Personal Restraint Petition Of Johnathan Michael Goulding Booth

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: February 24, 2026
• Docket: 59634-2
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two

February 24, 2026

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 59634-2-II

JOHNATHAN MICHAEL GOULDING BOOTH, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner.

LEE, J.— Johnathan M. Goulding Booth seeks relief from personal restraint imposed after

he was convicted of three counts of domestic violence felony violation of a no contact order.

Goulding Booth’s trial was delayed for several months after the trial court ordered a

competency evaluation at defense counsel’s request, which tolled the time for trial clock until

Goulding Booth was found competent to stand trial. In this personal restraint petition (PRP),

Goulding Booth argues that his time for trial right under CrR 3.3 was violated because defense

counsel did not consult him before requesting the competency evaluation, and the trial court did

not explain to Goulding Booth the impact on his rights before ordering the evaluation. We deny

Goulding Booth’s PRP.

FACTS

While Goulding Booth was in jail for a different case, police served Goulding Booth with

a no contact order prohibiting Goulding Booth from contacting his former landlord. The next day,

after Goulding Booth was released from jail, he called his landlord twice from the jail lobby’s

public phone and then a third time that night from a hotel phone. Because Goulding Booth had No. 59634-2-II

two prior convictions for violating a no contact order, the State charged Goulding Booth with three

counts of domestic violence felony violation of a no contact order.

A. PRETRIAL PROCEEDINGS

In December 2022, the trial court appointed counsel for Goulding Booth and arraigned him

on the charges. The next month, his appointed counsel left the office of public defense and new

counsel was appointed to represent Goulding Booth, which reset the 60-day time for trial clock to

begin running on January 24, 2023. CrR 3.3(c)(2)(vii).

On February 9, 2023, defense counsel raised concerns about Goulding Booth’s competency

to stand trial, and the trial court ordered Goulding Booth to undergo a competency evaluation,

which tolled the time for trial clock at 17 days. CrR 3.3(e)(1). Booth was evaluated at Western

State Hospital and was found competent to stand trial on May 11, so the time for trial clock

resumed running on that date. CrR 3.3(e)(1). Because Goulding Booth was pursuing the expert

reports required to support a request for a Mental Health Sentencing Alternative (MHSA), the

court did not set a trial date but did set a review hearing date.

At the review hearing on May 23, Goulding Booth began complaining that his time for trial

rights had been violated because he had not been consulted about defense counsel’s decision to

request a competency evaluation and more than 60 days had passed since his arraignment.1 When

the trial court asked if Goulding Booth wished to set the case for trial, Goulding Booth stated that

he did not want to abandon his pursuit of the MHSA. Two days later, on May 25, the parties asked

1 Goulding Booth consistently uses the term “speedy trial” when discussing the right in question, but it is clear throughout proceedings below and in the briefing for this PRP that he is referring to the 60-day time for trial limit set out in CrR 3.3(b).

2 No. 59634-2-II

the court to schedule the case for trial. The trial court set June 27 as the date for trial to begin,

with a pretrial management hearing set for June 8.

At the pretrial management hearing on June 8, Goulding Booth again tried to raise his time

for trial claim related to the competency evaluation, but the trial court refused to hear the motion

because Goulding Booth was not self-represented and his appointed attorney was not present at

the hearing (Goulding Booth was represented at the hearing by another attorney from the office of

public defense).

On June 20, at the pretrial readiness hearing, Goulding Booth challenged his attorney’s

ability to seek a competency evaluation because Goulding Booth did not give his consent, and he

orally moved to dismiss the charges based on the violation of his time for trial rights. The trial

court denied the motion to dismiss. When the trial court asked whether Goulding Booth wanted a

new attorney, Goulding Booth clarified that he was “not requesting anything in regards to [his]

attorney” but simply objecting to counsel’s decision to request a competency evaluation without

his approval. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 48. The trial court then set the case for trial on

June 28.

B. TRIAL, VERDICT, AND SENTENCING

Throughout his trial, Goulding Booth repeatedly protested and sought to have the charges

dismissed because he believed that the period during which he was awaiting a competency

evaluation counted towards the time for trial calculation. In response, the State informed the court

that Goulding Booth cooperated with the competency evaluation and never asked to proceed as a

self-represented litigant. In denying Goulding Booth’s request for dismissal of the charges, the

trial court explained to Goulding Booth that the competency proceedings tolled the time for trial

3 No. 59634-2-II

clock, and while Goulding Booth’s attorney probably should have discussed “the implications of

that” with him, “[i]f your attorney at that time felt that you weren't competent, she may not have

had that conversation with you because she may not have felt that you understood or could

understand.” VRP at 219.

At trial, witnesses testified consistent with the facts described above, and Goulding Booth

admitted on the stand that he called the victim three times and knew that he was violating a no

contact order when he did so.

After the close of evidence, Goulding Booth orally sought reconsideration of the trial

court’s denial of his motion for dismissal of the charges. The trial court denied the motion,

reiterating that competency evaluation proceedings were excluded from the time for trial period.

When Goulding Booth continued to protest, the trial court explained that even if Goulding Booth

had objected to counsel’s competency concerns, those proceedings would have continued because

any party, including the trial court, can raise competency concerns about a criminal defendant.

RCW 10.77.400(1)(b)(i). 2

The jury convicted Goulding Booth of all three counts and entered special verdicts finding

that he and the victim were household or family members. The trial court imposed a standard

range sentence of 60 months in custody.

Goulding Booth filed a timely CrR 7.8 motion, which the trial court transferred to this court

for consideration as a PRP pursuant to CrR 7.8(c)(2) after finding that Goulding Booth failed to

make a substantial showing that he was entitled to relief.

2 After Goulding Booth’s trial, former RCW 10.77.060 was recodified as RCW 10.77.400. See LAWS OF 2025, ch. 358, § 2. Because the relevant language allowing any party including the court to request a competency evaluation has not changed, we cite to the current version of the statute.

4 No. 59634-2-II

ANALYSIS

Goulding Booth argues that his CrR 3.3(b) time for trial right was violated because defense

counsel’s request for a competency evaluation without Goulding Booth’s consent delayed the trial

and extended the time for trial period.3 Goulding Booth insists that the trial court should have

directly confirmed with him that the competency evaluation would toll the time for trial clock

before the trial court ordered a competency evaluation. Goulding Booth asserts that the failure to

inform him that the competency evaluation proceedings would toll the time for trial clock violated

his due process rights. He therefore contends that the charges against him should have been

dismissed once 60 days had elapsed since his arraignment.

The State responds that, under RCW 10.77.400(1)(b)(i), any party or the trial court can

raise doubts about competency, which can lead to a competency evaluation, during which time the

time for trial clock is tolled. The State contends that there is no authority requiring a defendant to

be consulted before defense counsel raises concerns about their client’s competency. We agree

with the State.

A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES

To receive relief through a timely PRP, a petitioner “must show either a constitutional error

that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice or a nonconstitutional error that ‘constitute[es] a

3 Goulding Booth cites to the “6th Amendment Right to Speedy Trial,” but provides no argument with regard to the constitutional right to speedy trial, and his arguments only discuss the time for trial rule encompassed in CrR 3.3. PRP at 7*; RAP 10.3(a)(6); Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549 (1992) (courts will not consider claims raised in passing or without argument).

*We note that the PRP does not contain page numbers. We number the pages of the PRP 1-17 starting with the first page of the PRP.

5 No. 59634-2-II

fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice.’” In re Pers.

Restraint of Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d 801, 807, 383 P.3d 454 (2016) (internal quotation marks

omitted) (quoting In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 811, 792 P.2d 506 (1990)).

Goulding Booth argues both that his nonconstitutional right to a trial within 60 days of arraignment

under CrR 3.3(b) was violated by the delay while his competency was evaluated, and that his

constitutional due process rights were violated when counsel requested and the court ordered a

competency evaluation without explaining to Goulding Booth that the time for trial would be tolled

until he was determined competent.

Generally, a “defendant who is detained in jail shall be brought to trial within . . . 60 days

after the commencement date.” CrR 3.3(b)(1)(i). The time for trial usually commences running

at arraignment, but will be reset by certain events, including a change of attorneys. CrR 3.3(c)(1),

(c)(2)(vii). Additionally, certain time “periods shall be excluded in computing the time for trial,”

including “[a]ll proceedings relating to the competency of a defendant to stand trial on the pending

charge.” CrR 3.3(e)(1). The time for trial calculation stops “beginning on the date when the

competency examination is ordered and terminating when the court enters a written order finding

the defendant to be competent.” CrR 3.3(e)(1).

The procedure for initiating competency proceedings is as follows. “Whenever there is a

doubt as to competency, the court on its own motion or on the motion of any party shall first review

the allegations of incompetency.” RCW 10.77.400(1)(b)(i) (emphasis added). “If a genuine doubt

as to competency exists, the court shall . . . designate a qualified expert or professional person . . .

to evaluate and report upon the mental condition of the defendant.” RCW 10.77.400(1)(b)(i).

6 No. 59634-2-II

B. ANALYSIS

CrR 3.3(e)(1) clearly excludes from the time for trial period the time between when a court

orders a competency evaluation and when the court finds the defendant competent to stand trial.

And the State is correct that under the relevant statute, any party in a proceeding, as well as the

trial court sua sponte, can raise concerns about a defendant’s competency. RCW

10.77.400(1)(b)(i). Also, nothing in the statute requires the trial court to discuss the request for a

competency evaluation with the defendant or to inform the defendant that competency proceedings

are excluded from the time for trial period.

Goulding Booth insists that a defendant must consent to waive their time for trial rights in

order to toll the time for trial clock. Specifically, Goulding Booth asserts that “[e]verything” in

CrR 3.3(b) and (e) and chapter 10.77 RCW is dependent on the disclosure to a defendant of which

rights are being affected by competency proceedings. Reply Br. of Pet’r at 4 (underlining omitted).

Aside from vague references to constitutional due process rights, he does not cite any authority to

support this claim. To the contrary, federal and Washington law strictly prohibit allowing an

incompetent defendant to stand trial. See State v. Phan, 25 Wn. App. 2d 185, 201, 522 P.3d 105

(2022) (“A ‘mentally incompetent defendant, though physically present in the courtroom, is in

reality afforded no opportunity to defend himself’ and, accordingly, cannot be forced to undergo

trial.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Drope v. Missouri, 420 U.S. 162, 171, 95 S. Ct.

896, 43 L. Ed. 2d 103 (1975))), review denied, 1 Wn.2d 1010 (2023). Further, there are many

reasons why defense counsel may be in a better position than the defendant to suspect that the

defendant is not competent to stand trial. Indeed, even the prosecutor or the trial court alone could

initiate competency proceedings, which certainly would not require the defendant’s consent

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beforehand. And while it would be a best practice for defense counsel to discuss the implications

of a request for a competency evaluation with their client, no case law, statute, or court rule requires

the defendant’s consent.

In sum, Goulding Booth fails to show a constitutional error or fundamental defect arising

from defense counsel’s request for a competency evaluation without Goulding Booth’s consent or

from the tolling of the time for trial period while Goulding Booth’s competency was being

evaluated. Swagerty, 186 Wn.2d at 807. Thus, we deny Goulding Booth’s petition.

CONCLUSION

We deny Goulding Booth’s personal restraint petition.

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW

2.06.040, it is so ordered.

Lee, J. We concur:

Maxa, P.J.

Che, J.