24CA2023 Petition of Perez 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2023 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JA69 Honorable Elizabeth McCarthy, Judge
Upon the Petition of the
Gloria J. Perez,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Gloria J Perez, Pro Se ¶1 Gloria J. Perez (petitioner) appeals the judgment denying her
request for access to the adoption records of H.R. (adoptee). We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In Colorado, adoption records are “confidential” and cannot be
accessed unless a petitioning party satisfies one of several
exceptions. § 19-5-305(1), C.R.S. 2024. As pertinent to this
appeal, a party can access adoption records if the party (1) qualifies
as an eligible person under section 19-5-305(2); or (2) establishes
good cause to release the records under section 19-1-309, C.R.S.
2024, see § 19-5-305(1).
¶3 In the present case, petitioner petitioned the Denver Juvenile
Court for access to adoptee’s adoption records. Petitioner asserted
that she was eligible to access the records because, as adoptee’s
first cousin once removed, she was adoptee’s “descendant.” An
adoptions clerk at the juvenile court responded to petitioner’s
request and told her that she didn’t meet the eligibility criteria to
receive records under section 19-5-305.5, C.R.S. 2024.
¶4 Petitioner refiled her petition, this time asserting that, even if
she didn’t meet the eligibility criteria, she had “good cause” to
1 access the records under section 19-1-309. In support, petitioner
explained that she was conducting a “family history” and believed
that she was one of adoptee’s only living relatives. She stated that
adoptee’s grandmother (who was petitioner’s great-grandmother)
adopted adoptee between 1916 — when adoptee’s mother died —
and 1920 — when the federal census identified adoptee as his
grandmother’s adopted son. The juvenile court didn’t find good
cause to release the records and denied petitioner’s request.
II. Discussion
¶5 On appeal, petitioner argues that the juvenile court erred by
(1) determining that she didn’t qualify as adoptee’s descendant, or
in the alternative, (2) finding that she didn’t have “good cause” to
access the adoption records. We discern no error.
A. Descendant
¶6 Petitioner asserts that, because she was adoptee’s descendant,
the juvenile court erred by declining to release the adoption records
to her. We aren’t persuaded.
¶7 To resolve this question, we must interpret the adoption
statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we
review de novo. People in Interest of C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662, 665-66
2 (Colo. App. 2011). In construing statutes, appellate courts must
ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent by
implementing the plain and ordinary meanings of its words. People
in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 13. To discern the plain and
ordinary meanings of words not defined by statute, we may
consider dictionary definitions. See People v. Grosko, 2021 COA 28,
¶ 18. If the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
apply it as written. See State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo.
2000).
¶8 Section 19-5-305(2)(b)(I)(A) provides that “the custodian of
records shall provide direct access to adoption records for
inspection and copying by . . . an adult descendant of an
adoptee . . . if the adult adoptee is deceased.” The Colorado
Children’s Code doesn’t define “descendant.”
¶9 Because the Children’s Code doesn’t define “descendant,” we
look to a dictionary definition to ascertain the term’s plain and
ordinary meaning. See Grosko, ¶ 18. Generally, a “descendant” is
“one originating or coming from an ancestral stock or source: one
descended from another.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
3 https://perma.cc/N9EB-MNMR.1 Under this definition, petitioner
isn’t a descendant of adoptee because, although petitioner and
adoptee have a common ancestor (i.e., petitioner’s great-
grandparents), petitioner doesn’t directly descend from adoptee. In
other words, because petitioner isn’t adoptee’s child, grandchild,
great-grandchild, and so on, she isn’t his descendant under the
statute and, therefore, can’t access his adoption records under
section 19-5-305(2)(b)(I)(A).
¶ 10 Petitioner doesn’t provide us with any argument as to why we
should apply a different definition for “descendant” that would
include her. And although we recognize that petitioner appears pro
se, we can’t create arguments for her, Minshall v. Johnston, 2018
COA 44, ¶ 21, or otherwise “act as [her] advocate,” People v. Cali,
2020 CO 20, ¶ 34. Cf. Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5 (noting
1 We recognize that Black’s Law Dictionary provides a more liberal
definition of “descendant,” defining it as “[s]omeone who, by birth or adoption, follows in the familial line of an ancestor, either lineally or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary 559 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). But that definition goes on to provide that a “collateral descendant” is “a relative who is not strictly a descendant, such as a niece or nephew.” Id. Because the Black’s Law Dictionary definition acknowledges that a collateral descendant isn’t generally considered a descendant, we aren’t persuaded that this definition provides a plain and ordinary meaning of the term “descendant.”
4 that appellate courts should broadly construe a pro se party’s
pleading “to ensure that they are not denied review of important
issues because of their inability to articulate their argument like a
lawyer”).
