Personal Restraint Petition Of Adrian Martinez Loyola

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 26, 2026
• Docket: 87032-7
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

In the Matter of the Personal Restraint No. 87032-7-I Petition of DIVISION ONE

ADRIAN MARTINEZ LOYOLA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION Petitioner.

SMITH, J. — Adrian Martinez Loyola1 filed this personal restraint petition

(PRP) challenging his serious prison disciplinary infraction for “causing an

inaccurate count” under WAC 137-25-030(1)(653). Martinez Loyola contends

that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty finding and he did not

receive adequate notice. Because Martinez Loyola fails to demonstrate that he

was deprived of a fundamentally fair proceeding, we deny the PRP.

FACTS

Martinez Loyola has been an inmate at Coyote Ridge Corrections Center

(CRCC) since December 21, 2023. CRCC conducts a formal facility count four

1 Petitioner's counsel’s filed briefs identifying the petitioner as “Martinez- Loyola.” The hyphen is often used to prevent improper alphabetization using the second part of the surname. In re Pers. Restraint of Garcia-Mendoza, 196 Wn.2d 836, 841 n.1, 479 P.3d 674 (2021). Because Martinez Loyola does not use a hyphen in his pro se petition, we follow his spelling of his own name in this opinion. Id. (recognizing defendant's hyphenated name in the court's docket is not how defendant spells his own name and electing to follow defendant's spelling of his own name). No. 87032-7-I/2

times a day: 12:00 a.m. (midnight), 6:20 a.m., 4:00 p.m., and 9:00 p.m. During a

formal count, prison staff count each inmate after observing obvious signs of life

and reconcile their counts with each other. If the total facility count matches the

master count, the count has “cleared.” If the count does not clear, prison staff

conduct a recount following the same procedures. If the recount does not clear,

prison staff conduct a formal picture card count. This requires prison staff to

positively identify each inmate by visually matching each inmate’s identification

card to the inmate and to the unit roster.

On June 25, 2024, the 4:00 p.m. formal standing count was announced on

the CRCC loudspeaker at 4:01 p.m. The 4:00 p.m. formal count at CRCC is a

standing count. During a standing count, inmates must sit upright on their

assigned bunks unless they have a documented medical condition that prevents

them from doing so. Martinez Loyola does not have a documented condition.

While conducting the 4:00 p.m. formal standing count, corrections officers

counted only one incarcerated individual in Martinez Loyola’s cell. After master

control reported that Martinez Loyola’s unit was down one individual, the

corrections officers informally recounted and arrived at the same number. At

around 4:55 p.m., a formal recount was initiated across CRCC. After conducting

the recount in the presence of a sergeant, again, only one individual was counted

in Martinez Loyola’s cell.

At 6:01 p.m., a formal picture count commenced. Upon reaching Martinez

Loyola’s cell, the officers saw Martinez Loyola reach down from the upper bunk

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while lying on his back to pass his identification card to his cell mate. The

officers did not see Martinez Loyola before this because their view of the top

bunk was obscured by a duffel bag placed at the end of the bunk facing the cell

door.

The Department of Corrections (DOC) charged Martinez Loyola with

violating WAC 137-25-030(1)(653) (WAC 653), which prohibits “[c]ausing an

inaccurate count or interfering with count by means of unauthorized absence,

hiding, concealing oneself, or other form of deception or distraction[.]” Martinez

Loyola was timely notified of the charges and the scheduled hearing date.

At the July 2, 2024 hearing, Martinez Loyola pleaded not guilty and

asserted that that he “never did it on purpose.” Martinez Loyola explained that

he moved his duffel bag to accommodate his cellmate, then took ibuprofen for a

toothache and fell asleep. Martinez Loyola said he did not hear the loudspeaker

announcement for the 4:00 p.m. count and that his cellmate, who is blind and

does not understand English, did not wake him up. Martinez Loyola also said it

is difficult for him to understand the loudspeaker announcements. Martinez

Loyola did not request any witness statements in his defense.

Based on Martinez Loyola’s statement and the officers’ statements, the

hearing officer found Martinez Loyola guilty of violating WAC 653 because his

failure to follow the rules of count caused two inaccurate counts. The hearing

officer accepted Martinez Loyola’s claim that he did not intentionally evade count,

but noted that WAC 653 prohibits causing an inaccurate count regardless of

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deceptive intent. The hearing officer also pointed out that Martinez Loyola has

been through “probably a couple hundred counts” since arriving at CRCC and is

“not new to this.” The hearing officer warned Martinez Loyola about the

importance of complying with count procedures and issued the lowest possible

sanction for any infraction of any level: a reprimand and warning.

