Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
April 26, 2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 53337-5-II
DARRELL KANTREAL JACKSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner,
PRICE, J. — Darrell Jackson brings this untimely personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing
that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that he is entitled to resentencing
because of the changes in the law surrounding the sentencing of youthful offenders. We determine
that because Jackson’s youthful offender sentencing argument is time-barred, his petition is mixed.
Accordingly, we dismiss the petition in its entirety.
FACTS
Jackson was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree murder and two counts of
felony murder for events that occurred in 2007 when he was 21 years old.1 Jackson appealed, and
in 2011, we affirmed his convictions. A mandate was issued in June 2013.
Jackson then brought a timely PRP which was granted in part, and we remanded for the
sentencing court to vacate his felony murder convictions to comply with the prohibition against
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this opinion are from our decision in Jackson’s previous appeal and PRP. State v. Jackson, No. 49801-4-II, (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018), D2 49801-4- II Unpublished Opinion.pdf (wa.gov); In re Pers. Restraint of Jackson, No. 46411-0-II (Wash. Ct. App. March 8, 2016), D2 46411-0-II Unpublished Opinion.pdf (wa.gov). No. 53337-5-II
double jeopardy.2 Jackson was resentenced in 2016 to life without parole. We then affirmed his
sentence.
Jackson filed this second, untimely, PRP in February 2019.
ANALYSIS
Jackson raises two arguments in his petition. First, he argues that there was insufficient
evidence of premeditation to support his convictions for aggravated first degree murder. Second,
he argues that, as a youthful offender, the sentencing court improperly failed to consider the
mitigating factors of youth. Because Jackson’s youthful offender argument is time-barred, we
dismiss his petition as mixed.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Unless an exception applies, petitioners have one year after their judgment and sentence
becomes final to file a PRP. RCW 10.73.090(1). Since Jackson’s judgment and sentence became
final when the appeal mandate was issued in 2013, this PRP is untimely unless he can show that
an exception applies.
A “mixed petition” occurs where a petition raises both untimely claims and claims that are
exempt from the time bar. In re Pers. Restraint of Thomas, 180 Wn.2d 951, 952-53, 330 P.3d 158
(2014). We do not address the claims in mixed petitions; rather, the petition in its entirety is
dismissed. Id. at 953.
2 Jackson also brought a second PRP in 2016, but he voluntarily withdrew his petition “[i]n the interests of judicial economy, and through the advice of recent counsel” in 2017. Motion to Withdraw PRP, In re the Pers. Restraint of Jackson, No. 49313-6-II, (Wash. Ct. App. June 14, 2017).
2 No. 53337-5-II
One exception to the time bar applies where a defendant pled not guilty and alleges that
the State presented insufficient evidence to support the conviction. RCW 10.73.100(4). Another
exception to the time bar occurs where a petitioner demonstrates that there has been a significant
change in the law that is retroactively applicable and material to their conviction or sentence. RCW
10.73.100(6); State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016).
B. JACKSON’S PETITION IS MIXED
Jackson makes two arguments in his petition: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions, and (2) that the sentencing court failed to adequately consider the
mitigating factors of youth. If either one of these arguments is time-barred, then Jackson’s petition
would be mixed and, therefore, dismissed. Since Jackson’s first argument regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence appears to meet an exception to the time bar, the issue here is whether
his second argument, regarding youthful offender sentencing, also meets an exception to the time
bar.
In support of his youthful offender argument, Jackson argues that the “significant change
in the law” exception to the time bar applies because recent decisions around juvenile sentencing
have resulted in a significant change in the law that is material to his sentence. We disagree.
Jackson was 21 years old at the time of his offenses, but the bulk of the recent cases he
cites involving sentencing youthful offenders relate to individuals under this age.3 Therefore,
3 Jackson cites to numerous cases that address the law around sentencing youthful offenders, but most pertain to offenders under the age of 18. State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018) (16 year old defendant); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (17 and 16 year old defendants); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (14 year old defendant); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005)
3 No. 53337-5-II
Jackson heavily relies on State v. O’Dell, where the court determined that “age may well mitigate
a defendant’s culpability, even if that defendant is over the age of 18.” 183 Wn.2d 680, 695, 358
P.3d 359 (2015). The O’Dell court’s holding that a defendant’s youthfulness may be a mitigating
factor that would justify a sentence below the standard range set by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1981 (SRA)4 was not limited to child defendants because O’Dell was over 18 at the time of his
offense. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 696.
