Peter-Jason Helfrich v. Comerica Bank

District Court, E.D. California·Decided March 25, 2026·No. 2:26-cv-01012·Unknown

Opinion

PETER-JASON HELFRICH, No. 2:26-cv-1012-DJC-CKD (PS) Plaintiff, v. ORDER AND COMERICA BANK, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS Defendant.

On March 20, 2025, proceeding without counsel, plaintiff Peter-Jason Helfrich filed a complaint, motion for temporary restraining order (“TRO”), motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and motion to e-file. (ECF Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4.)1 This case is referred to the undersigned by operation of Local Rule 302(c)(21) and 28 U.S.C. § 636. For the reasons set forth below, plaintiff’s motion for TRO (ECF No. 2) should be denied. The court will screen plaintiff’s complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) and address plaintiff’s other pending motions in due course, but first plaintiff must re-file a signed pleading. Every pleading, motion, or paper filed with the court must be signed by at least one attorney of record or personally signed by a party who is not represented by an attorney. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a); Local Rule 131(b). An electronic signature such as, for example, one in the form /s/John 1 Each of these filings appears to be the same document styled as “Combined Complaint, TRO, and IFP Request.” Doe is only accepted on documents filed electronically by an attorney or when a party appearing pro se has been authorized to file documents electronically and that signature is accompanied by a statement that the original signature has been retained by that party.2 I. Background Plaintiff’s complaint seeks relief under the Electronic Fund Transfer Act (“EFTA”) and alleges defendant has refused to process an ACH transfer of Social Security Disability funds from plaintiff’s Direct Express account to his Chase bank account. (ECF No. 1.) The complaint seeks damages and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Id. at 3.) Plaintiff also seeks a preliminary injunction and TRO. (Id.; ECF No. 2.) The motion for TRO is appropriate for decision without oral argument under Local Rule 230(g). II. Legal Standard The purpose of a temporary restraining order under Rule 65(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to preserve the status quo and to prevent irreparable harm “so long as is necessary to hold a hearing, and no longer.” Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Bhd. of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 439 (1974). In determining whether to issue a temporary restraining order, a court relies on the same factors that guide the evaluation of a request for preliminary injunctive relief: whether the moving party “is likely to succeed on the merits, ... likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, ... the balance of equities tips in [its] favor, and ... an injunction is in the public interest.” Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“Winter”); see also Stuhlbarg Int’l. Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 (9th Cir. 2001) (stating the analysis for temporary restraining orders and preliminary injunctions is “substantially identical”). Courts within this circuit may also consider a request for a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction using a “sliding scale” test in which “a stronger showing of one element

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Peter-Jason Helfrich v. Comerica Bank, (E.D. Cal. 2026).

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