Petty v. City of New York

Second Circuit

Petty v. City of New York

633 F. App'x 52

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Second Circuit

DecidedMarch 4, 2016

Docket14-4550

StatusUnpublished

Cited by1 cases

This text of 633 F. App'x 52 (Petty v. City of New York) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

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Petty v. City of New York, 633 F. App'x 52 (2d Cir. 2016).

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Opinion

SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Darren Lawrence Petty, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his discrimination and retaliation claims against the City of New York (the “City”) and several of its employees and municipal agencies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101, et seq. We *53 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

As a preliminary matter, Petty’s brief addresses only the ruling that his discrimination claims were untimely. He does not challenge the dismissal of his Title VII and ADA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; retaliation claims for inability to establish a prima facie case of retaliation; due process claim for lack of a protected property or liberty interest; or his claims against non-suable municipal agencies and un-served individual defendants. Consequently, these claims are deemed abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that Petty’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination claims — the only claims not dismissed on the above grounds — were untimely. Claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations from the date that the claims accrue. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d); Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir.2007) (“claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are time-barred unless filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory acts”). Petty’s discrimination claims accrued in April 2006, when the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) sent him his third and final disqualification letter informing him his employment application was rejected because he had not met the requirements for the position of police officer. Petty, however, did not file his federal complaint until November 2010, more than four years later.

Petty contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because the NYPD never sent him any disqualification letters, and he asserts that the letters produced by the City are unreliable evidence because the postmarks they bear were manipulated. The contention that the City never sent the disqualification letters is flatly contradicted by the inclusion of those letters in the record with the corresponding postmarked envelopes and certified mail receipts. And the assertion that those letters are unreliable evidence because the postmarks they bear were manipulated is conclusory and unsupported by any facts. Petty has not demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. See Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir.2003).

We have considered all of Petty’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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SUMMARY ORDER

Appellant Darren Lawrence Petty, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment dismissing his discrimination and retaliation claims against the City of New York (the “City”) and several of its employees and municipal agencies under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, et seq.; the New York State Human Rights Law (“NYSHRL”), N.Y. Exec. Law § 290, et seq.; and the New York City Human Rights Law (“NYCHRL”), N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-101, et seq. We *53 assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, the procedural history of the case, and the issues on appeal.

We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, with the view that “[sjummary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party shows that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Miller v. Wolpoff & Abramson, L.L.P., 321 F.3d 292, 300 (2d Cir.2003). We are required to resolve all ambiguities and draw all inferences in favor of the non-movant. Nationwide Life Ins. Co. v. Bankers Leasing Ass’n, 182 F.3d 157, 160 (2d Cir.1999). Summary judgment is appropriate “[wjhere the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-moving party,” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986).

As a preliminary matter, Petty’s brief addresses only the ruling that his discrimination claims were untimely. He does not challenge the dismissal of his Title VII and ADA claims for failure to exhaust administrative remedies; retaliation claims for inability to establish a prima facie case of retaliation; due process claim for lack of a protected property or liberty interest; or his claims against non-suable municipal agencies and un-served individual defendants. Consequently, these claims are deemed abandoned. See LoSacco v. City of Middletown, 71 F.3d 88, 92-93 (2d Cir.1995).

Upon review, we conclude that the district court correctly ruled that Petty’s NYSHRL and NYCHRL discrimination claims — the only claims not dismissed on the above grounds — were untimely. Claims under the NYSHRL and NYCHRL are subject to a three-year statute of limitations from the date that the claims accrue. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214(2); N.Y.C. Admin. Code § 8-502(d); Kassner v. 2nd Ave. Delicatessen Inc., 496 F.3d 229, 238 (2d Cir.2007) (“claims under the NYSHRL and the NYCHRL are time-barred unless filed within three years of the alleged discriminatory acts”). Petty’s discrimination claims accrued in April 2006, when the New York Police Department (“NYPD”) sent him his third and final disqualification letter informing him his employment application was rejected because he had not met the requirements for the position of police officer. Petty, however, did not file his federal complaint until November 2010, more than four years later.

Petty contends that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because the NYPD never sent him any disqualification letters, and he asserts that the letters produced by the City are unreliable evidence because the postmarks they bear were manipulated. The contention that the City never sent the disqualification letters is flatly contradicted by the inclusion of those letters in the record with the corresponding postmarked envelopes and certified mail receipts. And the assertion that those letters are unreliable evidence because the postmarks they bear were manipulated is conclusory and unsupported by any facts. Petty has not demonstrated the extraordinary circumstances that would warrant equitable tolling. See Zerilli-Edelglass v. N.Y.C. Transit Auth., 333 F.3d 74, 80-81 (2d Cir.2003).

We have considered all of Petty’s arguments and find them to be without merit. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.

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