Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
July 22, 2025
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 58353-4-II
MATTHEW DALE CLARK REAVIS,
Petitioner.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
VELJACIC, A.C.J. — In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Matthew Reavis challenges
several community custody conditions following his convictions for attempted child rape in the
second degree, felony communication with a minor for immoral purposes, and possession of
depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct. By order, this court already dismissed
as frivolous several of Reavis’s claims. We hold that Reavis fails to establish an exception to the
one-year time bar for the remainder of his claims and dismiss his petition as untimely.
FACTS
In 2019, Reavis pled guilty to attempted child rape in the second degree, felony
communication with a minor for immoral purposes, and possession of depictions of minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.
The attempted child rape in the second degree conviction was based on police posing as a
fictitious 13-year-old girl to arrange a meeting with Reavis on an online social media platform. 58353-4-II
Reavis coordinated a meeting with the girl for the intent to have oral and anal sexual intercourse.
When Reavis arrived, he was arrested.
The communication with a minor for immoral purposes conviction was based on Reavis
messaging with a 16-year-old girl to meet up for a “porn photo shoot” via the same online social
media platform. Br. of Resp’t, App. at 4.
The possession of depictions of minors engaged in sexual activity conviction was based on
photographs found on Reavis’s cell phone when he was arrested. Reavis admitted that he
possessed the photographs for his own sexual gratification.
Prior to sentencing, the trial court ordered the Department of Corrections (DOC) to compile
a presentence investigation report. The report stated that when Reavis was arrested police located
two cell phones in his car. One of his cell phones contained over 100 images of minors engaged
in sexually explicit conduct. The report also indicated that Reavis took sexually explicit
photographs on his phone of a three-year-old girl. The girl’s mother identified the girl and reported
that Reavis and the girl stayed overnight in his recreational vehicle on two occasions.
The report indicated that Reavis denied using drugs or alcohol in the commission of his
crimes, but he has a family history of addiction and he was working on overcoming a nicotine
habit.
On November 26, 2019, the trial court sentenced Reavis. His sentence included several
sex offender special community custody conditions set forth in Appendix H to Reavis’s judgment
and sentence. Reavis was ordered to “[n]ot possess or consume controlled substances” and to not
“consume alcohol and/or [m]arijuana.” Br. of Resp’t, App. at 59-60. The court also imposed the
following conditions, relevant to Reavis’s petition:
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12 Be available for and submit to urinalysis and/or breathanalysis upon the request of the CCO [community correction officer] and/or the chemical dependency treatment provider. .... 19 . . . Stay out of areas where children’s activities regularly occur or are occurring. This means parks used for youth activities, schools, daycare facilities, playgrounds, shopping malls, fast food restaurants (to include the drive-thrus), wading pools, swimming pools being used for youth activities, play areas (indoor or outdoor), sports fields being used for youth sports, arcades, and any specific location identified in advance by DOC or CCO. .... 24 . . . No internet access or use, including email, without prior approval of the supervising CCO and Treatment Provider. 25 . . . No use of a computer, phone, or computer related device with access to the Internet or on-line computer service except as necessary for employment purposes (including job searches). The CCO is permitted to make random searches of any computer, phone or computer-related device to which the defendant has access to monitor compliance with this condition. 26 . . . No possession of any audio or video recording equipment, to include personal electronic devices, such as cell phones, watches, and iPods, with a camera/video recording capability without the prior approval of the supervising CCO and Treatment Provider. The CCO is permitted to make random searches of any computer, phone or computer-related device to which the defendant has access to monitor compliance with this condition.
Br. of Resp’t, App. at 60.
In August 2022, Reavis filed a CrR 7.8 motion to modify his judgement and sentence. He
argued that his judgment and sentence was facially invalid because the trial court improperly
calculated his offender score and imposed several community custody conditions that were
unconstitutional or exceeded the trial court’s authority (conditions 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 19, 24, 25, and
26).
The trial court transferred Reavis’s untimely motion to us as a PRP under CrR 7.8(c)(2).
In our April 12, 2024 order, we determined that Reavis’s challenge to his offender score was time
barred; that the challenges to conditions 9, 10, and 11 were also time barred; and that the challenge
to condition 8, involving a home search, was not ripe for review. We dismissed those claims. We
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determined that the remaining community custody challenges (12, 19, 24, 25, 26) should be
referred to a panel of judges for review.
