasis added.) Similarly, when asked “Did he ever put a return date on it

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1 or say it was only a vacation,” Mother answered: “Not once. Not ever.” (Tr. 566.) The 2 June 2, 2022 text exchange undermines Mother’s testimony on this point because it shows 3 that she did, in fact, sometimes refer to the trip as a vacation. 4 I. Mother’s June 19, 2022 Text Message 5 On June 19, 2022, Mother sent another series of text messages to Richardson. In 6 relevant part, they provided: “Things are really good with Charles. He’s talking about 7 settling the bar after we do a pre bilan [accounting] In October. And Is ok for me to move 8 to Arizona before Xmas so we can be there for the holidays and then the kids start their 9 daycare program January. Everything is calm and good.” (Ex. 34, Bates 12.) 10 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, these text messages are 11 one of Father’s strongest pieces of evidence on the issue of consent. They suggest that 12 Mother and the Children would not be moving permanently to the United States until the 13 very end of 2022, “before Xmas so we can be there for the holidays.” (Id.) This is 14 consistent with the timeframe expressed in many of the other parties’ communications 15 bearing on the issue of consent and is consistent with Father’s position that the June 2022 16 trip was simply a vacation from which Mother and the Children would return. In contrast, 17 it is very difficult to reconcile these text messages with the notion that Mother and the 18 Children were leaving France for good in June 2022, never to return. 19 J. The Parties’ June 20-21, 2022 Statements To The Police 20 On the evening of June 20, 2022, the parties got into a physical altercation that led 21 to a neighbor calling the police. Father was held in jail overnight and eventually charged 22 with a domestic violence offense (of which he was later acquitted). 23 As relevant here, both parties made statements to the police (outside each other’s 24 presence) regarding Mother’s travel plans. Mother stated: “[O]n June 30, 2022 I was 25 supposed to go to the United States for 02 months.” (Ex. 5, Bates 144.) Meanwhile, when 26 asked “How do you envisage your relationship today?”, Father stated: “We will go through 27 divorce proceedings. She will go to the USA and I will stay in France. The children will 28 follow their mother to the USA, I accept it.” (Ex. 37, Bates 90.)

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1 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, these statements are 2 favorable to Father on the issue of consent. Most important, Mother acknowledged that 3 she expected to return to France about two months after the trip on June 30, 2022. This is 4 inconsistent with the notion that the trip was a permanent, one-way move (let alone that 5 Father was aware it would be a permanent, one-way move and consented to it) and 6 consistent with notion that any permanent move would occur later, perhaps around 7 Christmas 2022. Meanwhile, although Father acknowledged the possibility that Mother 8 would eventually move to the United States with the Children, he also stated that “We will 9 go through divorce proceedings.” Although Father may have expressed pessimism about 10 his chances of prevailing on the issue of child custody in that future proceeding, such 11 pessimism is not the same thing as consent for Mother to take the Children to the United 12 States before the future proceeding had even begun. 13 K. Mother’s June 22, 2022 Text Messages 14 On June 22, 2022, Mother sent another series of text messages to Richardson. In 15 relevant part, they provided: “I didn’t want to tell you over text but things are not good 16 again[.] I think we will be leaving France indefinitely June 30[.] I may need you to take 17 some of my antique stuff . . . [u]ntil I can figure out a good way to get them back or you 18 keep them.” (Ex. 34, Bates 13.) 19 That same day, Mother sent a series of text messages to a friend named Val Lodge, 20 to whom she was attempting to sell some of the Children’s furniture. In relevant part, the 21 text messages provided: “I’m actually moving back to the USA which is why I’m selling 22 my things. . . . [I]ts [sic] a little complicated right now with my husband (French) and I’ll 23 be moving back with my kids June 30 and not sure he’ll be joining us.” (Ex. 42, Bates 24 112.) 25 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, these text messages are 26 difficult to reconcile. The messages to Richardson described the upcoming trip as 27 “indefinite[]” in duration. This is not how a person would be expected to describe a 28 permanent move and is consistent with idea that Mother and the Children would be

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1 returning to France on an as-yet-determined future date (perhaps in two months, as Mother 2 had suggested in her statement to the police). 3 The statements to Lodge are not qualified in the same manner. Statements such as 4 “I’m actually moving back to the USA” and “I’ll be moving back with my kids June 30” 5 suggest that Mother viewed the June 30, 2022 trip to be part of a permanent move, not an 6 “indefinite” trip from which they’d be returning. Thus, the messages to Lodge provide 7 support for Mother’s position. 8 With that said, it must be noted that Mother’s statements about her own intent are 9 not necessarily indicative of whether Father was aware of and consented to that intent. 10 There is no evidence that Father saw or was otherwise made aware of the content of 11 Mother’s June 22, 2022 text message to Lodge before he authorized Mother and the 12 Children to leave for the United States on June 30, 2022. Thus, even though the text 13 message to Lodge may, when viewed in isolation, support Mother’s position, it is not 14 dispositive. 15 L. Mother’s June 29, 2022 Text Messages 16 On June 29, 2022, Mother exchanged a series of text messages with Catherine Peyré 17 (“Catherine”), who is Father’s aunt. (Ex. 56, Bates 174.) The exchange began with 18 Catherine saying that she “loved [Mother] very much” and “the whole family . . . regret[s] 19 this decision very much.” (Id.) In response, Mother wrote (among other things) that “It’s 20 not me who decided that it’s not my decision, it’s Charles’. I am very confused, and I do 21 not know what will happen in the future.” (Id.) Catherine replied: “If you haven’t had any 22 feedback, it is because no one knows! You haven’t told anyone, and everyone thinks you 23 are going to go home like you did last summer. I want to trust you to find a solution for 24 you and the children and the Garage.” (Id.) Later, Catherine added: “I don’t understand 25 why Charles would have done that. Everything is so confusing so everything will be OK 26 over time.” (Id.) 27 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, this is another example of 28 a text-message exchange that is somewhat helpful to Mother, but too ambiguous to be

