Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance

Supreme Court

Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance

350 U.S. 495, 76 S. Ct. 490, 100 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 L. Ed. 639, 1956 U.S. LEXIS 1204

CourtSupreme Court of the United States

DecidedMarch 26, 1956

Docket469

StatusPublished

Cited by54 cases

This text of 350 U.S. 495 (Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of the United States primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Petrowski v. Hawkeye-Security Insurance, 350 U.S. 495, 76 S. Ct. 490, 100 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 L. Ed. 639, 1956 U.S. LEXIS 1204 (1956).

Pincite

Opinion

Per Curiam.

Respondent, Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, filed a motion to quash the return of service of summons on the grounds that the District Court acquired no personal jurisdiction over it and that the power of attorney which it had filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of Wisconsin did not authorize him to accept service of process for it in this case. After this motion was denied, respondent filed its answer to the complaint in which it again pressed its claim that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Subsequently, however, respondent filed (1) a motion to amend its answer and to interplead; (2) a counterclaim; (3) a stipulation and order adding a party-plaintiff and amending the complaint and answer; and (4) a stipulation that judgment be entered against the alleged insured in favor of the additional party-plaintiff. The latter *496 stipulation included the following provision, together with others consistent with it and confirmatory of its purpose:

“1. That each of the parties to this stipulation voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the above entitled Court without service of process herein, the same as if personal service had been obtained by each against the other.”

Following a trial on the merits, judgment was entered against respondent, but the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed on the ground that respondent’s motion to quash should have been granted. 226 F. 2d 126.

Upon examination of the record and the law, we conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and that respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over it. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to it for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

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Per Curiam.

Respondent, Hawkeye-Security Insurance Company, filed a motion to quash the return of service of summons on the grounds that the District Court acquired no personal jurisdiction over it and that the power of attorney which it had filed with the Commissioner of Motor Vehicles of the State of Wisconsin did not authorize him to accept service of process for it in this case. After this motion was denied, respondent filed its answer to the complaint in which it again pressed its claim that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Subsequently, however, respondent filed (1) a motion to amend its answer and to interplead; (2) a counterclaim; (3) a stipulation and order adding a party-plaintiff and amending the complaint and answer; and (4) a stipulation that judgment be entered against the alleged insured in favor of the additional party-plaintiff. The latter *496 stipulation included the following provision, together with others consistent with it and confirmatory of its purpose:

“1. That each of the parties to this stipulation voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of the above entitled Court without service of process herein, the same as if personal service had been obtained by each against the other.”

Following a trial on the merits, judgment was entered against respondent, but the Court of Appeals, with one judge dissenting, reversed on the ground that respondent’s motion to quash should have been granted. 226 F. 2d 126.

Upon examination of the record and the law, we conclude that the District Court had jurisdiction of the subject matter and that respondent, by its stipulation, waived any right to assert a lack of personal jurisdiction over it. We, therefore, reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case to it for further proceedings.

Reversed and remanded.

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Bluebook (online)

350 U.S. 495, 76 S. Ct. 490, 100 L. Ed. 2d 639, 100 L. Ed. 639, 1956 U.S. LEXIS 1204, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petrowski-v-hawkeye-security-insurance-scotus-1956.

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