Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 1 of 8
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 13-10680 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D. C. Docket No. 9:11-cv-80434-KLR
PETER BLOCH, MARIA BLOCH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, BANK OF AMERICA MORTGAGE CAPITAL CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation, a.k.a. Bank of America Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________
(February 3, 2014)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 2 of 8
Peter and Maria Bloch appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage1 (Wells Fargo) in the Blochs’ diversity action.
After review,2 we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Wells
Fargo.
I. BACKGROUND
The Blochs entered into a mortgage and note in the amount of $324,000 on
November 18, 2002 (the loan). Wells Fargo is the servicer of the loan.
In 2007, the Blochs defaulted on the loan by failing to make payments due.
A foreclosure action was filed against the Blochs in 2008. The Blochs then entered
into a loan modification/restructure of the mortgage loan, and, as a result the
foreclosure action was voluntarily dismissed on June 30, 2008.
Subsequently, the Blochs defaulted on the modified loan, and a second
foreclosure action was filed. On September 20, 2009, Wells Fargo sent the Blochs
a letter inviting them to apply to participate in the federal Home Affordable
1 The Blochs also purport to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Bank of America on their negligent misrepresentation claim, but offer no argument as to the district court’s determination the Blochs “never had any conversations with anyone employed with Bank of America concerning the loan,” and accordingly, “Bank of America could not have made any misrepresentations to [the Blochs].” Accordingly, the Blochs have abandoned the issue and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as it relates to Bank of America. 2 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dawkins v. Fulton Cnty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2013). “All reasonable inferences arising from the undisputed facts should be made in favor of the nonmovant, but an inference based on speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 3 of 8
Modification Program (HAMP). The Blochs completed and submitted their
application shortly thereafter. The Blochs made four trial payments of $2,162
while waiting for a decision regarding whether their loan qualified for a permanent
modification under the HAMP. After reviewing the relevant information, Wells
Fargo determined the Blochs did not qualify for a permanent loan modification
under the HAMP. As a result, the four trial payments were credited to the
outstanding balance on the Blochs’ modified loan.
On January 11, 2010, the Blochs entered into a forbearance agreement with
Wells Fargo. The Special Forbearance Agreement provided that the “lender is
under no obligation to enter into any further agreement, and this forbearance shall
not constitute a waiver of the lender’s right to insist upon strict performance in the
future.” The Special Forbearance Agreement further provided that “[a]ll of the
provisions of the note and security instrument, except as herein provided, shall
remain in full force and effect.”
The Blochs have not made any payments on their loan since April 2010. On
February 14, 2011, the Blochs were offered a permanent loan modification by
Wells Fargo, but they declined. The Blochs then filed an action in federal district
court in April of 2011. The Blochs filed a Third Amended Complaint on June 22,
2012, alleging several causes of actions. By the time the district court considered
Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment, the Blochs’ only remaining claims
3 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 4 of 8
were (1) the portion of a promissory estoppel claim that related to the purported
representation that the Blochs were HAMP participants when they were not and
would be considered for loan modification when they were not; and (2) a negligent
misrepresentation claim as it related to the October 23, 2009, representation by
Wells Fargo employee Aerek Stephens that the Blochs were HAMP participants.
The Blochs appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo
on both issues.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Promissory Estoppel
The Blochs contend that Wells Fargo’s September 2009 letter stating they
“may be eligible for a trial modification plan under [HAMP], and we estimate your
new payment amount to be $2,162,” takes this action outside the ambit of the bank
statute of frauds. They assert the district court overlooked critical evidence,
specifically, transcripts of telephone conversations with Wells Fargo
representatives that Peter Bloch recorded. The Blochs contend they detrimentally
relied on Wells Fargo’s promise to conduct a review of their HAMP application
and that Wells Fargo misled them about their status in the HAMP process for
months. The Blochs further argue the September 2009 letter constitutes a binding
promise that Wells Fargo would at least consider them for the HAMP program,
and that based on conversations with Wells Fargo representatives, they believe
4 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 5 of 8
they were mistakenly dropped from and never actually considered for the HAMP
program. They contend they suffered damages because the promise to review their
HAMP application led them to not pursue a short sale or bankruptcy options.3
The Blochs maintain their promissory estoppel claim is based on a
combination of Wells Fargo’s September 2009 letter and oral representations by
phone representatives of Wells Fargo. In Florida, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel “applies when there is (1) a promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, (2) action or forbearance in
reliance on the promise, and (3) injustice resulting if the promise is not enforced.”
DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85, 96 (Fla. 2013). Florida
law also provides “the judicial doctrine of promissory estoppel may not be used to
circumvent” the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 97.
