Peter Christian v. Charles Pace and Alexa Pace

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: October 16, 2025
• Docket: 10-24-00348-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas

10-24-00348-CV

Peter Christian, Appellant

v.

Charles Pace and Alexa Pace, Appellees

On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3 of McLennan County, Texas Judge J. Patrick Atkins, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 20240421CV3

JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Peter Christian, acting pro se, appeals from the trial court’s judgment in

a forcible detainer action awarding possession of certain real property to

Charles and Alexa Pace. In two issues, Christian asserts the trial court lacked

jurisdiction to hear the case and the Paces’ cause of action has no basis in law.

We affirm. BACKGROUND

On July 1, 2023, the Paces, as landlords, and Christian and his wife,

Shelbie Zimmerman,1 as tenants, signed a residential lease agreement.

Pursuant to the lease, Christian leased a mobile home located at 1785 Double

EE Ranch Road, Waco, Texas. The term of the lease began on July 1, 2023 and

ended on September 30, 2023.

On February 5, 2024, the Paces filed a petition for eviction in Justice

Court alleging as grounds for eviction unpaid rent and violations of several

lease terms. Zimmerman and Christian each filed an answer denying the

Paces’ allegations and asserting that the Paces are not the owners of the

property, they have no standing, the court lacks jurisdiction, and the case must

be dismissed. After a hearing, the Justice Court rendered judgment in favor

of the Paces for possession of the premises. The court also ordered Christian

to pay rent into the Justice Court registry.

Christian appealed the judgment to County Court at Law Number 3

where the case was heard by a jury. In accordance with the jury verdict, the

court ordered that the Paces recover possession of the premises and economic

damages in the amount of $3,600.00. This appeal ensued.

1 Shelbie Zimmerman passed away during the pendency of this case.

Christian v. Pace Page 2 JURISDICTION/BASELESS CAUSE OF ACTION

In his first and second issues, Christian contends the lower courts lacked

jurisdiction and the Paces’ cause of action has no basis in law.2 Specifically,

he asserts that the issues of possession and title are so inextricably intertwined

or integrally linked that the title question must be answered first, in a district

court. Further, he contends, because the Paces are not entitled to recover

possession of the property, their suit has no basis in law.

Christian contends that, while the Paces may have owned the property

at the outset of the lease, an assertion he deems immaterial even if true, there

was a change in ownership of the property in November 2023, causing the lease

to become defunct. Therefore, he argues, there was no landlord-tenant

relationship after September 2023.

In support of his argument that there was a change in ownership,

Christian relies on documents he signed in November 2023. At the time

Christian moved onto the property, Charles Pace was president of The Branch

the LORD Our Righteousness (The Branch), and Charles Pace apparently

controlled church property, which includes the property leased to Christian.

However, according to Christian, Pace asked Christian to be the new leader of

2 In the trial court, Christian filed a “Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction or Dismiss Baseless Cause of Action,” based in part on Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 91a, in which he separated the two arguments. On appeal, although he listed the issues separately, Christian combines his arguments.

Christian v. Pace Page 3 the church on November 7, 2023, and Christian agreed. On November 8, 2023,

Christian, purportedly acting in accordance with established church by-laws,

reorganized The Branch into The Davidian Branch the LORD Our

Righteousness. On the same date, Christian signed a document entitled

“Correction Special Warranty Deed” in an apparent attempt to transfer all

property owned by The Branch to the Davidian Branch.

Also on November 8, Christian signed a lease agreement purportedly

between the reorganized church as landlord and Christian and his family as

tenants. Christian signed the lease as landlord in his capacity as president of

The Davidian Branch, and he also signed as tenant. Therefore, according to

Christian’s argument, the church owns the property, Christian, as head of the

church, is now the landlord, and by virtue of the November 8 lease, Christian

is the church’s tenant. Accordingly, Christian asserts, the Paces have not

proven they own the property, their eviction suit has no basis in law, and they

have no standing to bring this suit.

Finally, Christian asserts that the church owns the property, and under

the ecclesiastical abstention doctrine, courts do not have jurisdiction to

determine church governmental issues. Specifically, he contends that the

possession issue is inextricably intertwined with the question of which church

Christian v. Pace Page 4 members may decide who will be the next church leader and who may be

removed from the church, issues that are exclusively ecclesiastical.

Standard of Review

Whether a trial court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law

we review de novo. Tex. Nat. Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d

849, 855 (Tex. 2002). When conducting a de novo review, because the question

is one of law and not of facts, the reviewing tribunal exercises its own judgment

and accords the original tribunal’s decision no deference. Quick v. City of

Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116 (Tex. 1998).

We conduct a de novo review of a trial court’s ruling on a Rule 91a motion

to dismiss. Bethel v. Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C., 595

S.W.3d 651, 654 (Tex. 2020). In ruling on a Rule 91a motion, a court may not

consider evidence and must decide the motion based solely on the plaintiff’s

live pleadings, and any pleading exhibits permitted by Rule 59, if applicable.

TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6; Triple P.G. Sand Dev., LLC v. Del Pino, 649 S.W.3d 682,

694 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2022, no pet.). We construe the pleadings

liberally in favor of the plaintiff, look to the pleader’s intent, and accept as true

the factual allegations in the pleading. Roach v. Ingram, 557 S.W.3d 203, 225

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, pet. denied).

Christian v. Pace Page 5 Applicable Law

When there is no unlawful entry, a forcible-detainer suit is the proper

procedure to determine possession of real property. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.

§ 24.002; see also Lenz v. Bank of Am., N.A., 510 S.W.3d 667, 671 (Tex. App.—

San Antonio 2016, pet. denied). A justice court in the precinct in which real

property is located has jurisdiction over a forcible detainer suit. TEX. PROP.

CODE ANN. § 24.004(a). Appeal is to the county court. TEX. R. CIV. P. 510.10(c).

The sole issue in a forcible detainer suit is the right to immediate possession

of the premises. See Rice v. Pinney, 51 S.W.3d 705, 709 (Tex. App.—Dallas

2001, no pet.). Neither justice courts nor county courts exercising appellate

jurisdiction have jurisdiction to determine or adjudicate title to land in a

forcible detainer action. See Yarbrough v. Household Fin. Corp. III, 455 S.W.3d

277, 280 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.).

The existence of a title dispute does not deprive the justice court of

jurisdiction, but when there is a genuine issue of title so intertwined with the

issue of possession that the justice court cannot decide the issue of possession

without first deciding the title issue, then the justice court lacks jurisdiction

over the suit. Id. However, if there is an independent basis to resolve the

possession issue, such as a landlord-tenant relationship, then the justice court

and county court at law retain jurisdiction and may resolve the possession

Christian v. Pace Page 6 issue without deciding the title issue. See Chinyere v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.,

440 S.W.3d 80, 83-84 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).

A tenant who continues to occupy leased premises after expiration or

termination of its lease is a “holdover tenant.” Coinmach Corp. v. Aspenwood

Apartment Corp., 417 S.W.3d 909, 915 (Tex. 2013). A holdover tenant at

sufferance is a tenant who has been in lawful possession of property and

wrongfully remains as a holdover after the tenant’s interest has expired. Id.

In a tenancy at sufferance, the landlord may revoke consent and treat the

tenant as a trespasser. Id. at 916.

Rule of Civil Procedure 91a authorizes a party to move for early

dismissal of a cause of action on the ground that it has no basis in law or fact.

See Bethel, 595 S.W.3d at 654. A cause of action has no basis in law if the

allegations, taken as true, together with any inferences reasonably drawn from

them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought. Id. Courts have

recognized that a cause of action has no basis in law under Rule 91 in at least

two situations: (1) where the plaintiff fails to plead a viable, legally cognizable

cause of action; and (2) where the allegations in the plaintiff’s own pleading

establish a legal bar to the relief requested. See Reaves v. City of Corpus

Christi, 518 S.W.3d 594, 608 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi-Edinburg 2017, no

pet.).

Christian v. Pace Page 7 Discussion

Jurisdiction

It is undisputed that the Paces and Christian entered into a residential

lease agreement. The lease provided that it covered a three-month period and

a new lease will be drawn up for the next six months if both landlord and

tenant are in agreement. Thereafter, the lease could be renewed every six

months. The lease did not contain a holdover provision, so the parties’ conduct

will determine the nature of the holdover tenancy. Coinmach Corp., 417

S.W.3d at 916. Alexa Pace testified that before the lease expired, she and her

husband told Christian that they wanted him to vacate the premises. When

the lease ended at the end of September, Christian refused to surrender the

property, and the Paces sent at least two notices to vacate. Accordingly,

Christian was a tenant at sufferance. See id. at 915.

A forcible detainer suit is the proper method of determining possession

where, as here, a tenant holds over after the expiration of a lease without the

consent of the owner. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.002(a)(1). The parties’

landlord-tenant relationship presented an independent basis on which the trial

court could determine the right to immediate possession without resolving

underlying title issues. See Chinyere, 440 S.W.3d at 83-84; Rice, 51 S.W.3d at

712. Accordingly, the justice court had subject-matter jurisdiction to

Christian v. Pace Page 8 determine whether the Paces or Christian had a superior right to immediate

possession of the property. Because the justice court had subject matter

jurisdiction over the underlying forcible detainer suit, the county court had

subject matter jurisdiction over the appeal. See Rice, 51 S.W.3d at 708-09.

Rule 91a

Christian asserts the Paces’ cause of action has no basis in law because

they are not entitled to recover possession of the property. However, accepting

the Paces’ pleadings as true, their cause of action is based on the landlord-

tenant relationship resulting from the parties’ lease. See Roach, 557 S.W.3d

at 225. Likewise, Christian’s argument that the Paces do not own the property

and litigation to determine ownership would violate the ecclesiastical

abstention doctrine also fails. There is no support for that argument in the

pleadings, and we may not consider any evidence. TEX. R. CIV. P. 91a.6.

Construing the pleadings in favor of the Paces and accepting as true the factual

allegations in the petition, we conclude that Christian did not establish that

the Paces’ claims lack a basis in law. See Reaves, 518 S.W.3d at 608.

Standing

Further, due to the landlord-tenant relationship between the Paces and

Christian regarding the property, the Paces have a justiciable interest in the

outcome of the lawsuit, and there is a real controversy between the parties.

Christian v. Pace Page 9 See Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato, 171 S.W.3d 845, 848-49 (Tex. 2005).

Accordingly, the Paces had standing to bring the forcible-detainer action. Id.

Finding no merit in Christian’s arguments, we overrule his issues one and two.

CONCLUSION

The Paces had standing to bring the cause of action, and the justice and

county courts had jurisdiction to hear the case. Further, Christian did not

establish that the Paces’ cause of action lacks a basis in law. We affirm the

trial court’s judgment.3

STEVE SMITH Justice

OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: October 16, 2025 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirm CV06

3 All pending motions are dismissed as moot.

Christian v. Pace Page 10