Petralia v. Appleton Papers, et al.

2001 DNH 072
CourtDistrict Court, D. New Hampshire
DecidedApril 6, 2001
DocketCV-99-183-M
StatusPublished

This text of 2001 DNH 072 (Petralia v. Appleton Papers, et al.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. New Hampshire primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petralia v. Appleton Papers, et al., 2001 DNH 072 (D.N.H. 2001).

Opinion

Petralia v . Appleton Papers, et a l . CV-99-183-M 04/06/01 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

Rosemary C . Petralia, Plaintiff

v. Civil N o . 99-183-M Opinion N o . 2001 DNH 072 Appleton Papers, Inc.; and Moore U.S.A., Inc., f/k/a Moore Business Forms, Inc., Defendants

O R D E R

Pro se plaintiff asserts a number of claims against the

remaining defendants arising from her alleged injurious exposure

to carbonless copy paper in the work place. Her claims are based

on strict liability, negligence, failure to warn, breach of

warranty, and battery.

As a pro se litigant, plaintiff has had a difficult time

litigating against experienced legal counsel. But, she is

educated, seemingly well-informed, and, from her pleadings,

appears to understand the general requirement that opponent’s

motions require a response and that deadlines must be met. From

time to time she has sought and been granted continuances in

order to obtain the assistance of counsel, but has yet to find anyone to take up her cause. Her compliance with discovery

requirements has been irregular, prompting the Magistrate Judge

to require her to pay the cost of two hours of deposition to

permit defendants to obtain information she should have provided

by other means. And, plaintiff did not disclose the identity or

reports of her intended expert witnesses by the ordered deadline

of December 1 , 2000.

Because she did not make expert disclosures by the date

required, defendants filed a motion to compel production

(document n o . 3 3 ) , or, alternatively, for default. Plaintiff

ignored the motion, and on January 3 0 , 2001, the Magistrate Judge

issued his ruling. He did not order plaintiff to disclose her

expert witnesses by a new date, nor did he enter a default (the

requested relief) but, rather, precluded plaintiff from offering

expert testimony at trial:

Consistent with her past disregard of discovery requirements plaintiff has failed to disclose experts by 12/01/00 and has not objected to this motion. Plaintiff is precluded from using an expert.

Document n o . 3 3 , margin order. Plaintiff did not appeal that

ruling to the district judge.

2 Since plaintiff cannot establish essential elements of her

claims without expert testimony (e.g., dangerousness, defect,

causation, damages), defendants filed a joint motion for summary

judgment (document no. 3 8 ) . See e.g., Celotex Corp. v . Catrett,

477 U.S. 317 (1986). Plaintiff has ignored defendants’ summary

judgment motion as well.

A pro se litigant is entitled to be heard, and courts

routinely (often to the bar’s consternation) “loosen the reins”

for pro se litigants when it comes to compliance with rules of

practice and procedure. But, as the court of appeals has noted:

[T]he “right of self-representation is not ‘a license not to comply with relevant rules of procedural and substantive law.’” Andrews v . Bechtel Power Corp., 780 F.2d 124, 140 (1st Cir. 1985)(quoting Faretta v . California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 n.46, 95 S.Ct. 2525, 2541 n.46, 45 L.Ed.2d 562 (1975)), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1172, 106 S.Ct. 2896, 90 L.Ed.2d 983 (1986). The ‘Constitution does not require judges . . . to take up the slack when a party elects to represent himself. See McKaskle v . Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-84, 104 S.Ct. 9 4 4 , 953-54, 79 L.Ed.2d 122 (1984)(explaining that courts need not “take over chores for a pro se defendant that would normally be attended to by trained counsel as a matter of course”).

3 Indeed, there is a long line of authority rejecting the notion that pro se litigants in either civil or regulatory cases are entitled to extra procedural swaddling. See Julie M. Bradlow, Comment, Procedural Due Process Rights of Pro Se Civil Litigants, 55 U.Chi.L.Rev. 659, 668 nn 41,42 (1988)(collecting cases).

Eagle Eye Fishing Corp. v . U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 20 F.3d 503,

506 (1st Cir. 1994).

Because plaintiff did not respond to the earlier motion to

compel, did not appeal the Magistrate Judge’s order precluding

her use of expert testimony, and did not respond to the

defendants’ summary judgment motion, and has not filed any motion

seeking relief (and explaining her failure to disclose as

required), the court can only assume that she has no expert

evidence to offer on product dangerousness or defect, or

proximate causation, or medical causation, or the nature and

scope of injury allegedly sustained.

Defendants are correct — they may point to record materials

that demonstrate that the nonmoving party will be unable to carry

her burden of persuasion at trial, thereby shifting the burden to

the nonmoving party to show that there is indeed a genuine issue

of fact precluding entry of summary judgment. Defendants have

4 done so here, and plaintiff has remained mute. “[I]f the summary

judgment record satisfactorily demonstrates that the plaintiff’s

case i s , and may be expected to remain, deficient in vital

evidentiary support, this may suffice to show that the movant has

met its initial burden.” Carmona v . Toledo, 215 F.3d 124, 133

(1st Cir. 2000). Defendants have satisfied their initial burden

of production on summary judgment, showing the absence of genuine

issues of material fact and that plaintiff cannot meet her burden

at trial; plaintiff has not responded and has not shown that

genuine disputes exist as to material facts or that she will be

able to meet her burden of proof at trial.

Conclusion

Accordingly, for the reasons given in this order and the

memorandum in support of defendants’ joint motion for summary

judgment (document no. 3 8 ) , summary judgment is granted in favor

5 of defendants.1 The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in

accordance with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

April 6, 2001

cc: Rosemary C . Petralia Anita Hotchkiss, Esq. Lucy C . Hodder, Esq. Edward M . Kaplan, Esq.

1 Should plaintiff seek reconsideration, her motion shall, at a minimum, be filed in a timely fashion, state whether she has expert evidence to offer, and identify her expert witnesses. She shall also show good cause for failing to make expert disclosures by the December 1 , 2000, deadline, failing to respond to the motion to compel, failing to seek relief from the preclusion order, and failing to object to the joint motion for summary judgment (beyond mere general invocations of distracting illness or lack of legal training).

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Related

Faretta v. California
422 U.S. 806 (Supreme Court, 1975)
McKaskle v. Wiggins
465 U.S. 168 (Supreme Court, 1984)
Carmona v. Toledo
215 F.3d 124 (First Circuit, 2000)
Andrews v. Bechtel Power Corp.
780 F.2d 124 (First Circuit, 1985)

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