IN I IRED .NOV 1 9 LUl~
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION Docket No. AP-13-16 M~~ -C{Ut..-{- 11-lt'-lq JENNIFER PETERS,
Petitioner ORDER v. RECEIVED & FILED NOV 1 0 2014 COMMISSIONER, MAINE ANDROSCOGGIN DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH SUPERIOR COURT AND HUMAN SERVICES,
Respondent
This matter is before the court on Petitioner Jennifer Peters' Rule 80C appeal of
the Decision of Respondent Maine Department of Health and Human Services
("DHHS"), which found that Ms. Peters is no longer eligible for coverage under the
MaineCare Home and Community Based Benefits Program for Adults with Disabilities
("HCB Program"). Pursuant to 5 M.R.S. § 11001 et seq. and Rule 80C, Ms. Peters is
asking that this court vacate the decision made by DHHS. Respondent DHHS has
opposed Ms. Peters' Appeal. After hearing on May 7, 2014, review of the record and the
parties' filings, the court denies Ms. Peters' Appeal for the reasons set forth below.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The record on appeal provides the following:
Ms. Peters is 38-years-old and receives MaineCare. Ms. Peters suffers from
numerous ailments, including, but not limited to neurofibromatosis II, three brain tumors,
and cervical and lumbar spinal tumors. She is wheel chair dependent as a result of lack
of sensation and motor activity of the left leg. She also suffers from psoriasis, f ,,_·. ~- ~~ 1-: agoraphobia, post-traumatic stress disorder, bipolar disorder, fibromyalgia, legal
blindness, poor balance, memory loss, hypersomnolence, depression, systemic Lupus
Erythematosus, and obstructive sleep apnea. (App. Ex. 3.) • According to the Journal of the American Medical Association, • - "Neurofibromatosis (NF) is a genetic disorder causing skin abnormalities and tumors
that form on nerve tissues." (App. Ex. 6)(Emphasis in the original). At the time of her
assessment, Ms. Peters had recently undergone surgery to remove a 'tumor from
underneath her fingernail. (HO Ex. 5.) The year before, she had a brain tumor removed.
(ld.) She was also hospitalized earlier in the year for a reaction to medication. (ld.) Ms.
Peters has inoperable tumors in her brain as well as in her thighs. (R. at 33: 17-20.) At the
hearing, Ms. Peters stated that her physical condition has deteriorated over the course of
the last year. (R. at 33:13-16.) She conveyed that her physical condition is only expected /:) to dec line in the future. (R. at 33 :9-16.)
RN Charlene McPhee, a representative from Goold Health Systems 1, assessed
Ms. Peters for her eligibility for the HCB program. (HO Exs. 4, 5.) Ms. McPhee performs
18 assessments per week. (R. at 17.) On June 17, 2013, Ms. McPhee conducted the
assessment with Ms. Peters and Ms. Peters' stepmother and personal support specialist
("PSS"), Deborah Girard, at Ms. Peters.' apartment. (HO Ex. 5.) Ms. McPhee's
assessment period covered from June 10, 2013 to June 16, 2013, and her findings are
noted on the Medical Eligibility Determination ("MED") form dated June 17, 2013. (Dec.
at 4; HO Ex. 5.) Ms. McPhee had no contact with Ms. Peters' medical providers. (R. at
25:17-26:4.)
0 1 DHHS contracts with Goold Health Systems for it to perform assessments regarding in-home care cases. (R. at 7.)
-" Prior to June of 2013, Ms. Peters was eligible for and received services through
the HCB Program, based on a prior DHHS assessment that found that Ms. Peters, a
MaineCare recipient, requires extensive assistance with three out of five "Activities of
Daily Living" ("ADL"). It was previously determined that she requires extensive
assistance with transfers, locomotion and bed mobility. (App. Ex. 8.)
A reassessment of Ms. Peters HCB Program eligibility was conducted on June 17,
2013. At that time it was determined that Ms. Peters no longer requires extensive
assistance with bed mobility. According to Ms. McPhee's notes, "She does need help
putting her 'back leg' into bed at night. Consumer has no difficulty turning or situating
herself in bed though she usually stays in one position by choice." (HO Ex. 5.) It was also
determined that Ms. Peters does not require assistance with toileting. Ms. McPhee's
assessment notes provide: "Consumer and her PSS state that she is totally independent in
toileting. She occasionally has dribbling when she sneezes but does not use pull-ups or
depends." (HO Ex. 5.) Based upon the June 17, 2013 reassessment, DHHS determined
that Ms. Peters no longer met the minimum eligibility requirements for the HCB
Program.
