Pettit v. AUSTIN LOGGING COMPANY

497 P.2d 207, 9 Or. App. 347, 1972 Ore. App. LEXIS 979
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
DecidedMay 18, 1972
Docket6321
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 497 P.2d 207 (Pettit v. AUSTIN LOGGING COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pettit v. AUSTIN LOGGING COMPANY, 497 P.2d 207, 9 Or. App. 347, 1972 Ore. App. LEXIS 979 (Or. Ct. App. 1972).

Opinion

*349 THORNTON, J.

This is an appeal by the employer from an adverse order of the circuit court adopting the findings of the hearing officer and the Workmen’s Compensation Board (with one exception), affirming the orders of the hearing officer and Board in favor of claimant, and awarding $1,000 attorney fees for the appeal to the circuit court.

Claimant was employed by Austin Logging Company as a eat skinner. In the latter part of June 1967 while yarding logs with a D8 cat in a particularly hilly and rocky area, claimant reported that he had suffered a back injury as a result of “jarring and jolting.” On July 6 he saw Dr. Caughran, stating that he had injured his back while operating the eat and was suffering from numbness in his legs. The doctor diagnosed his condition as “Acute Lumbosacral Strain; Possible herniated disc” and referred him to a surgeon. He continued working for several days, however, in spite of extreme difficulty and discomfort.

On July 10 he saw Dr. Samuel, a chiropractic physician, then on July 14 Dr. Luce, a surgeon. The latter recommended x-rays of the dorsal spine, myelography and surgery, which were subsequently carried out the latter part of July. Claimant returned to work in November 1967. The symptoms recurred after defendant had been working about two months.

In February 1968 claimant returned to Dr. Luce, who recommended, following examination and x-rays, a repeat myelography and that claimant should discontinue working. The second myelography on April 9, and the third on October 14, were performed. On October 21 Dr. Luce reported that the claimant must be considered as a multiple sclerosis suspect. Claimant was referred to Dr. Dow in Portland.

*350 On November 14, 1968, Dr. Dow reported that in Ms opinion claimant had multiple sclerosis. He believed that the claimant’s temporary improvement in condition was due to a remission of the multiple sclerosis and that the surgery was not the reason for the improvement.

On January 10, 1969, the insurance carrier for the employer notified claimant that it was denying responsibility for multiple sclerosis and submitting the medical records to the Workmen’s Compensation Board and requesting a determination of benefits in Ms claim. In February the Director of the Closing and Evaluation Division of the Workmen’s Compensation Board wrote to the carrier requesting a current examination of claimant by Dr. Luce. The doctor reported on March 3 that it was unnecessary to reexamine claimant, stating that there were no permanent residuals that could be separated from the multiple sclerosis and he did not consider that there was any relationship between the injury and multiple sclerosis. On March 31 the division made its award of temporary total disability to March 4, 1969, less time worked, and made no award of permanent partial disability resulting from the injury.

Dr. Swank examined claimant on October 15, 1969, and reported January 13, 1970, as follows: That the disease was not necessarily aggravated by the work which claimant was doing, except that it may have been too strenuous; that from his experience surgery on patients with multiple sclerosis was hazardous because it was apt to precipitate exacerbation of the disease; that in his opinion the laminectomy by virtue of causing an exacerbation of the multiple sclerosis, plus the multiple sclerosis itself, had rendered the *351 workman incapable of being gainfully and suitably employed.

The hearing officer made the following determinations: (1) That the defendant accept the claim of claimant for aggravation of the pre-existing multiple sclerosis condition for processing, for payment of appropriate temporary total disability benefits from March 4, 1969, until the claim is closed in accordance with OES 656.268; (2) that the claim be remanded to the Closing and Evaluation Division of the Workmen’s Compensation Board for determination of permanent disability, including the multiple sclerosis aggravation; and (3) that the claimant’s attorney be awarded $950, to be paid by defendant.

Thereupon the defendant filed its request for review, and the Workmen’s Compensation Board entered its order on review. The defendant then filed its notice of appeal, following which, on August 10, 1971, a hearing was held before the circuit judge. After oral argument the court rendered its decision. The findings of the hearing officer were for the most part accepted, except as supplemented by the judge and striking the award of attorney fees to be paid by defendant.

On appeal the employer makes the following contentions :

(1) That employer’s letter of January 10, 1969, denying responsibility for the multiple sclerosis and “submitting all of the medical reports in your case to the Workmen’s Compensation Board and we are requesting a determination of benefits in your claim” was a valid and effective “partial denial” of claimant’s claim and became res judicata with claimant’s failure to contest such denial;

*352 (2) That even if the hearing officer did properly consider this issue the evidence fails to show that claimant’s work and medical treatment aggravated his condition; and

(3) The trial judge abused his discretion in awarding excessive attorney fees for the proceedings in circuit court.

Judicial review of compensation claims is de novo on the record to the same extent as in appellate review proceedings in equity. Hannan v. Good Samaritan Hosp., 4 Or App 178, 471 P2d 831, 476 P2d 931 (1970), Sup Ct review denied (1971).

Taking up the employer’s first point, we agree with the trial judge, the Board and the hearing officer’s opinion and order that the letter of January 10, 1969, was ambiguous; that it was neither a denial of a compensable claim ab initio nor a denial of a claim of aggravation of the pre-existing multiple sclerosis. The letter, while purporting to disclaim “responsibility from multiple sclerosis,” advised the claimant that the claim was being submitted to the Board for a “determination of benefits in your claim.” However, the claim had already been accepted and was in fact on January 17, 1969, submitted to the Board for determination under ORS 656.268. A determination order of the Board on March 31, 1969, awarded claimant compensation for temporary total disability to March 4, 1969, less time he had worked. Further, the letter was not a valid and effective denial of the multiple sclerosis. As the hearing officer held, “[t]he carrier did not expressly disclaim responsibility for aggravation and it will not be inferred.” It failed to state with reasonable certainty what was being denied as required by ORS 656.262 (6).

*353 The trial judge in the case at bar in his opinion stated:

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Related

Reeves v. Sierra Homes
563 P.2d 1242 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1977)
Muncy v. State Accident Insurance Fund
529 P.2d 407 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1974)
Compton v. Tillamook Veneer Co.
499 P.2d 1367 (Court of Appeals of Oregon, 1972)

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Bluebook (online)
497 P.2d 207, 9 Or. App. 347, 1972 Ore. App. LEXIS 979, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pettit-v-austin-logging-company-orctapp-1972.