A letter stating that they might be eligible for a trial modification under
HAMP was not “a binding promise” the Blochs would receive a loan modification
under HAMP. To the extent the Blochs contend it was a binding promise they
would be considered for a loan, the evidence demonstrates the Blochs’ loan was in
fact reviewed to determine whether they qualified for a HAMP modification.
3 This Court has held there is no private cause of action under HAMP for a lender’s refusal to permanently modify a loan. Miller v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 1 of 8
[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT ________________________
No. 13-10680 Non-Argument Calendar ________________________
D. C. Docket No. 9:11-cv-80434-KLR
PETER BLOCH, MARIA BLOCH,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, BANK OF AMERICA MORTGAGE CAPITAL CORPORATION, a Foreign Corporation, a.k.a. Bank of America Corporation,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida _________________________
(February 3, 2014)
Before MARCUS, MARTIN and BLACK, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 2 of 8
Peter and Maria Bloch appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment
to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage1 (Wells Fargo) in the Blochs’ diversity action.
After review,2 we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Wells
Fargo.
I. BACKGROUND
The Blochs entered into a mortgage and note in the amount of $324,000 on
November 18, 2002 (the loan). Wells Fargo is the servicer of the loan.
In 2007, the Blochs defaulted on the loan by failing to make payments due.
A foreclosure action was filed against the Blochs in 2008. The Blochs then entered
into a loan modification/restructure of the mortgage loan, and, as a result the
foreclosure action was voluntarily dismissed on June 30, 2008.
Subsequently, the Blochs defaulted on the modified loan, and a second
foreclosure action was filed. On September 20, 2009, Wells Fargo sent the Blochs
a letter inviting them to apply to participate in the federal Home Affordable
1 The Blochs also purport to appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Bank of America on their negligent misrepresentation claim, but offer no argument as to the district court’s determination the Blochs “never had any conversations with anyone employed with Bank of America concerning the loan,” and accordingly, “Bank of America could not have made any misrepresentations to [the Blochs].” Accordingly, the Blochs have abandoned the issue and we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment as it relates to Bank of America. 2 We review a district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Dawkins v. Fulton Cnty. Gov’t, 733 F.3d 1084, 1088 (11th Cir. 2013). “All reasonable inferences arising from the undisputed facts should be made in favor of the nonmovant, but an inference based on speculation and conjecture is not reasonable.” Id. (quotation omitted). 2 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 3 of 8
Modification Program (HAMP). The Blochs completed and submitted their
application shortly thereafter. The Blochs made four trial payments of $2,162
while waiting for a decision regarding whether their loan qualified for a permanent
modification under the HAMP. After reviewing the relevant information, Wells
Fargo determined the Blochs did not qualify for a permanent loan modification
under the HAMP. As a result, the four trial payments were credited to the
outstanding balance on the Blochs’ modified loan.
On January 11, 2010, the Blochs entered into a forbearance agreement with
Wells Fargo. The Special Forbearance Agreement provided that the “lender is
under no obligation to enter into any further agreement, and this forbearance shall
not constitute a waiver of the lender’s right to insist upon strict performance in the
future.” The Special Forbearance Agreement further provided that “[a]ll of the
provisions of the note and security instrument, except as herein provided, shall
remain in full force and effect.”
The Blochs have not made any payments on their loan since April 2010. On
February 14, 2011, the Blochs were offered a permanent loan modification by
Wells Fargo, but they declined. The Blochs then filed an action in federal district
court in April of 2011. The Blochs filed a Third Amended Complaint on June 22,
2012, alleging several causes of actions. By the time the district court considered
Wells Fargo’s motion for summary judgment, the Blochs’ only remaining claims
3 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 4 of 8
were (1) the portion of a promissory estoppel claim that related to the purported
representation that the Blochs were HAMP participants when they were not and
would be considered for loan modification when they were not; and (2) a negligent
misrepresentation claim as it related to the October 23, 2009, representation by
Wells Fargo employee Aerek Stephens that the Blochs were HAMP participants.
The Blochs appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo
on both issues.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Promissory Estoppel
The Blochs contend that Wells Fargo’s September 2009 letter stating they
“may be eligible for a trial modification plan under [HAMP], and we estimate your
new payment amount to be $2,162,” takes this action outside the ambit of the bank
statute of frauds. They assert the district court overlooked critical evidence,
specifically, transcripts of telephone conversations with Wells Fargo
representatives that Peter Bloch recorded. The Blochs contend they detrimentally
relied on Wells Fargo’s promise to conduct a review of their HAMP application
and that Wells Fargo misled them about their status in the HAMP process for
months. The Blochs further argue the September 2009 letter constitutes a binding
promise that Wells Fargo would at least consider them for the HAMP program,
and that based on conversations with Wells Fargo representatives, they believe
4 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 5 of 8
they were mistakenly dropped from and never actually considered for the HAMP
program. They contend they suffered damages because the promise to review their
HAMP application led them to not pursue a short sale or bankruptcy options.3
The Blochs maintain their promissory estoppel claim is based on a
combination of Wells Fargo’s September 2009 letter and oral representations by
phone representatives of Wells Fargo. In Florida, the doctrine of promissory
estoppel “applies when there is (1) a promise which the promisor should
reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance, (2) action or forbearance in
reliance on the promise, and (3) injustice resulting if the promise is not enforced.”
