[Cite as Peters v. Rock-Tenn Co., 2011-Ohio-3949.]
COURT OF APPEALS DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
EUGENE N. PETERS : JUDGES: : Hon. John W. Wise, P.J. Plaintiff-Appellant : Hon. Julie A. Edwards, J. : Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J. -vs- : : ROCK-TENN CO., ET AL : Case No. 10CAE040030 : Defendant-Appellees : OPINION
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDING: Appeal from the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas, Case No. 07-CVH-3-300
JUDGMENT: AFFIRMED
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: August 10, 2011
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellant For Defendant-Appellees
RUSSELL A. KELM CHRISTOPHER E. HOGAN JOANNE W. DETRICK 5025 Arlington Centre Blvd., Suite 400 37 W. Broad Street Columbus, OH 43220 Suite 860 Columbus, OH 43215 CLIFFORD M. WEISS NOELLE A. ABASTILLAS 541 Village Trace Bldg. 11A, Suite 201 Marietta, Georgia 30067 Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 2
Delaney, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-Appellant Eugene N. Peters appeals the March 23, 2010 jury
verdict of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas finding in favor of Defendants-
Appellees, Rock-Tenn Company, Rock-Tenn Services, Inc., Craig Gunckel, and Michael
E. Kiepura on Appellant’s age discrimination claim.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND CASE
{¶2} On March 16, 2007, Appellant filed a complaint in the Delaware County
Court of Common Pleas alleging age discrimination by Appellees. Appellant was an
employee of Rock-Tenn Company and the company terminated Appellant’s
employment on January 10, 2007. Appellant alleged Appellees unlawfully terminated
Appellant’s employment based upon his age. At the time of his termination, Appellant
was 55 years old.
{¶3} Appellees filed a motion for summary judgment on February 1, 2008. The
trial court granted Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and Appellant appealed the
matter to this Court. In Eugene N. Peters v. Rock-Tenn Co., 180 Ohio App.3d 10, 2008-
Ohio-6444, 903 N.E.2d 1256, this Court reversed the decision of the trial court to grant
summary judgment and remanded the case to the trial court for further proceedings.
We found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellees’ reasons
for terminating Appellant’s employment were mere pretext for impermissible
discrimination.
{¶4} The matter proceeded to a jury trial on March 9 through March 16, 2010.
The following testimony was adduced at trial. Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 3
{¶5} Rock-Tenn Company, based in Norcross, Georgia, produces corrugated
and consumer packaging, such as folding cartons. Appellant, who resides in
Westerville, Ohio, began working for Rock-Tenn in 1981 as a sales person. When
Appellant started with Rock-Tenn, he was responsible for selling quick service
restaurant cartons, which are folding cartons used by restaurants and fast food
establishments. Appellant’s sales territories included the Midwest, mid-Atlantic, Texas,
Arizona, and Wisconsin. Appellant averaged approximately $5 million and $5.5 million
in sales per year.
{¶6} The quick service cartons are primarily produced at Rock-Tenn’s folding
carton plant in Eutaw, Alabama. Dan Williams is the general manager of the Eutaw
plant and has worked for Rock-Tenn since 1974. Because the products Appellant sold
were produced at the Eutaw plant, Dan Williams and Appellant worked closely together
throughout their careers. Williams spoke to Appellant about increasing his sales and
warned that Appellant could lose his job if he did not increase his sales.
{¶7} Conrad Hill, Vice President of Manufacturer Representative Sales, was
Appellant’s supervisor. In 2005, Rock-Tenn purchased a competitor and reorganized
the folding carton sales division. Due to the reorganization, Hill’s position was
eliminated, but he was reassigned as a salesperson with no change in salary or
benefits. Hill was 63 years old at the time and was considering retirement.
{¶8} Appellant’s new supervisor was Appellee, Craig Gunckel, Sales Manager
of the Eastern Division. Gunckel was 34 years old. Before 2005, Appellee, Michael
Kiepura was Senior Vice President of Sales for the Folding Carton Division. After 2005, Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 4
Kiepura was Executive Vice President of the Folding Carton Division. Gunckel reported
to Kiepura.