Martinez Loyola administratively appealed his infraction to the

superintendent, asserting that he did not hide himself on purpose and did not

interfere or obstruct the officers. Martinez Loyola explained that after the

hearing, his cellmate told him that he had tried to signal to a corrections officer

whether he should wake Martinez Loyola during count and they signaled, “no.”

Martinez Loyola argued that giving him a serious infraction based on a

misunderstanding between his cellmate and the officer was unfair. He also

stated that he did not bring a witness to the hearing because he was not sure it

was necessary and did not see how it could help.

After reviewing the disciplinary process and the evidence, the

superintendent/designee concurred with the hearing officer’s findings,

determined that Martinez Loyola received a fair and impartial hearing, and

affirmed the infraction decision and sanctions.

Martinez Loyola then initiated this PRP.

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ANALYSIS

Standard of Review

To prevail on this PRP under RAP 16.4, Martinez Loyola must show that

he is under restraint and that the restraint is unlawful.2 In re Pers. Restraint of

Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 212-13, 227 P.3d 285 (2010). Under RAP 16.4, a

prisoner is under “restraint” if the petitioner is confined, and the “restraint” is

unlawful only if the conditions or manner of the “restraint” violated the

Constitution or the laws of Washington, or other grounds exist to challenge the

legality of the restraint. RAP 16.4(b); RAP 16.4(c)(6)-(7). A serious infraction

that results in a loss of earned early release credit implicates a liberty interest

subject to minimum due process protections. In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist,

138 Wn.2d 388, 397-98, 978 P.2d 1083 (1999). Although Martinez Loyola

received only a reprimand for his serious infraction, he is under “restraint”

because he is confined in a state correctional facility and has a serious infraction

on his record. See Kozol v. Dep’t of Corr., 185 Wn.2d 405, 410-11, 379 P.3d 72

(2016) (even when discipline does not result in the loss of good time credit,

DOC’s regulatory procedures and safeguards apply given that a serious

infraction “casts a shadow over an inmate’s institutional history” that “could be

2 Unlike a PRP challenging a judgment and sentence, petitioners seeking relief from prison discipline where no prior judicial review has been afforded are not required to show actual and substantial prejudice or a miscarriage of justice. In re Pers. Restraint of Grantham, 168 Wn.2d 204, 214, 227 P.3d 285 (2010).

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considered when determining sanction for later infraction.”). The question is

whether his restraint is unlawful.

“Offenders facing discipline are not entitled to the full panoply of

constitutional procedures given criminal defendants at trial.” Grantham, 168

Wn.2d at 215. When reviewing a prison disciplinary proceeding, we determine

whether the action taken was “so arbitrary and capricious as to deny the

petitioner a fundamentally fair proceeding.” In re Pers. Restraint of Reismiller,

101 Wn.2d 291, 294, 678 P.2d 323 (1984). A disciplinary action is not arbitrary

or capricious if it meets the minimum due process protections applicable in prison

disciplinary proceedings and is supported by “some evidence.” Grantham, 168

Wn.2d at 215-16.

Minimum due process protections are satisfied if the inmate (1) receives

notice of the alleged violation, (2) has an opportunity to present documentary

evidence and call witnesses (when not unduly hazardous to institutional safety

and correctional goals), and (3) receives a written statement of the evidence

relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action. Gronquist, 138 Wn.2d at

396-97. The “some evidence” standard is satisfied as long as there is “any

evidence” in the record to support the finding of guilt. Superintendent, Mass.

Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 455-56, 105 S. Ct. 2768, 86 L. Ed. 2d 356

(1985). “Where an inmate claims lack of fair notice and is nevertheless found

guilty of committing a serious infraction, ‘some evidence’ in the record of the

hearing must support a finding that the inmate did receive fair notice of the

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prohibited conduct, despite [their] protests to the contrary.” In re Pers. Restraint

of Krier, 108 Wn. App. 31, 33, 29 P.3d 720 (2001).