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1 dispositive. Although the statements in this exchange could be viewed as consistent with 2 the idea that Mother’s upcoming trip with the Children was part of a permanent move to 3 the United States to which Father consented, the statements are also susceptible to other 4 interpretations. For example, the reference to “this decision” might be a reference to a 5 permanent relocation to the United States on June 30, 2022, but it might also be a reference 6 to the parties’ decision to divorce, after which Mother would leave the country for good 7 (with the Children likely being allowed to come with her). Similarly, the statement 8 “everyone thinks you are going home like you did last summer” might be a reference to 9 the fact that Father knew this trip was a relocation (and not a summer vacation), which 10 would support Mother’s position on the issue of consent, but might also be a suggestion 11 that everyone in Father’s family, including Father, was unaware of Mother’s intention not 12 to return (which would support Father’s position on the issue of consent). 13 M. Father’s June 29, 2022 Statement To The Children 14 On June 29, 2022, Father, Mother, the Children, and Mother’s sister were all present 15 at the parties’ apartment in France, preparing for the following day’s flight. According to 16 a declaration provided by Mother’s sister, Father “played with the Children throughout the 17 day. At one point, I overheard him tell them that he loved them, that he would not see them 18 for a long time but would visit them when he could.” (Ex. 52, Bates 158.) Meanwhile, 19 during his testimony during the evidentiary hearing, Father questioned whether Mother’s 20 sister would have understood the words he spoke to the Children during this conversation 21 (because he was speaking in French) but acknowledged that the conversation involved a 22 tearful goodbye: “They were going away for two months, I obviously say good-bye to my 23 kids. . . . I mean, I cry all the time when I see them . . . . So two months you can imagine.” 24 (Tr. 379.) 25 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, Father’s conduct and 26 statements during his interactions with the Children on June 29, 2022 shed little light on 27 the issue of consent. Irrespective of whether the trip on June 30, 2022 was a permanent 28 relocation to the United States or the start of a two-month vacation to the United States, it

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1 would be normal and expected for Father to be tearful and say goodbye to the Children the 2 day before their departure. 3 N. Father’s June 30, 2022 Travel Authorization 4 On June 30, 2022, Mother, Mother’s sister, and the Children left the parties’ 5 apartment in France to head to the airport. Father helped drive them to the train station. In 6 anticipation of the trip, Mother asked Father to hand-write a travel authorization and Father 7 agreed to do so. It is dated June 30, 2022 and provides as follows: “I authorize my wife 8 Katie McGarey-Peyre to leave the territory with our kids.” (Ex. 43.) 9 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, this authorization 10 document is too ambiguous to shed much light on the issue of consent. Mother requested 11 the document because she believed the airline would require it before allowing her to board 12 an international flight with the Children outside Father’s presence.8 Thus, the fact that 13 Father signed the document is equally consistent with Mother’s position (i.e., the flight was 14 part of a permanent relocation to the United States) and Father’s position (i.e., the flight 15 was the start of a two-month international vacation). 16 Of course, in hindsight, and given Father’s awareness of the warnings set forth in 17 Madame Carmouse’s letter—specifically, that it was risky to allow Mother to leave France 18 with the Children—it would have been prudent for him to specify in the authorization 19 document that he was not agreeing to a permanent relocation. But his failure to do so is 20 not, in the Court’s estimation, proof of consent to a permanent relocation. If, as Father 21 contends, he was expecting Mother to follow through on the asserted plan to return to 22 France with the Children at the end of the summer, it would have been highly provocative 23 and antagonistic for him to hand-write into the authorization document that he was only 24 granting a travel authorization on those terms. 25 … 26 8 Mother’s sister wrote in a declaration: “Katie asked Charles to provide her with a 27 handwritten letter stating that he consented to her leaving France with the Children as it may be required for us to board our flight from Paris to New York.” (Ex. 52, Bates 158.) 28 Likewise, Father testified: “You cannot travel with kids without the authorization of the other parent. Doesn’t mean that I let her like settle in another country.” (Tr. 464-65.)

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1 III. Logistical And Other Details Concerning The Trip 2 In an effort to show that the June 30, 2022 trip to the United States was a permanent 3 relocation to which Father consented, Mother presented an array of evidence concerning 4 the details of the trip. Among other things, Mother presented evidence that she bought a 5 large number of packing boxes and used them to ship the bulk of her French possessions 6 to the United States (with Father helping to buy and pack the boxes); that she also sold or 7 otherwise disposed of the Children’s furniture and other possessions in France; that she 8 and her family took steps in anticipation of the trip to register the Children for a highly 9 sought-after preschool program in Arizona; and that she attended a going-away party right 10 before the trip and otherwise received gifts from friends and neighbors that were consistent 11 with those individuals saying a final goodbye. 12 Father attempted to counter this evidence by downplaying the volume of the 13 materials shipped in the boxes; noting that Mother also left behind some of her and the 14 Children’s possessions; showing that the preschool program would not have started until 15 long after June 2022 (and, thus, the mere fact of registration in May 2022 does not evince 16 an intent to permanently relocate in June 2022); suggesting that the going-away parties and 17 gifts were also consistent with how friends would react before a multi-month trip; and 18 suggesting that the sale of the Children’s cribs was simply because the Children were 19 growing and would soon be ready for toddler beds. Father also presented evidence that 20 Mother failed to take certain steps, in the aftermath of the trip, that might be expected of a 21 person who had permanently left a country, such as cancelling certain French benefit 22 payments. 23 From the Court’s perspective in its capacity as factfinder, the evidence regarding 24 the shipping and other trip-related details is too ambiguous to support either side’s position. 25 Those details are largely consistent with the notion that Mother and the Children were 26 moving permanently to the United States in June 2022. However, they are also consistent 27 with the notion that, even though Mother hoped and planned to eventually relocate to the 28 United States with the Children, she would be returning to France with the Children a few

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1 months after the trip to sort out the details of her divorce from Father and the resulting 2 custody arrangement. 3 IV. Post-Departure Statements And Conduct 4 During the hearing, in an effort to address the issues of consent and acquiescence, 5 both sides presented evidence regarding the parties’ statements and conduct following the 6 June 30, 2022 trip. 7 As an initial matter, it must be noted that, at the time Mother and the Children left 8 on June 30, 2022, Father was facing criminal domestic violence charges related to the 9 incident on June 20, 2022. The trial on those charges was scheduled for October 2022, and 10 Father testified during the evidentiary hearing that he was reluctant to engage in much 11 communication with Mother until the charges were resolved out of fear that she might 12 retaliate against him in a way that was harmful to his criminal defense. Indeed, on October 13 6, 2022, soon after he was acquitted of the charges, Father sent the following text message 14 to Mother: “Until Monday’s judgment I was not free to talk to you. Anything I said or did 15 could have been used against me. And I/you/we could have lost even more. I want to 16 apologize if I was cold or distant. It was wanted [sic] and sometimes reluctantly but 17 unfortunately essential.” (Ex. 35, Bates 21.) The overhang of the criminal charges 18 provides a possible explanation for Father’s relative inaction in the months immediately 19 following Mother’s departure. 20 To that end, in late July 2022, Mother sent text messages to Father asking him to 21 cancel the Children’s French health insurance and informing him that she had a new 22 American phone number. (Ex. 35, Bates 18.) The Court does not view these messages as 23 providing much insight on the issues of consent or acquiescence. Although they may 24 reflect that Mother had no intention to return to France in the weeks following the trip, they 25 do not show that Father was aware of that intention (and consented to it) before she left or 26 that he was belatedly acquiescing to it. Indeed, the relevant trial exhibit does not show that 27 Father even responded to these text messages. 28 On August 2, 2022, the parties exchanged a series of text messages. Mother began