ANALYSIS
Reavis contends that conditions 12, 19, 24, 25, and 26 are unconstitutional. He argues that
these conditions render his judgment and sentence facially invalid, an exception to the one-year
time bar. We disagree.
I. PRP PRINCIPLES
Relief through a PRP is extraordinary. In re Pers. Restraint of Coats, 173 Wn.2d 123, 132,
267 P.3d 324 (2011). A petitioner may seek relief through a PRP when they are under unlawful
restraint. RAP 16.4(a). To be timely, a petitioner challenging a judgment and sentence must file
a PRP within one year after the judgment becomes final. RCW 10.73.090(1). This time limit does
not apply if the judgment and sentence is invalid on its face. RCW 10.73.090(1).1 The petitioner
bears the burden of showing that they timely filed their PRP. In re Pers. Restraint of Quinn, 154
Wn. App. 816, 832, 226 P.3d 208 (2010). Untimely challenges to a final judgment and sentence
are time barred, and we will not consider them. Id.
Reavis’s judgment and sentence became final in November 2019, when it was filed. RCW
10.73.090(3)(a). Reavis did not file his petition until August 2022. Reavis does not dispute that
he filed his PRP more than a year after his judgment and sentence became final, but he argues that
1 A recently created exception to the one-year time bar is when a petitioner files a motion for modification of community custody conditions pursuant to RCW 9.94A.703 and RCW 9.94A.709. RCW 10.73.100(6). This exception took effect in March 2024. LAWS OF 2024, ch. 118, § 8(6). This exception applies when there is a motion for modification “following the offender’s release from total confinement.” RCW 9.94A.703(5)(a); RCW 9.94A.709(2)(a). This is not the case here. Accordingly, this exception does not apply.
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the challenged community custody conditions render his judgment and sentence invalid on its face,
an exception to the time bar.
“[T]he general rule is that a judgment and sentence is not valid on its face if the trial judge
actually exercised authority (statutory or otherwise) it did not have.” In re Pers. Restraint of Scott,
173 Wn.2d 911, 917, 271 P.3d 218 (2012). “Invalid on its face” means “the judgment and sentence
evidences the invalidity without further elaboration.” In re Pers. Restraint of Hemenway, 147
Wn.2d 529, 532, 55 P.3d 615 (2002). Matters “of fact and trial judge discretion” are “not evident
on the face of the judgment and sentence without further elaboration.” In re Pers. Restraint of
Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d 801, 814, 383 P.3d 454 (2016).
“Constitutionally invalid on its face” means “a conviction which without further
elaboration evidences infirmities of a constitutional magnitude.” In re Pers. Restraint of
Thompson, 141 Wn.2d 712, 718, 10 P.3d 380 (2000); State v. Ammons, 105 Wn.2d 175, 188, 713
P.2d 719, 718 P.2d 796 (1986). Significantly, our Supreme Court has recognized that the court
can infringe on a convicted offender’s constitutional rights during a term of community custody if
the Sentencing Reform Act of 1981 (SRA), chapter 9.94A RCW, authorizes it. State v. Ross, 129
Wn.2d 279, 287, 916 P.2d 405 (1996). But the conditions must be “sensitively imposed” and
“‘reasonably necessary to accomplish the essential needs of the state and public order.’” State v.
Bahl, 164 Wn.2d 739, 757, 193 P.3d 678 (2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting State
v. Riley, 121 Wn.2d 22, 37-38, 846 P.2d 1365 (1993)).
II. LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITIONS
A. Vagueness
Community custody conditions that are vague are unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 3 of the Washington
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Constitution. State v. Hai Minh Nguyen, 191 Wn.2d 671, 678-79, 425 P.3d 847 (2018).
Community custody conditions are unconstitutional if they (1) do not define the condition “‘with
sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand what conduct is proscribed, or (2) . . .
[do] not provide ascertainable standards . . . to protect against arbitrary enforcement.’” Id. at 678
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting City of Spokane v. Douglass, 115 Wn.2d 171, 178,
795 P.2d 693 (1990)).
A community custody condition “‘is not unconstitutionally vague merely because a person
cannot predict with complete certainty the exact point at which his actions would be classified as
prohibited conduct.’” State v. Padilla, 190 Wn.2d 672, 677, 416 P.3d 712 (2018) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting State v. Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d 782, 793, 239 P.3d 1059
(2010)). Rather, the question is whether fair-minded citizens have fair warning of proscribed
conduct. State v. Shreve, 28 Wn. App. 2d 785, 791, 538 P.3d 958 (2023). And they do if “ordinary
people can understand what is and is not allowed, and are protected against arbitrary enforcement.”