However, subsequently, our Supreme Court clarified that O’Dell is not a significant change
in the law for purpose of avoiding the time bar under RCW 10.73.100(6). In re Pers. Restraint of
Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328, 337-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (court rejects the retroactivity of O’Dell
stating that “[w]hile O’Dell broadened our understanding of youth as it relates to culpability, it did
not alter the court’s interpretation of [provisions of the SRA that permit sentencing courts to depart
from guidelines]” and the sentencing court’s already-existing ability to consider youth as a
mitigating factor of sentencing). Although Jackson argues that the Light-Roth decision was
incorrectly decided, we are bound by stare decisis to follow its holding. See State v. Gore, 101
Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (stare decisis requires appellate courts to follow Supreme
Court decisions).
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Filed Washington State Court of Appeals Division Two
April 26, 2022
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 53337-5-II
DARRELL KANTREAL JACKSON, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner,
PRICE, J. — Darrell Jackson brings this untimely personal restraint petition (PRP) arguing
that there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions and that he is entitled to resentencing
because of the changes in the law surrounding the sentencing of youthful offenders. We determine
that because Jackson’s youthful offender sentencing argument is time-barred, his petition is mixed.
Accordingly, we dismiss the petition in its entirety.
FACTS
Jackson was convicted of two counts of aggravated first degree murder and two counts of
felony murder for events that occurred in 2007 when he was 21 years old.1 Jackson appealed, and
in 2011, we affirmed his convictions. A mandate was issued in June 2013.
Jackson then brought a timely PRP which was granted in part, and we remanded for the
sentencing court to vacate his felony murder convictions to comply with the prohibition against
1 Unless otherwise noted, the facts in this opinion are from our decision in Jackson’s previous appeal and PRP. State v. Jackson, No. 49801-4-II, (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2018), D2 49801-4- II Unpublished Opinion.pdf (wa.gov); In re Pers. Restraint of Jackson, No. 46411-0-II (Wash. Ct. App. March 8, 2016), D2 46411-0-II Unpublished Opinion.pdf (wa.gov). No. 53337-5-II
double jeopardy.2 Jackson was resentenced in 2016 to life without parole. We then affirmed his
sentence.
Jackson filed this second, untimely, PRP in February 2019.
ANALYSIS
Jackson raises two arguments in his petition. First, he argues that there was insufficient
evidence of premeditation to support his convictions for aggravated first degree murder. Second,
he argues that, as a youthful offender, the sentencing court improperly failed to consider the
mitigating factors of youth. Because Jackson’s youthful offender argument is time-barred, we
dismiss his petition as mixed.
A. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
Unless an exception applies, petitioners have one year after their judgment and sentence
becomes final to file a PRP. RCW 10.73.090(1). Since Jackson’s judgment and sentence became
final when the appeal mandate was issued in 2013, this PRP is untimely unless he can show that
an exception applies.
A “mixed petition” occurs where a petition raises both untimely claims and claims that are
exempt from the time bar. In re Pers. Restraint of Thomas, 180 Wn.2d 951, 952-53, 330 P.3d 158
(2014). We do not address the claims in mixed petitions; rather, the petition in its entirety is
dismissed. Id. at 953.
2 Jackson also brought a second PRP in 2016, but he voluntarily withdrew his petition “[i]n the interests of judicial economy, and through the advice of recent counsel” in 2017. Motion to Withdraw PRP, In re the Pers. Restraint of Jackson, No. 49313-6-II, (Wash. Ct. App. June 14, 2017).
2 No. 53337-5-II
One exception to the time bar applies where a defendant pled not guilty and alleges that
the State presented insufficient evidence to support the conviction. RCW 10.73.100(4). Another
exception to the time bar occurs where a petitioner demonstrates that there has been a significant
change in the law that is retroactively applicable and material to their conviction or sentence. RCW
10.73.100(6); State v. Miller, 185 Wn.2d 111, 114, 371 P.3d 528 (2016).