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1 the exchange by writing: “I have no idea how you feel about anything, or what will happen 2 between us in the future. Do you even consider the possibility of moving to the United 3 States or is that something I should consider as not going to ever happen?” (Ex. 35, Bates 4 18.) Father responded: “What I feel about things is that I’m very sad not to physically see 5 my children anymore. There is a great emptiness in my heart that I no longer have them 6 on a daily basis. I am considering the idea of moving to the US. It’s still in the thinking 7 stage. . . . Nothing concrete to date.” (Id.) Mother then wrote: “Do you ever think about 8 us? O[r] is it just the kids you miss in your life?” (Id.) Father responded: “You have and 9 will always count in my life for being my wife and for being the mother of our children. 10 That said between us it’s over. We will never be a couple again.” (Id.) About an hour 11 later, Mother wrote that “[w]ell you won’t have to consider the idea of moving anymore 12 because it’s no longer a possibility,” and when Father asked why, Mother stated that his 13 visa eligibility hinged on remaining married to her: “You won’t be with me, you don’t have 14 the visa.” (Id.) 15 These text messages, again, shed little light on the issues of consent and 16 acquiescence. Nothing in them suggests that Father had agreed, before June 30, 2022, to 17 allow Mother and the Children to make a permanent move to the United States on that date. 18 Additionally, nothing in them suggests that Father had belatedly acquiesced to that state of 19 affairs. His discussion of possibly moving to the United States was tentative and not 20 inconsistent with the position he took in various pre-trip communications and continues to 21 take in this litigation—that is, that Mother and the Children should return to France so a 22 French judge can resolve their divorce and make a custody determination. 23 In a related vein, on August 10, 2022, the parties exchanged another series of text 24 messages, this time related to daycare, health insurance, and child support. (Ex. 35, Bates 25 19-20.) Father’s first response to Mother’s messages on these topics was to clarify that, 26 “in my opinion, it is better to go through a lawyer given our situations (different 27 nationalities, remoteness, separation of property).” (Id.) Father also stated: “I keep the 28 house in the hope of receiving the children one day. The law is very strict on this subject

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1 in France. I must have a second room to accommodate them.” (Id.) These statements are 2 inconsistent with any claim of consent and acquiescence—they show that, less than six 3 weeks after the trip, Father was expressing his desire (which he also expressed in many of 4 his pre-trip communications) to litigate the issue of child custody via lawyers, with the 5 hope that he would be awarded custody of the Children by a French judge. 6 On November 23, 2022, Father went to a police station in his town in France to 7 formally report that Mother had taken the Children without his permission. (Ex. 5, Bates 8 170-77.) During this visit, Father also accused Mother of engaging in domestic violence 9 against him in the past. (Id.) Relevant to the allegation of wrongful removal, Father 10 asserted that “[i]n June, she wanted to go on vacation in Phoenix, at her parents’ house. It 11 was still not possible for me to leave my business, and I agreed then to let her leave with 12 the little ones. . . . [O]n the 23rd,9 she had the police intervene at our home, mentioning 13 some domestic violence. I was picked up by the police. . . . I had a hard time getting out 14 of there, for they heaped accusations on me. That’s why, when she asked me for an 15 authorization for the children to leave France, I agreed, thinking that it would calm things 16 down between us. . . . I could not imagine that she might not come back, even though she 17 had threatened me with not coming back, I knew it.” (Id., Bates 172-73.) 18 During the evidentiary hearing, Mother placed heavy emphasis on the Father’s use 19 of the phrase “I knew it,” suggesting it was proof of his consent or acquiescence. The 20 Court respectfully disagrees and views Father’s statement to the French police as consistent 21 with how he described his understanding of Mother’s trip in his pre-trip communications 22 and continues to describe it in this litigation—as a vacation to the United States that Mother 23 later, and without his consent, converted to a permanent move. 24 V. Domestic Violence/Grave Risk 25 One of Mother’s defenses in this action is that “the return of the Children would 26 expose them to a grave risk of harm based on Father’s domestic violence against Mother 27 9 28 It appears this date was a mistake, as the incident involving police intervention occurred on June 20, 2022.

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1 and serious abuse or neglect against the Children.” (Doc. 15 at 5-6. See also Doc. 23 at 2 17-20.) This defense is based on the series of incidents described below. 3 First, in May 2018, after Father and Mother got into a verbal disagreement, Father 4 smashed his head into a door in an apparent self-harm attempt. (Tr. 451.) As Father 5 explained: “I wanted my life to stop at that moment and I smashed my head against the 6 door so as not to wake up. No luck.” (Id. See also Tr. 635 [Mother: “He tried to smash 7 his head . . . in our bedroom door and broke a huge portion of the door out. . . . [T]hat’s 8 the night that he was tripping me outside the house.”].) 9 Second, on April 7, 2022, Mother asked Father to look after the Children, who were 10 on the bottom floor of the parties’ apartment, while she was on the top floor. (Tr. 513-14.) 11 Soon afterward, one of the Children fell and sustained a cut to his finger that required 12 emergency treatment at the hospital. (Id.) According to Mother, the injury was caused by 13 Father’s decision to play a game on his phone rather than pay proper attention to the 14 Children. (Id.) 15 Third, on a later date in April 2022, Mother, Father, and the Children were visiting 16 Paris when Mother and Father got into an argument. (Tr. 517-18.) According to Mother, 17 Father “literally abandoned us on the street of Paris . . . . [He] grabbed the sandwiches, 18 chucked them in the trash and just left us in Paris. . . . I was like crying on the street and 19 random people were helping me. I was so overwhelmed.” (Id.) 20 Fourth, on May 27, 2022, Father and Mother got into the disagreement that is 21 discussed in more detail above. According to Mother, Father “got really upset,” puffed up 22 his chest and belly, and then “body slammed” her in a manner that caused her to trip but 23 not fall to the ground. (Tr. 525-26.)10 Father sought to characterize this encounter in a 24 more benign light, testifying that although he and Mother were “[b]elly against belly and 25 we pushed each other . . . it stopped there. There has been no actual real violence, like we 26 10 Similarly, during her interview with the police on June 20, 2022, Mother described 27 the May 27, 2022 incident as follows: “[We] started an argument and he came towards me in the kitchen and with his body, his belly he was pushing me with his torso with his belly 28 to push me and make me fall . . . . I slightly lost my balance. . . . I wasn’t hurt.” (Ex. 5, Bates 146.)

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1 didn’t punch each other, push each other, nothing.” (Tr. 505.)11 Mother disagreed with 2 Father’s characterization: “He didn’t push me in the stomach. He body slammed me.” (Tr. 3 638.) 4 Fifth, on June 20, 2022, Father and Mother got into the disagreement that is 5 discussed in more detail above. According to Mother, Father “turned into like a raging 6 animal,” “charged” toward her as she was holding Madame Carmouse’s letter, and “with a 7 ton of force . . . smacked [her] body against the cabinets. . . . [He] hit me really hard against 8 them and then he’s pinning me with his body.” (Tr. 536-37.) Mother further testified that 9 Father then “physically grabbed [her] hand . . . with a ton of force [and] tried to rip the 10 letter out of [her] hand.” (Tr. 537.) According to Mother, she “scratched to push him away 11 from [her] and . . . tugged the collar of his shirt and scratched his neck at the same motion 12 to like get him off [her].” (Id.) Mother then asked Father to leave the house, Father refused, 13 and Mother called the police. (Tr. 538-39.)12 Father provided a somewhat different 14 account of this incident. According to Father, he spent a half hour attempting to calm 15 Mother down and then, when she refused to turn over Madame Carmouse’s letter, he 16 “approached her and tried to block her with [his] body like a basketball. It’s a police way 17 of saying that [he] pushed her with [his] chest. . . . At that moment she tried to tear [his] 18 T-shirt and scratched [his] neck.” (Tr. 439-40.) 19 Although these incidents do not paint Father in a flattering light—Father admitted, 20 during his post-arrest interview following the June 20, 2022 incident, that his “reaction 21 [was] clearly inappropriate” (Ex. 37, Bates 88)—Mother’s statements and conduct in the 22 aftermath of these incidents are inconsistent with the notion that she views Father as posing 23 a grave risk of harm to herself or the Children. For example, during her interview with the 24 11 Similarly, during his interview with the police on June 20, 2022, Father admitted that he pushed Mother with his stomach in a “violent” manner on May 27, 2022 but claimed 25 he was simply attempting to look intimidating. (Ex. 38, Bates 88-89.) 12 26 Similarly, during her interview with the police on the night of the June 20, 2022 incident, Mother described the incident as follows: “Charles came to me and pushed me, 27 he wanted to take the letter in one hand and he pushed me with the other hand quite strongly on the countertop. . . . My back hurt on the countertop . . . and my head banged on a cabinet 28 . . . . I suddenly reached, I [tore] the collar of his shirt for him to release me to make him go away and protect myself . . . .” (Ex. 5, Bates 144.)

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1 French police on June 20, 2022, Mother stated that she did not feel “in danger” from Father, 2 also did not think that Father posed a danger to the Children, and did not wish to press 3 charges or file a complaint. (Ex. 5, Bates 150, 152.) During this interview, Mother also 4 described Father as “a good father,” at least when not distracted by his phone. (Id., Bates 5 150.) These statements are consistent with Mother’s conduct in the immediate aftermath 6 of the incident. Soon after Father was released from police custody, Mother invited him to 7 accompany her to a visit to a “naturist” (i.e., nudist) retreat in France, which he declined. 8 (Tr. 559-60.) 9 Separately, on September 6, 2022, Mother sent a text message to Father in which 10 she invited him to come to the United States and stay at her parents’ house in Arizona 11 (where she was also living with the Children) while her parents were on vacation: “Hey so 12 my parents are going on vacation the week of October 20-26. Just throwing this out as an 13 option for when you could visit and stay at the house if you would like.” (Ex. 35, Bates 14 20.) Similarly, on October 6, 2022, Mother made another offer for Father to stay with her 15 and the Children, this time for purposes of an anticipated trip over the holidays: “If [I] have 16 a home by then you can stay with us, if not, we can all stay at [the] Kaisers over the holidays 17 because they will be traveling.” (Ex. 35, Bates 21.) Finally, on October 29, 2022, Mother 18 made another offer for Father to stay with her and the Children when he was visiting over 19 the holidays: “I was thinking of renting a cabin near the Grand Canyon for a few days. 2- 20 3 bedrooms so we can each have a room. Does that interest you? Somewhere with a little 21 cowboy town to hang out in and close to the Grand Canyon to go see it one day. . . . I 22 found a cute Airbnb in Prescott, Arizona that is 1/2 mile from the historic downtown. I 23 was thinking [of] staying 12/29-1/2.” (Ex. 1, Bates 14-15.) 24 VI. Acclimatization 25 Another of Mother’s defenses in this action is that the Children have become 26 acclimated to living in the United States, such that ordering their return to France would 27 be impermissible. (Doc. 23 at 6-9.) In support of this defense, Mother testified that the 28 Children have been attending the same daycare facility for nine months and are

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1 “[c]ompletely adapted” to it, have established new relationships with pediatricians in 2 Arizona, have made new “best friends,” and have formed close relationships with Mother’s 3 parents and extended family. (Tr. 640-50.) 4 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 5 I. Father’s Prima Facie Case 6 “A court that receives a petition under the Hague Convention may not resolve the 7 questions of who, as between the parents, is best suited to have custody of the child.” 8 Cuellar v. Joyce, 596 F.3d 505, 508 (9th Cir. 2010). Instead, the court must begin its 9 analysis by determining whether “the child has been wrongfully removed or retained within 10 the meaning of the Convention.” 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(1)(A). The petitioner—here, 11 Father—bears the burden of proof on this issue and must prove it by a preponderance of 12 the evidence. Id. See generally Colchester v. Lazaro, 16 F.4th 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2021) 13 (“The Hague Convention is a multilateral international treaty on parental kidnapping that 14 seeks to deter parental abductions. The objects of the Convention are to secure the prompt 15 return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any Contracting State and to ensure 16 that parents cannot gain tactical advantages in child custody proceedings by absconding 17 with a child to a more favorable forum or by otherwise undermining custody decrees 18 entered in the country of the child’s habitual residence. The Convention’s focus is thus 19 whether a child should be returned to a country for custody proceedings and not what the 20 outcome of those proceedings should be.”) (cleaned up). 21 To determine whether the removal or retention was “wrongful,” a district court must 22 answer a series of four questions: 23 (1) When did the removal or retention at issue take place? (2) Immediately prior to the removal or retention, in which state was the child habitually 24 resident? (3) Did the removal or retention breach the rights of custody attributed to the petitioner under the law of the habitual residence? (4) Was 25 the petitioner exercising those rights at the time of the removal or retention? 26 Mozes v. Mozes, 239 F.3d 1067, 1070 (9th Cir. 2001). 27 The dispute in this case largely focuses on the applicability of ICARA’s exceptions 28 for consent, acquiescence, and/or grave risk, rather than on whether Father has established