Sufficiency of the Evidence

Martinez Loyola claims that he was denied minimum due process

protections because the evidence was insufficient to support the hearing officer’s

finding that he was guilty of violating WAC 653. Martinez Loyola does not

dispute that he was familiar with CRCC’s count procedures or that he caused two

inaccurate counts by failing to comply. Instead, Martinez Loyola asserts that the

evidence was insufficient to sustain the guilty finding because WAC 653

punishes only deceptive or distracting conduct and the parties agree he did not

engage in such conduct. DOC asserts that the plain language of WAC 653 does

not require deception or distraction and that “causing an inaccurate count” is

sufficient to violate the rule. We agree with DOC.

The issue presented is a matter of statutory interpretation, which we

review de novo. State v. Pratt, 196 Wn.2d 849, 852, 479 P.3d 680 (2021). “The

rules of statutory interpretation equally apply to interpretation of agency rules and

regulations.” Alstom Power, Inc. v. Dep't of Revenue, 26 Wn. App. 2d 36, 45,

526 P.3d 855 (2023) (citing Dep't of Licensing v. Cannon, 147 Wn.2d 41, 56, 50

P.3d 627 (2002)). “In interpreting a statute, this court looks first to its plain

language.” State v. Armendariz, 160 Wn.2d 106, 110, 156 P.3d 201 (2007).

“[W]e employ traditional rules of grammar in discerning the plain language of the

statute.” State v. Bunker, 169 Wn.2d 571, 578, 238 P.3d 487 (2010). If the

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statute's meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that plain meaning as an

expression of legislative intent. State v. Hirschfelder, 170 Wn.2d 536, 543, 242

P.3d 876 (2010). But “[i]f statutory language is susceptible to more than one

reasonable interpretation, it is ambiguous, and we may resort to extrinsic aids

such as legislative history to resolve the ambiguity.” State v. Buck, 2 Wn.3d 806,

815, 544 P.3d 506 (2024). “ ‘A statute is ambiguous only if it can be reasonably

interpreted in more than one way, not merely because other possible

interpretations exist.’ ” State v. Cathers, 13 Wn. App. 2d 29, 32, 461 P.3d 375,

377 (2020) (quoting Pac. Nw. Shooting Park Ass'n v. City of Sequim, 158 Wn.2d

342, 354, 144 P.3d 276 (2006)).

We conclude that WAC 653 unambiguously authorizes a hearing officer to

impose a finding of guilt where an inmate either caused an inaccurate count or

interfered with count through deception. WAC 653 prohibits “[c]ausing an

inaccurate count or interfering with count by means of unauthorized absence,

hiding, concealing oneself, or other form of deception or distraction[.]” (emphasis

added). The word “or” is most commonly used in the disjunctive and employed

to indicate an alternative. Garcia v. Dep't of Soc. & Health Servs., 10 Wn. App.

2d 885, 911, 451 P.3d 1107 (2019); State v. Riofta, 134 Wn. App. 669, 682, 142

P.3d 193 (2006) (“[w]e presume that the word ‘or’ does not mean ‘and’ and that a

statute's use of the word ‘or’ is disjunctive to separate phrases unless there is a

clear legislative intent to the contrary.” (quoting HJS Dev., Inc. v. Pierce County,

148 Wn.2d 451, 473 n.95, 61 P.3d 1141 (2003)). Under Martinez Loyola’s

8 No. 87032-7-I/9

interpretation, every violation for causing an inaccurate count would also be a

violation for interfering with count, thereby rendering the first option meaningless.

The only reasonable interpretation of WAC 653 is that causing an inaccurate

count is itself sufficient to violate the rule, regardless of deceptive intent.3

Martinez Loyola contends that WAC 653 should not be interpreted to

impose strict liability for “[c]ausing an inaccurate count.” “ ‘Strict liability crimes’

are crimes that ‘criminalize conduct regardless of whether the actor intended

wrongdoing.’ ” State v. Christian, 18 Wn. App. 2d 185, 210, 489 P.3d 657 (2021)

(quoting State v. Blake, 197 Wn.2d 170, 179, 481 P.3d 521 (2021)). “[D]eciding

whether a statute sets forth a strict liability crime is a statutory construction

question aimed at ascertaining legislative intent.” State v. Bash, 130 Wn.2d 594,

604-05, 925 P.2d 978 (1996).

