Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
April 28, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 61316-6-II
ERNEST DALE BENSON, JR.,
PUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner.
MAXA, P.J. – In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Ernest Dale Benson, Jr. seeks relief
from a Department of Corrections (DOC) decision ordering him to return to prison based on an
alleged miscalculation of earned release time (ERT).
In 1995, Benson pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated first degree murder. After a
resentencing in 2024, the trial court amended his sentence from life without parole (LWOP) to
two concurrent 40 year sentences.
DOC initially granted Benson an ERT credit of 33.33 percent of his sentence, which
allowed him to be released from confinement. But DOC later determined that Benson was
entitled to only a 15 percent ERT credit under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b).
RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) states that an offender convicted of a “serious violent offense”
committed on or after July 1, 1990 and before July 1, 2003 is eligible for a maximum ERT of 15
percent of the sentence. RCW 9.94A.030(46) includes first degree murder as a “serious violent No. 61316-6-II
offense,” but not aggravated first degree murder. Benson argues that RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) is
inapplicable because aggravated first degree murder is not within the definition of a “serious
violent offense.”
We hold that aggravated first degree murder is a “serious violent offense” under RCW
9.94A.729(3)(b), meaning that Benson is entitled only to a 15 percent ERT credit. Therefore,
Benson fails to establish that he is under unlawful restraint. Accordingly, we deny Benson’s
PRP.
FACTS
In 1995, Benson pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated first degree murder. He was
20 years old at the time of the offenses. An LWOP sentence was mandatory for aggravated first
degree murder, former RCW 10.95.030 (1993), and the trial court sentenced him to two LWOP
terms.
In 2021, the Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOP sentences for offenders between
the ages of 18 and 20 violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re
Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 329, 482 P.3d 276 (2021). In 2024, the Supreme
Court also held that a court may impose determinate sentences for people convicted of
aggravated first degree murder whose LWOP sentences were invalidated by Monschke. State v.
Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 548 P.3d 935 (2024). Accordingly, in November 2024, the trial court
resentenced Benson to two concurrent 40 year sentences.
In March 2025, DOC released Benson from confinement based on a determination that he
was entitled to receive a 33.33 percent ERT. However, after his release, DOC determined that
aggravated first degree murder is a “serious violent offense” that qualifies only for a maximum
of 15 percent ERT under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b). As a result, Benson was returned to prison.
2 No. 61316-6-II
Shortly before his return to prison, Benson filed this PRP. Benson also filed an
emergency motion for release pending disposition of his PRP, which a commissioner of this
court denied. This court accelerated review of Benson’s PRP.
ANALYSIS
A. PRP PRINCIPLES
RAP 16.4(a) states that we will grant appropriate relief if a person is under unlawful
restraint. RAP 16.4(b) states that a person is under restraint if “the petitioner has limited
freedom because of a court decision in a civil or criminal proceeding, the petitioner is confined,
the petitioner is subject to imminent confinement, or the petitioner is under some other disability
resulting from a judgment or sentence in a criminal case.”
To prevail in a PRP, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1)
a constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice or (2) a fundamental defect
of a nonconstitutional nature that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re
Pers. Restraint of Meredith, 191 Wn.2d 300, 306, 422 P.3d 458 (2018).
B. APPLICABILITY OF RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b)
Benson argues that he is entitled to a 33.33 percent ERT credit because aggravated first
degree murder is not within the statutory definition of “serious violent offense,” and therefore
RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) is inapplicable. We disagree.
1. Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Abdi-Issa,
199 Wn.2d 163, 168, 504 P.3d 223 (2022). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to
determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. To determine the legislature’s intent, we
first look to the plain language of the statute, considering the language of the provisions in
3 No. 61316-6-II
question, how the provisions fit within the context of the statute, and the statutory scheme as a
whole. Id. at 168-69. If a word is not defined in the statute, we can consider dictionary
definitions to attempt to determine the word's ordinary meaning. State v. Hribar, 34 Wn. App. 2d
546, 554, 569 P.3d 743, review denied, 5 Wn.3d 1014 (2025).
The language of a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. State v. M.V., 33 Wn. App. 2d 658, 662, 564 P.3d 564 (2025). We “first attempt to
resolve the ambiguity and determine the legislature’s intent by considering other indicia of
legislative intent, including principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant
case law.” Id. “If these indications are insufficient to resolve the ambiguity, the rule of lenity
requires that we interpret the ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant.” Id.
One principle of statutory construction is that courts generally interpret ambiguous
language to avoid absurd results. State v. Schwartz, 194 Wn.2d 432, 443, 450 P.3d 141 (2019).
We presume that the legislature did not intend absurd results. Id.
2. Relevant Statutes
RCW 10.95.020 states that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if “he or
she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.020(1)(a). . . and one or more of the
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
April 28, 2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 61316-6-II
ERNEST DALE BENSON, JR.,
PUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner.
MAXA, P.J. – In this personal restraint petition (PRP), Ernest Dale Benson, Jr. seeks relief
from a Department of Corrections (DOC) decision ordering him to return to prison based on an
alleged miscalculation of earned release time (ERT).
In 1995, Benson pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated first degree murder. After a
resentencing in 2024, the trial court amended his sentence from life without parole (LWOP) to
two concurrent 40 year sentences.
DOC initially granted Benson an ERT credit of 33.33 percent of his sentence, which
allowed him to be released from confinement. But DOC later determined that Benson was
entitled to only a 15 percent ERT credit under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b).
RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) states that an offender convicted of a “serious violent offense”
committed on or after July 1, 1990 and before July 1, 2003 is eligible for a maximum ERT of 15
percent of the sentence. RCW 9.94A.030(46) includes first degree murder as a “serious violent No. 61316-6-II
offense,” but not aggravated first degree murder. Benson argues that RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) is
inapplicable because aggravated first degree murder is not within the definition of a “serious
violent offense.”
We hold that aggravated first degree murder is a “serious violent offense” under RCW
9.94A.729(3)(b), meaning that Benson is entitled only to a 15 percent ERT credit. Therefore,
Benson fails to establish that he is under unlawful restraint. Accordingly, we deny Benson’s
PRP.
FACTS
In 1995, Benson pleaded guilty to two counts of aggravated first degree murder. He was
20 years old at the time of the offenses. An LWOP sentence was mandatory for aggravated first
degree murder, former RCW 10.95.030 (1993), and the trial court sentenced him to two LWOP
terms.
In 2021, the Supreme Court held that mandatory LWOP sentences for offenders between
the ages of 18 and 20 violated the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In re
Pers. Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 329, 482 P.3d 276 (2021). In 2024, the Supreme
Court also held that a court may impose determinate sentences for people convicted of
aggravated first degree murder whose LWOP sentences were invalidated by Monschke. State v.
Carter, 3 Wn.3d 198, 548 P.3d 935 (2024). Accordingly, in November 2024, the trial court
resentenced Benson to two concurrent 40 year sentences.
In March 2025, DOC released Benson from confinement based on a determination that he
was entitled to receive a 33.33 percent ERT. However, after his release, DOC determined that
aggravated first degree murder is a “serious violent offense” that qualifies only for a maximum
of 15 percent ERT under RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b). As a result, Benson was returned to prison.
2 No. 61316-6-II
Shortly before his return to prison, Benson filed this PRP. Benson also filed an
emergency motion for release pending disposition of his PRP, which a commissioner of this
court denied. This court accelerated review of Benson’s PRP.
ANALYSIS
A. PRP PRINCIPLES
RAP 16.4(a) states that we will grant appropriate relief if a person is under unlawful
restraint. RAP 16.4(b) states that a person is under restraint if “the petitioner has limited
freedom because of a court decision in a civil or criminal proceeding, the petitioner is confined,
the petitioner is subject to imminent confinement, or the petitioner is under some other disability
resulting from a judgment or sentence in a criminal case.”
To prevail in a PRP, the petitioner must establish by a preponderance of the evidence (1)
a constitutional error that resulted in actual and substantial prejudice or (2) a fundamental defect
of a nonconstitutional nature that inherently resulted in a complete miscarriage of justice. In re
Pers. Restraint of Meredith, 191 Wn.2d 300, 306, 422 P.3d 458 (2018).
B. APPLICABILITY OF RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b)
Benson argues that he is entitled to a 33.33 percent ERT credit because aggravated first
degree murder is not within the statutory definition of “serious violent offense,” and therefore
RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) is inapplicable. We disagree.
1. Statutory Interpretation
Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review de novo. State v. Abdi-Issa,
199 Wn.2d 163, 168, 504 P.3d 223 (2022). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to
determine and give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. To determine the legislature’s intent, we
first look to the plain language of the statute, considering the language of the provisions in
3 No. 61316-6-II
question, how the provisions fit within the context of the statute, and the statutory scheme as a
whole. Id. at 168-69. If a word is not defined in the statute, we can consider dictionary
definitions to attempt to determine the word's ordinary meaning. State v. Hribar, 34 Wn. App. 2d
546, 554, 569 P.3d 743, review denied, 5 Wn.3d 1014 (2025).
The language of a statute is ambiguous if it is susceptible to more than one reasonable
interpretation. State v. M.V., 33 Wn. App. 2d 658, 662, 564 P.3d 564 (2025). We “first attempt to
resolve the ambiguity and determine the legislature’s intent by considering other indicia of
legislative intent, including principles of statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant
case law.” Id. “If these indications are insufficient to resolve the ambiguity, the rule of lenity
requires that we interpret the ambiguous statute in favor of the defendant.” Id.
One principle of statutory construction is that courts generally interpret ambiguous
language to avoid absurd results. State v. Schwartz, 194 Wn.2d 432, 443, 450 P.3d 141 (2019).
We presume that the legislature did not intend absurd results. Id.
2. Relevant Statutes
RCW 10.95.020 states that a person is guilty of aggravated first degree murder if “he or
she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW 9A.32.020(1)(a). . . and one or more of the
following aggravating circumstances exist.”1 The statute then lists a number of aggravating
circumstances. RCW 10.95.020(1)-(14).
RCW 9.94A.729 states in part,
(3) An offender may earn early release time as follows: .... (b) In the case of an offender convicted of a serious violent offense, or a sex offense that is a class A felony, committed on or after July 1, 1990, and before
1 The version of RCW 10.95.020 in effect at the time of Benson’s offense had identical language but referred to RCW 9A.32.030(1)(a). LAWS OF 1994, Ch. 121. § 3. Because this change is not relevant, we cite to the current version of the statute.
4 No. 61316-6-II
July 1, 2003, the aggregate earned release time may not exceed 15 percent of the sentence. .... (e) In no other case shall the aggregate earned release time exceed one-third of the total sentence.
The definition of “serious violent offense” in RCW 9.94A.030(47) lists several offenses,
including first degree murder, second degree murder, first degree manslaughter, first degree
assault, and first degree kidnapping. The list does not include aggravated first degree murder.2
3. Analysis
The issue here is whether RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) or RCW 9.94A.729(3)(e) applies to
Benson’s sentence. RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) applies only if aggravated first degree murder is a
serious violent offense.
Benson argues that because aggravated first degree murder does not appear in RCW
9.94A.030(47)’s definition of serious violent offense, the legislature necessarily excluded that
offense from the possible crimes to which the maximum 15 percent ERT applies. This argument
is based on the assumption that aggravated first degree murder is distinct from first degree
murder.
This assumption is incorrect. The plain language of RCW 10.95.020 states that
aggravated first degree murder is a type of first degree murder. “ ‘A person is guilty of
aggravated first degree murder if he or she commits first degree murder as defined by RCW
9A.32.030(1)(a)’ and one or more statutory aggravating circumstances exists.” State v. Roberts,
142 Wn.2d 471, 501, 14 P.3d 713 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting RCW 10.95.020).
2 The definition in effect in 1995 when Benson was convicted of his offenses also included first degree and second degree murder but not aggravated first degree murder. Former RCW 9.94A.030(29) (1994).
5 No. 61316-6-II
“ ‘[A]ggravated first degree murder is not a crime in and of itself; the crime is
premeditated murder in the first degree . . . accompanied by the presence of one or more . . .
statutory aggravating circumstances.’ ” State v. Thomas, 166 Wn.2d 380, 387, 208 P.3d 1107
(2009) (quoting Roberts, 142 Wn.2d at 501) (internal quotation marks omitted). And a jury
determines whether aggravating factors are present such that first degree murder is elevated to
aggravated first degree murder. Thomas, 166 Wn.2d at 387.
Benson argues that if the legislature wanted aggravated first degree murder to qualify
only for a 15 percent ERT credit, it would have included that offense in the definition of “serious
violent offense” in RCW 9.94A.030(47). But at the time of Benson’s crime, the legislature
prohibited a person convicted of aggravated first degree murder from receiving any ERT.
Former RCW 10.95.030. A person convicted of aggravated first degree murder was ineligible to
receive ERT because the mandatory sentence was LWOP. Therefore, there was no need to
include aggravated first degree murder in the definition of “serious violent offense.” When
Monschke invalidated LWOP sentences for young adults, the legislature did not need to add
aggravated first degree murder to the definition of “serious violent offense” because that
definition already included first degree murder. As discussed above, aggravated first degree
murder is a type of first degree murder, not a standalone offense.
We also avoid interpreting statutes in a manner that produces absurd results. Schwartz,
194 Wn.2d at 443. The legislature has determined that aggravated first degree murder has the
highest seriousness level of any offense. RCW 9.94A.515. Benson’s interpretation would create
an absurd result that aggravated first degree murder would receive more generous ERT credit
than lesser felonies that the legislature identified as seriously violent, such as first degree assault
6 No. 61316-6-II
and first degree kidnapping. We decline to interpret RCW 9.94A.729(3)(b) in a manner that
plainly contradicts the legislature’s hierarchy of offenses.
Because Benson’s conviction is only eligible for a maximum of 15 percent ERT, Benson
is not under unlawful restraint. Therefore, we cannot grant him relief. RAP 16.4(a)-(b).
CONCLUSION
We deny Benson’s PRP.
MAXA, P.J.
We concur:
LEE, J.
CRUSER, J.