Peters v. Winnebago County Sheriff's Department

2024 IL App (4th) 230482-U

• Court: Appellate Court of Illinois
• Decided: April 30, 2024
• Docket: 4-23-0482
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOTICE 2024 IL App (4th) 230482-U This Order was filed under FILED Supreme Court Rule 23 and is April 30, 2024 NO. 4-23-0482 not precedent except in the Carla Bender limited circumstances allowed 4th District Appellate under Rule 23(e)(1). IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

ADRIAN PETERS, ) Appeal from the Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Circuit Court of v. ) Winnebago County THE WINNEBAGO COUNTY SHERIFF’S ) No. 22LM48 DEPARTMENT, GARY CARUANA, BOB ) REDMOND, LIEUTENANT DAN BOYD, CAPTAIN ) ROB LUKOWSKI, and LIEUTENANT ANTHONY ) Honorable PONTE, ) Lisa R. Fabiano, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge Presiding.

JUSTICE LANNERD delivered the judgment of the court. Presiding Justice Cavanagh and Justice Knecht concurred in the judgment.

ORDER

¶1 Held: The appellate court affirmed, concluding the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it dismissed plaintiff’s complaint.

¶2 In December 2022, plaintiff, Adrian Peters, filed a pro se complaint against

defendants, the Winnebago County Sheriff’s Office, Gary Caruana, Bob Redmond, Lieutenant

Dan Boyd, Captain Rob Lukowski, and Lieutenant Anthony Ponte, alleging they violated his rights

under the Mental Health and Developmental Disabilities Confidentiality Act (Act) (740 ILCS

110/1 et seq. (West 2022)). Defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss, which the trial court

granted. Plaintiff appeals, arguing the court erred as a matter of law when it dismissed his

complaint. We affirm.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND ¶4 In December 2022, plaintiff filed a pro se complaint against defendants seeking

declaratory relief and an injunction. Plaintiff was being held in the Winnebago County jail and

alleged defendants violated his rights under the Act by opening, reading, and potentially copying

his sealed outgoing mail to his therapist. Plaintiff filed a grievance with defendants and argued the

Act provided for confidential communication with his therapist. Defendants denied plaintiff relief

on the basis that mail to his therapist was not privileged. Plaintiff argued in his complaint,

inter alia, the purpose of the mail was for mental health treatment and/or therapy, the mail was

protected by therapist-recipient confidentiality, and defendants’ interference with the mail

hindered his ability to receive treatment, which caused him undue stress.

¶5 Defendants filed a combined motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the

Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2022)). As to section 2-619(a)(9) of

the Code (id. § 2-619(a)(9)), defendants argued communications between a jail detainee and a

therapist are not privileged under the County Jail Standards (20 Ill. Admin. Code 701.180 (2014))

and they were authorized to read and inspect the subject mail. Under section 2-615 of the Code

(735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2022)), defendants argued plaintiff failed to state a claim because the

Act only applies to therapists or agencies providing mental health services, and even if it did apply

to them, no violation occurred as they did not disclose plaintiff’s records or communications. In

response, plaintiff asserted the Act superseded the County Jail Standards. Plaintiff also argued

defendants were subject to the Act, regardless of whether they were the ones providing mental

health treatment, and a violation occurred when defendants required plaintiff to disclose his

therapist communications.

¶6 In May 2023, the trial court held a hearing and found (1) the County Jail Standards

provided plaintiff’s communications with his therapist were not exempt from defendants’

-2- inspection and (2) the Act only prevents therapists from disclosing mental health records and

communications. Thus, the court dismissed plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to section 2-619.1 of the

Code.

¶7 This appeal followed.

¶8 II. ANALYSIS

¶9 On appeal, plaintiff argues the trial court erred when it held county jails were

exempt from the Act. Defendants maintain therapist communications are not exempt from

inspection under the County Jail Standards and plaintiff failed to state a claim because defendants

did not provide mental health services or disclose plaintiff’s therapist communications.

¶ 10 At the outset, we note defendants argue plaintiff’s appellate brief should be stricken

and the appeal should be dismissed for plaintiff’s failure to comply with Illinois Supreme Court

Rule 341(h) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Specifically, plaintiff’s brief is missing a table of contents, an

introductory paragraph, a statement of the issues presented for review, a statement of jurisdiction,

text from the statutes involved, a statement of facts, a conclusion, and an appendix. Ill. S. Ct. R.