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1 a prima facie case of wrongful removal. Nevertheless, in an abundance of caution, the 2 Court clarifies that Father has, in fact, successfully established a prima facie case. 3 A. Date Of Removal 4 As for the first element—the date of removal—both sides agree in their pleadings 5 that the relevant date is June 30, 2022. (Doc. 1 ¶ 20; Doc. 15 ¶ 11.) The evidence on this 6 point during the evidentiary hearing was undisputed. 7 B. Habitual Residence 8 As for the second element—the country of habitual residence—the Court concludes 9 that the Children were habitual residents of France immediately before their removal. 10 As an initial matter, Mother does not appear to dispute this point. Although Mother 11 asserted in her answer that she “denies that France is the habitual residence of the Children” 12 (Doc. 15 ¶ 22), the Court asked Mother’s counsel, at the outset of the evidentiary hearing, 13 to clarify whether Mother is “making a habitual residence claim or . . . an acclimatization 14 claim.” (Tr. 9.) In response, Mother’s counsel stated: “[T]here’s no dispute with regard to 15 the children’s residence up to the date that mother left, but it’s more of an acclimatization 16 issue with regard to since that time.” (Id.) Similarly, just before the parties presented 17 closing argument, the Court asked Mother’s counsel to clarify “are you taking the position 18 . . . that the children’s habitual residence was the United States at the time of the move on 19 June 30th or are you taking the position that Mr. Peyre consented to the move?” (Tr. 759- 20 60.) Mother’s counsel responded: “We’re taking the position that Mr. Peyre consented to 21 the move.” (Id.) The Court interpreted these statements as a concession that the Children’s 22 habitual residence at the time of the removal was France. 23 Nevertheless, even assuming it is disputed, the question of habitual residence does 24 not present a close call. As the Supreme Court recently clarified, “[t]he place where a child 25 is at home, at the time of removal or retention, ranks as the child’s habitual residence.” 26 Monasky v. Taglieri, 140 S. Ct. 719, 726 (2020). “Because locating a child’s home is a 27 fact-driven inquiry, courts must be sensitive to the unique circumstances of the case and 28 informed by common sense.” Id. at 727 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

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1 “There are no categorical requirements for establishing a child’s habitual residence—least 2 of all an actual-agreement requirement for infants. . . . An infant’s ‘mere physical presence’ 3 . . . is not a dispositive indicator of an infant’s habitual residence. But a wide range of facts 4 other than an actual agreement, including facts indicating that the parents have made their 5 home in a particular place, can enable a trier to determine whether an infant’s residence in 6 that place has the quality of being ‘habitual.’” Id. at 728-29. 7 Here, the Children were born in France to a French father and, at the time of their 8 removal, had lived their entire lives (except for some vacations) in France. It follows that 9 the Children were habitual residents of France immediately before their removal on June 10 30, 2022. In re A.L.C., 607 F. App’x 658, 662 (9th Cir. 2015) (“The district court clearly 11 erred in finding E.R.S.C. could be a habitual resident of a nation in which she never resided. 12 . . . [W]e recognize the obvious truth that ‘habitual residence cannot be acquired without 13 physical presence.’”); Friedrich v. Friedrich, 983 F.2d 1396, 1401 (6th Cir. 1993) 14 (“Thomas was born in Germany to a German father and an American mother and lived 15 exclusively in Germany except for a few short vacations before Mrs. Friedrich removed 16 him to the United States. Mrs. Friedrich argues that despite the fact that Thomas’s ordinary 17 residence was always in Germany, Thomas was actually a habitual resident of the United 18 States because . . . Mrs. Friedrich intended to return to the United States with Thomas when 19 she was discharged from the military. Although these ties may be strong enough to 20 establish legal residence in the United States, they do not establish habitual residence . . . 21 [which] pertains to customary residence prior to the removal.”). See generally Monasky, 22 140 S. Ct. at 727 (“Common sense suggests that some cases will be straightforward: Where 23 a child has lived in one place with her family indefinitely, that place is likely to be her 24 habitual residence.”). 25 This conclusion is not undermined by the fact that Mother and Father had been 26 discussing, in the months leading up to June 30, 2022, the possibility of jointly moving to 27 the United States with the Children. First, although the “shared, settled intent” of the 28 parents was once a critical component of the habitual-residence analysis under Ninth

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1 Circuit law, the factor has less salience in light of the Supreme Court’s 2020 decision in 2 Monasky. See, e.g., Farr v. Kendrick, 824 F. App’x 480, 481 (9th Cir. 2020) (“The district 3 court thoroughly and carefully reviewed the evidence and found that the parents did not 4 have a shared, settled intent to abandon the United States as their habitual residence when 5 they moved to Mexico, pursuant to existing precedent. However, after the district court’s 6 decision, the Supreme Court [in Monasky] held that a child’s habitual residence depends 7 on the totality of the circumstances specific to the case. Thus, a wide range of facts other 8 than an actual agreement, including facts indicating that the parents have made their home 9 in a particular place, can enable a trier to determine whether an infant’s residence in that 10 place has the quality of being habitual.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); 11 Rosansen v. Rosansen, 2023 WL 128617, *1 (9th Cir. 2023) (“The district court did not 12 clearly err in finding that Norway was the habitual residence of the parties’ children. Any 13 agreement between the parents to raise the children in the United States was not 14 dispositive.”) (citation omitted).13 Second, at any rate, Mother and Father had not yet 15 developed, by June 30, 2022, a shared, settled intent to raise the Children in the United 16 States—as discussed in other portions of this order, the plan was ever-changing and subject 17 to various unfulfilled contingencies. 18 Finally, to the extent the concept of acclimatization is applicable here, it does not 19 change the habitual-residence analysis. Murphy v. Sloan, 764 F.3d 1144, 1152-53 (9th Cir. 20 2014) (noting that “courts should be slow to infer [acclimatization], both because the 21 inquiry is fraught with difficulty, and because readily inferring abandonment would 22 circumvent the purposes of the Convention”) (citation and internal quotation marks 23 omitted). Although the Court appreciates and accepts that the Children have made good 24 friends and become close to Mother’s family since their removal to the United States in 25 June 2022, the bottom line is that they are two-year-olds who have lived most of their lives 26 in France. They have not become so acclimatized to living in the United States as to alter 27 13 28 In the portion of the joint trial brief discussing the concept of habitual residence (Doc. 23 at 4-9), both parties cite cases decided before Monasky.

