IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of: No. 77174-4-I
MICHAEL DEAN KOEHLER JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
DWYER, J. — Michael Koehler Jr. filed this personal restraint petition
challenging the sentence imposed on him following a conviction of murder in the
first degree with a deadly weapon enhancement, a crime committed when he
was 17 years old. Koehler contends that recent developments in our Supreme
Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence have rendered his sentence
unconstitutional. Because Koehler fails to establish actual and substantial
prejudice, we deny the petition.
I
Michael Koehler Jr. and his co-defendant Gregory Torres murdered
Melissa Marshall in Lake Fenwick Park in Kent. Marshall accompanied Koehler
and Torres to the park after agreeing to have sex with them in exchange for
drugs. At the park, Torres pointed a knife at Marshall’s chest and Koehler held a
knife to her throat. Torres ordered Marshall to take her clothes off, stabbed her
one time in the stomach, and raped her. Meanwhile, Koehler went through No. 77174-4-I /2
Marshall’s clothing searching for money. Koehler smelled what he believed was
feces and stated as much, causing Torres to get off of Marshall. Marshall
attempted to run away, Koehler and Torres ran after Marshall, caught her and
stabbed her to death. During the course of the attack, Koehler said, “[t]his is fun,
so fun.” Marshall was stabbed more than 90 times.
Koehler pleaded guilty as charged. The standard sentencing range for
Koehler was 264 to 344 months of incarceration, including a 24 month deadly
weapon enhancement. Koehler requested a low-end standard range sentence.
The State requested a mid-range sentence of 300 months. The trial court
determined that two aggravating factors were present, deliberate cruelty and
sexual motivation, and imposed an exceptional sentence of 380 months upon
Koehler.
II
Koehler contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Houston-
Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), entitles him to resentencing. This
is so, he avers, because the sentencing judge did not fully consider the mitigating
qualities of youth. Because Koehler does not demonstrate actual and substantial
prejudice, he is not entitled to relief.
“Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary,
and the petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an
otherwise settled judgment.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132,
267 P.3d 324 (2011). A petitioner alleging constitutional error bears the
threshold burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
2 No. 77174-4-I /3
petitioner was actually and substantially prejudiced by the alleged error. In re
Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 315, 440 P.3d 978 (2019). This
standard is met when “[b]ased on the record, it appears that more likely than not”
that the trial court “would have imposed a lower sentence had [it] understood that
the Eighth Amendment requires absolute discretion to impose any sentence
below the standard range based on youthful diminished culpability.” In re Pers.
Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 244-45, 474 P.3d 507 (2020).
Courts have “an affirmative duty to ensure that proper consideration is
given to the juvenile’s ‘chronological age and its hallmark features.’” State v.
Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 443, 387 P.3d 650 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 477, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
These features include “the juvenile’s immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences—the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding
environment and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s participation in
the crime, the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him or her,
how youth impacted any legal defense, and any factors suggesting that the
juvenile might be successfully rehabilitated.” State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169,
176, 438 P.3d 133 (2019) (citing Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23).
However, “age is not a per se mitigating factor automatically entitling every
youthful defendant to an exceptional sentence.” State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680,
695, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). When sentencing juveniles in adult court, the court
retains its discretion to impose a standard range sentence. State v. Gregg, 196
Wn.2d 473, 478, 474 P.3d 539 (2020). The burden of proving youth as a
3 No. 77174-4-I /4
mitigating factor lies with the defendant. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at 478. “[W]hen
sentencing judges determine that youth is a mitigating factor and exercise their
broad discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence, such judges (1) must
explain the reasons for their determination and (2) those reasons must be
rationally related to evidence adduced at trial or presented at sentencing.” State
v. Rogers, 17 Wn. App. 2d 466, 480, 487 P.3d 177 (2021).
