Petrie v. Torrent

58 N.W. 690, 100 Mich. 117, 1894 Mich. LEXIS 768
CourtMichigan Supreme Court
DecidedApril 17, 1894
StatusPublished
Cited by3 cases

This text of 58 N.W. 690 (Petrie v. Torrent) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Michigan Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petrie v. Torrent, 58 N.W. 690, 100 Mich. 117, 1894 Mich. LEXIS 768 (Mich. 1894).

Opinions

McGrath, C. J.

Both parties appeal from an accounting under a decree affirmed in 88 Mich. 43. The facts respecting the original agreement and the decree thereon are so fully set forth in that opinion that it is unnecessary to reiterate.

It is clear that the expenses incurred by either party [118]*118prior to the purchase were not to enter into any computation afterwards made; that defendant was to furnish the capital, buy and sell the property; that complainant was to receive for his expenses incurred prior to the purchase, and for his services, one-third of the profits; that defendant, in consideration of the use of his capital, and his services in connection with the disposition of the joroperty, was to receive two-thirds of the profits; and that defendant’s advances, and the expenses incident to the retention of the property until sale, and the expenses connected with such sale, should be first realized and paid out of the proceeds of the property. This disposes of defendant’s claims for expenses incurred in examining the land prior to the purchase, for services in connection with the sale of the property, for interest on advances and balances his objection to the disallowance of the claim for the bonus alleged to have been paid by him for the purpose of raising the money used in the purchase, and his objection to the charge against him for the rebate upon the purchase price, which was allowed him by reason of the cash payment of a part of such purchase price. Complainant held an option on the property, aud brought to defendant’s attention a transaction involving a large expenditure, but promising a margin of several hundred thousand dollars. Before the purchase, complainant had negotiated a sale of one of the tracts, and within a few days after defendant had made the first payment the transaction is credited with 1370,000, received from the sale so negotiated. Foresight and inventive genius are valuable, although the individuals entitled to credit for the same are ofttimes deprived of .the legitimate results. For his foresight and the option held by him, complainant was to receive one-third of the profits. He contracted for the use of defendant’s capital, and his executive ability, to be employed in the disposition of the property, and in consideration thereof defendant was to receive two-thirds of [119]*119the profits. It was a matter of no moment to complainant what bonus defendant would in turn have to pay in order to command that capital. It was not credit, but capital, that complainant contracted for; and the only bonus that he agreed should be paid therefor was two-thirds of the profits. The total sum paid out by defendant from October 23, 1886, to December 31, 1891, in excess of the purchase price, is less than $45,000, and at the close of the year 1888 he had in his hands a surplus, and at the close of the year 1891 that surplus reached nearly $260,000.

Complainant was also entitled to his share of any advantage secured by defendant by reason of the use of cash in the transaction. The purchase was made October 23, 1886. Defendant paid $500,000 in cash, and gave two notes for $134,589 each, — one for one year, without' interest; the other for two years, with interest after the first year at 6 per cent. In addition to the $370,000 aforesaid, within 90-days after the purchase defendant received from the sales, of said property notes and cash” aggregating $288,400, paid! his notes, and received a rebate of $5,364.05. We think that the transaction was entitled to be credited with the-sum so rebated.

Defendant's sixth exception relates to a charge of $3,000.. The S. O. Hall Lumber Company owned a mill and other-property, which was subject to an indebtedness of $15,000. Defendant exchanged the Long Lake mill, which was a. part of the property embraced in the deal, for the lumber company's mill, and received a note for $3,000, which-, was afterwards collected. He then sold the Hall mill and. property connected therewith, the purchaser paying him $5,000 in cash and assuming the indebtedness to which the-property was subject. Out of the transaction defendant, realized $8,000, but charged himself with the $5,000 only-The charge of $3,000 was proper.

[120]*120Defendant’s eighth exception relates to interest received by him upon notes given upon purchase of parts of the property. Defendant does not hesitate to charge up notes which were not paid, and, if any of the notes upon which he claims to be entitled to the interest had not been paid, he would certainly have been entitled to charge them up against the transaction if already credited.

A controversy arises in the case respecting the property known as Stimson Row.” It appears that of the prop" erty purchased the Traverse mill and lands were valued at $225,000. Complainant was anxious to lumber this tract on his own account, and it was agreed that, if he should procure a capitalist to, go in with him, he could take the property at that figure. Complainant found such a party, —one Fay, — but defendant declined to carry out the arrangement, but afterwards himself entered into a copartnership with Fay to operate said tract, said party purchasing a half interest. Defendant, after some months, sold his half interest in said partnership to one Stimson, .and received therefor $112,000, as follows: Cash, $910.85; block ten (10) Wood’s addition to city of Muskegon, $1,-■000; Muskegon Boom Company’s stock, $1,255.15; certain pine lands, $24,500; assumed by Stimson of Torrent’s indebtedness to Hannah, Lay & Co., $75,334; Stimson row property, $9,000. All of the said property except the boom company stock and the Stimson row has been disposed of. No disclosure is made as to dividends upon the boom company stock. Defendant was not entitled to make choice as to what portion of the property he should retain, and we think that the Stimson row property should be charged up to him as of June 21, 1887, the date of the transaction.

Complaint is made because of the refusal of the court to allow a credit of the sum of $55,000 before decree, but we think it is clear that under the stipulation and receipt [121]*121this amount was not to be credited until decree made.

Respecting complainant’s claim for an allowance to complainant 'of solicitors’ fees, the business was continued after December 31, 1891, and there are large sums yet to be accounted for by defendant. Whether the suits now pending were instituted at the’ instance of defendant, and to hinder and harass complainant, will more fully appear when those suits are finally disposed of. We think that the question of the allowance should be reserved for the future.

The court below made the following computation:

Total receipts in money to December 31, 1889, Schedule BB....................-___________ $750,375 41
Add note, S. C. Hall Lumber Company, October 29, 1886.....................................- 3,000 00
Add rebate, Hannah, Lay & Co. notes, January 81, 1887.-.............................-...... 5,864 05
Total receipts to December 31, 1889____________ $758,739 46
Disbursements to December 81, 1889, Schedule BB................1______________________ 685,573 71
Balance December 31, 1889____________________ $123,165 75
One-third of this______________________________ $41,055 25

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Related

Nester v. Sullivan
111 N.W. 85 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1907)
Tuttle v. Bristol
105 N.W. 145 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1905)
Petrie v. Torrent
65 N.W. 557 (Michigan Supreme Court, 1895)

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Bluebook (online)
58 N.W. 690, 100 Mich. 117, 1894 Mich. LEXIS 768, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petrie-v-torrent-mich-1894.