Ms. Peters receives home care from Ms. Girard. Up until the reassessment, Ms.
Peters had received 40 hours a week of care. She now qualifies for 16.75 hours a week of
care from a PSS through the MaineCare Private Duty Nursing/Personal Care Services
program (PDN-Level III program). Ms. Peters will also receive help from a nurse for one
hour per month.
Ms. Peters timely filed a request for an administrative hearing, which was held on
September 30, 2013. Ms. Peters and Ms. Girard testified on Ms. Peters' behalf. Debra
3 Turner, R.N., an appeals specialist for Goold Health Systems, and Ms. McPhee testified
on behalf of DHHS. On November 6, 2013, the Hearing Officer issued a Decision finding
that DHBS was correct 'that Ms. Peters is no longer eligible for MaineCare coverage of
her expenses under the Home and Community Based Benefits Program for Adults with
Disabilities. The Hearing officer's Decision provides that Ms. Peters "is eligible for
services under level III of the PDN Program." (Dec. at 3.)
Ms. Peters timely filed her Petition For Review of Agency Action.
II. Standard of Review
In its appellate capacity, the court reviews agency decisions for "abuse of
discretion, error of law, or findings not supported by the evidence." Rangeley
Crossroads Coal. v. Land Use Reg. Comm'n, 2008 ME 115, ~ 10,955 A.2d 223.
The burden of proof is on a petitioner to prove that "no competent evidence
supports the [agency's] decision and that the record compels a contrary conclusion."
Bischoffv. Maine State Ret. Sys., 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995). "Inconsistent evidence
will not render an agency decision unsupported." Id. "Judges may not substitute their
judgment for that of the agency merely because the evidence could give rise to more than
one result." Gulick v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 452 A.2d 1202, 1209 (Me. 1982).
The court must give great deference to an agency's construction of a statute it is
charged with administering. Rangeley Crossroads Coal., 2008 ME 115, ~ 10, 955 A.2d
223. "A court will 'not vacate an agency's decision unless it: violates the Constitution or
statutes; exceeds the agency's authority; is procedurally unlawful; is arbitrary or
capricious; constitutes an abuse of discretion; is affected by bias or an error of law; or is
unsupported by the evidence in the record.'" Kroeger v. Dep 't of Environmental Prot.,
4 2005 ME 50,~ 7, 870 A.2d 566 (quoted in Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 452 at
312 (4th ed. 2013)); see also 5 M.R.S.A. § 11007(4)(c).
Where there have been multiple levels of administrative decision-making, the
most recent decision will be the one subject to Superior Court review, if the most recent
decision-maker had de novo capacity and/or the authority to conduct additional fact-
finding. See Alexander, Maine Appellate Practice § 455(b) at 315; see also Concerned
Citizens to Save Roxbury v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 2011 ME 39, ~ 17, 15 A. 3d 1263.
III. Discussion
Pursuant to 22 M.R.S.A. § 3173, DHHS is "authorized to administer programs of
aid, medical or remedial care and services for medically indigent persons." DHHS is
required to operate a Medicaid program for disabled persons. See § 3174-G(l)(C)
(providing that DHHS "shall provide for the delivery of federally approved Medicaid
services to the following persons: A qualified elderly or disabled person when the
person's family income is equal to or below 100% of the nonfarm income official poverty
line . . . . ") DHHS is also empowered "to make all necessary rules and regulations
consistent with the laws of the State for the administration of these programs including,
but not limited to, establishing conditions of eligibility .... " § 3173.
The MaineCare Benefits Manual and the MaineCare Eligibility Manual contain
regulations propagated by the Department to manage MaineCare benefits. Section 19 of
the MaineCare Benefits Manual concerns home and community benefits for the elderly
and for adults with disabilities. "Home and Community Benefits for the Elderly and
Adults with Disabilities (HCB) are in-home care and other services, designed as a
package, to assist eligible members to remain in their homes, or other residential
5 community settings, and thereby avoid or delay institutional nursing facility care." 10-
144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, Ch. II,§ 19.