{¶9} At the time of the reorganization, Hill counseled Gunckel on the sales
people newly assigned to Gunckel. Hill recommended that Gunckel terminate
Appellant’s employment because Appellant demonstrated poor performance and
declining sales. Appellant had decreased sales every year and in the last 39 months
prior to his termination, Appellant only opened one new account. Dan Williams also
recommended that Rock-Tenn terminate Appellant’s employment. Gunckel declined to
terminate Appellant at that time because he felt he could assist Appellant with his sales
performance.
{¶10} When Gunckel met with his newly assigned sales representatives, he
requested that they increase their sales. Appellant stated that Gunckel required
Appellant to increase his sales goal to $10 million per year. Appellant also testified that
Gunckel required Appellant to sell folding cartons other than the quick service cartons
that Appellant was familiar with. Other Rock-Tenn sales people testified that due to the
growth and reorganization of Rock-Tenn, the sales people were expected to sell all of
Rock-Tenn’s folding carton products to a variety of customers and they did so. In 2006,
Gunckel requested that Appellant develop a list of prospective customers. Appellant did
not provide the list to Gunckel until September 2006 and after Gunckel told Appellant
that he would not ask for the list again. Appellant testified that he had difficulty in
developing the list because he was required to look for customers in the Cleveland and
Columbus area that were already being marketed by other Rock-Tenn sales people.
Gunckel denied limiting Appellant to the Cleveland and Columbus markets. Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 5
{¶11} During Appellant’s tenure with Rock-Tenn, Appellant received a bonus in
2006. Appellant also received effective performances on his employment reviews by
Hill when Hill was his supervisor. Cole Harford, Appellant’s largest customer, gave
Rock-Tenn and its sales people a 10 on its customer survey. Williams testified that the
favorable customer survey was through William’s work at maintaining the relationship
with Cole Harford, rather than Appellant’s salesmanship.
{¶12} In December 2006, Rock-Tenn began interviewing Richard Burklew for a
sales position within Gunckel’s division. Richard Burklew was 43 years old. On
January 8, 2007, it was confirmed that Burklew would be coming to Rock-Tenn. On
January 10, 2007, Gunckel terminated Appellant’s employment. Appellees stated that
Appellant’s employment was terminated because of Appellant’s poor sales
{¶13} Gunckel assigned a portion of Appellant’s sales accounts to Burklew.
Other accounts were assigned to another sales person, manufacturer’s representatives,
and customer service. When Conrad Hill officially retired, a portion of his accounts were
assigned to Burklew.
{¶14} At the conclusion of Appellant’s case in chief, Appellees moved for a
directed verdict. The trial court denied the motion. Appellees renewed their motion for
directed verdict on Appellant’s claim of direct evidence of age discrimination. The trial
court granted the motion. Appellant’s claim of indirect evidence of age discrimination
went to the jury. The jury was supplied with four interrogatories.
{¶15} On March 16, 2010, the jury returned with a verdict. The jury answered
the first interrogatory in favor of the Appellant, finding that Appellant established a prima Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 6
facie case of age discrimination. The jury found in the second interrogatory that by a
preponderance of the evidence, Appellees overcame the presumption of age
discrimination by articulating a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for Appellant’s
discharge from employment. In the third interrogatory, however, the jury found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Appellant did not establish that the legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason given by Appellees for Appellant’s termination was mere
pretext for unlawful discrimination. Accordingly, the jury found in favor of Appellees.
{¶16} Appellant did not file any post-trial motions.
{¶17} It is from this decision Appellant now appeals.
ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR
{¶18} Appellant raises three Assignments of Error:
{¶19} “I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN COMMENTING ON THE EVIDENCE
TO THE JURY.
{¶20} “II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS INSTRUCTIONS TO THE JURY
ON AGE DISCRIMINATION.
{¶21} “III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION
FOR DIRECTED VERDICT ON THE ISSUE OF DIRECT EVIDENCE OF AGE
DISCRIMINATION.”
I.
