Persow v. Gage
This text of Persow v. Gage (Persow v. Gage) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, District of Columbia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MEYER J. PERSOW, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) Civil Case No. 09-1216 (RJL) ) JOHN GAGE, President, AFGE, ) ) Defendant. ) ) MEMORANDUM ORDER
The plaintiff, Meyer Persow ("plaintiff'), proceeding pro se, seeks a preliminary
injunction! prohibiting the defendant ("defendant"), President of the American Federation
of Government Employees ("AFGE"), from suspending him from his position as
President of AFGE Local 32 before conducting a hearing, as required by AFGE's
constitution. 2
"A movant may obtain a preliminary injunction only if it is able to demonstrate: (I)
that it is likely to succeed on the merits; (2) that it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in
the absence of preliminary relief; (3) that the balance of equities tips in its favor; and (4)
that an injunction is in the public interest." TD Int'l, LLC v. Steven K. Fleischmann, 639
F. Supp. 2d 46,48 (D.D.C. 2009).
lPlaintiff originally sought a Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), and this Court held a hearing on the TRO request on July 6, 2009, at which point plaintiff stated he was no longer seeking a TRO, but a Preliminary Injunction.
20n August 3 and 4,2009, AFGE held a hearing regarding the various charges levied against him, and, on October 1,2009, issued its decision to remove plaintiff from office. At the preliminary injunction hearing on July 21,2009, however, plaintiff
acknowledged that notwithstanding his temporary suspension he could be reinstated to the
presidency of Local 32 after AFGE conducted a full and fair hearing into the charges
against him, and effectively conceded that he was not being deprived of any rights,
income, or benefits during his suspension from office. As a result, the Court finds that
plaintiff has failed to establish the irreparable harm necessary to receive the extraordinary
injunctive relief he now seeks. See Nat 'I Football League Players Ass 'n v. Nat 'I Football
League, 724 F. Supp. 1027, 1027-28 (D.D.C. 1989) (declining to grant preliminary relief
to professional football players who alleged damage to their "skills, reputations, and
professional careers" as a result of their temporary suspension pending arbitration under
the steroid testing program); see also Smith v. Harvey, No. 06-1117, 2006 WL 2025026
*2 (July 17,2006 D.D.C.) ("[I]t is unclear that Smith could show irreparable harm
because the flag [on Smith's personnel file] represents only a suspension of various
favorable personnel actions from taking effect, not a permanent deprivation. ").
Thus, as plaintiff has not established irreparable harm, a necessary element of ~ preliminary relief, it is, this 2,.0 day of November, 2009, hereby
ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Preliminary Injunction [#3] is hereby
DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
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