Sanchez Valencia, 169 Wn.2d at 791.
When deciding a vagueness challenge, we consider the terms in the context in which they
are used. In re Pers. Restraint of Ansell, 1 Wn.3d 882, 898, 533 P.3d 875 (2023). “Community
custody conditions should be ‘read in a commonsense fashion in the context of the judgment and
sentence, and related documents that will be available to [the CCO].’” Id. (alteration in original)
(quoting State v. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d 740, 748, 487 P.3d 893 (2021)).
B. Overbreadth
An overbreadth challenge to a community custody condition “goes to the question of
whether state action is couched in terms so broad that it may not only prohibit unprotected behavior
but may also prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well.” In re Pers. Restraint of Sickels,
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14 Wn. App. 2d 51, 67, 469 P.3d 322 (2020). However, limitations on fundamental rights of a
person on community custody are permissible if they are sensitively imposed and narrowly
tailored. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d at 744-45. “[T]he interplay of sentencing conditions and
fundamental rights is delicate and fact-specific, not lending itself to broad statements and bright
line rules.” In re Pers. Restraint of Rainey, 168 Wn.2d 367, 377, 229 P.3d 686 (2010).
C. Ripeness
A preenforcement challenge to community custody conditions is ripe for review when “‘the
issues raised are primarily legal, do not require further factual development, and the challenged
action is final.’” State v. Nelson, ___ Wn.3d ___, 565 P.3d 906, 913 (2025) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting State v. Cates, 183 Wn.2d 531, 534, 354 P.3d 832 (2015)). Factual
development is needed when the challenger’s argument is based on the potential for “‘[s]ome
future misapplication of the community custody condition,’ which necessarily depends ‘on the
particular circumstances of the attempted enforcement.’” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Cates, 183 Wn.2d at 535). We also consider the hardship the petitioner would face if we
decline to review his or her challenge at this time. Nelson, 565 P.3d at 913.
D. Crime Related
Under RCW 9.94A.703(3)(f), the trial court may require an offender to “[c]omply with any
crime-related prohibitions.” A crime-related prohibition must “directly relate[] to the
circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10).
There must be a basis for connecting the condition to the crime. State v. Geyer, 19 Wn. App. 2d
321, 331, 496 P.3d 322 (2021). “A community custody condition is not impermissibly overbroad
if it is crime related.” State v. Lee, 12 Wn. App. 2d 378, 401, 460 P.3d 701 (2020).
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III. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITION NO. 12
Reavis asserts that condition 12 is unconstitutional because it is not crime related and it
allows urinalysis and/or breathanalysis to be required without suspicion of drug or alcohol use.
We disagree.
RCW 9.94A.703(2)(c) provides that “[u]nless waived by the court, as part of any term of
community custody, the court shall order an offender to . . . [r]efrain from possessing or consuming
controlled substances except pursuant to lawfully issued prescriptions.” And, “[a]s part of any
term of community custody, the court may order an offender to . . . [r]efrain from possessing or
consuming alcohol.” RCW 9.94A.703(3)(e).
Here, in accordance with RCW 9.94A.703(2)(c), the trial court ordered Reavis to not
consume drugs or alcohol. It then imposed condition 12 that ordered testing to ensure compliance
with its no consumption condition.
Our Supreme Court recently held that a community custody condition requiring the
defendant to “[s]ubmit to breathalyzer testing or any other testing to ensure no alcohol
consumption” was not unconstitutional if it was the only way to monitor compliance with valid
conditions related to refraining from drug and alcohol consumption. Nelson, 565 P.3d at 910, 920.
If further factual development is necessary, a condition is not invalid on its face. See Hemenway,
147 Wn.2d at 532.
Because condition 12 is not invalid, it does not render Reavis’s judgment and sentence
facially invalid. Without this showing, the challenge to condition 12 is time barred and we decline
to address it further.
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IV. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITION NO. 19
Reavis next argues that condition 19 that prohibits him from being in places were children
congregate, including shopping malls, schools, and fast food restaurants, is unconstitutionally
overbroad. We disagree.