DHHS determines whether an individual is medically eligible to receive HCB
services through a medical eligibility determination (MED) assessment. Jd. The
assessment may be performed either by DHHS or an authorized agent. Jd. The Manual
provides:
A person meets the medical eligibility requirements for HCB if he or she meets the medical eligibility requirements specified in Chapter II, Section 67. 02, Nursing Facility Services, of this manual. The Department, or its Assessing Services Agency, using the medical eligibility determination (MED) form must complete a face-to-face assessment. The clinical judgment of the ASA shall be determinative ofthe scores given on the MED assessment.
10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, Ch. II,§ 19.02-2.
There are several different criteria used in Section 67.02-3 to determine whether
an individual is eligible for a nursing facility level of care, in this case Ms. Peters'
eligibility hinges upon whether or not she requires extensive assistance in three out of
five activities of daily living ("ADLs"). 2 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, Ch. II, § 67.02-
3(A)(12). Section 67.02-3(A)(l2) provides that
A person meets the medical eligibility requirements for NF services if he or she needs at least one (1) of the following services seven (7) days per week (unless otherwise specified) that are or otherwise would be performed by or under the supervision of a registered professional nurse: ...
2 The court notes that in the Respondent's Brief DHHS cites to § 67.02-3(B)(l), (2) and (3). In order to qualify under§ 67.02-3(B), Ms. Peters would be required to show that "she needs a combination of at least three (3) of the following services described in 67.02-3(B) below, including at least one (1) ofthe nursing services described in 67.02-3(B)(l), that are or otherwise would be performed by or under the supervision of a registered professional nurse." Ms. Peters has clarified that she is not seeking eligibility under§ 67.02-3(B) since she admits that she does not need the nursing services listed. Therefor, the proper section of the regulations to consider is § 67.02-3(A).
6 extensive assistance or total dependence with three (3) of the following five (5) activities of daily living: a) bed mobility; (b) transfer; (c) locomotion; (d) eating; and (e) toilet use (refer to 67.02-3(B)(2) below).
Section 19.01-15 provides extensive assistance:
means although the individual performed part of the activity over the last seven (7) days, or twenty-four (24) to forty-eight (48) hours if in a hospital setting, help of the following type(s) was provided: -Weight-bearing support three (3) or more times, or - Full staff performance of activity (three (3) or more times) during part (but not all) of the last seven (7) days.
The Department found that Ms. Peters requires extensive assistance with two out
of the five relevant ADLS: locomotion and transfers. The Department did not find that
Ms. Peters requires extensive assistance with bed mobility, eating, or toilet use. She does
not contest that she does not require extensive assistance with eating. Ms. Peters'
eligibility for the HCB Program hinges upon whether she requires extensive assistance
with either bed mobility or toileting. Ms. Peters contests the Department's determination
that she is independent with regard to toilet use and that she does not require assistance in
the area of bed mobility. She avers that she requires extensive assistance in toileting and
bed mobility. Ms. Peters' also contends that the 2012 Goold assessment should have a res
judicata effect regarding Ms. Peters' conditions, with the only possible exception being
for new evidence of a change in Ms. Peters' diagnosis or conditions.
Bed Mobility
Under Section E (physical functioning/structural problems) of the Medical
Eligibility Determination Form ("MED Form"), ADL self-performance and ADL support
are numerically evaluated. (HO Ex. 5.) Numbers zero through eight are used to indicate
different levels or types of support or whether an activity did or did not occur. (!d.) For
the evaluation of ADL self-performance, setup is not included. (!d.) In Section E, Bed
7 Mobility is defined as it is also defined in Section 67.02-3(B)(2)(a) of the Manual: "How
person moves to and from lying position, turns side to side, and positions body while in
bed." (HO Ex. 5); § 67.02-3(B)(2)(a). Getting in and out of bed is covered under the
Transfer section. (!d.) Ms. McPhee indicated that Ms. Peters is independent with bed
mobility and that she requires no setup or physical help from staff. (Id.)
