Petrini v. Naran

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 21, 2025
• Docket: 5:25-cv-02896
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 7 KATRINA POPOVICH PETRINI, et al., Case No. 25-cv-02896-SVK

8 Plaintiffs, SCREENING ORDER PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) 9 v.

10 SARJU NARAN, et al., Re: Dkt. No. 15 11 Defendants.

12 On March 28, 2025, Plaintiffs Katrina P. Petrini and Bunker B.W. Roggee, appearing self- 13 represented, filed a civil complaint (Dkt. 1 the “Complaint”) and a motion for leave to proceed in 14 forma pauperis (Dkt. 2 “original IFP Application”). After the Court denied Plaintiffs’ original IFP 15 application, (Dkt. 5), Plaintiffs filed amended IFP applications, (Dkts. 6, 7 (the “Renewed IFP 16 Applications”)). On May 22, 2025, the Court granted Plaintiffs’ Renewed IFP Applications and, 17 upon a Section 1915 screening, found that the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief and 18 ordered Plaintiffs to amend their complaint by June 12, 2025. Dkt. 12 (the “Prior Order”). 19 This action relates to an earlier state court lawsuit in which Defendants, including a law 20 firm who represented Plaintiff Petrini’s former employer, filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff 21 Petrini that included a claim for violation to California Penal Code Section 502, the Computer 22 Data Access and Fraud Act. See Dkt. 1, Ex. A. The Complaint alleged that the state court lawsuit 23 resulted in an unfavorable judgment against Plaintiff Petrini and that the judgment has been 24 enforced against Plaintiffs’ property in Texas. See generally Dkt. 1. Before the Court is 25 Plaintiffs’ Amended Complaint, filed on June 12, 2025, pursuant to the Prior Order. Dkt. 15 (the 26 “FAC”).1 27 1 This Order screens Plaintiffs’ FAC pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) requiring screening for 2 civil actions filed in forma pauperis. For the reasons below, the Court concludes that the first, 3 second and third causes of action in the FAC fail to state a claim for relief and leave to amend 4 those claims would be futile. Thus, the Court will RECOMMEND the first three causes of action 5 be DISMISSED.2 The Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the fourth cause of action 6 as pleaded in the FAC, although leave to amend the fourth cause of action may not be futile. 7 Accordingly, as to the fourth cause of action only, the Court DISMISSES WITH LEAVE TO 8 AMEND no later than August 20, 2025. 9 I. SCREENING UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 10 A. Legal Standard 11 Federal district courts must screen civil actions filed in forma pauperis to ensure that the 12 complaint states a claim, is not frivolous and does not seek monetary relief against a defendant 13 who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 112-27 14 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). A “frivolous” complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in 15 fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). The Ninth Circuit has noted that 16 § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) parallels the language of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Barren v. 17 Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998). Both Rule 12(b)(6) and § 1915(e)(2)(B) require 18 a district court to dismiss a complaint that fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 19 A “complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to 20 relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. 21 Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) provides that 22 a pleading must contain a “short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction” 23 and a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” 24 Although a plaintiff “does not need detailed factual allegations,” a plaintiff must still provide 25 2 Plaintiffs have consented to the jurisdiction of a magistrate judge, (Dkts. 8, 9), but Defendants 26 have not. All named parties must consent before a magistrate judge has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(1) to hear and decide a case. See Williams v. King, 875 F.3d 500, 203 (9th Cir. 27 2017). Accordingly, following the opportunity for leave to amend the fourth cause of action, the 1 enough “[f]actual allegations . . . to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Twombly, 2 550 U.S. at 555. Pursuant to a Section 1915 review, “[d]ismissal is proper only if it is clear that 3 the plaintiff cannot prove any set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle him to relief.” 4 Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (citations omitted). 5 In its review, the Court liberally construes pro se pleadings. Wilhelm v. Rotman, 680 F.3d 6 1113, 1121 (9th Cir. 2012). Moreover, a “court should not dismiss a pro se complaint without 7 leave to amend unless ‘it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be 8 cured by amendment.’” Id. (quoting Schucker v. Rockwood, 846 F.2d 1202, 1203–04 (9th 9 Cir.1988) (per curiam). 10 B. Analysis 11 Regarding diversity jurisdiction requirements under 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the Court construes 12 Plaintiffs’ allegations as sufficient.3 The Court previously screened Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which 13 pled three causes of action, and granted leave to amend each cause of action: (1) violation of 42 14 U.S.C. § 1983; (2) malicious prosecution; and (3) emotional distress. Dkt. 12 at 3. “All three 15 causes of action [were] premised on the assertion that Defendants instituted a criminal proceeding 16 against Plaintiff Petrini in California state court.” Id. (citing Dkt. 1) (emphasis in original). 