¶ 11 Nor are we persuaded to reach a different result based on
petitioner’s assertion that the court clerk applied the wrong statute
when she rejected the initial petition. To be sure, the clerk noted in
the rejection letter that petitioner didn’t meet the criteria under
section 19-5-305.5, which allows an eligible party to access
personal records of a “former ward of the state home for dependent
and neglected children,” and not section 19-5-305(2)(b)(I)(A). But
both statutes allow a “descendant” to access records, and we
presume that “descendant” has the same meaning under both
sections. Therefore, under either statute, petitioner wasn’t
adoptee’s descendant and thus not eligible to access records.
B. Good Cause
¶ 12 Petitioner next asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding
that she didn’t have “good cause” to access the adoption records.
Again, we aren’t persuaded.
5 ¶ 13 Generally, whether good cause exists depends on the facts of
each case and is an inquiry left to the juvenile court’s sound
discretion. See People v. Hines, 2021 COA 45, ¶ 21. A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. People in
Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.
¶ 14 Neither section 19-5-305 nor section 19-1-309 define good
cause or provide any criteria for establishing it. However, our case
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24CA2023 Petition of Perez 07-31-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA2023 City and County of Denver Juvenile Court No. 24JA69 Honorable Elizabeth McCarthy, Judge
Upon the Petition of the
Gloria J. Perez,
Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division V Opinion by JUDGE WELLING Grove and Johnson, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced July 31, 2025
Gloria J Perez, Pro Se ¶1 Gloria J. Perez (petitioner) appeals the judgment denying her
request for access to the adoption records of H.R. (adoptee). We
affirm.
I. Background
¶2 In Colorado, adoption records are “confidential” and cannot be
accessed unless a petitioning party satisfies one of several
exceptions. § 19-5-305(1), C.R.S. 2024. As pertinent to this
appeal, a party can access adoption records if the party (1) qualifies
as an eligible person under section 19-5-305(2); or (2) establishes
good cause to release the records under section 19-1-309, C.R.S.
2024, see § 19-5-305(1).
¶3 In the present case, petitioner petitioned the Denver Juvenile
Court for access to adoptee’s adoption records. Petitioner asserted
that she was eligible to access the records because, as adoptee’s
first cousin once removed, she was adoptee’s “descendant.” An
adoptions clerk at the juvenile court responded to petitioner’s
request and told her that she didn’t meet the eligibility criteria to
receive records under section 19-5-305.5, C.R.S. 2024.
¶4 Petitioner refiled her petition, this time asserting that, even if
she didn’t meet the eligibility criteria, she had “good cause” to
1 access the records under section 19-1-309. In support, petitioner
explained that she was conducting a “family history” and believed
that she was one of adoptee’s only living relatives. She stated that
adoptee’s grandmother (who was petitioner’s great-grandmother)
adopted adoptee between 1916 — when adoptee’s mother died —
and 1920 — when the federal census identified adoptee as his
grandmother’s adopted son. The juvenile court didn’t find good
cause to release the records and denied petitioner’s request.
II. Discussion
¶5 On appeal, petitioner argues that the juvenile court erred by
(1) determining that she didn’t qualify as adoptee’s descendant, or
in the alternative, (2) finding that she didn’t have “good cause” to
access the adoption records. We discern no error.
A. Descendant
¶6 Petitioner asserts that, because she was adoptee’s descendant,
the juvenile court erred by declining to release the adoption records
to her. We aren’t persuaded.
¶7 To resolve this question, we must interpret the adoption
statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we
review de novo. People in Interest of C.L.S., 313 P.3d 662, 665-66
2 (Colo. App. 2011). In construing statutes, appellate courts must
ascertain and give effect to the General Assembly’s intent by
implementing the plain and ordinary meanings of its words. People
in Interest of J.G., 2016 CO 39, ¶ 13. To discern the plain and
ordinary meanings of words not defined by statute, we may
consider dictionary definitions. See People v. Grosko, 2021 COA 28,
¶ 18. If the language in a statute is clear and unambiguous, we
apply it as written. See State v. Nieto, 993 P.2d 493, 500 (Colo.
2000).
¶8 Section 19-5-305(2)(b)(I)(A) provides that “the custodian of
records shall provide direct access to adoption records for
inspection and copying by . . . an adult descendant of an
adoptee . . . if the adult adoptee is deceased.” The Colorado
Children’s Code doesn’t define “descendant.”
¶9 Because the Children’s Code doesn’t define “descendant,” we
look to a dictionary definition to ascertain the term’s plain and
ordinary meaning. See Grosko, ¶ 18. Generally, a “descendant” is
“one originating or coming from an ancestral stock or source: one
descended from another.” Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
3 https://perma.cc/N9EB-MNMR.1 Under this definition, petitioner
isn’t a descendant of adoptee because, although petitioner and
adoptee have a common ancestor (i.e., petitioner’s great-
grandparents), petitioner doesn’t directly descend from adoptee. In
other words, because petitioner isn’t adoptee’s child, grandchild,
great-grandchild, and so on, she isn’t his descendant under the
statute and, therefore, can’t access his adoption records under
section 19-5-305(2)(b)(I)(A).
