Petroleum Exploration v. United States

404 F. Supp. 93, 53 Oil & Gas Rep. 225, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 461, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15527
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. West Virginia
DecidedOctober 31, 1975
DocketCiv. A. No. C-69-2-C
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 404 F. Supp. 93 (Petroleum Exploration v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. West Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petroleum Exploration v. United States, 404 F. Supp. 93, 53 Oil & Gas Rep. 225, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 461, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15527 (N.D.W. Va. 1975).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

OREN R. LEWIS, Senior District Judge, Sitting by Designation.

The plaintiff is an integrated distributor and producer of natural gas in the geographical area of Eastern Kentucky known as the Clay-Knox Field. Almost all of the gas comes from wells located within the Clay-Knox Field, most of which are owned by the plaintiff. Some are owned by independent producers— most sell their gas to the plaintiff— there are no other buyers of natural gas in Clay County — the plaintiff together with the Knox Gas Company and Cumberland Valley Pipe Lines purchased all of the known production of natural gas in Knox County.

The plaintiff collects and distributes the gas thus produced to towns in or near the geographical area in question.

Bickering over the proper depletion allowance has been going on between the plaintiff and the Internal Revenue Service since the early 1930s — a settlement was agreed upon in 1933 wherein IRS used a price of 250 mcf for the depletion computation — this price was arrived at by using the so-called “roll back” from the 330 mcf sales price.

Although the record here made is silent as to the depletion claimed and/or allowed for the thirty years between [95]*951933 and 1963, IRS has questioned an‘d disallowed the amount claimed by the plaintiff for the years 1963 and 1964. After much further bickering IRS levied a deficiency assessment against the plaintiff for the years in question — the deficiency was paid and this tax refund suit followed in January of 1969.

Three United States district judges for the Northern District of West Virginia have devoted a considerable amount of time since that date in getting this case ready for trial — pretrial orders governing the trial, which was set for May 20, 1975, were entered by Chief Judge Robert E. Maxwell of the Northern District of West Virginia.

The Government demanded and was granted a jury trial for the fixing of the mcf price to be used by the Court in computing the plaintiff’s depletion allowance for the years in question. The case was then assigned to the undersigned.

The plaintiff alleged there was no representative market or field price for gas in the Clay-Knox Field for the years in question — the Government claimed there was. Both sides produced documentary and expert testimony in support of their respective positions — both agreed that representative market or field price at the wellhead governs. Neither could or would define representative market or field price, or could or would give the Court any gauge or yardstick for the jury to follow in fixing the representative price to be used in computing the depletion in this case.

For these and other reasons stated at the conclusion of the May 20th hearing the Court ruled that neither party had produced sufficient evidence to establish a representative market or field price for natural gas in the Clay-Knox Field for the years in question. The jury was then dismissed, and the Government’s motion for a directed verdict was denied —the Court then announced that it would compute the plaintiff’s depletion allowance for the years in question in accordance with Paragraph 14(e) of the pretrial order.1

Before so doing the Court requested that each side advise the Court of any comparable fields that might be used in making this computation and to suggest any alternative methods that they would like the Court to consider in making this computation — Both sides complied.

Further hearing on the method of computation to be used was held on August 25th at which time both sides presented additional documentary and expert evidence in support of and in opposition to their respective positions.

The Government offered little help in the premises — they suggested three so-called comparable areas, created in the main by adding a part or all of an adjacent county or so to all or a part of the Clay-Knox geographical area. They offered no alternative method of computing .the depletion allowance, claiming there was a representative market or field price for natural gas in the Clay-Knox Field and that the Court erred in not so finding — they seem to take the position that since Treasury Regulation 1.613-3(a) provides for no other method of pricing gas for depletion purposes, no alternative method can be used absent the rare and unlikely event of finding a field without a representative wellhead market or field price — this in the face of the Court of Claims comment in the first and second Hugoton cases, 315 F. 2d 868 (1963) and 349 F.2d 418 (1965), and in Panhandle Eastern Pipe Line Company v. United States, 408 F.2d 690, 187 Ct.Cl. 129 (1969), wherein the Court said:

“ . . . [W]e read the language in question to mean that the applicable regulation requires the use of a ‘representative market or field price,’ if [96]*96an acceptable price of such nature can be ' established. Neither the court’s decision . . . nor.the regulation requires the impossible, i. e., the use of a price that cannot be determined representative, or as precluding us from applying some other formula that produces a fair result. ■ To hold otherwise would mean that in the instant proceeding the Government has successfully presented to plaintiff a ‘heads I win, tails you lose’ proposition.”

It is also significant to note that it was the Government in the first Hugo-ton case, not the taxpayer, that contended there was no representative field price.

The plaintiff contended in its pleadings and during the May 20th trial that there was no representative market or field price for wellhead gas in the Clay-Knox Field and that the Court should use the roll-back basis for the purpose of computing its depletion allowance.

They reiterated this position during the August 25th hearing and suggested four additional methods of computation, namely—

The average wellhead price of gas produced in Eastern Kentucky for the years involved.
The Federal Power Commission pricing policies, adjusted by the cost of gathering such gas.
The weighted average sale price of all unprocessed gas sold in the Clay-Knox Field, adjusted by the deduction of gathering charges.
The weighted average of wellhead sales of produced gas sold in a local utility market similar to that of the plaintiff’s operation in the Clay-Knox Field.

The defendant’s expert testified during the May 20th trial that the representative wellhead price of natural gas in the Clay-Knox Field was 15.90 and 17.60 per mcf for the years in question. The additional evidence introduced during the' August 25th hearing for crosschecking purposes disclosed substantially the same mcf prices for the years in question.

The plaintiff’s roll-back prices for the years in question were 31.8 mcf and 31.3 mcf.

Kentucky wellhead prices were 23.9 and 23.7 mcf.
Eastern Kentucky gas was 26 mcf for both years.
The Federal Power Commission pricing policy permitted 250 mcf as the adjusted price for the years in question.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Petroleum Exploration v. United States
551 F.2d 308 (Fourth Circuit, 1977)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
404 F. Supp. 93, 53 Oil & Gas Rep. 225, 37 A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 461, 1975 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15527, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petroleum-exploration-v-united-states-wvnd-1975.