Pessano v. Blue Cross of California

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. California
DecidedMarch 14, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-01189
StatusUnknown

This text of Pessano v. Blue Cross of California (Pessano v. Blue Cross of California) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Pessano v. Blue Cross of California, (E.D. Cal. 2025).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 EMILY PESSANO, individually and as Case No. 1:24-cv-01189-JLT-EPG guardian ad litem for her minor daughter 12 Calliope Pessano-Maldonado, 13 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING MOTION TO SEAL WITHOUT PREJUDICE AND PERMITTING 14 v. SUPPLEMENT IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR APPROVAL OF MINOR’S 15 BLUE CROSS OF CALIFORNIA, COMPROMISE 16 Defendant. (ECF No. 7) 17 18 19 This is an ERISA action, which seeks to compel Defendant Blue Cross of California to 20 pay air ambulance transportation costs for Calliope Pessano-Maldonado under an insurance 21 policy. The complaint, as amended, is brought by Emily Pessano on behalf of her minor daughter, 22 Calliope Pessano-Maldonado.1 23 Now before the Court is (1) the parties’ joint request to seal information; and (2) 24 Plaintiffs’ unopposed petition for approval of minor’s compromise. (ECF Nos. 23, 24). As 25 discussed below, the Court will deny the motion to seal without prejudice and permit Plaintiffs to 26 file a supplement in support of the petition. 27 1 Although only a minor’s initials would typically be used under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 5.2(a)(3), 28 Plaintiff has waived such redaction protection under Rule 5.2(h). (ECF No. 14). 1 I. REQUEST TO SEAL 2 The parties ask the Court to seal (1) their settlement agreement and (2) any transcript that 3 is produced following the hearing on the petition. The motion is supported by the declaration of 4 defense counsel.2 “Historically, courts have recognized a ‘general right to inspect and copy public records 5 and documents, including judicial records and documents.’” Kamakana v. City & Cnty. of 6 Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172, 1178 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 7 U.S. 589, 597 & n.7 (1978)); see also Local Rule 141(a) (“Documents may be sealed only by 8 written order of the Court, upon the showing required by applicable law.”). Unless a court record 9 is “traditionally kept secret,3 a strong presumption in favor of access is the starting point.” 10 Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1178 (quotation marks and citation omitted). In order to overcome this 11 strong presumption, a party seeking to seal a judicial record bears the burden of articulating 12 compelling reasons, which are supported by specific facts, that outweigh the historical right of 13 access and the public policies favoring disclosure. Id. at 1178–79; see M.P. ex rel. Provins v. 14 Lowe’s Companies, Inc., No. 2:11-CV-01985-GEB, 2012 WL 1574801, at *1 (E.D. Cal. May 3, 15 2012) (applying compelling reasons standard to request to seal documents in connection with 16 application for approval of minor’s settlement). 17 The Court must “conscientiously balance[] the competing interests of the public and the 18 party” seeking to seal the judicial record. Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179 (quotation marks citation 19 omitted). And “[a]fter considering these interests, if the court decides to seal certain judicial 20 records, it must base its decision on a compelling reason and articulate the factual basis for its 21 ruling, without relying on hypothesis or conjecture.” Id. 22 The determination as to what is a “compelling reason” is within the Court’s “sound 23 discretion.” Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1097 (9th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted). Examples of compelling reasons include where a record might “become a 24 vehicle for improper purposes,” such as to “gratify private spite, promote public scandal, circulate 25 26 2 As will be discussed later, the settlement agreement is provided with the petition and redacts all the 27 agreement’s terms. (ECF No. 24-2, pp. 6-13). 3 “Thus far, we have identified two types of documents as ‘traditionally kept secret’: grand jury transcripts 28 and warrant materials during the pre-indictment phase of an investigation.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1185. 1 libelous statements, or release trade secrets.” Kamakana, 447 F.3d at 1179. However, “the mere 2 fact that the production of records may lead to a litigant’s embarrassment, incrimination, or 3 exposure to further litigation will not, without more, compel the court to seal its records.” Id. 4 The parties offer two reasons to seal their settlement agreement: (1) “Confidentiality was a bargained for term of the settlement and the Settlement Agreement contains provisions ensuring 5 the confidentiality of the settlement and the terms of agreement”; and (2) “[t]he Settlement 6 Agreement itself specifically discloses the settlement amount, as well as 7 other related information regarding settlement terms.” (ECF No. 23-1, p. 2). The parties rely on 8 these same reasons to seal any purported “confidential information [that will be discussed] at the 9 hearing.” (Id. at 3). 10 Beginning with the parties’ first argument, the motion states as follows: 11 In this case, confidentiality was a bargained for contractual term of the settlement. 12 Hence, the settlement was made possible in significant part because of the Parties’ mutual agreement to keep the settlement amounts and terms confidential. This 13 mutual contractual obligation not to disclose the settlement amounts is an overriding interest that justifies the sealing. To deny the Parties the benefit of their 14 bargain on confidentiality would deprive them of their settlement and frustrate 15 their negotiation efforts. On the other hand, no benefit will be served to the members of the public by making such records publicly available. Thus, there is an 16 overriding interest for confidentiality here that far outweighs the right of public access. 17 (Id. at 4). 18 The Court does not find sufficient basis to seal the entirety of the settlement agreement 19 and transcript of the hearing on the motion for approval of the settlement. While the parties 20 provide a basis to seal the settlement amount, the parties do not identify a sufficient basis to seal 21 all terms of the agreement or the entirety of the transcript. See Huff v. Thousandshores, Inc., No. 22 21-CV-02173-HSG, 2021 WL 6621065, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 1, 2021) (“the parties’ preference 23 that their settlement remain confidential does not outweigh the [public’s interest in disclosure].”); 24 Medina v. Cnty. of Monterey, No. 24-CV-00053-BLF, 2024 WL 2112890, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 25 16, 2024) (“The Court first notes that the fact that the parties have agreed to keep information 26 confidential is not a compelling reason to seal court records.”). 27 The parties’ next argument is based on privacy concerns relating primarily to the 28 settlement amount. 1 Plaintiff has a legitimate and cognizable interest in being free from unwanted annoyance, harassment, and potential contact concerning the amount of money 2 they will receive through settlement. A court order protecting the confidentiality of the financial terms of this settlement protects Plaintiff from those who might gain 3 access to the Court’s public record regarding this case. 4 Additionally, Anthem has a strong interest in protecting against public disclosure the amount of consideration it is paying in this settlement. 5 (ECF No. 23-1, p. 5). 6 The Court agrees with the parties, and other courts, that the amount a minor plaintiff 7 receives in a settlement can be a compelling reason in a case to seal information, so as to avoid 8 the minor being subjected to unwanted attention based on the amount they received. See, e.g., 9 Huff, 2022 WL 547109, at *3 (agreeing to seal amount a minor would receive under settlement to 10 avoid third parties from targeting or soliciting the minor when they are old enough to control 11 funds).

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Robidoux v. Rosengren
638 F.3d 1177 (Ninth Circuit, 2011)
Center for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, LLC
809 F.3d 1092 (Ninth Circuit, 2016)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
Pessano v. Blue Cross of California, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/pessano-v-blue-cross-of-california-caed-2025.