Petition 5972-R of Portman

4 Cust. Ct. 411
CourtUnited States Customs Court
DecidedMarch 6, 1940
DocketNo. 43327
StatusPublished

This text of 4 Cust. Ct. 411 (Petition 5972-R of Portman) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Customs Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Petition 5972-R of Portman, 4 Cust. Ct. 411 (cusc 1940).

Opinion

Kincheloe, Judge:

This is a petition filed under section 489 of the Tariff Act of 1930 praying for the remission of additional duties accruing under that section by reason of the final appraised value of certain so-called dyed Krimmer lambskins imported from Canada and entered at the port of New York exceeding the entered value. The advance in value made by the appraiser represented the Canadian import duty and the Canadian sales and excise tax to which the merchandise in question was subjected and which were not included in petitioners’ entered value.

Three witnesses appeared herein on behalf of petitioners. The first witness was the secretary and treasurer of the petitioner corporation who testified that the business of said firm is the manufacture of ladies’ wearing apparel; that he purchases all the furs used by his concern in the manufacture of such wear; and that he purchased the skins imported in the shipment under consideration. In connection with the transaction in question, the witness stated that he received a telegram from the Canadian exporter of the instant merchandise advising him of the availability of said merchandise for sale; that he thereupon went to Montreal where he found and inspected a parcel of 10,000 skins being held in bond in the customhouse. The witness further testified that the shipment in question, consisting of 2,289 skins, is part of the 10,000 that he saw when he was in Canada; that the skins covered by the importation in question were shipped with the understanding that if they proved suitable for its purpose, petitioners would buy the remainder; that after receiving said skins they were found to be unsatisfactory and therefore petitioners did not exercise their option for the purchase of the remainder of the lot. The witness further stated that the invoice price is the price actually paid for the merchandise; that said price was the price at which it was held in bond; and that he made no investigation as to the market value for such skins.

In response to questions propounded on cross-examination, said witness testified that neither he nor anyone connected with his firm, so far as he was informed, knew that the instant merchandise had been sent from the United States to Canada; and that he was advised by the Canadian exporter of the instant merchandise, when he was in Canada in connection with the transaction under consideration, that the skins in question came from Russia. The witness further testified that at the time of his inspection in Canada of the instant merchandise he observed that it was stamped “From Russia”; and that he did not know merchandise imported into Canada from Russia was subject to 15 percent duty there, nor that a Canadian sales or excise tax was applicable to said merchandise.

The second witness called on behalf of petitioners was Frank Schneider, the president of said corporation, who stated that his duties with said firm are to handle the financial end of the business and to take care of the office. Said witness testified that this was the first shipment of dyed skins received by his firm from Canada; that previous shipments had always consisted of raw skins; and that, upon receipt of the bill and papers relating to the transaction in question, he immediately transmitted them to his customs broker with instructions to make entry on the basis of the invoice price.

[412]*412Said witness’ testimony with, reference to bis actions prior to entry of the instant merchandise was, in our opinion, vague and indefinite. Although he testified that he instructed his broker to check up and verify the correctness of the price and the dutiable value of the instant merchandise with the examiner, he said he “didn’t know” whether it had been done. He stated that he received communications from his broker but was unable to recall the time or the substance of such communications. When he was shown copies of letters, which were conceded by counsel to have been sent by the broker to the petitioners, said witness was unable to recall the receipt of said letters and denied knowledge of the contents of same. His testimony in that respect is as follows:

Q. Did you receive any requests from the broker to consult the examiner, at any time? — A. I think I received some letters, but I don’t remember exactly.
Q. Do you know what the substance of those letters were?
Me. Carstarphen. I object to the substance of them. I have copies of the letters here. If you care to offer them, you can.

By Mr. Mandell:

Q. Did you, on or about the month of February, receive a communication from the Draeger Shipping Company, a copy of which I will now show you? — A. I don’t know. I am not looking the mail over. I didn’t look at the mail, and I can’t tell whether I received it or not.
Q. Did you receive a similar letter on March 10th? — A. I can’t tell. Anything we received is in the file.
Q. And on August 1st? — A. I know we received some from Draeger, but what it was I don’t know.
Q. Did you read them? — A. I think I looked over a letter once in which I made an appointment with one of his men to meet him about some extra $200 which the Customs asked.
Q. Did you know what that was for? — A. I don’t know.
ífc * * Hi ift ifc *
Q. And you did not answer the communications that you received by mail from your broker? — A. Maybe I received them, but I don’t know. The only thing that I can tell is when we look into the file, and if it is there, I know.
Q. Don’t you remember it? — A. I don’t, because I am not always reading the letters. The girl does all the work.

Thereupon, counsel for petitioners offered in evidence the three letters referred to in the above-quoted testimony and said letters were admitted and marked Collective Exhibit 3.

In the first letter, dated February 21, 1939, the broker referred to numerous previous telephone conversations with the petitioners regarding entry of the instant merchandise, and advised petitioners of the advance in value contemplated by the appraiser, and urged said petitioners to amend its entry to meet the values found by the appraiser. The letter of March 21 was a follow-up of the earlier letter and again urged the petitioners to amend their entry to meet the appraiser’s value, and concluded as follows:

We cannot see any reason why you neglect to inform us to amend this value and must advise that if we do not hear from you within 24 hours, we shall consider the matter closed.

The third letter dated August 1, 1939, referred to the previous correspondence on the same matter with the advice that the petitioners amend their entry, and “straighten out this matter immediately.”

Said witness was further interrogated by both counsel for petitioners and counsel for respondent who attempted to obtain facts material to the issue presented herein, but his testimony, in our judgment, was evasive and indicated either an unwillingness on the part of the witness to give to the court all the pertinent facts relating to the importation and entry of the skins in question, or an unfamiliarity with such facts to an extent that as president of the petitioner corporation and in charge of its office and financial affairs he had not exercised [413]

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13 Ct. Cust. 589 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1926)

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4 Cust. Ct. 411, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/petition-5972-r-of-portman-cusc-1940.