In contrast, Ms. Peters and Ms. Girard discussed the assistance Ms. Peters
requires in the morning and the evening getting in and out of bed and positioning in bed
in the evening. In her testimony, Ms. Peters described how Deborah Girard manipulates
her in and out of bed in the morning and at night, and how Ms. Girard positions her in the
bed at night to prepare for sleep. (R. at 41-42.) Ms. Girard stated that Ms. Peters requires
her assistance to get out of bed in the morning, to get into bed at night, and to be properly
positioned in the bed. (R. at 57-59.) In particular, Ms. Peters requires help lifting and
positioning the leg that she cannot lift. (R. at 59:3-17.) Ms. Peters argues that her medical
record from her nurse practitioner shows that her physical condition always affects her
ability to change positions while she is lying down, and her medical record from her
occupational therapist shows that she has an impaired ability to shift positions while lying
down at home in bed. (See App. Ex. 2 at 2; App. Ex. 4 at 2.) Ms. Peters also points out
that both her nurse practitioner and her treating physician noted leg weakness. (App. Ex.
2 at 1 (noting "lack of sensation & motor activity of left leg"); App. Ex. 3 at 1.) The
medical records presented by Ms. Peters at the administrative hearing were from after her
assessment date, but appear to reflect her condition either during or fairly close in time to
the assessment period. (App. Exs. 1-5.)
8 Ms. Peters argues that the Hearing Officer did not give her medical sources the
appropriate weight. In particular, she argues that under 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527 her primary
care physician's opinion should have been given more weight. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527
("Generally, we give more weight to opinions from your treating sources, since these
sources are likely to be the medical professionals most able to provide a detailed,
longitudinal picture of your medical impainnent(s) .... ") The section of the C.F .R. that
Ms. Peters cites to, however, pertains to determinations regarding whether an individual
is disabled for purposes of receiving disability benefits. This case does not involve a
determination of whether or not Ms. Peters, who is already receiving MaineCare, and
who is eligible for the PDN-III program, is or is not disabled. The court finds § 404.1527
instructive, and concurs that medical evidence from treating sources is informative,
however, the HCB Program assessment process involves a limited time period where the
"clinical judgment of the ASA shall be determinative of the scores given on the MED
assessment." (10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, Ch. II,§ 19.02-2.) The Hearing Officer admitted
Ms. Peters' medical records into evidence, over the objections of DHHS, but it appears
that the records did not persuade her that Ms. Peters requires extensive assistance with
toileting or bed mobility.
The Hearing Officer noted that the medical records do not reflect that Ms. Peters
has conveyed that she requires help with bed mobility to her providers. (Dec. at 7.) She
mentioned that Dr. Tan's notes mention that Ms. Peters requires assistance with preparing
her food, medications, and bath or shower, but the notes do not mention that Ms. Peters
needs assistance with bed mobility or toilet use. (Dec. at 8.; App. Ex. 3 at 1). The court
9 notes, however, that Dr. Tan's list of activities Ms. Peters requues assistance with
includes the proviso "including, but not limited to". (App. Ex. 3 at 1.)
Ms. McPhee's findings and testimony directly contradicted Ms. Peters and Ms.
Girard's testimony. Ms. McPhee's findings regarding bed mobility were also discussed
during the administrative hearing:
"Ms. Turner: You have written here that you were told by Ms. Peters and her PSS
that she was independent in bed mobility that she didn't have any difficulty
moving in bed.
Ms. McPhee: Right that is what she said." (R. at 18:12-15 .)
Ms. Peters contends that Ms. McPhee failed to testify at the administrative hearing
regarding whether Ms. Peters can sit up in bed or lay down in bed independently, and that
the Hearing Officer failed to address the issue of whether Ms. Peters can "move [] to and
from lying position." § 67.02-3(B)(2)(a). Ms. McPhee did address the issue of bed
mobility more broadly, however, when she conveyed that she was told that Ms. Peters is
independent with bed mobility. Her notes also reflect Ms. McPhee's independence with
"turning or situating herself in bed." (HO Ex. 5.) In addition, Ms. McPhee stated in her
notes that "Task times were reviewed three times as were all ADL capabilities. All
present were in agreement with them and contributed in developing the task times." (ld.)
Ms. McPhee agreed at the administrative hearing that she had no personal stake in the
outcome of assessments. (R. at 22-23.)
With regard to bed mobility, the Hearing Officer wrote, "I do not find Ms. Peters
and Ms. Girard Credible." (Dec. at 7.) The Hearing Officer, did however, find Ms.
McPhee's testimony regarding bed mobility credible.