DK Arena, Inc. v. EB Acquisitions I, LLC, 112 So. 3d 85, 96 (Fla. 2013). Florida
law also provides “the judicial doctrine of promissory estoppel may not be used to
circumvent” the Statute of Frauds. Id. at 97.
A letter stating that they might be eligible for a trial modification under
HAMP was not “a binding promise” the Blochs would receive a loan modification
under HAMP. To the extent the Blochs contend it was a binding promise they
would be considered for a loan, the evidence demonstrates the Blochs’ loan was in
fact reviewed to determine whether they qualified for a HAMP modification.
3 This Court has held there is no private cause of action under HAMP for a lender’s refusal to permanently modify a loan. Miller v. Chase Home Fin., LLC, 677 F.3d 1113, 1116 (11th Cir. 2012). In Miller, we also held a lender cannot be liable pursuant to a theory of promissory estoppel under Georgia law for declining to issue a permanent loan modification if there is no promise upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied. Id. at 1117 (citing O.C.G.A. § 13- 3-44(a)). 5 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 6 of 8
After reviewing the relevant information, Wells Fargo concluded the Blochs did
not qualify for a permanent loan modification under the HAMP.
Additionally, to the extent the Blochs attempt to add verbal conversations to
the purported “promise,” such addition is barred by section 687.0304 of the Florida
Statutes, known as “Florida’s Banking Statute of Frauds.” See Coral Reef Drive
Land Dev., LLC v. Duke Realty Ltd. P’ship, 45 So. 3d 897, 902-03 (Fla. 3d DCA
2010) (finding promissory estoppel claim legally insufficient under the Banking
Statute of Frauds where borrower alleged lender agreed to forbear repayment and
to make financial accommodations to borrower in a phone call). The Banking
Statute of Frauds provides that a borrower may not maintain an action on an
agreement by a creditor to take certain actions, such as entering into a new credit
agreement, forbearing from exercising remedies under prior credit agreements, or
extending installments due under prior credit agreements, unless the agreement is
in writing, expresses consideration, sets forth the relevant terms and conditions,
and is signed by the creditor and the debtor. § 687.0304, Fla. Stat.
It is undisputed there is no signed written agreement expressing
consideration and setting forth the relevant terms and conditions of the purported
HAMP modification. The purported agreement for a HAMP modification does
6 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 7 of 8
not meet the requirements of the Banking Statute of Frauds, and the district court
did not err in determining Bloch’s promissory estoppel claim fails. 4
B. Negligent Misrepresentation
The Blochs allege that on October 23, 2009, Wells Fargo representative
Aerek Stephens informed their former counsel that they were participants in the
HAMP program. They contend that if they had been aware Wells Fargo never
intended to modify their loan, they would have attempted to sell their home at the
outset, foregoing the modification process.
Under Florida law, negligent misrepresentation requires:
(1) misrepresentation of a material fact; (2) the representor must either know of the misrepresentation, must make the representation without knowledge as to its truth or falsity, or must make the representation under circumstances in which he ought to have known of its falsity; (3) the representor must intend that the representation induce another to act on it; (4) injury must result to the party acting in justifiable reliance on the misrepresentation.
Rocky Creek Ret. Props., Inc. v. Estate of Fox ex rel. Bank of Am., 19 So. 3d 1105,
1110 (Fla. 2d DCA 2009) (quotation omitted).
The Blochs alleged injury is speculative. Evidence of damages must be
concrete, not based on speculation and conjecture. George Hunt, Inc. v. Dorsey
Young Constr., Inc., 385 So. 2d 732, 733 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).; see also
4 Additionally, the Special Forbearance Agreement signed by the Blochs after the purported representation that they were in the HAMP, provided the provisions of the note and security instrument were to remain in full force and effect. 7 Case: 13-10680 Date Filed: 02/03/2014 Page: 8 of 8
Colandrea v. Johnson, 632 So. 2d 284, 285 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994). The Blochs do
not allege they have paid any more than what was due under the loan, and admit
they defaulted on the loan, as modified by the permanent loan modification they
received, by failing to pay all amounts due under the loan. The district court did
not err in determining the Bloch’s negligent misrepresentation claim also fails.
III. CONCLUSION
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s grant of summary judgment to
Wells Fargo.
AFFIRMED.