¶ 10 Petitioner doesn’t provide us with any argument as to why we
should apply a different definition for “descendant” that would
include her. And although we recognize that petitioner appears pro
se, we can’t create arguments for her, Minshall v. Johnston, 2018
COA 44, ¶ 21, or otherwise “act as [her] advocate,” People v. Cali,
2020 CO 20, ¶ 34. Cf. Jones v. Williams, 2019 CO 61, ¶ 5 (noting
1 We recognize that Black’s Law Dictionary provides a more liberal
definition of “descendant,” defining it as “[s]omeone who, by birth or adoption, follows in the familial line of an ancestor, either lineally or collaterally.” Black’s Law Dictionary 559 (12th ed. 2024) (emphasis added). But that definition goes on to provide that a “collateral descendant” is “a relative who is not strictly a descendant, such as a niece or nephew.” Id. Because the Black’s Law Dictionary definition acknowledges that a collateral descendant isn’t generally considered a descendant, we aren’t persuaded that this definition provides a plain and ordinary meaning of the term “descendant.”
4 that appellate courts should broadly construe a pro se party’s
pleading “to ensure that they are not denied review of important
issues because of their inability to articulate their argument like a
lawyer”).
¶ 11 Nor are we persuaded to reach a different result based on
petitioner’s assertion that the court clerk applied the wrong statute
when she rejected the initial petition. To be sure, the clerk noted in
the rejection letter that petitioner didn’t meet the criteria under
section 19-5-305.5, which allows an eligible party to access
personal records of a “former ward of the state home for dependent
and neglected children,” and not section 19-5-305(2)(b)(I)(A). But
both statutes allow a “descendant” to access records, and we
presume that “descendant” has the same meaning under both
sections. Therefore, under either statute, petitioner wasn’t
adoptee’s descendant and thus not eligible to access records.
B. Good Cause
¶ 12 Petitioner next asserts that the juvenile court erred by finding
that she didn’t have “good cause” to access the adoption records.
Again, we aren’t persuaded.
5 ¶ 13 Generally, whether good cause exists depends on the facts of
each case and is an inquiry left to the juvenile court’s sound
discretion. See People v. Hines, 2021 COA 45, ¶ 21. A court
abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly arbitrary,
unreasonable, or unfair, or when it misapplies the law. People in
Interest of A.N-B., 2019 COA 46, ¶ 9.
¶ 14 Neither section 19-5-305 nor section 19-1-309 define good
cause or provide any criteria for establishing it. However, our case
law indicates that a party can’t establish good cause if the party
doesn’t need the records for its stated purpose. See In re R.M.C.,
2022 COA 46, ¶ 39 (noting that psychological father didn’t have
good cause to access adoption records for purposes of his appeal
because his claim involved a “purely legal issue”); see also W.D.A. v.
City & Cnty. of Denver, 632 P.2d 582, 585 (Colo. 1981) (reversing
the juvenile court’s finding of good cause because the adoption
records wouldn’t assist the board in making its legal decision).
¶ 15 In this case, petitioner requested access to adoptee’s adoption
records because she wanted to “find out where [adoptee] was from
age 7-8 living in Denver, CO with his grandmother until he enlisted
6 in the military in Vancouver[,] WA in 1930.” We conclude for two
reasons that petitioner didn’t establish good cause.
¶ 16 First, petitioner hasn’t explained how the adoption records
would reveal the information she asserts that she needs. As
relevant here, an “adoption record” includes (1) non-identifying
information about the birth parents and adoptee; (2) an order of
relinquishment; (3) an order terminating parental rights; (4) an
adoptee’s original and amended birth certificate; and (5) a final
decree of adoption. § 19-1-103(7)(a), C.R.S. 2024. Because
petitioner knows the identity of the birth parents and the adoptee,
she doesn’t need the non-identifying information that may be
contained in the adoption records to which she seeks access. And
because adoptee’s parents didn’t relinquish parental rights or have
their parental rights terminated, the adoption records wouldn’t
contain either document. Finally, petitioner doesn’t explain how
the adoptee’s original and amended birth certificate and final decree
of adoption would provide her with the information she wants.
¶ 17 Second, petitioner hasn’t directed us to any authority in which
a party established good cause to access adoption records based on
a desire to conduct a family history. Indeed, courts in other
7 jurisdictions have determined that a petitioner must show a
“compelling need” to access adoption records, Bradey v. Children’s
Bureau of South Carolina, 274 S.E.2d 418, 421 (S.C. 1981), which
“must rest on more than mere curiosity,” In re Adoption of S.J.D.,
641 N.W.2d 794, 800 (Iowa 2002). Because petitioner hasn’t shown
that her request rests on more than mere curiosity, we conclude
that the juvenile court didn’t abuse its discretion in denying her
request.
III. Disposition
¶ 18 The judgment is affirmed.
JUDGE GROVE and JUDGE JOHNSON concur.