341(h)(1), (2), (3), (4), (5), (6), (9) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). Plaintiff’s brief only contains an argument

section, which further fails to comply with Rule 341(h) as it contains no citations to the pages of

the record relied on. Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff. Oct. 1, 2020). In plaintiff’s reply brief, he asks

this court for leniency because he is not a lawyer.

¶ 11 A party proceeding pro se is presumed to have full knowledge of applicable court

rules and procedures. Steinbrecher v. Steinbrecher, 197 Ill. 2d 514, 528 (2001). Therefore, pro se

litigants must comply with the rules and are held to the same standards as licensed attorneys.

Zemater v. Village of Waterman, 2020 IL App (2d) 190013, ¶ 19. The rules governing appellate

briefs are mandatory and not mere suggestions. State ex rel. Fox v. Thornley, 2023 IL App (4th)

-3- 220622, ¶ 71. Failure to follow these rules may result in forfeiture of an issue raised on appeal,

and if numerous violations impede our review, we may strike the appellant’s brief and dismiss the

appeal. Rosestone Investments, LLC v. Garner, 2013 IL App (1st) 123422, ¶ 18. We recognize

striking a brief, in whole or in part, is a harsh sanction and should be reserved for the most

egregious noncompliance with the rules that hinders our appellate review. Battle v. Chicago Police

Department, 2022 IL App (1st) 200083, ¶ 9. However, “the rules are an admonishment to the

parties and not a limitation upon the jurisdiction of this court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Id. Despite deficiencies in an appellant’s brief, “where the record is short and the issues are simple,

the appellate court may choose to address the issues.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Vance

v. Joyner, 2019 IL App (4th) 190136, ¶ 80. We decline to strike plaintiff’s brief and proceed to the

merits.

¶ 12 Here, the trial court granted defendants’ motion to dismiss pursuant to section 2-

619.1 of the Code. A motion under section 2-619.1 allows a party “to combine a section 2-615

motion to dismiss based upon a plaintiff’s substantially insufficient pleadings with a section 2-619

motion to dismiss based upon certain defects or defenses.” Edelman, Combs & Latturner v.

Hinshaw & Culbertson, 338 Ill. App. 3d 156, 164 (2003). We would typically address the section

2-615 motion first, because if a plaintiff failed to plead a legally sufficient cause of action, we need

not consider a defendant’s assertion of a defect or defense. Johannesen v. Eddins, 2011 IL App

(2d) 110108, ¶ 29. However, a combined motion to dismiss presents at least two independent

reasons to dismiss a complaint and either reason alone is sufficient to support a court’s order of

dismissal. We address the section 2-619 motion first, as it was the primary basis for defendants’

combined motion.

-4- ¶ 13 A motion brought under section 2-619(a)(9) contends “the claim asserted against

defendant is barred by other affirmative matter avoiding the legal effect of or defeating the claim.”

735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2022). Under this section, a defendant admits the legal sufficiency

of a plaintiff’s cause of action but asserts an affirmative matter bars or defeats the plaintiff’s claim.

Smith v. Waukegan Park District, 231 Ill. 2d 111, 120-21 (2008). We review a trial court’s

dismissal under section 2-619 de novo and consider whether dismissal was proper as a matter of

law. Pinkston v. City of Chicago, 2023 IL 128575, ¶ 22. Here, defendants claimed, assuming they

violated the Act, they were authorized by the County Jail Standards to inspect and potentially copy

plaintiff’s mail to his therapist.

¶ 14 The County Jail Standards provide mail procedures for outgoing nonprivileged mail

and outgoing privileged mail. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 701.180(c)(5), (e) (2014). Outgoing nonprivileged

mail must be submitted unsealed and may be inspected, read, or reproduced or withheld from

delivery if it presents a threat to security or safety. 20 Ill. Adm. Code 701.180(c)(5) (2014). In

contrast, outgoing privileged mail may be sealed by the detainee prior to submission for mailing.

20 Ill. Adm. Code 701.180(e) (2014). The County Jail Standards provide a list of persons or

organizations to which detainees may send privileged mail, which includes various governmental

officials, legal organizations providing direct legal representation, and registered attorneys. 20 Ill.