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1 their habitual residence. Cf. Monasky, 140 S. Ct. at 727 (suggesting that “older children 2 [are] capable of acclimating to their surroundings” but other children may be “too young 3 . . . to acclimate”); Holder v. Holder, 392 F.3d 1009, 1020-21 (9th Cir. 2004) (“The 4 younger son’s youth adds a twist to the analysis. When and how does a newborn child 5 acquire a habitual residence? . . . [I]t is practically impossible for a newborn child, who is 6 entirely dependent on its parents, to acclimatize independent of the immediate home 7 environment of the parents.”). 8 C. Law Of The Country Of Habitual Residence 9 As for the third element—whether the removal breached the rights of custody 10 attributed to Father under the law of France—Father alleges in his complaint that if the 11 removal was wrongful, it was in violation of French law. (Doc. 1 ¶ 22(a).) In her answer, 12 Mother does not dispute Father’s allegations on this point. (Doc. 15 ¶ 22 [only denying 13 paragraph 22 to the extent it alleged that France was the habitual residence of the 14 Children].) Moreover, during the evidentiary hearing, Father introduced evidence that, 15 under French law, “[t]he father and mother shall exercise parental authority in common” 16 (Ex. 16, Bates 299), whereas Mother never raised any arguments or defenses concerning 17 the third element of Father’s prima facie case. Similarly, this element is not identified as 18 a disputed issue in the parties’ joint trial brief. (Doc. 23.) Accordingly, the Court concludes 19 that the removal did, in fact, breach Father’s rights of custody under French law. 20 D. Actual Exercise Of Rights 21 As for the fourth element—whether Father was exercising those rights at the time 22 of the removal—Mother admits in her answer that this element is satisfied. (Doc. 15 ¶ 11 23 [“Mother admits the allegations . . . that Father continued to exercise parental rights and 24 his relationship with the Children . . . .”].) At any rate, the evidence bearing on this element 25 was undisputed and showed that Father was, in fact, exercising his parental rights at the 26 time of removal. See, e.g., Asvesta v. Petroutsas, 580 F.3d 1000, 1018 (9th Cir. 2009) 27 (emphasizing that an ICARA petitioner has only a “minimal” burden when it comes to 28 establishing the exercise of custodial rights, that such exercise may be established through

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1 proof of “regular contact” with family members, and that “requiring a petitioning party to 2 meet a high bar in demonstrating the actual exercise of custody rights [would] contradict[] 3 the Convention’s objective to reserve custody determinations for the country of habitual 4 residence”) (citations omitted); Walker v. Walker, 701 F.3d 1110, 1121 (7th Cir. 2012) 5 (“The standard for finding that a parent was exercising his custody rights is a liberal one, 6 and courts will generally find exercise whenever a parent with de jure custody rights keeps, 7 or seeks to keep, any sort of regular contact with his or her child. Indeed, a person cannot 8 fail to exercise his custody rights under the Hague Convention short of acts that constitute 9 clear and unequivocal abandonment of the child.”) (cleaned up). 10 II. Exceptions 11 Because Father has established a prima facie case of wrongful removal, the burden 12 shifts to Mother to prove that an exception applies. 13 A. Consent And Acquiescence 14 The first, related set of exceptions raised by Mother are those of consent and 15 acquiescence, which are recognized in Article 13(a) of the Hague Convention.14 The 16 parties agree (Doc. 23 at 9, 13) that Mother bears the burden of proving the applicability 17 of these exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence. See also Gonzalez-Caballero v. 18 Mena, 251 F.3d 789, 793 (9th Cir. 2001); 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(B). 19 As an initial matter, it is important to note that “ex ante consent” and “ex post 20 acquiescence” are analytically distinct concepts. Gonzalez-Caballero, 251 F.3d at 794. 21 “Under the Hague Convention’s plain, unambiguous language, consent before the removal 22 and retention or subsequent acquiescence extinguishes the right of return.” Id. Thus, if a 23 respondent establishes “ex ante consent,” the court’s “inquiry [is] complete because even 24 ex post non-acquiescence could not revive [a] right of return under the Convention.” Id. 25 26 14 Specifically, Article 13(a) provides that, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not 27 bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that . . . the person, institution or other body having the care of the 28 person of the child . . . had consented to or subsequently acquiesced in the removal or retention.”

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1 With that said, “conduct after removal can be useful in determining whether consent was 2 present at the time of the removal.” Id. See also Baxter v. Baxter, 423 F.3d 363, 371 (3d 3 Cir. 2005) (“Although analytically distinct, the defenses of consent and acquiescence under 4 article 13(a) of the Hague Convention are both narrow. The consent defense involves the 5 petitioner’s conduct prior to the contested removal or retention, while acquiescence 6 addresses whether the petitioner subsequently agreed to or accepted the removal or 7 retention.”) (citations omitted). 8 With those clarifications in mind, the Court first addresses consent. To succeed on 9 this defense, Mother must establish that Father “actually, subjectively intended to allow 10 [the Children] to remain in the United States.” Berenguela-Alvarado v. Castanos, 950 F.3d 11 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2020). Critically, “[e]ven ambiguous statements or actions don’t 12 suffice; the Convention requires the parent opposing removal to unequivocally demonstrate 13 that the petitioning parent consented to the child’s indefinite stay in America.” Cuellar, 14 596 F.3d at 512 (cleaned up). Such “consent needn’t be formal, but it is important to 15 consider what [Father] actually contemplated and agreed to in allowing the [Children] to 16 travel outside [their] home country. The focus . . . should be on [Father’s] subjective intent, 17 and should take into account the nature and scope of [his] consent, and any conditions or 18 limitations on that consent.” Berenguela-Alvarado, 905 F.3d at 1359 (cleaned up). Thus, 19 “[t]he fact that a petitioner initially allows children to travel, and knows their location and 20 how to contact them, does not necessarily constitute consent to removal or retention under 21 the Convention.” Baxter, 423 F.3d at 371. Indeed, “[m]any cases begin with a parent’s 22 taking the child away from home for a vacation or visit with the consent of the other parent, 23 but nevertheless result in a Hague Convention order compelling the child’s return.” Fabri 24 v. Pritikin-Fabri, 221 F. Supp. 2d 859, 871-72 (N.D. Ill. 2001) 25 Here, for the reasons discussed in more detail in the Findings of Fact, Mother has 26 failed to meet her burden of establishing that Father’s actual, subjective intent when 27 authorizing the Children to leave France with Mother on June 30, 2022 was to allow them 28 to begin living permanently in the United States from that point forward. Although many