10 Although Ms. Peters' arguments and the evidence from medical providers are
compelling, the court is constrained to find that the hearing officer's determination is
supported by evidence presented by Ms. McPhee. Accordingly, the court declines to
vacate the hearing officer's determination regarding bed mobility.
Toileting
There were similar differences of opinion among Ms. Peters, Ms. Girard and Ms.
McPhee on the issue of toileting. Under Section E of the Med Form, Toilet Use is
described as "How a person uses the toilet room (or commode bedpan, urinal); transfers
on/off toilet, cleanses, changes pad, manages ostomy or catheter, adjusts clothes." (HO
Ex. 5); § 67.02-3(B)(2)(e). Ms. McPhee indicated that Ms. Peters was independent and
required no setup or physical help in the area of toilet use. (HO Ex. 5.)
Ms. Peters stated that during the assessment period she required assistance with
toileting from Ms. Girard approximately one to two times per day. (R. at 42:16-44:2.)
Ms. Girard conveyed that she assists Ms. Peters with toileting by bearing her weight as
she gets on and off the toilet, and that she does so four or five times over the course of
time that she is at Ms. Peters' apartment. (R. at 59:18-61: 4.)
When asked by the Hearing Officer about her assessment that Ms. Peters toilets
independently, Ms. McPhee testified that Ms. Peters and her stepmother both stated that
she independently toilets. When asked if she had any reason to doubt that, Ms. McPhee
said, No.
The Hearing Officer also inquired, "And when you asked about toileting do you
say do you toilet independent [sic] or do you go through all the motions of up and down
11 from the toilet, cleaning, that sort of thing? Ms. McPhee answered, "I go through all the
motions." (R. at 20:12-20.)
Ms. Peters contends that the Hearing Officer misinterpreted the cleaning and
adjusting clothes section of the toilet use category. Ms. McPhee stated that a patient who
suffered from frequent incontinence, needed someone to help her change depends or pull-
ups, and required someone to wash her would require extensive assistance, therefore, Ms.
Peters argues that since she sometimes suffers from dribbling incontinence that
necessitates a change of underpants she should also be considered in need of extensive
assistance in toilet use. (R. at 24:5-7.) Ms. McPhee's testimony, however, was that Ms.
Peters "can change her own underpants and not [sic] considered that she needs excessive
help." (R. at 24:1-2.)
Ms. Girard and Ms. Peters' testimony did not persuade the Hearing Officer. To
the contrary, the Hearing Officer found that Ms. Peters is required to use the toilet
independently on weekends. Ms. Peters is also on her own in the later afternoon and
evenings, the times when Ms. Peters stated she needs assistance with toilet use. (Dec. 7-
8.) In addition, the Hearing Officer found that Dr. Tan's office notes do not state that Ms.
Peters needed assistance with toilet use or bed mobility. (App. Ex. 3 at 1; Dec. at 8.)
The court acknowledges Ms. Peters' serious medical conditions, and IS
sympathetic to her arguments. That finding notwithstanding, the court is constrained by
the great deference it must afford DHHS in its determination if there is any credible
evidence to support the agency's decision. See Bischoff, 661 A.2d 167, 170 (Me. 1995);
see also Gulick, 452 A.2d 1202, 1209 (Me. 1982). Based on the aforementioned standard
of review, the evidence presented by Ms. Peters at the administrative hearing was neither
12 persuasive nor sufficient to convince the Hearing Officer to overturn DHHS's Decision
regarding toilet use.
Res Judicata and Collateral Estoppel
Ms. Peters has also advanced a res judicata/collateral estoppel argument.
Res judicata applies when: (1) the same parties or their privies are involved in both actions; (2) a valid final judgment was entered in the prior action; (3) the matters presented for decision in the second action were, or might have been, litigated in the first action ... ; and (4) both cases involve the same cause of action . . . The doctrine of res judicata applies to prior administrative proceedings, provided that such proceedings contain the essential elements of adjudication.
