Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 18, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-2078 Lower Tribunal No. M22-8999 ________________
Peter Sciallo, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Julie Harris Nelson, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Nicholas A. Lynch, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J. Appellant, Peter Sciallo, appeals from a withhold of adjudication and
probationary sentence imposed for the charge of petit theft, in violation of
section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2022), following a jury trial. On appeal,
he contends the trial court reversibly erred in failing to strike a juror for cause.
Constrained by our precedent, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Sciallo was charged with petit theft for stealing keys and a fob
belonging to his former personal trainer from a storage cubby at the Miami
Iron Gym after the two were involved in a physical confrontation. The case
proceeded to trial.
During jury selection, the challenged juror indicated he had strong
feelings about theft cases because several of his family members were
robbery victims. When pressed further, he explained, “I don’t know how it
would affect my opinion on this. I don’t think it would, but just going through
that.” He was then asked whether he would be thinking about the crimes
committed against his family members if selected as a juror on the case, and
he responded affirmatively. Upon more in-depth questioning, he further
stated, “You try not to, of course, but I can’t say for sure I wouldn’t think of it.
But I would try not to.” When asked whether he could guarantee that he
would not think of the experiences, he replied, “I can’t—I can’t guarantee it.
2 I’m, you know, human like everybody else what things are going to pop in
my mind, but I would try not to.”
Neither the State nor the trial court rehabilitated the juror, and during
the strike conference, the defense asserted a cause challenge. The State
requested permission to rehabilitate the juror. The trial court denied the
request and the cause challenge. The defense then exercised a peremptory
challenge. After exhausting all peremptory challenges, the defense
requested another for the purpose of striking an identified juror. The court
denied the motion, and the defense accepted the panel subject to prior
objections. See Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1128 (Fla. 2000). The
jury found Sciallo guilty, and the court withheld adjudication and imposed a
short probationary term. This appeal ensued.
ANALYSIS
“We review a trial court’s decision to deny a challenge for cause to a
potential juror for an abuse of discretion.” Rivas v. Sandoval, 319 So. 3d
744, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). “The test for determining juror competency is
whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict
solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by
the court.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004).
3 A juror should be excused if there is any reasonable doubt about his
or her ability to render an impartial verdict. See Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553,
556 (Fla. 1985). “To determine whether such reasonable doubt exists, the
trial court should consider the context and entirety of the juror’s responses.”
Jackson v. State, 213 So. 3d 754, 770 (Fla. 2017). “The law is also clear
that close calls on the issue of juror competency should be resolved in favor
of removal.” Martinez v. State, 795 So. 2d 279, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
In this case, the challenged juror stated he felt strongly about the
charges and equivocated on whether he would be influenced by the past
crimes against his family members. “The mere fact that a juror gives
equivocal responses does not disqualify that juror for service. The question
is whether the responses voiced by [the juror] were equivocal enough to
generate a reasonable doubt about his fitness as a juror.” Busby, 894 So. 2d
at 96; see also Guzman v. State, 934 So. 2d 11, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Here, the juror was not rehabilitated.1 Hence, the facts are on all fours
with several cases in which Florida appellate courts found reversible error.
1 Section 913.03(10), Florida Statutes (2023), “provides that a prospective juror’s ‘formation of an opinion or impression’ that is biased does not warrant disqualification of the juror if the juror ‘declares and the court determines’ that the juror ‘can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence.’” Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473, 493 (Fla. 2013) (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting § 913.03(10), Fla. Stat.).
4 In one such case, Miles v. State, 826 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 3d DCA
2002), the defendant was charged with capital sexual battery and witness
tampering. A medical social worker who worked with sexually abused
children was on the venire. Id. The prosecutor inquired as to whether there
was anything about that experience that would affect her impartiality. Id.
She responded, “Again, that’s a difficult question. I don’t think so.” Id. On
appeal, this court reversed, finding that “Ms. Garner’s ‘equivocal response to
counsel’s questions cast a reasonable doubt as to her ability to serve as a
fair and impartial juror in this case.’” Id. at 494 (quoting Kerestesy v. State,
760 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)); see also Henry v. State, 586 So.
