Peterman, Jr., W. v. Maple Press Co.

• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania
• Decided: May 30, 2025
• Docket: 1696 MDA 2024
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

J-A15004-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

WILLIAM PETERMAN, JR. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA Appellant : : : v. : : : MAPLE PRESS COMPANY : No. 1696 MDA 2024

Appeal from the Order Entered October 25, 2024 In the Court of Common Pleas of York County Civil Division at No(s): 2024-SU-002044

BEFORE: BOWES, J., STABILE, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.: FILED: MAY 30, 2025

William Peterman, Jr. (“Plaintiff”) appeals pro se from the order that

sustained the preliminary objections of Maple Press Company (“Defendant”)

and dismissed his complaint. We dismiss this appeal.

Given our disposition, a detailed case history is unnecessary. Briefly,

Plaintiff filed a complaint in July 2024 in the York County Court of Common

Pleas against Defendant alleging one count of employment discrimination.

Therein, he asserted that he had applied for an open press operator position

with Defendant and been hired in January 2024, but the offer was rescinded

the following week due to market conditions. When Defendant advertised new

machine operator openings in the summer of 2024, Plaintiff again applied but

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court. J-A15004-25

was not hired, allegedly because he was overqualified. Plaintiff maintained

that, given his previous hiring, the rejection of his application must have been

founded upon discrimination.

Defendant filed preliminary objections to the complaint in the nature of

a demurrer. It observed that Plaintiff did not allege that he first filed a claim

with the Pennsylvania Human Relations Commission (“PHRC”). Defendant

further contended that the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”) is the

exclusive remedy for claims of unlawful discrimination, and that Plaintiff’s

failure to pursue relief through the PHRC deprived the court of jurisdiction

over the claim. Defendant additionally asserted that, in any event, being

overqualified is not a protected class under the PHRA.

Plaintiff filed a response in opposition to the objections which, in large

part, was a collection of words conveying little discernable meaning. See,

e.g., Response to Preliminary Objections, 8/30/24, at ¶ 9 (“The objection by

Defendant is that discrimination must course through PHRC. However, the

PHRC limits its service to protected classes. Plaintiff asserts, needlessly per

judicial accreditation, that discrimination is possible outside the protected

classes. And, thereby, all discrimination does not require a course through

protected classes; neither then a stipulation of the PHRC. The objection is

irrelevant, based on the boundary of scope, and additionally, based on the

allegation of Defendant pertaining a failure of protected class.”); id. at ¶ 33

(“The Defendant smokes fear into the litigation, by way of presumptiveness

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of status quo. To make aware for the court the potential of a procedural

stipulation is at once a capacity of Defense and of Judgment (to Decision);

that if the objection fails Defense, then it can still carry influence

independently for Judgment.”). So far as the trial court was able to discern,

Plaintiff’s position was that the nature of Defendant’s discrimination was

unknown, yet not based upon Plaintiff’s membership in a protected class.

Thus, his claim fell outside the scope of the PHRA, which only prohibited

discrimination against specified groups, and, consequently, he was not

obligated to file his claim with PHRC before bringing the instant action.

The trial court sustained Defendant’s preliminary objections and

dismissed Plaintiff’s complaint by order of October 25, 2024. In an

accompanying opinion, the court explained that, under Pennsylvania law, a

prima facie case of employment discrimination requires a plaintiff to show

membership in a protected class, qualification for the job for which he applied,

a rejected application, and the employer’s continued recruitment of

applications of equal qualifications. See Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/24, at 7

(pagination supplied). The court further observed that the right to a remedy

for employment discrimination is established by the PHRA, which requires

exhaustion of the administrative remedies vested in the PHRC before actions

may be pursued in court. Id. (citing, inter alia, Clay v. Advanced Computer

Applications, Inc., 559 A.2d 917 (Pa. 1989)).

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This timely appeal followed. In this Court, Plaintiff has filed a brief that,

in addition to suffering from the same inscrutable prose style as quoted above,

does not adhere to the requirements of a host of our Rules of Appellate

Procedure. In particular, his brief fails to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(1)

(statement of jurisdiction); Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(3) (statement of the scope and

standard of review); Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(4) statement of questions involved);

and Pa.R.A.P. 2111(a)(6) (summary of argument). Further, Plaintiff does not

attempt to develop any argument that is supported by citations to pertinent

legal authority as is required by Pa.R.A.P. 2119(a) and (b). Indeed, the only

citations within Plaintiff’s argument are to the trial court’s opinion. He proffers

no countervailing authority to explain how or why the trial court should have

allowed further litigation of his undefined discrimination claims.

As we have cautioned:

Although this Court is willing to construe liberally materials filed by a pro se litigant, pro se status generally confers no special benefit upon an appellant. A pro se litigant must comply with the procedural rules set forth in the Pennsylvania Rules of the Court. Any layperson choosing to represent himself or herself in a legal proceeding must, to some reasonable extent, assume the risk that his or her lack of expertise and legal training will prove his or her undoing.

Smithson v. Columbia Gas of PA/NiSource, 264 A.3d 755, 760 (Pa.Super.

2021) (cleaned up).

Plaintiff’s noncompliance has left us unable to conduct meaningful

review. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gilliam, 249 A.3d 257, 271

(Pa.Super. 2021) (“It is not the role of this Court to develop Appellant’s

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argument.”); Butler v. Illes, 747 A.2d 943, 944 (Pa.Super. 2000) (“When

issues are not properly raised and developed in briefs, when briefs are wholly

inadequate to present specific issues for review, a court will not consider the

merits thereof.” (cleaned up)). Therefore, we dismiss this appeal without

considering its merits. See Pa.R.A.P. 2101 (“[I]f the defects are in the brief

or reproduced record of the appellant and are substantial, the appeal or other

matter may be . . . dismissed.”).

Appeal dismissed. Oral argument scheduled for June 17, 2025, is

cancelled.

Judgment Entered.

Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary

Date: 5/30/2025

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