At Koehler’s sentencing, defense counsel asked for a sentence at the low
end of the standard range, arguing that Koehler’s developmental deficits
combined with the impacts of drug use at the time of the crime were mitigating
circumstances. Koehler’s counsel also argued that he was influenced by his co-
defendant. Several witnesses testified that Koehler did not have a stable home
environment and that his father, who he was residing with at the time of the
crime, was an alcoholic who “had no supervision for him.” These witnesses
described Koehler as a “good kid,” a “loving, young teenage boy” and “just a
child.” Anthony Carreon, who described Koehler as “like a younger brother,”
explained:
I don’t think these boys are monsters. I think they are just two teenagers that were led the wrong way and need some guidance in their life. And I think once this is all over and they come out of that, maybe they will find God, maybe they will find something that is going to put that—going to fill that hole and void in their life that is going to make them become stronger men and better people in society. . . . . . . [T]hey are still kids. They are not full grown men. They are still kids. They are still boys. Their mentalities are still children. They are still boys.
The State requested a mid-range sentence of 300 months.
4 No. 77174-4-I /5
The sentencing judge appears to have been unmoved by the requests for
leniency. The judge made findings of deliberate cruelty and sexual motivation,
and sentenced Koehler to an exceptional sentence of 380 months. He
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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE In the Matter of the Personal Restraint Petition of: No. 77174-4-I
MICHAEL DEAN KOEHLER JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
DWYER, J. — Michael Koehler Jr. filed this personal restraint petition
challenging the sentence imposed on him following a conviction of murder in the
first degree with a deadly weapon enhancement, a crime committed when he
was 17 years old. Koehler contends that recent developments in our Supreme
Court’s juvenile sentencing jurisprudence have rendered his sentence
unconstitutional. Because Koehler fails to establish actual and substantial
prejudice, we deny the petition.
I
Michael Koehler Jr. and his co-defendant Gregory Torres murdered
Melissa Marshall in Lake Fenwick Park in Kent. Marshall accompanied Koehler
and Torres to the park after agreeing to have sex with them in exchange for
drugs. At the park, Torres pointed a knife at Marshall’s chest and Koehler held a
knife to her throat. Torres ordered Marshall to take her clothes off, stabbed her
one time in the stomach, and raped her. Meanwhile, Koehler went through No. 77174-4-I /2
Marshall’s clothing searching for money. Koehler smelled what he believed was
feces and stated as much, causing Torres to get off of Marshall. Marshall
attempted to run away, Koehler and Torres ran after Marshall, caught her and
stabbed her to death. During the course of the attack, Koehler said, “[t]his is fun,
so fun.” Marshall was stabbed more than 90 times.
Koehler pleaded guilty as charged. The standard sentencing range for
Koehler was 264 to 344 months of incarceration, including a 24 month deadly
weapon enhancement. Koehler requested a low-end standard range sentence.
The State requested a mid-range sentence of 300 months. The trial court
determined that two aggravating factors were present, deliberate cruelty and
sexual motivation, and imposed an exceptional sentence of 380 months upon
Koehler.
II
Koehler contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in State v. Houston-
Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), entitles him to resentencing. This
is so, he avers, because the sentencing judge did not fully consider the mitigating
qualities of youth. Because Koehler does not demonstrate actual and substantial
prejudice, he is not entitled to relief.
“Relief by way of a collateral challenge to a conviction is extraordinary,
and the petitioner must meet a high standard before this court will disturb an
otherwise settled judgment.” In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132,
267 P.3d 324 (2011). A petitioner alleging constitutional error bears the
threshold burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the
2 No. 77174-4-I /3
petitioner was actually and substantially prejudiced by the alleged error. In re
Pers. Restraint of Meippen, 193 Wn.2d 310, 315, 440 P.3d 978 (2019). This
standard is met when “[b]ased on the record, it appears that more likely than not”
that the trial court “would have imposed a lower sentence had [it] understood that
the Eighth Amendment requires absolute discretion to impose any sentence
below the standard range based on youthful diminished culpability.” In re Pers.
Restraint of Ali, 196 Wn.2d 220, 244-45, 474 P.3d 507 (2020).
Courts have “an affirmative duty to ensure that proper consideration is
given to the juvenile’s ‘chronological age and its hallmark features.’” State v.
Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 443, 387 P.3d 650 (2017) (quoting Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 477, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (plurality opinion)).
These features include “the juvenile’s immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to
appreciate risks and consequences—the nature of the juvenile’s surrounding
environment and family circumstances, the extent of the juvenile’s participation in
the crime, the way familial and peer pressures may have affected him or her,
how youth impacted any legal defense, and any factors suggesting that the
juvenile might be successfully rehabilitated.” State v. Gilbert, 193 Wn.2d 169,
176, 438 P.3d 133 (2019) (citing Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23).