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1 of the pieces of evidence bearing on this point are frustratingly ambiguous, and some could 2 individually be viewed as supporting Mother’s position, the Court cannot ignore the fact 3 that, during the roughly month-long period preceding the departure date, both Father and 4 Mother repeatedly referred to the trip as some variant of a temporary visit to the United 5 States from which Mother and the Children would be returning. For example, when 6 speaking to the police on June 20, 2022, Mother stated that she had argued with Father a 7 few weeks earlier about the “date he wanted to come to the USA, to check about our return 8 to France” and characterized her upcoming trip as “go[ing] to the United States for 02 9 months.” (Ex. 5, Bates 144, 146.) Similarly, in text messages sent to a friend in the weeks 10 leading up to the trip, Mother discussed her plan to “go ahead to Arizona . . . to set up life” 11 after the expiration of her work permit in January 2023 (Ex. 34, Bates 10), her plan to 12 “move to Arizona before Xmas so we can be there for the holidays” (id., Bates 12), and 13 her plan to “leav[e] France indefinitely June 30” (id., Bates 13). Meanwhile, although 14 some of Father’s communications during this period (like his May 27, 2022 email and his 15 statement to the police on June 21, 2022) acknowledged that Mother and the Children 16 might ultimately wind up living in the United States without him, these communications 17 also suggested that various other developments would need to occur first. 18 The Court does not discount the possibility that Mother may have honestly, if 19 incorrectly, believed that her trip on June 30, 2022 was a permanent move being made with 20 Father’s blessing. The trip occurred during a particularly tumultuous time in the parties’ 21 marriage, during which their communications were strained. But to the extent there was 22 some miscommunication or misunderstanding, it is only Father’s subjective intent that 23 matters for purposes of Mother’s consent defense. Berenguela-Alvarado, 950 F.3d at 1360. 24 Additionally, “ambiguous statements or actions don’t suffice” when it comes to consent. 25 Cuellar, 596 F.3d at 512. Thus, although the issue presents a close call, the Court 26 concludes that Mother has failed to establish that Father provided consent for her to move 27 to the United States with the Children on June 30, 2022. 28 Nor has Mother met her burden of establishing acquiescence. On August 10,

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1 2022—less than six weeks after the trip—Father sent text messages to Mother in which he 2 expressed his desire to litigate the issue of child custody via lawyers, with the hope that he 3 would be awarded custody of the Children by a French judge and the Children would live 4 with him in France. (Ex. 35, Bates 19-20.) A few months later, after being acquitted of 5 the criminal charges arising from the June 20, 2022 incident, Father filed a report with the 6 French police accusing Mother of taking the Children without his permission and then filed 7 formal return petitions under the Hague Convention. Such conduct is inconsistent with the 8 notion that Father acquiesced to the removal of the Children. Friedrich, 78 F.3d at 1070 9 (“Subsequent acquiescence requires more than an isolated statement to a third-party. Each 10 of the words and actions of a parent during the separation are not to be scrutinized for a 11 possible waiver of custody rights. . . . [W]e believe that acquiescence under the Convention 12 requires either: an act or statement with the requisite formality, such as testimony in a 13 judicial proceeding; a convincing written renunciation of rights; or a consistent attitude of 14 acquiescence over a significant period of time.”). 15 B. Grave Risk 16 The final exception raised by Mother is the so-called “grave risk” exception, which 17 is set forth in Article 13(b) of the Hague Convention.15 See generally Golan v. Saada, 142 18 S. Ct. 1880, 1887 (2022) (“[I]f a court finds that a child was wrongfully removed from the 19 child’s country of habitual residence, the court ordinarily must order the child’s return. 20 There are, however, exceptions to that rule. As relevant here, a court is not bound to order 21 a child’s return if it finds that return would put the child at a grave risk of physical or 22 psychological harm.”). Mother bears the burden of proving the applicability of this 23 exception by clear and convincing evidence. 22 U.S.C. § 9003(e)(2)(A). 24 The Ninth Circuit has emphasized that the grave-risk exception must be “drawn very 25 26 15 Specifically, Article 13(b) provides that, “[n]otwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Article, the judicial or administrative authority of the requested State is not 27 bound to order the return of the child if the person, institution or other body which opposes its return establishes that . . . there is a grave risk that his or her return would expose the 28 child to physical or psychological harm or otherwise place the child in an intolerable situation.”

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1 narrowly” and “is not license for a court in the abducted-to country to speculate on where 2 the child would be happiest.” Gaudin v. Remis, 415 F.3d 1028, 1035-36 (9th Cir. 2005) 3 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “Rather, the question is whether the child 4 would suffer ‘serious abuse’ that is ‘a great deal more than minimal.” Id. at 1035 (citations 5 omitted). Additionally, “because the Hague Convention provides only a provisional, 6 short-term remedy in order to permit long-term custody proceedings to take place in the 7 home jurisdiction, the grave-risk inquiry should be concerned only with the degree of harm 8 that could occur in the immediate future.” Id. at 1037. Thus, “even a living situation 9 capable of causing grave psychological harm over the full course of a child’s development 10 is not necessarily likely to do so in the period necessary to obtain a custody determination.” 11 Id. 12 Mother has not come close to establishing that the Children would be exposed to a 13 grave risk of physical or psychological harm if returned to France. There is no suggestion 14 that Father has ever abused or intentionally harmed the Children. To the contrary, the 15 evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing suggests that Father was (and is) an 16 involved, loving, and active parent. Mother herself described Father as “a good father” 17 during her interview with the French police. (Ex. 5, Bates 150.) As for the incident in 18 which one of the Children fell and sustained a finger injury, it is surprising that Mother 19 would hold this out as evidence supporting a grave-risk claim. In hindsight, of course, 20 Father should not have allowed himself to be distracted by his phone, but the incident 21 involved an accidental fall by a toddler inside the parties’ home while Father was in close 22 physical proximity. This is a far cry from the sort of conduct that has been found to trigger 23 the grave-risk exception. Cf. Cuellar, 596 F.3d at 510 (“[T]he district court concluded that 24 Leyda was so neglectful that to return K.C. to her custody would be ‘unsafe.’ By drawing 25 this conclusion about Leyda’s fitness as a parent, the district court overstepped its mandate 26 and impermissibly addressed the ultimate question of custody. Well-cared-for children do 27 occasionally have accidents . . . . Richard’s feeble showing . . . falls far short of clear and 28 convincing evidence of ‘serious abuse’ that is ‘a great deal more than minimal.’”).