17 Because the state court cross-complaint was a civil action, not a criminal proceeding, the Court 18 found the Complaint failed to state a claim for relief. Dkt. 12 at 4. After considering the 19 amendments, the Court finds the FAC similarly fails to state a claim for relief in the first, second 20 and third causes of action. The Court also lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the fourth cause 21 of action. 22 //// 23 //// 24 //// 25 3 The Prior Order explained that “[p]laintiffs allege that this Court has subject matter jurisdiction 26 based on diversity because they ‘are from Comal County Texas,’ ‘Defendants are from San Jose, California,’ and the amount in controversy is over $171,000.” Dkt. 12 at 3 (quoting Dkt. 1 at 2). 27 The FAC alleges the same basis for diversity jurisdiction as the original Complaint. Dkt 15 at 2. 1 1. The FAC Fails to State a Claim for Relief for the First, Second and Third Causes of Action 2 Plaintiffs’ FAC attempts to claim the same three causes of action as the Complaint and 3 adds a fourth cause of action for extrinsic fraud. Dkt. 15 at 15. The FAC first supplements these 4 claims with a “Definitions” section defining the phrase “Penal Code.” Id. at 2. However, the first 5 two causes of action do not contain additional allegations. Compare Dkt. 15 at 5-10 with Dkt. 1 at 6 5-10. The third cause of action contains additional caselaw references and explanations of 7 California Penal Code Section 502 but no new factual allegations. Dkt. 13 at 12-14. 8 The claims in the FAC rely on an alleged criminal proceeding, yet the allegations and 9 supporting documents undermines the existence of any criminal proceeding because the state court 10 cross-complaint against Plaintiff Petrini is a civil cross-complaint. See Dkt. 1 at 21. As the Court 11 previously noted, “the state court cross-complaint contains a claim for violation of California 12 Penal Code § 502.” Dkt. 12 at 4 (citing id.). To support the allegation of criminal prosecution, 13 Plaintiffs cite the definition of “penal code”: “a code of laws concerning crimes and offenses and 14 their punishment,” (Dkt. 15 at 2 (citing Meriam Webster Dictionary)) and claim that “[Section] 15 502(e)(1) does not allow civil litigation unless 502(c) is criminally prosecuted first.” Dkt. 15 at 6. 16 But the citation to Meriam Webster’s Dictionary is inconclusive, and Plaintiffs’ other contention is 17 inaccurate: No portion of section 502(e) requires criminal prosecution before bringing a civil 18 action under the statute. To the contrary, Section 502(e)(1) permits “the owner or lessee of the 19 computer, computer system, computer network, computer program or date” to “bring a civil action 20 against the violator” when the violator causes “damage or loss by reason of a violation of any of 21 the provisions of subdivision (c)….” Cal. Penal C. § 502(e)(1) (emphasis added). The Court 22 understands Plaintiffs’ confusion; the cross-complaint refers to the Penal Code, but the claim 23 asserted pursuant to the Penal Code is civil in nature as evidenced by the language of Section 24 502(e)(1) and the “CV” (civil) case number. Dkt. 12 at 4 (citing Dkt 1. at 21). As a result, 25 Plaintiffs’ premise underlying the first three causes of action in the FAC is fatally flawed, and the 26 additional references do not cure this pleading defect. 27 The Court previously granted leave to amend the Complaint with the suggestion that 1 “Plaintiff might be able to sue one or more of the Defendants based on the allegations that they 2 improperly pursued a civil action” against her. Dkt. 12 at 4 (emphasis in original). However, in 3 the FAC, Plaintiffs maintain the premise that the state court cross-complaint was a criminal 4 proceeding to support of the first, second and third causes of action. See, generally, Dkt. 15. 5 Because the FAC does not amend this mistaken premise and additional pleadings cannot cure this 6 defect, the Court finds that any further leave to amend these claims would be futile. See, e.g., Paul 7 G. v. Monterey Peninsula Unified Sch. Dist., No. 16-cv-05582-BLF, 2018 WL 2763302, at *12 8 (N.D. Cal. June 8, 2018) (“failure to cure the identified deficiency and lack of indication that [a 9 plaintiff is] able to do so show that leave to amend would be futile.”). Thus, following the 10 opportunity to amend only the fourth cause of action explained below, the Court will direct that 11 this case be reassigned and will RECOMMEND DISMISSAL of the first, second and third 12 causes of action in Plaintiffs’ FAC WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 13 2. The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine Bars the Court’s Subject Matter Jurisdiction Over the Fourth Cause of Action 14 The fourth cause of action, newly added to the FAC, attempts to state a claim for relief 15 from the state court judgment based on extrinsic fraud. Dkt. 15 at 15. The Court concludes that 16 the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars subject matter jurisdiction over this cause of action but, as 17 explained below, grants leave to amend the FAC’s pleading deficiencies regarding extrinsic fraud. 18 The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject 19 matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment.” Kougasian v. 20 TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 21 U.S. 413 (1923) and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983)). A 22 plaintiff brings a forbidden de facto appeal and Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction 23 when the “federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state 24 court” and “seeks relief from a state court judgment” based on that decision. Kougasian, 359 F.3d 25 at 1140 (quoting Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1154 (9th Cir.2003)). However, if a “federal 26 plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker- 27 Feldman does not bar jurisdiction.” Noel, 341 F.3d at 1164. 