However, “age is not a per se mitigating factor automatically entitling every
youthful defendant to an exceptional sentence.” State v. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d 680,
695, 358 P.3d 359 (2015). When sentencing juveniles in adult court, the court
retains its discretion to impose a standard range sentence. State v. Gregg, 196
Wn.2d 473, 478, 474 P.3d 539 (2020). The burden of proving youth as a
3 No. 77174-4-I /4
mitigating factor lies with the defendant. Gregg, 196 Wn.2d at 478. “[W]hen
sentencing judges determine that youth is a mitigating factor and exercise their
broad discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence, such judges (1) must
explain the reasons for their determination and (2) those reasons must be
rationally related to evidence adduced at trial or presented at sentencing.” State
v. Rogers, 17 Wn. App. 2d 466, 480, 487 P.3d 177 (2021).
At Koehler’s sentencing, defense counsel asked for a sentence at the low
end of the standard range, arguing that Koehler’s developmental deficits
combined with the impacts of drug use at the time of the crime were mitigating
circumstances. Koehler’s counsel also argued that he was influenced by his co-
defendant. Several witnesses testified that Koehler did not have a stable home
environment and that his father, who he was residing with at the time of the
crime, was an alcoholic who “had no supervision for him.” These witnesses
described Koehler as a “good kid,” a “loving, young teenage boy” and “just a
child.” Anthony Carreon, who described Koehler as “like a younger brother,”
explained:
I don’t think these boys are monsters. I think they are just two teenagers that were led the wrong way and need some guidance in their life. And I think once this is all over and they come out of that, maybe they will find God, maybe they will find something that is going to put that—going to fill that hole and void in their life that is going to make them become stronger men and better people in society. . . . . . . [T]hey are still kids. They are not full grown men. They are still kids. They are still boys. Their mentalities are still children. They are still boys.
The State requested a mid-range sentence of 300 months.
4 No. 77174-4-I /5
The sentencing judge appears to have been unmoved by the requests for
leniency. The judge made findings of deliberate cruelty and sexual motivation,
and sentenced Koehler to an exceptional sentence of 380 months. He
I often hear people tell me at the time of sentencing, which is often the first day of reckoning for the individuals, that it was their age, it was drugs, it was a bad family circumstance that caused them to participate in particular types of conduct. Those factors can all be considered by the Court, and they have been taken into consideration. But, nonetheless, it does not eliminate the fact that we have a woman’s life that was brutally taken away from her on one given night because of the actions of only two people, and that is the two of you. . . . .... . . . [T]he defendant’s conduct during the commission of the current offense manifested deliberate cruelty to the victim. . . . .... . . . These deliberate acts took place over a period of time and distance sufficiently long to inflict extreme fear, pain and suffering on the part of the victim prior to her death.
It is thus clear that the sentencing court heard and considered the
circumstances of Koehler’s youth, and determined that the egregious nature of
his crime outweighed those circumstances. There is nothing in our record to
suggest that the sentencing judge would have imposed a lesser sentence had
the judge been aware of his broad discretion to depart below the standard
sentencing range including the firearm enhancement. The sentencing court
certainly recognized its discretion to impose a lesser sentence than was
imposed, given that both the State and Koehler requested a lower sentence. The
sentencing court expressly recognized Koehler’s age as a “factor” in making its
sentencing determination. Nevertheless, the sentencing court chose to impose
5 No. 77174-4-I /6
an exceptional sentence above the standard range because of the circumstances
of the offense.
Although it is theoretically possible that the sentencing court would have
imposed a different sentence had it predicted the Houston-Sconiers decision,
“mere possibilities do not establish a prima facie showing of actual and
substantial prejudice.” Meippen, 193 Wn.2d at 317. Nothing in this record
indicates that this sentencing judge had any such inclination. Koehler does not
show that he was actually and substantially prejudiced by the claim of error he
raises. Accordingly, he does not meet the burden imposed upon him. As he
does not establish an entitlement to relief, the petition is denied.
WE CONCUR: