Personal Restraint Petition Of Charles Weber, Jr.

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: March 9, 2026
• Docket: 87008-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

IN THE MATTER OF THE PERSONAL No. 87008-4-I RESTRAINT OF: DIVISION ONE CHARLES WEBER, JR., UNPUBLISHED OPINION

Petitioner.

FELDMAN, J. — Charles Weber, Jr., an inmate in the custody of the

Washington State Department of Corrections (DOC), filed a personal restraint

petition (PRP) challenging an infraction and related sanctions imposed following a

prison disciplinary hearing and DOC’s decision to terminate him from his position

as a groundskeeper at Monroe Correctional Complex (MCC). Because DOC has

expunged the challenged infraction, restored the resulting loss of good conduct

time, and granted Weber’s request to transfer to a different facility, this court can

no longer provide effective relief as to Weber’s claims. Accordingly, we dismiss

his PRP as moot.

I

Weber’s PRP describes three infractions: (1) a general infraction in

violation of WAC 137-28-220(103), “[f]ailing to follow any oral/written orders, rules, No. 87008-4-I

or policies not otherwise included in these rules”; (2) a general infraction for

violation of WAC 137-28-220(055), “[d]amaging, altering, or destroying any item

that is not the incarcerated individual’s personal property, the value of which is less

than ten dollars”; and (3) a serious infraction for violation of WAC 137-25-030(810),

“[f]ailing to seek/maintain employment or training or maintain oneself financially, or

being terminated from a work, training, education, or other programming

assignment for negative or substandard performance.” Each of these infractions

has been resolved favorably to Weber. Following a disciplinary hearing, Weber

was found not guilty of the WAC 103 infraction. While Weber was initially found

guilty of the WAC 055 infraction, he successfully appealed the finding. And while

Weber was initially found guilty of the WAC 810 infraction, DOC has since

expunged this infraction from Weber’s prison record and restored the good conduct

time he lost as a result of the infraction.

In Weber’s supplemental briefing, he also addresses DOC’s decision to

terminate him from his position as a groundskeeper at MCC. Weber was first

terminated from this position following a Facility Risk Management Team (FRMT)

review on June 28, 2024. DOC subsequently determined it had failed to provide

Weber with adequate notice of this review. Accordingly, it conducted a new FRMT

review—after providing adequate notice—on October 3, 2024. Following this

review, the termination decision was upheld. Although Weber seeks reinstatement

of this position at MCC, he has since requested a transfer from MCC to Washington

Corrections Center (WCC). DOC granted this request, and Weber has been

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incarcerated at WCC since August 2025 and has been accepted into other

programming there following his most recent FRMT review.

II

In a PRP, the petitioner must generally show they are restrained under RAP

16.4(b) and the restraint is unlawful under RAP 16.4(c). In re Pers. Restraint of

Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 212-13, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). The petitioner bears the

burden of proving that their restraint is unlawful by a preponderance of the

evidence. In re Pers. Restraint of Cook, 114 Wn.2d 802, 814, 792 P.2d 506 (1990).

When a petitioner seeks relief from discipline imposed as a result of a prison

disciplinary hearing, as Weber does here, a court “will reverse a prison discipline

decision only upon a showing that it was so arbitrary and capricious as to deny the

petitioner a fundamentally fair proceeding so as to work to the offender’s

prejudice.” Grantham, 168 Wn.2d at 215. “This is a heightened standard based

on the particular type of executive action we are asked to review.” Id.

Before we can reach the merits of Weber’s PRP, we must determine

whether, as DOC argues, we should dismiss Weber’s PRP as moot. Although

Weber was initially found guilty of the WAC 810 infraction, DOC has since

expunged the infraction and restored the resulting loss of good conduct time.

While the Court of Appeals has exclusive jurisdiction of Weber’s PRP, court rules

do not prevent DOC from providing an alternative remedy. In re Pers. Restraint of

Higgins, 152 Wn.2d 155, 162-63, 95 P.3d 330 (2004). Expungement effectively

and adequately addresses Weber’s challenge to this infraction. Id. This court can

no longer provide effective relief and any issue with respect to this infraction is now

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moot. In re Det. of Cross, 99 Wn.2d 373, 376-77, 662 P.2d 828 (1983).

Accordingly, we dismiss Weber’s PRP as to this infraction.

Nor can this court grant effective relief regarding Weber’s claim that DOC

arbitrarily and capriciously terminated him from his position as a groundskeeper at

MCC. As noted, Weber seeks reinstatement of that position at MCC. Even if this

court could grant such relief pursuant to a PRP (as opposed to granting a new

review hearing because the previous FRMT review hearing was so arbitrary and

capricious as to deny Weber a fundamentally fair proceeding), Weber has since

requested transfer to WCC and DOC has granted that request. Given this transfer,

which DOC granted at Weber’s request, the court cannot provide effective relief

with regard to reinstatement of Weber’s position as a groundskeeper at MCC.

Because this court can no longer provide such relief, we likewise dismiss as moot

Weber’s PRP as to this specific claim for relief.

Lastly, Weber has also requested various other forms of relief such as back

pay for lost wages, restoration of custody points, and reinstatement of his one-

person cell. It is unclear whether Weber still seeks this relief. But even if he does,

these remedies are beyond the scope of relief of a PRP. In In re Personal Restraint

of Sappenfield, 138 Wn.2d 588, 595, 980 P.2d 1271 (1999), for example, the court

considered a PRP challenging DOC’s collection of restitution payments from an

offender after its authority to do so had expired. The court declined to order DOC

to return the payments it had improperly collected because, under the PRP rules,

appellate courts “can order only the removal of the illegal restraint.” Id. at 591,

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595. Here too, this court cannot grant relief beyond the removal of the unlawful

restraint. Weber’s various claims for additional relief thus fail.

PRP dismissed.

WE CONCUR:

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