B. JACKSON’S PETITION IS MIXED
Jackson makes two arguments in his petition: (1) that there was insufficient evidence to
support his convictions, and (2) that the sentencing court failed to adequately consider the
mitigating factors of youth. If either one of these arguments is time-barred, then Jackson’s petition
would be mixed and, therefore, dismissed. Since Jackson’s first argument regarding the
sufficiency of the evidence appears to meet an exception to the time bar, the issue here is whether
his second argument, regarding youthful offender sentencing, also meets an exception to the time
bar.
In support of his youthful offender argument, Jackson argues that the “significant change
in the law” exception to the time bar applies because recent decisions around juvenile sentencing
have resulted in a significant change in the law that is material to his sentence. We disagree.
Jackson was 21 years old at the time of his offenses, but the bulk of the recent cases he
cites involving sentencing youthful offenders relate to individuals under this age.3 Therefore,
3 Jackson cites to numerous cases that address the law around sentencing youthful offenders, but most pertain to offenders under the age of 18. State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018) (16 year old defendant); State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017) (17 and 16 year old defendants); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407 (2012) (14 year old defendant); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005)
3 No. 53337-5-II
Jackson heavily relies on State v. O’Dell, where the court determined that “age may well mitigate
a defendant’s culpability, even if that defendant is over the age of 18.” 183 Wn.2d 680, 695, 358
P.3d 359 (2015). The O’Dell court’s holding that a defendant’s youthfulness may be a mitigating
factor that would justify a sentence below the standard range set by the Sentencing Reform Act of
1981 (SRA)4 was not limited to child defendants because O’Dell was over 18 at the time of his
offense. O’Dell, 183 Wn.2d at 696.
However, subsequently, our Supreme Court clarified that O’Dell is not a significant change
in the law for purpose of avoiding the time bar under RCW 10.73.100(6). In re Pers. Restraint of
Light-Roth, 191 Wn.2d 328, 337-38, 422 P.3d 444 (2018) (court rejects the retroactivity of O’Dell
stating that “[w]hile O’Dell broadened our understanding of youth as it relates to culpability, it did
not alter the court’s interpretation of [provisions of the SRA that permit sentencing courts to depart
from guidelines]” and the sentencing court’s already-existing ability to consider youth as a
mitigating factor of sentencing). Although Jackson argues that the Light-Roth decision was
incorrectly decided, we are bound by stare decisis to follow its holding. See State v. Gore, 101
Wn.2d 481, 487, 681 P.2d 227 (1984) (stare decisis requires appellate courts to follow Supreme
Court decisions). Therefore, O’Dell does not represent a significant change in the law that would
permit Jackson to avoid the time bar under RCW 10.73.100(6).
In his supplemental brief, Jackson relies on the recently decided case of In re Pers.
Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021), and argues that it also entitles him
(17 year old defendant); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010) (16 year old defendant). 4 Ch. 9.94A RCW.
4 No. 53337-5-II
to be resentenced. However, even if Monschke represents a significant change in the law for the
purposes of RCW 10.73.100(6), the case is not material to Jackson’s sentencing.
In Monschke, our Supreme Court extended constitutional protections against life without
parole sentences to defendants older than 18 years old. 197 Wn.2d at 325-26.5 But Monschke
explicitly limited its holding to defendants between the ages of 18 and 20. 197 Wn.2d at 329. And
subsequent court decisions have declined to extend the protections of Monschke to individuals
older than 20 years old. See, e.g., State v. Wright, 19 Wn. App. 2d 37, 47, 493 P.3d 1220 (2021);
State v. Langley, No. 82142-3-I, slip op. at *2 (Wash. Ct. App. Nov. 8, 2021),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/821423.pdf. Because Jackson was 21 years old when he
committed these offenses, Monschke does not apply to him and, accordingly, is not material to his
sentence. Therefore, Jackson’s reliance on Monschke to avoid the time bar fails.
CONCLUSION
Because Jackson was 21 when he committed his offenses, he fails to cite to any authority
supporting his position that there has been a significant change to the law material to his case
sufficient to overcome the time bar with regard to this youthful offender sentencing argument.
Without an exception to the time bar for one of his two arguments, Jackson’s petition is mixed
and, accordingly, we dismiss it in its entirety.
5 Unlike O’Dell, Light-Roth, and Monschke, Jackson offers no authority that the cases he cites involving offenders under the age of 18 have relevance to this case. Accordingly, we do not further address them.
5 No. 53337-5-II
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J. We concur:
WORSWICK, J.
LEE, J.