Pettersen v. Circle K Stores Inc.

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 10 11 WILLIAM D. PETTERSEN, individually Case No.: 3:21-cv-00237-RBM-BGS and on behalf of all others similarly 12 situated, ORDER DENYING WITHOUT 13 PREJUDICE MOTION TO SEAL Plaintiffs,

14 v. [Doc. 82] 15 CIRCLE K STORES, INC., an Arizona 16 Corporation, and DOES 1-10, 17 Defendant. 18 19 20 Currently pending before the Court is a motion to seal filed by Plaintiff William D. 21 Pettersen (“Plaintiff”). (Doc. 82 (“Mot.”).) For the reasons discussed below, Plaintiff’s 22 motion to seal is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE. 24 “[T]he courts of this country recognize a general right to inspect and copy public 25 records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Nixon v. Warner 26 Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 597 (1978). “Unless a particular court record is one 27 ‘traditionally kept secret,’ a ‘strong presumption in favor of access’ is the starting point.” 28 Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (citing Foltz v. 1 State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 331 F.3d 1122, 1135 (9th Cir. 2003)). “The presumption 2 of access is ‘based on the need for federal courts, although independent—indeed, 3 particularly because they are independent—to have a measure of accountability and for the 4 public to have confidence in the administration of justice.’” Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler 5 Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 6 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995)). 7 A party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of overcoming the strong 8 presumption of public access. Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1135. The showing required to meet this 9 burden depends upon whether the documents to be sealed relate to a motion that is “more 10 than tangentially related to the merits of the case.” Ctr. for Auto Safety, 809 F.3d at 1102. 11 When the underlying motion is more than tangentially related to the merits, the 12 “compelling reasons” standard applies. Id. at 1096–98. When the underlying motion does 13 not surpass the tangential relevance threshold, the “good cause” standard applies. Id. 14 The “compelling reasons” standard is generally satisfied if the moving party can 15 show that the “‘court files might have become a vehicle for improper purposes,’ such as 16 the use of records to gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate libelous 17 statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quoting Nixon, 435 18 U.S. at 598). The decision to seal documents is “one best left to the sound discretion of 19 the trial court” upon consideration of “the relevant facts and circumstances of the particular 20 case.” Nixon, 435 U.S. at 599. 22 Plaintiff seeks to seal certain documents in connection with Plaintiff’s opposition to 23 the motion for summary judgment filed by Defendant Circle K Stores, Inc. (“Defendant”), 24 including: (1) Exhibits 19, 20 and 32 to the Declaration of L. Timothy Fisher; and (2) 25 portions of the Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Plaintiff’s Opposition 26 to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. (Mot. at 2.) Plaintiff states these 27 documents were marked confidential by Defendant pursuant to the parties’ stipulated 28 protective order and were designated confidential because they refer to Defendant’s 1 internal business practices. (Id.) 2 At the outset, the Court notes that one party’s designation of a document as 3 “Confidential” does not, standing alone, demonstrate that the documents should be shielded 4 from public access. See, e.g., Foltz, 331 F.3d at 1136 (“[T]he presumption of access is not 5 rebutted where, as here, documents subject to a protective order are filed under seal as 6 attachments to a dispositive motion.”); In re Packaged Seafood Prod. Antitrust Litig., No. 7 15-MD-2670 JLS (MDD), 2020 WL 6395595, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2020) (“That a 8 document is designated confidential pursuant to a protective order is of little weight when 9 it comes to sealing court filings.”); In re Incretin Mimetics Prod. Liab. Litig., No. 10 13MD2452 AJB MDD, 2014 WL 1912731, at *2 (S.D. Cal. May 13, 2014) (“Though the 11 Parties themselves may have stipulated to the confidential nature of this information, the 12 ‘compelling reasons’ standard is invoked even if the motion, or its attachments, were 13 previously filed under seal or protective order.”) (citing Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179). 14 Additionally, in accordance with Section IV of this Court’s Civil Chamber Rules, 15 any motion to seal predicated solely on the opposing party’s designation of the document 16 as sensitive under a protective order, including with a “confidential” or “attorneys’ eyes 17 only” designation, must be accompanied by a response from the designating party within 18 seven days of the motion filing date, demonstrating that the sealing standard has been 19 satisfied for the document or information at issue. See Civil Chamber Rules § IV(B). To 20 date, Defendant has failed to file any response to Plaintiff’s motion to seal. (See generally 21 Docket.) However, in light of the potentially commercially sensitive information at issue, 22 the Court will grant Defendant until March 29, 2023 to file a response, if any, to Plaintiff’s 23 sealing motion. 25 For the reasons discussed above, Plaintiff’s motion to seal (Doc. 82), is DENIED 26 WITHOUT PREJUDICE. Defendant may file a response to Plaintiff’s motion to seal, in 27 accordance with Section IV of this Court’s Civil Chamber Rules, on or before March 29, 28 2023. Such response should make clear if Defendant seeks to seal each document in part 1 in full. In the event Defendant files such a response, Plaintiff need not refile its motion 2 ||to seal. Defendant’s March 29, 2023 deadline to file a response remains in effect 3 || notwithstanding the Court’s March 1 Order staying this case and vacating all pending 4 || dates. 6 |} DATE: March 1, 2023 _ Za errs Mote D 8 HON. RUTH BERMUDEZ MONTENEGRO UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28