2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (holding trial court abused its discretion
by not excusing juror for cause where juror responded “I don’t think so” to
court’s question as to whether juror’s work experience would influence juror’s
“ability to be fair and impartial”).
Similarly, in Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), a
prospective juror repeatedly responded, “I don’t think so” when questioned
as to whether he harbored any potential prejudice. This court found the
“juror’s responses to the trial judge were again feeble, conditional, and
positively not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit
as a fair and impartial juror.” Id.
5 Both holdings are consistent with Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936, 940
(Fla. 1984), which held that a juror was properly excused for cause after
responding, “I don’t think so” to whether she could base her verdict on the
law and evidence.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed September 18, 2024. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
________________
No. 3D23-2078 Lower Tribunal No. M22-8999 ________________
Peter Sciallo, Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida, Appellee.
An appeal from the County Court for Miami-Dade County, Julie Harris Nelson, Judge.
Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Nicholas A. Lynch, Assistant Public Defender, for appellant.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Ivy R. Ginsberg, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Before LOGUE, C.J., and MILLER and BOKOR, JJ.
MILLER, J. Appellant, Peter Sciallo, appeals from a withhold of adjudication and
probationary sentence imposed for the charge of petit theft, in violation of
section 812.014, Florida Statutes (2022), following a jury trial. On appeal,
he contends the trial court reversibly erred in failing to strike a juror for cause.
Constrained by our precedent, we reverse.
BACKGROUND
Sciallo was charged with petit theft for stealing keys and a fob
belonging to his former personal trainer from a storage cubby at the Miami
Iron Gym after the two were involved in a physical confrontation. The case
proceeded to trial.
During jury selection, the challenged juror indicated he had strong
feelings about theft cases because several of his family members were
robbery victims. When pressed further, he explained, “I don’t know how it
would affect my opinion on this. I don’t think it would, but just going through
that.” He was then asked whether he would be thinking about the crimes
committed against his family members if selected as a juror on the case, and
he responded affirmatively. Upon more in-depth questioning, he further
stated, “You try not to, of course, but I can’t say for sure I wouldn’t think of it.
But I would try not to.” When asked whether he could guarantee that he
would not think of the experiences, he replied, “I can’t—I can’t guarantee it.
2 I’m, you know, human like everybody else what things are going to pop in
my mind, but I would try not to.”
Neither the State nor the trial court rehabilitated the juror, and during
the strike conference, the defense asserted a cause challenge. The State
requested permission to rehabilitate the juror. The trial court denied the
request and the cause challenge. The defense then exercised a peremptory
challenge. After exhausting all peremptory challenges, the defense
requested another for the purpose of striking an identified juror. The court
denied the motion, and the defense accepted the panel subject to prior
objections. See Kearse v. State, 770 So. 2d 1119, 1128 (Fla. 2000). The
jury found Sciallo guilty, and the court withheld adjudication and imposed a
short probationary term. This appeal ensued.
ANALYSIS
“We review a trial court’s decision to deny a challenge for cause to a
potential juror for an abuse of discretion.” Rivas v. Sandoval, 319 So. 3d
744, 746 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021). “The test for determining juror competency is
whether the juror can lay aside any bias or prejudice and render a verdict
solely on the evidence presented and the instructions on the law given by
the court.” Busby v. State, 894 So. 2d 88, 95 (Fla. 2004).
3 A juror should be excused if there is any reasonable doubt about his
or her ability to render an impartial verdict. See Hill v. State, 477 So. 2d 553,
556 (Fla. 1985). “To determine whether such reasonable doubt exists, the
trial court should consider the context and entirety of the juror’s responses.”
Jackson v. State, 213 So. 3d 754, 770 (Fla. 2017). “The law is also clear
that close calls on the issue of juror competency should be resolved in favor
of removal.” Martinez v. State, 795 So. 2d 279, 282 (Fla. 3d DCA 2001).
In this case, the challenged juror stated he felt strongly about the
charges and equivocated on whether he would be influenced by the past
crimes against his family members. “The mere fact that a juror gives
equivocal responses does not disqualify that juror for service. The question
is whether the responses voiced by [the juror] were equivocal enough to
generate a reasonable doubt about his fitness as a juror.” Busby, 894 So. 2d
at 96; see also Guzman v. State, 934 So. 2d 11, 15 (Fla. 3d DCA 2006).
