Peter Kleidman v. Rff Family Partnership, Lp

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: August 28, 2024
• Docket: 23-55610
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS AUG 28 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

PETER KLEIDMAN, No. 23-55610

Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 2:22-cv-03947-SPG-AFM

v. MEMORANDUM* RFF FAMILY PARTNERSHIP, LP; TANI CANTIL-SAKAUYE, Chief Justice,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California Sherilyn Peace Garnett, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted August 20, 2024**

Before: S.R. THOMAS, RAWLINSON, and COLLINS, Circuit Judges.

Peter Kleidman appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing

his action alleging federal and state law claims related to his state court

proceedings. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo a

dismissal under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Davidson v.

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Kimberly-Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956, 963 (9th Cir. 2018). We affirm.

The district court properly dismissed Kleidman’s constitutional claims

because Kleidman failed to allege facts sufficient to show that California’s

vexatious litigant statute violated his constitutional rights. See Wolfe v. George,

486 F.3d 1120, 1125-27 (9th Cir. 2007) (upholding as constitutional California’s

prefiling requirements on vexatious litigants).

The district court properly dismissed Kleidman’s remaining claims because

these claims constituted forbidden “de facto appeal[s]” of a prior state court

judgment or were “inextricably intertwined” with that judgment. See Noel v. Hall,

341 F.3d 1148, 1163-65 (9th Cir. 2003) (discussing proper application of the

Rooker-Feldman doctrine).

The district court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing without leave to

amend because further amendment would have been futile. See Cervantes v.

Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 656 F.3d 1034, 1041 (9th Cir. 2011) (setting forth

standard of review and explaining that dismissal without leave to amend is proper

when amendment would be futile).

AFFIRMED.

2 23-55610