{¶22} Appellant contends in his first Assignment of Error that the trial court made
comments on the evidence that were prejudicial to Appellant. Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 7
{¶23} Appellant points to two statements made by the trial court during
Appellant’s cross-examination of Appellee, Michael Kiepura. In the first instance, the
interaction was as follows:
{¶24} “Q. In the period of December of 2006 in January of 2007, the Company
hired Richard Burklew and terminated Gene Peters; is that right?
{¶25} “A. Yes.
{¶26} “Q. And at what point in the discussions in December of 2006 was it
decided that the place to put Richard Burklew was principally into Gene Peters’s
customers?
{¶27} “THE COURT: Counsel, you’re putting inferences in your questions that
have not been established by any of the facts. Ask a question based upon facts, not
your intuition.
{¶28} “MR. KELM: I have, Your Honor. We’ve established through evidence that
no other salesman other than –
{¶29} “THE COURT: There is no testimony, sir, that Mr. Burklew replaced Gene
Peters.” (T. 643).
{¶30} Appellant argues the issue Appellant was developing was the element of
replacement on Appellant’s claim for a prima facie case of indirect evidence of age
discrimination. Appellant states trial court’s comment influenced the jury on the issue of
Appellant’s replacement by Richard Burklew.
{¶31} Appellant argues the second exchange with the trial court affected
Appellant’s ability to show the element of pretext. The second exchange was as
follows: Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 8
{¶32} “Q. And was there any other salesman in the company that you’re aware
of in 2006 that had a restriction of one city or two cities to where they could sell folding
cartons?
{¶33} “A. I’m not aware that Gene had a restriction of –
{¶34} “Q. I’m just asking if there’s any salesman that you’re aware of in 2006
that had a restriction to one or two cities to selling folding cartons.
{¶35} “A. I’m not aware of any salesman who had any restriction on a city or two,
is that what you’re saying?
{¶36} “Q. Right.
{¶37} “A. I’m not aware of any salesman having that restriction.
{¶38} “Q. So if, indeed, Gene Peters had been told he could sell in Columbus
and he could sell in Northeast Ohio and he needed to clear those customers, that was
contrary to what any other salesman had as a restriction; is that true?
{¶39} “MR. WEISS: Objection.
{¶40} “THE COURT: Sustained. That’s a complete misinterpretation of what he
just testified to. He said there were no restrictions.
{¶41} “MR. KELM: But the testimony before, Your Honor, was that Mr. Peters
was told he could sell specifically in Columbus and specifically in Northeast Ohio.
{¶42} “THE COURT: He wasn’t restricted to those locations. There’s no
testimony that says he was restricted to those two locations.
{¶43} “MR. KELM: That was his testimony.
{¶44} “THE COURT: Not according to my notes.” (T. 656-657). Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 9
{¶45} Counsel for Appellant objected to the trial court’s comments and moved
the trial court for a curative instruction or a mistrial. The trial court denied the motion.
During the charge to the jury, the trial court stated, “If, during the course of the trial, I
said or did anything that you consider an indication on [sic] my views on the facts, you
are to disregard the same.” (T. 1351).
{¶46} The decision whether to grant a mistrial is one addressed to the sound
discretion of the trial court. Quellos v. Quellos (1994), 96 Ohio App.3d 31, 41, 643
N.E.2d 1173. This Court may not substitute its judgment for that of the trial court absent
an abuse of discretion. Id. An abuse of discretion connotes more than an error of law or
judgment; it implies that the court's attitude is unreasonable, arbitrary or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 450 N.E.2d 1140.
A mistrial should only be granted where the party seeking the same demonstrates that
he or she suffered material prejudice so that a fair trial is no longer possible. State v.
Franklin (1991), 62 Ohio St.3d 118, 127, 580 N.E.2d 1.
{¶47} The scope of cross-examination is governed by Evid.R. 611(A), which
provides:
{¶48} “The court shall exercise reasonable control over the mode and order of
interrogating witnesses and presenting evidence so as to (1) make the interrogation and
presentation effective for the ascertainment of the truth, (2) avoid needless consumption
of time, and (3) protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment.”
{¶49} The Tenth District Court of Appeals, in Dublin Transp., Inc. v. Goebel
(1999), 133 Ohio App.3d 272, 727 N.E.2d 938 utilized the criteria found in State v.