Here, the juror was not rehabilitated.1 Hence, the facts are on all fours
with several cases in which Florida appellate courts found reversible error.
1 Section 913.03(10), Florida Statutes (2023), “provides that a prospective juror’s ‘formation of an opinion or impression’ that is biased does not warrant disqualification of the juror if the juror ‘declares and the court determines’ that the juror ‘can render an impartial verdict according to the evidence.’” Matarranz v. State, 133 So. 3d 473, 493 (Fla. 2013) (Canady, J., dissenting) (quoting § 913.03(10), Fla. Stat.).
4 In one such case, Miles v. State, 826 So. 2d 492, 493 (Fla. 3d DCA
2002), the defendant was charged with capital sexual battery and witness
tampering. A medical social worker who worked with sexually abused
children was on the venire. Id. The prosecutor inquired as to whether there
was anything about that experience that would affect her impartiality. Id.
She responded, “Again, that’s a difficult question. I don’t think so.” Id. On
appeal, this court reversed, finding that “Ms. Garner’s ‘equivocal response to
counsel’s questions cast a reasonable doubt as to her ability to serve as a
fair and impartial juror in this case.’” Id. at 494 (quoting Kerestesy v. State,
760 So. 2d 989, 991 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000)); see also Henry v. State, 586 So.
2d 1335, 1337 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991) (holding trial court abused its discretion
by not excusing juror for cause where juror responded “I don’t think so” to
court’s question as to whether juror’s work experience would influence juror’s
“ability to be fair and impartial”).
Similarly, in Price v. State, 538 So. 2d 486, 489 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989), a
prospective juror repeatedly responded, “I don’t think so” when questioned
as to whether he harbored any potential prejudice. This court found the
“juror’s responses to the trial judge were again feeble, conditional, and
positively not reflective of a final, neutral, and detached determination to sit
as a fair and impartial juror.” Id.
5 Both holdings are consistent with Bush v. State, 461 So. 2d 936, 940
(Fla. 1984), which held that a juror was properly excused for cause after
responding, “I don’t think so” to whether she could base her verdict on the
law and evidence. A number of other cases have found similar language
sufficiently equivocal to warrant excusal in the absence of rehabilitation. See
Miller v. State, 847 So. 2d 1093, 1096–97 (Fla. 4th DCA 2003) (stating trial
court properly excused juror who, when asked if she could be fair and
impartial, said “no, I don’t think so”); Lewis v. State, 931 So. 2d 1034, 1037,
1039 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (finding “the court committed manifest error by
refusing to dismiss [the juror] for cause” after the juror equivocated on his
impartiality); Wright v. State, 337 So. 3d 112, 114 (Fla. 3d DCA 2021) (“When
a juror’s last response indicates that the juror is potentially prejudiced, and
the response is not retracted or modified, the juror must be stricken for
cause.”) (quoting Marquez v. State, 721 So. 2d 1206, 1207 (Fla. 3d DCA
1998)); Wilkins v. State, 607 So. 2d 500, 501 (Fla. 3d DCA 1992) (holding
trial court erred by keeping juror who stated his family’s similar experience
“shouldn’t make any difference [in his decision], but [he] couldn’t definitely
say whether it would”); Perea v. State, 657 So. 2d 8, 9 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995)
(reversing for new trial where juror at issue gave equivocal responses on his
ability to give a fair trial for sexual assault due to a sexual molestation
6 experience of juror’s family member); Salazar v. State, 564 So. 2d 1245,
1246 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990) (“[The juror] stated: ‘Strange thing, I would hope
not. I would hope I could be fair but I guess there is always that doubt.’ This
statement reiterated the reasonable doubt existing in this juror’s state of
mind. Therefore, . . . the trial court erred in failing to excuse [the juror] for
cause where a reasonable doubt existed as to her ability to be impartial.”);
Smith v. State, 516 So. 2d 43, 44 (Fla. 3d DCA 1987) (“Plainly, a reasonable
doubt was established on this record concerning [the juror]’s ability to render
an impartial verdict . . . and the said juror should have been excused for
cause.”). Accordingly, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
Reversed and remanded.