Adm. Code 701.180(e)(1)-(8) (2014). The parties agree plaintiff’s outgoing mail to his therapist is

not classified as privileged mail under this statute. Therefore, defendants established their defense

under section 2-619(a)(9) as the County Jail Standards permitted them to read and inspect

plaintiff’s nonprivileged mail. The burden shifted to plaintiff to establish defendants’ defense was

unfounded. See Van Meter v. Darien Park District, 207 Ill. 2d 359, 377 (2003). Plaintiff argues

-5- defendants’ reliance on the County Jail Standards was unfounded because they are superseded by

the Act.

¶ 15 The Act provides all records and communications created in the course of mental

health treatment shall be confidential and shall not be disclosed. 740 ILCS 110/3(a) (West 2022).

Our supreme court explained the Act provides a recipient of mental health treatment with a

statutory privilege to refuse to disclose and to prevent the disclosure of confidential information.

Doe v. Burke Wise Morrissey & Kaveny, LLC, 2023 IL 129097, ¶ 24. The Act provides various

circumstances when these records and communications may be disclosed, and plaintiff argues

these exceptions do not permit disclosure to jail personnel. See 740 ILCS 110/4-12.2 (West 2022).

¶ 16 The issue plaintiff presents, whether the Act supersedes the County Jail Standards,

would require this court to reconcile the statutes on our accord. The aforementioned inadequacies

of plaintiff’s appellate brief are compounded by his failure to further develop his position on this

issue or cite any authority in support thereof. “[A] reviewing court is not simply a depository into

which a party may dump the burden of argument and research.” People ex rel. Illinois Department

of Labor v. E.R.H. Enterprises, 2013 IL 115106, ¶ 56; see Vancura v. Katris, 238 Ill. 2d 352, 370

(2010) (holding an issue merely listed or included in a vague allegation of error is insufficient to

warrant review). Moreover, we find it inappropriate to address this claim, as it would require us to

speculate as to the arguments plaintiff might have presented and transform this court’s role from a

jurist to an advocate. Jackson v. Board of Election Commissioners of City of Chicago, 2012 IL

111928, ¶ 34.

¶ 17 Plaintiff attempts to rectify the shortcomings of his opening brief by providing

additional argument in his reply brief. However, “[p]oints not argued are forfeited and shall not be

raised in the reply brief, in oral argument, or on petition for rehearing.” Ill. S. Ct. R. 341(h)(7) (eff.

-6- Oct. 1, 2020). Forfeiture aside, plaintiff’s untimely argument does not assist this court in

reconciling the supposed conflict between statutes. First, plaintiff cites Stuckey v. Renaissance at

Midway, 2015 IL App (1st) 143111, which involved a resident of a long-term care facility who

brought a negligence suit against the facility based on allegations he was physically assaulted by

his roommate. Id. ¶ 4. Plaintiff moved to compel discovery of facility records protected under the

Act. Id. ¶ 8. The First District found disclosure was not warranted where no argument was made

that an exception within the Act applied. Id. ¶ 30. Here, plaintiff argues his case warrants the same

result; however, he still fails to resolve this contention with the County Jail Standards. Plaintiff

also relies on Norskog v. Pfiel, 197 Ill. 2d 60, 72 (2001), to establish “[a]ll 50 states, the District

of Columbia and the federal courts recognize a psychiatrist-patient privilege, either by statute or

common law.”

¶ 18 Neither Stuckey nor Norskog assist this court in reconciling the conflict plaintiff

presents. We emphasize plaintiff cites no authority providing one statute supersedes the other (e.g.,

735 ILCS 5/8-802 (West 2022) (providing the statutory physician-patient privilege yields to the

Act in the event a conflict arises between the statutes)), no analogous cases resolving conflicting

statutes, or any other authority providing how to resolve this purported conflict of law. As such,

even assuming, arguendo, plaintiff stated a cause of action to defeat defendants’ section 2-615

motion to dismiss, plaintiff failed to overcome his burden to demonstrate defendants’ reliance on

the County Jail Standards was unfounded as to their section 2-619(a)(9) motion to dismiss. See

Van Meter, 207 Ill. 2d at 377. Accordingly, the trial court did not err as a matter of law when it

granted defendants’ motion and dismissed the complaint.

¶ 19 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 20 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

-7- ¶ 21 Affirmed.

-8-