Wade (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 182, 373 N.E.2d 1244 to determine whether a trial judge's Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 10
remarks were prejudicial in a civil case. In Wade, the Ohio Supreme Court held that a
reviewing court must adhere to the following rules: (1) the burden of proof is placed
upon the complaining party to demonstrate prejudice, (2) it is presumed that the trial
judge is in the best position to decide when a breach is committed and what corrective
measures are called for, (3) the remarks are to be considered in light of the
circumstances under which they are made, and (4) consideration is to be given to their
possible effect upon the jury and the possible impairment of the effectiveness of
counsel. State v. Wade, supra, at 188.
{¶50} We first find Appellant can show no prejudice as to the trial court’s
comments regarding Appellant’s replacement by Richard Burklew because of the jury’s
affirmative finding on the first interrogatory that Appellant had established a prima facie
case of age discrimination through indirect evidence. In order to show a prima facie
case of age discrimination through indirect evidence, Appellant proved by a
preponderance of the evidence that Appellant was replaced by, or his discharge
permitted the retention of, Richard Burklew.
{¶51} We find no prejudicial error as to the trial court’s second comment.
Appellant testified that Gunckel limited Appellant to selling new folding carton products
in the Cleveland and Columbus markets. (T. 233, 243). Gunckel, however, testified
that he did not limit Appellant to Cleveland or Columbus. (T. 1114-1115). Kiepura
testified that no sales person had a restriction on their markets. We find in this instance
the trial court properly limited the scope of Appellant’s cross-examination of Kiepura
based on Evid.R. 611(A). Further, the trial court gave the jury a curative instruction to
disregard its comments and the “presumption always exists that the jury has followed Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 11
the instructions given to it by the trial court.” Pang v. Minch (1990), 53 Ohio St.3d 186,
187, 559 N.E.2d 1313, at paragraph four of the syllabus.
{¶52} Appellant’s first Assignment of Error is overruled.
II.
{¶53} Appellant argues in his second Assignment of Error that the trial court
erred in its instructions to the jury on age discrimination.
{¶54} Under Ohio law, a prima facie case of age discrimination may be proved
either directly or indirectly. An employee “may establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination directly by presenting evidence, of any nature, to show that an employer
more likely than not was motivated by discriminatory intent.” Mauzy v. Kelly Services,
Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664 N.E.2d 1272, paragraph one of the syllabus; Smith
v. E.G. Baldwin & Assoc., Inc. (1997), 119 Ohio App.3d 410, 415, 695 N.E.2d 349. If,
however, the employee is unable to establish a causal link or nexus between the
employer's discriminatory statements or conduct and the act that allegedly violated the
employee's rights under the statute, then the employee has not proved age
discrimination by the direct method of proof. See Byrnes v. LCI Communication
Holdings Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 125, 672 N.E.2d 145, cert. denied (1997), 521 U.S.
1104, 117 S.Ct. 2480, 138 L.Ed.2d 989. Without direct proof of discrimination, an
employee may establish a prima facie claim of age discrimination indirectly by
demonstrating he or she (1) was a member of the statutorily protected class, (2) was
discharged, (3) was qualified for the position, and (4) was replaced by, or the discharge
permitted the retention of, a person of substantially younger age. Coryell v. Bank One
Trust Co., N.A., 101 Ohio St.3d 175, 803 N.E.2d 781, 2004-Ohio-723, at ¶ 20. Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 12
{¶55} Once an employee establishes a prima facie case of age discrimination,
the burden shifts to the employer to provide some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for the action taken. Kohmescher v. Kroger Co. (1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 501, 503, 575
N.E.2d 439. If the employer establishes a nondiscriminatory reason, the employee then
bears the burden of showing the employer's proffered reason was a pretext for
impermissible discrimination. Owens v. Boulevard Motel Corp. (Nov. 5, 1998), 10th Dist.