Town of Ogunquit v. Cliff House & Motels, Inc., 2000 ME 169, ,-[,-[ 10-11, 759 A.2d 731
(quotations omitted). Ms. Peters contends that DHHS should be bound by its 2012
decision. She argues that since her condition has not changed, and the evaluation criteria
have remained the same, DHHS should be bound by its 2012 decision that she is eligible
for the HCB Program. DHHS has stated that her claim is more precisely a collateral
estoppel claim, since Ms. Peters' case does not involve the litigation of the exact same
claim, but rather a question of whether the same factual issue is being determined once
again. See Portland Water Dist. v. Town of Standish, 2008 ME 23, ,-[ 9, 940 A.2d 1097
(quotations and citations omitted) (stating that collateral estoppel "prevents the
relitigation of factual issues already decided if the identical issue was determined by a
prior final judgment, and the party estopped had a fair opportunity and incentive to
litigate the issue in a prior proceeding.. . Collateral estoppel can be applied to
administrative proceedings ... ") DHHS maintains that the same issue is not being
decided once again, and therefore collateral estoppel is inapplicable.
In Kelley v. Maine Pub. Employees Ret. Sys., the Law Court determined that
collateral estoppel was not applicable in a case involving a review of the petitioner's
13 eligibility for disability retirement benefits based upon whether she was capable of
substantial gainful activity. 2009 ME 27, ~~ 22-23, 967 A.2d 676. The court wrote,
Collateral estoppel does not apply here, however, because the facts at issue in MPERS's 1998 decision are undeniably different from those at issue in 2006. Collateral estoppel only prevents the relitigation of factual issues when the identical issue was already determined by a prior final judgment. In 1998, the issue was whether Kelley's lower back problem, as it existed in 1998, prevented her from engaging in substantially gainful activity. In 2006, the issue was whether Kelley's lower back problem, as it existed in 2006, prevented her from engaging in substantially gainful activity.
2009 ME 27, ~ 22, 967 A.2d 676. The court also noted that the retirement disability
statutes "anticipates and allows for periodic review of the circumstances of individuals
who receive disability benefits. After each review, MPERS makes a new factual
determination on whether benefits should continue." Jd. at 23. The court noted that the
application of collateral estoppel in such a case would conflict with the statutory
requirement that the agency conduct periodic reviews. Jd.
DHHS has also noted that it is required to conduct periodic re-reviews by federal
law See 42 C.F.R. § 441.302(c)(2) (requiring at least annual re-evaluations). State
regulations also reflect that individuals may have multiple assessments over time, there
are defined eligibility periods, and reassessments are required prior to the end of an
eligibility period. See 10-144 C.M.R. Ch. 101, Ch. II,§§ 19.03 and 19.07.
The court f1nds that the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel are
inapplicable to this case. The two eligibility determinations were required by the
regulations. Simply put, the 2012 decision was a determination regarding Ms. Peters'
eligibility in 2012 and was based upon her condition at the time of that assessment; and,
the 2013 decision was a determination regarding Ms. Peters' eligibility in 2013 and was
based upon her condition at the time of the 20 13 assessment.
14 Accordingly, the court ORDERS that Petitioner's Appeal is DENIED.
The clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference
pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).
Dated:
15 Date Filed 12-1 0-13 Androscoggin Docket No. AP-13-16
Action: 80C Appeal
JENNIFER PETERS VS. COMMISSIONER, MAINE DEPT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
Plaintiffs Attorney Defendant's Attorney
Frank D'Aiessandro, Esq. Janine Raquet, Esq. PineTree Legal Asst Attorney General P.O. Box 547 84 Harlow Street 2nd Fl Portland, ME 04112 Bangor, ME 04401
Date of Entry
Dec 10 Received 12-10-13: Petition for Review of Agency Action filed.
Dec 17 Received 12-17-13: Entry of appearance of Janine Raquet, Esq. as counsel for respondent.
Dec 18 Received 12-18-13: Certified Return mail receipt served on December 12, 2013 on DHHS and Attorney General's Office filed.
Jan 8 Received 01-08-14: Certified Record filed.
Jan 8 On 01-08-14: Notice and Briefing Schedule filed. Petitioner's brief is due on or before February 19, 2014. Copies to counsel on 1-8-14.
Feb 19 Received 2-19-14: Petitioner's Brief filed.
Mar 7 Received 03-07-14: Respondent's Motion to Correct Record with Incorporated Memorandum of Law and proposed order filed.
Mar 10 On 03-10-14: As to Motion to Correct Record, motion granted. (Kennedy, J) Copies mailed to parties.
Page 1 AP-13-30