Our focus is on whether the conditions are couched in terms so broad that they not only
prohibit unprotected behavior but prohibit constitutionally protected activity as well. Sickels, 14
Wn. App. 2d at 67. Nevertheless, limitations on fundamental rights of a person on community
custody are permissible if they are sensitively imposed and narrowly tailored. Johnson, 197 Wn.2d
at 744. Given that Reavis’s offenses involved children, it is reasonable to prohibit him from
frequenting places where children are commonly present and to limit his contact with minors. The
terms “shopping malls,” “schools,” and “fast food restaurants” are not overbroad because the
restrictions are clear and reasonably necessary to accomplish essential State needs and public
order, and are sensitively imposed. See Bahl, 164 Wn.2d at 757. Accordingly, Reavis fails to
show that condition 19 renders the judgment and sentence facially invalid. The challenge to
community custody condition 19 is time barred.
V. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITIONS NO. 24 AND NO. 25
Reavis next argues that conditions 24 and 25 are unconstitutionally vague and overbroad
rendering his judgment and sentence facially invalid. We disagree.
Conditions 24 and 25 relate to internet access. In Johnson, the Supreme Court approved
of a community custody condition that the offender shall “not use or access the World Wide Web
unless specifically authorized by [his community custody officer] through approved filters.” 197
Wn.2d at 744. The court concluded that any danger of arbitrary enforcement is constrained by the
facts of the convictions. Id. at 749. According to the court, “the crimes themselves and the
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statement of probable cause provide sufficient direction to prevent arbitrary enforcement.” Id.
The court explained that because the probable cause statement contained “a detailed recitation of
the facts that led up to Johnson’s arrest, including the role Johnson’s Internet use played,” there
are “meaningful benchmarks to restrict arbitrary enforcement.” Id.
Similarly, here, conditions 24 and 25 are narrowly tailored like those in Johnson. They
limit the restrictions to the particular dangers posed by Reavis, namely his ability to contact minors
through the Internet. The court appropriately carved out exceptions for employment purposes.
And it permitted access if Reavis receives approval from his CCO and/or treatment provider. The
CCO searches permitted in conditions 24 and 25 are reasonably necessary to accomplish the
State’s duty to protect children. See State v. DeLeon, 11 Wn. App. 2d 837, 840, 456 P.3d 405
(2020) (prevention of harm to children is a compelling state interest).
Additionally, RCW 9.94A.631(1) states, “If there is reasonable cause to believe that an
offender has violated a condition or requirement of the sentence, a [CCO] may require an offender
to submit to a search and seizure of the offender’s person, residence, automobile, or other personal
property.” A CCO “must have ‘reasonable cause to believe’ a probation violation has occurred
before conducting a search at the expense of the individual’s privacy.” State v. Cornwell, 190
Wn.2d 296, 304, 412 P.3d 1265 (2018). Further, the offender’s “privacy interest is diminished
only to the extent necessary for the State to monitor compliance with the particular probation
condition that gave rise to the search.” Id. “[F]ailure to include the language does not affect the
order’s constitutionality.” State v. Massey, 81 Wn. App. 198, 201, 913 P.2d 424 (1996).
Therefore, failure to include the language would not render the judgment and sentence facially
invalid because reasonable cause is already statutorily required.
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Accordingly, conditions 24 and 25 are narrowly tailored to Reavis’s crimes, reasonably
necessary to accomplish essential needs of the State, and do not allow for arbitrary enforcement.
Reavis fails to show that conditions 24 and 25 render the judgment and sentence facially invalid.
Therefore, the challenges to these conditions are time barred.2
VI. COMMUNITY CUSTODY CONDITION NO. 26
Reavis next argues that condition 26 regarding restricting his use of recording devices
without CCO approval is unconstitutionally overbroad rendering his judgment and sentence
facially invalid. We disagree.
As discussed above, “[a] community custody condition is not impermissibly overbroad if
it is crime related.” Lee, 12 Wn. App. 2d at 401. In general, a determination as to whether a
condition is crime related requires an inquiry into whether the condition “directly relates to the
circumstances of the crime for which the offender has been convicted.” RCW 9.94A.030(10).
And an inquiry into the circumstances of the crimes underlying Reavis’s convictions involves “a
matter of fact and trial judge discretion,” requiring elaboration beyond “the face of [his] judgment
and sentence.” Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d at 814. Therefore, Reavis’s contention does not establish
that condition 26 is facially invalid. The challenge to this condition is time barred.
2 We also note that contrary to Reavis’s argument, the two conditions are not redundant. Condition 24 involves the use of the Internet and condition 25 involves specific devices.
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CONCLUSION
Because Reavis fails to establish an exception to the one-year time bar, we dismiss his
petition as untimely.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
Veljacic, A.C.J.
We concur:
Glasgow, J.
Che, J.