No. 97APE12-1728; Cruz v. South Dayton Urological Associates, Inc. (1997), 121 Ohio
App.3d 655, 659, 700 N.E.2d 675. The employee must prove the employer's
nondiscriminatory reason was false and discrimination was the real reason for the
action taken. Wagner v. Allied Steel & Tractor Co. (1995), 105 Ohio App.3d 611, 617,
664 N.E.2d 987.
{¶56} Appellant states the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give
Appellant’s proposed jury instructions on age discrimination. Specifically, Appellant
argues the trial court failed to give the correct prima facie case and burden shifting
instruction and failed to correctly define “qualified,” “replacement,” and “pretext.”
{¶57} To establish reversible error in the trial court's failure to give the requested
jury instruction, Appellant must first show the trial court's refusal to give a proposed jury
instruction was an abuse of discretion. Jaworowski v. Med. Radiation Consultants
(1991), 71 Ohio App.3d 320, 327, 594 N.E.2d 9. In order to find abuse of discretion, we
must determine the trial court's decision was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore (1983), 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d
1140. Generally, the court should give a proposed jury instruction if it is an accurate
statement of the law applicable to the facts presented at trial and reasonable minds Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 13
might reach the conclusion sought by the instruction. Murphy v. Carrollton Mfg. Co.
(1991), 61 Ohio St.3d 585, 591, 575 N.E.2d 828. Second, Appellant must demonstrate
that they were prejudiced by the court's refusal to give the proposed instruction.
Jaworowski v. Med. Radiation Consultants (1991), 71 Ohio App.3d at 327, 594 N.E.2d
9.
{¶58} We first address Appellant’s claimed error on the trial court’s prima facie
case and burden shifting instruction. Appellant argues the trial court failed to use the
preferred jury instruction for age discrimination based on indirect evidence found under
OJI §533.03. A review of the trial transcript shows the contrary. The trial court utilized
OJI §533.03 that states the employee may prove his discrimination by presenting
indirect evidence that age was a determining factor for his discharge. (T. 1338). The
instructions further quote directly from OJI §533.03 to explain “determining factor.” (T.
1338-1339).
{¶59} The jury instructions go on to explain how Appellant must establish a
prima facie case of age discrimination through indirect evidence and the burden-shifting
method. The trial court utilized the established Ohio law on age discrimination as stated
above. We find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in using Ohio law for its jury
instructions nor did the Appellant suffer prejudicial error by the trial court’s reliance on
Ohio law for the jury instructions.
{¶60} Appellant next argues the trial court erred in its definitions for “qualified”
and “replacement.” The jury instructions and verdict forms were supplemented by four
jury interrogatories. The first interrogatory asked if the jury found by a preponderance of Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 14
the evidence that Appellant had established a prima facie case of age discrimination.
The jury instructions stated:
{¶61} “In order to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination by indirect
evidence, Mr. Peters must prove by the greater weight of the evidence that 1, he was a
member of the statutorily protected class; 2 was discharged; 3 he was qualified for the
position; and 4, that was replaced by, or the discharge permitted the retention of, a
person of substantially younger age.” (T. 1339). (Emphasis added.)
{¶62} The jury answered “yes” to the first interrogatory that Appellant had
established a prima facie case of age discrimination.
{¶63} The first interrogatory asked if Appellant proved a prima facie case of age
discrimination, which was defined within the jury instructions to include the elements of
“qualified” and “replaced.” We can find no error prejudicial to Appellant when Appellant
successfully established a prima facie case of age discrimination as demonstrated by
the first interrogatory.
{¶64} Appellant finally argues the trial court erred in its definition of “pretext.”
The jury instructions stated as follows:
{¶65} “If the employer articulates a non-discriminatory reason, the employee
then bears the burden of showing that the employer’s proffered reason was a pretext
[f]or impermissible discrimination. The employee must prove the employer’s non-
discriminatory reason was false and that discrimination was the real reason for the
action taken.” (T. 1340).
{¶66} Appellant argues the correct method of determining pretext is found within
Manzer v. Diamond Shamrock Chemicals Co. (C.A. 6, 1994), 29 F.3d 1078, 1084. The Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 15
instruction provided by the trial court is well-settled Ohio law as relied upon in Williams
v. City of Akron, 107 Ohio St.3d 203, 2004-Ohio-6268, 837 N.E.2d 1169. The Ohio
Supreme Court further stated that while we are able to look to federal interpretation of
analogous statutes, we are not bound to apply such case law. Id. at ¶ 31.
{¶67} Appellant’s second Assignment of Error is overruled.
III.
{¶68} Appellant argues in his third Assignment of Error that the trial court erred
when it granted Appellees’ motion for directed verdict on Appellant’s claim of direct
evidence of age discrimination. We disagree.
{¶69} As stated above, Appellant can establish a prima facie case of age
discrimination through direct or indirect evidence of discrimination. An employee “may
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination directly by presenting evidence, of
any nature, to show that an employer more likely than not was motivated by
discriminatory intent.” Mauzy v. Kelly Servs., Inc. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 578, 664
N.E.2d 1272, paragraph one of the syllabus. If the employee is unable to establish a
causal link or nexus between the employer’s discriminatory statements or conduct and
the act that allegedly violated the employee’s rights under the statute, then the
employee has not proved age discrimination by the direct method of proof. See Byrnes
v. LCI Communication Holdings, Co. (1996), 77 Ohio St.3d 125, 672 N.E.2d 145.
{¶70} Appellant states that the direct evidence of Rock-Tenn’s discriminatory
intent can be shown by a comment made to Appellant by Dan Williams, the general
manager of the Eutaw plant. Appellant testified that Dan Williams told Appellant that he
and Appellant were “old Rock-Tenn” and they would be fortunate to be there in another Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 16
two or five years. Dan Williams stated at trial that his comment about “old Rock-Tenn”
had nothing to do with age: “[i]t had to do with a concept, a philosophy. When we went
there when I was 20 or 30 years old, Rock-Tenn was a small company, had a different
set of rules. * * * When the Company started buying other companies, we brought in
other people, the Company changed and you had to change or else you were not there.
* * * I’d tell him, don’t become part of the old Rock-Tenn, get out of that mode. You’ve
got to think about the new Rock-Tenn; move forward, change. * * * Gene and I had very
frank conversations. And it had nothing to do with age. It was the growing of the
company, growing of Eutaw that if we didn’t grow sales, produce products, make a profit
for Rock-Tenn, that we would not be there.” (Tr. 792-794).
{¶71} Appellees moved for a directed verdict at the close of Appellant’s case,
but the trial court denied the motion. Appellees renewed their motion for directed
verdict at the close of all evidence arguing that Appellant failed to establish direct
evidence of discrimination. A trial court can grant a motion for a directed verdict only
after finding that reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion on any determinative
issue and that conclusion is adverse to the party opposing the motion. Civ.R. 50(A)(4).
This “reasonable minds” test calls upon a court to determine only whether there exists
any evidence of substantial probative value in support of the claims of the non-moving
party. Akers v. Saulsbury, 5th Dist. No. 2008–CAE–12–0070, 2010–Ohio–4965, ¶ 10.
We must construe the evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the
motion is made and neither weigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of the
witnesses in ruling upon a motion. Id. Our review of the trial court's disposition of the
motion is de novo. Id. Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 17
{¶72} We find the trial court correctly determined that reasonable minds could
only conclude that the evidence reviewed in a light most favorable to Appellant
demonstrated that Appellant failed to establish his claim of direct evidence of
discrimination. Appellant argues that he established a case for discrimination through
direct evidence by Dan Williams’s statement about “old Rock-Tenn.” Our review of the
testimony shows Appellant did not establish a causal link between Dan Williams’s
comment about “old Rock-Tenn” and Appellant’s eventual termination from Rock-Tenn.
{¶73} Appellant’s third Assignment of Error is overruled.
{¶74} The judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Delaney, J.
Wise, P.J. and
Edwards, J. concur.
HON. PATRICIA A. DELANEY
HON. JOHN W. WISE
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS Delaware County, Case No. 10CAE040030 18
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR DELAWARE COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
EUGENE N. PETERS : : Plaintiff-Appellant : : -vs- : JUDGMENT ENTRY : ROCK-TENN CO., ET AL : : Defendants-Appellees : Case No. 10CAE040030
For the reasons stated in our accompanying Memorandum-Opinion, the
judgment of the Delaware County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed. Costs assessed
to Appellant.
HON. JULIE A. EDWARDS