Petronelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services

CourtUnited States Court of Federal Claims
DecidedMarch 21, 2016
Docket12-285
StatusUnpublished

This text of Petronelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services (Petronelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Federal Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petronelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, (uscfc 2016).

Opinion

In the United States Court of Federal Claims OFFICE OF SPECIAL MASTERS No. 12-285V Filed: February 22, 2016 (Unpublished) ********************* MONTEZ PETRONELLI, * * Special Master Gowen Petitioner, * v. * * Damages; Influenza; SECRETARY OF HEALTH * Guillain-Barré Syndrome; Attorney; AND HUMAN SERVICES, * Lost Wages. * Respondent. * ********************* Ronald C. Homer, Conway Homer & Chin-Caplan, P.C., Boston, MA, for petitioner. Michael P. Milmoe, United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C., for respondent.

RULING ON DAMAGES1

A hearing to obtain testimony from petitioner on the issue of damages was held on February 10, 2016. At the conclusion of the hearing, the undersigned issued a bench ruling awarding petitioner damages for past and future lost wages, past pain and suffering, past unreimburseable expenses, and various life care items. This order memorializes my bench ruling.

Based on this ruling, the parties are ORDERED to file a joint status report by Thursday, March 3, 2016 providing the net present value of the amounts awarded to petitioner for future wage loss and items for future life care, at a 1% discount rate. See Pet. Ex. 17.

I. Past and Future Lost Wages

The undersigned considered all of the parties’ filings in support of their respective positions on issues related to petitioner’s damages. On the issue of petitioner’s lost wages, petitioner’s vocational expert reports and supportive literature, her testimony at the hearing, and the striking

1 Because this ruling contains a reasoned explanation for the undersigned’s action in this case, the undersigned intends to post this ruling on the website of the United States Court of Federal Claims, in accordance with the E-Government Act of 2002, 44 U.S.C. § 3501 note (2012) (Federal Management and Promotion of Electronic Government Services). As provided by Vaccine Rule 18(b), each party has 14 days within which to request redaction “of any information furnished by that party: (1) that is a trade secret or commercial or financial in substance and is privileged or confidential; or (2) that includes medical files or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy.” Vaccine Rule 18(b). impression of her current condition persuasively established that she is completely disabled from either professional employment as an attorney or other competitive employment. This finding is also well supported by the medical records.

In detail, a questionnaire completed by petitioner’s treating neurologist, Dr. Jai Hee Cho, on August 22, 2013, noted that petitioner’s difficulties with walking, standing, higher cognitive functions, concentration, memory, judgment and significant fatigue were consistent with her diagnosis of Guillain-Barré Syndrome, albeit the severity and persistence of these symptoms were unusual. Petitioner’s Exhibit (“Pet. Ex.”) 27 at 1. Dr. Thanh Teresa Dao, petitioner’s treating physician, certified (on an application to the United States Department of Education to discharge petitioner’s student loans based on total and permanent disability2) that petitioner was “unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity in any field of work by reason of a medically determinable physical or mental impairment . . . .” Pet. Ex. 18 at 5. Dr. Dao wrote that as a result of petitioner’s Guillain-Barré Syndrome she was “unable to sit [greater than] 1 [hour] at a time due to pain and pressure in lower extremities,” was “unable to stand [greater than] 15 [minutes] due to fatigue,” was dependent on a cane or wheelchair to walk, was exhausted after “basic self- care activities” (which would then cause her to need “rest for hours afterwards to recuperate”), and had “difficulty concentrating due to [a] combination of Guillain-Barré Syndrome related cognitive impairment, but also due to chronic pain and medication side effects.” Id. Dr. Dao’s medical opinion, based on an evaluation of petitioner, was entirely consistent with my own observations of petitioner’s behavior at the hearing on February 10, 2016. Specifically, petitioner would stand or need a break from testifying every twenty to twenty-five minutes, would lose her train of thought and become aphasic as a result of what she described as flares of pain, and became increasingly fatigued as the proceedings continued. Petitioner testified that standing and/or switching her body’s positioning was a technique she learned from a pain management program to help her cope with chronic pain. The undersigned found petitioner to be credible and persuasive, both in her testimony and behavior.

Lastly, on the issue of whether petitioner is completely disabled from employment, Dr. Stephen Kalat, a neuropsychologist, assessed petitioner’s neurocognitive status on November 19, 2014 and summarized that “Ms. Petronelli [was] disabled from either professional employment or competitive employment” “based on her performance during the examination and her history of cyclic patterns of increasing pain . . . .” Pet. Ex. 21 at 13. Dr. Kalat completed petitioner’s neuropsychological evaluation over the course of three days (when in most cases, according to Dr. Kalat, a patient would complete a study in one day) because she “presented with increasing pain over the three days of testing due to [the] cognitive demands of the testing process,” she evidenced significant pain behaviors, having to get up, take breaks, and move around in response to her pain, and because she had difficulty with performing tasks for three days in a row.” Id. at 13. Dr. Kalat noted petitioner’s pain was “often 1-3 on average, and was 6.5/10 at the time of [the] initial interview.” Id. He further described that petitioner’s “pain flare-ups [would] go from 6 to 10 on a 1-10 scale of pain severity” and that stress and cognitive challenges increase[ed] her pain level . . . .” Id. Dr. Kalat concluded that petitioner’s “cognitive-type complaints [were] related to her chronic pain condition[,] which impinge[d] on her attentional capacities.” Id. at 12. He further concluded that her chronic pain appear[ed] to cause chronic stress, variations in mood, sleep 2 Petitioner’s application was approved on December 31, 2013, discharging approximately $137,000 of student loans based on total and permanent disability. 2 disturbance, fatigue, and other aspects of suffering, such as its high degree of interference in her life goals, secondary to her disability.” Id. at 12. Dr. Kalat found petitioner credible and not “exaggerating her cognitive complaints or her psychological condition.” Id. Petitioner passed all the validity and reliability indicators of the neuropsychological exam. Id.

Petitioner’s vocational expert, Dr. Staci Schonbrun, opined that, based on the above physical and mental limitations noted in the record, it seemed “unlikely” that petitioner would be capable of maintaining gainful employment on either a part-time or full-time basis. See Pet. Ex. 37 at 3-4; Pet. Ex. 23. The undersigned agrees. Respondent’s vocational expert, Mr. Edward Bennett, believed that, based on the “objective” medical records, “nothing would preclude petitioner from returning to work as an associate attorney with an allowance for self-and/or reasonable accommodations.” Respondent’s Exhibit (“Res. Ex.”) J at 3. Mr. Bennett’s opinion was unpersuasive as the undersigned found his vocational reports unreliable and not credible. For example, Mr. Bennett mischaracterized and disregarded petitioner’s seven years of practice as in- house counsel in order to significantly underreport petitioner’s past earnings to then conclude that she was not entitled to past lost wages because her post-injury earnings capacity would be twice her pre-injury earnings. See Res. Ex. D at 111-14.

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Related

§ 300aa-15
42 U.S.C. § 300aa-15(a)(4)
Purposes
44 U.S.C. § 3501
§ 300a
42 U.S.C. § 300a

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Petronelli v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petronelli-v-secretary-of-health-and-human-services-uscfc-2016.