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1 Mother also contends that she would be exposed to a grave risk of harm if forced to 2 return to France with the Children. As a legal matter, this theory is potentially viable. 3 Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 22 (2010) (“If . . . Ms. Abbott could demonstrate that returning 4 to Chile would put her own safety at grave risk, the court could consider whether this is 5 sufficient to show that the child too would suffer ‘psychological harm’ or be placed ‘in an 6 intolerable situation.’”); Colchester, 16 F.4th at 718 (“Spousal violence may also establish 7 a grave risk of harm to the child, particularly when it occurs in the presence of the child.”) 8 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). But as a factual matter, it is unavailing. 9 Without in any way excusing Father’s conduct during the incidents described in the 10 Findings of Fact, there is no evidence that Father ever punched or kicked Mother or caused 11 her to sustain any injuries requiring medical attention. Bumping up against one’s spouse a 12 few times in an aggressive manner, while improper, is not the sort of conduct that could 13 support a grave-risk claim. Compare Walsh v. Walsh, 221 F.3d 204, 218-20 (1st Cir. 2000) 14 (emphasizing that “the harm must be a great deal more than minimal” and finding that the 15 grave-risk exception was satisfied where the father had “demonstrated an uncontrollably 16 violent temper,” “his assaults have been bloody and severe,” and there was “a clear and 17 long history of spousal abuse, and of fights with and threats against persons other than his 18 wife”). Additionally, and more important, Mother’s conduct in the aftermath of these 19 incidents—including telling the French police that she did not view Father as a danger to 20 her, inviting Father to attend a retreat with her, then repeatedly inviting Father to stay alone 21 with her and the Children during his visit to the United States—is very difficult to reconcile 22 with the notion that she somehow views Father as posing a grave risk of harm to her. 23 III. Attorneys’ Fees And Costs 24 In the complaint, Father asserts that he “has incurred attorneys’ fees and costs as a 25 result of the wrongful retention of the Children by [Mother]” and “respectfully requests 26 that this Court award him all costs and fees, including transportation costs, incurred to date 27 as required by [statute].” (Doc. 1 ¶¶ 28-29.) In her answer, Mother generally denies these 28 allegations. (Doc. 15 ¶¶ 28-29.) The parties did not further address the topic of attorneys’

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1 fees and costs in their joint trial brief (Doc. 23) or during the evidentiary hearing. 2 Father’s request is governed by 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3), which provides: 3 Any court ordering the return of a child pursuant to an action brought under section 9003 of this title shall order the respondent to pay necessary expenses 4 incurred by or on behalf of the petitioner, including court costs, legal fees, 5 foster home or other care during the course of proceedings in the action, and transportation costs related to the return of the child, unless the respondent 6 establishes that such order would be clearly inappropriate. 7 Id. As the First Circuit has explained, although this formulation creates a “duty . . . to order 8 the payment of necessary expenses and legal fees,” this duty is “subject to a broad caveat 9 denoted by the words, ‘clearly inappropriate,’” and thus “giv[es] the district court broad 10 discretion.” Whallon v. Lynn, 356 F.3d 138, 140 (1st Cir. 2004). See also Oztalin v. 11 Oztalin, 708 F.3d 355, 375 (2d Cir. 2013) (“[A] prevailing petitioner in a return action is 12 presumptively entitled to necessary costs, subject to the application of equitable principles 13 by the district court.”). 14 Applying these standards, the Court concludes that Father is presumptively entitled 15 to recover his attorneys’ fees and costs because he has prevailed in this action and Mother 16 has not, at least yet, attempted to identify any reason why an award would be inappropriate. 17 As for the amount of the award, LRCiv 54.2(b)(2) provides that “the party seeking 18 an award of attorneys’ fees and related non-taxable expenses must file and serve a motion 19 for award of attorneys’ fees and related non-taxable expenses (along with a supporting 20 memorandum of points and authorities) within fourteen (14) days of the entry of judgment 21 in the action with respect to which the services were rendered.” Thus, within 14 days of 22 entry of judgment, Father may file such a motion. Any response by Mother is due within 23 14 days of when Father’s motion is filed. See LRCiv 54.2(b)(3). In that response, Mother 24 may attempt to show why an award would be inappropriate. Any reply by Father is due 25 within 7 days of when Mother’s response is filed. The parties are also encouraged to meet 26 and confer on the issue of attorneys’ fees and costs in an effort to reach a negotiated 27 resolution that avoids the need for further motion practice. 28 …

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1 Accordingly, IT IS ORDERED that: 2 1. Father’s petition (Doc. 1) is granted. 3 2. Mother shall return the Children to France within 30 days of this order. Per 4 22 U.S.C. § 9007(b)(3), Mother shall be responsible for the transportation costs. 5 3. The Clerk shall enter judgment accordingly and terminate this action. 6 4. Father may, within 14 days of entry of judgment, file a motion for attorneys’ 7 fees and costs. Any such motion shall be accompanied by an electronic Microsoft Excel 8 spreadsheet, to be emailed to the Court’s chambers email address, containing an itemized 9 statement of legal services with all information required by Local Rule 54.2(e)(1). This 10 spreadsheet shall be organized with rows and columns and shall automatically total the 11 amount of fees requested to enable the Court to efficiently review and recompute, if needed, 12 the total amount of any award after disallowing any individual billing entries. This 13 spreadsheet does not relieve the moving party of its burden under LRCiv 54.2(d) to attach 14 all necessary supporting documentation to its motion. 15 Dated this 30th day of May, 2023. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28

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