1 Here, Plaintiffs’ fourth cause of action on its face asserts “as a legal wrong an allegedly 2 erroneous decision by a state court….” Id. at 1140. Plaintiffs allege that the “court clerk back 3 dated the granting” of the default judgment and “then denied the filing of plaintiffs answer.” Dkt. 4 15 at 15. Plaintiffs further allege that the court “denied the plaintiff[‘s] motion to set aside the 5 default judgment” which in turn caused an improper default judgment. Id. These allegations 6 claim legal errors by the state court; therefore, the first aspect of Rooker-Feldman is met. 7 However, Plaintiffs seek “relief from a state court judgment” due to a cause of action 8 labelled “Extrinsic Fraud.” Dkt. 15 at 15. “Extrinsic fraud is conduct which prevents a party from 9 presenting his claim in court.” Wood v. McEwen, 644 F.2d 797, 801 (9th Cir. 1981). “Extrinsic 10 fraud on a court is, by definition, not an error by th[e state] court. It is, rather, a wrongful act 11 committed by the party or parties who engaged in the fraud.” Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1141. 12 When a “federal plaintiff alleges a cause of action for extrinsic fraud on a state court and seeks to 13 set aside [that] state court judgment,” Rooker-Feldman does not bar a district court’s subject 14 matter jurisdiction. Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140. A claim of extrinsic fraud thus creates a “closer 15 Rooker-Feldman question, because (at least under California law) it provides the basis for setting 16 aside a state court judgment.” Miroth v. Cnty. of Trinity, 136 F.4th 1141, 1153 (9th Cir. 2025); 17 see also Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140-41 (delineating which pleadings of extrinsic fraud provide 18 an exception to Rooker-Feldman and which do not). 19 Thus, under the second part of the Rooker-Feldman inquiry, the Court must determine 20 whether Plaintiff seeks relief from a state court judgment based on (alleged) errors of the state 21 court or based on conduct by private Parties. See Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1140-41. According to 22 the FAC, Plaintiffs seek relief “from this illegal onslaught of civil rights violations” caused by “an 23 organized syndicate including judges and court clerks” in the Santa Clara County. Dkt. 15 at 19. 24 Thus, Plaintiffs appear to be requesting the Court set aside the state court judgment based on 25 errors of the state court, necessarily requiring this Court overrule the state-court judgment in 26 contravention of Rooker-Feldman. 27 Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ FAC constitutes a forbidden de facto appeal of the state court’s 1 Rooker-Feldman. Thus, as pleaded in the FAC, the Rooker-Feldman jurisdictional bar applies, 2 and Plaintiff’s fourth cause of action must be dismissed. 3 However, the fourth cause of action cites a monetary amount that could be a request for 4 damages. Dkt. 15 at 15 (“The plaintiffs have declared extrinsic fraud in the defendants’ 5 acquisition of the criminal judgment against the plaintiff for $171,564.56.”). If Plaintiffs were to 6 amend the fourth cause of action to allege wrongful conduct by a private party, rather than error of 7 the state court, such a claim, liberally construed, might invoke the extrinsic fraud exception to 8 Rooker-Feldman. Accordingly, in view of their self-represented status, the Court will give 9 Plaintiffs an opportunity to amend the fourth cause of action. In sum, the fourth cause of action is 10 DISMISSED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND. 11 II. CONCLUSION 12 Even measured by the liberal standards accorded pro se litigants, Plaintiffs’ FAC fails to 13 state a claim for relief on the first, second and third causes of action. For the reasons above, the 14 Court will RECOMMEND DISMISSAL of the first, second and third causes of action in 15 Plaintiffs’ FAC WITHOUT LEAVE TO AMEND. 16 The Ninth Circuit recognizes that “dismissals for lack of jurisdiction should be . . . without 17 prejudice so that a plaintiff may reassert his claims in a competent court.” Freeman v. Oakland 18 Unified Sch. Dist., 179 F.3d 846, 847 (9th Cir. 1999) (cleaned up). As explained above, the fourth 19 cause of action in the FAC could be amended such that subject matter jurisdiction is proper in this 20 Court. The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs LEAVE TO AMEND only the FAC’s fourth cause 21 of action. Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint is due by August 20, 2025. If Plaintiffs do not 22 file a Second Amended Complaint by the deadline, the Court will issue an order reassigning the 23 case to a District Judge with a recommendation that the case be dismissed. 24 The Court reminds Plaintiffs that the Federal Pro Se Program at the San Jose Courthouse 25 provides free information and limited-scope legal advice to pro se litigants in federal civil cases. 26 The Federal Pro Se Program is available by appointment and on a drop-in basis. The Federal Pro 27 Se Program is available at Room 2070 in the United States Courthouse in San Jose (Monday to ] handbook free of charge; a copy may be downloaded at https://cand.uscourts.gov/pro-se-handbook 2 || or obtained from the Clerk’s Office. 3 4 SO ORDERED. 5 || Dated: July 21, 2025 6 7 Srassmn yet SUSAN VAN KEULEN 8 United States Magistrate Judge 9 10 1] as 12

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