DOC asserts that Martinez Loyola’s arguments are misdirected because

he was not found strictly liable for the offense. Resp. Supp. Br. at 1. But in any

event, Martinez Loyola does not dispute that DOC had the authority to deter non-

compliance with count procedures by imposing strict liability for causing an

inaccurate count. See State v. Anderson, 141 Wn.2d 357, 361, 5 P.3d 1247

(2000) (“The Legislature may create strict liability crimes.”). Nor does he analyze

3 The parties dispute whether the last antecedent rule applies to WAC 653. “The last antecedent rule states that ‘unless a contrary intention appears in the statute, qualifying words and phrases refer to the last antecedent[.]’ ” State v. Bunker, 144 Wn. App. 407, 418, 183 P.3d 1086 (2008) (quoting City of Spokane v. Spokane County, 158 Wn.2d 661, 673, 146 P.3d 893 (2006)). We need not rely on the last antecedent rule to determine that WAC 653 unambiguously bars the conduct at issue here, so we do not address these arguments further. For the same reason, we need not address arguments regarding legislative history.

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or even mention the factors our Supreme Court adopted in Bash to determine

whether the legislature intended to create a strict liability crime. See Bash, 130

Wn.2d at 605-06.

Martinez Loyola also asserts that DOC’s interpretation is morally

counterintuitive because it punishes “[c]ausing an inaccurate count” in all

circumstances without regard to culpable mental state while also punishing

“interfering with count” only when it is deliberately deceptive. But as DOC points

out, “causing an inaccurate count” is appropriately classified as a serious

violation because it significantly impacts facility operations whether intentional or

not. In contrast, an inmate who merely “[i]nterfer[es] or fail[s] to comply with

count procedures”—without actually “causing an inaccurate count” or engaging in

“deception or distraction”—may be found guilty of WAC 137-28-220(1)(214), a

general violation. Viewing these disciplinary count regulations as whole further

demonstrates that WAC 653 unambiguously punishes the act of causing an

inaccurate count, regardless of an individual’s motivation for doing so.

Notice

Martinez Loyola does not dispute that he received notice of the infraction

and the evidence against him. Rather, he contends that WAC 653 is

unconstitutionally vague as applied to him because it fails to give notice that it is

a strict liability offense.

“The due process vagueness doctrine seeks to ensure that the public has

adequate notice of what conduct is proscribed and to ensure that the public is

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protected from arbitrary ad hoc enforcement.” State v. Saunders, 132 Wn. App.

592, 599, 132 P.3d 743 (2006). A statute or regulation is “void for vagueness if it

is framed in terms so vague that persons of common intelligence must

necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” O'Day v. King

County, 109 Wn.2d 796, 810, 749 P.2d 142 (1988). Statutes are presumed

constitutional, and the standard for finding a statute unconstitutionally vague is

high. State v. Watson, 160 Wn.2d 1, 11, 154 P.3d 909 (2007).

Martinez Loyola asserts that WAC 653 is unconstitutionally vague as

applied because it did not put him on notice that it prohibited him from passively

falling asleep in his own bunk. But as discussed above, WAC 653

unambiguously prohibits "[c]ausing an inaccurate count[.]” It is undisputed that

Martinez Loyola understood the rules of formal standing count. The hearing

officer expressly based their decision on the fact that Martinez Loyola knew the

rules because he had been through count “a couple hundred” times at the time

he received the infraction. Contrary to Martinez Loyola’s claim, he was not

infracted for “completely innocent conduct.” He was punished because his failure

to follow the rules caused two inaccurate counts.

Martinez Loyola also contends that WAC 653 is vague as applied because

it did not put him on notice that inadvertence was not a defense to the charge.

He points out that the serious infraction report expressly accused him of

deceptive conduct. He claims that had he known his innocent explanation would

not suffice, his cellmate would have testified that the inaccurate count was

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caused by miscommunication with the counting officer rather than by Martinez

Loyola’s conduct.4 Again, WAC unambiguously prohibits the conduct that led to

the infraction. And Martinez Loyola successfully convinced the hearing officer of

his lack of deceptive intent and obtained the lowest possible sanction.

We conclude that Martinez Loyola received a fundamentally fair

proceeding, and we deny the PRP.

WE CONCUR:

4 Citing Krier, DOC asserts that this court may not consider declarations Martinez Loyola submitted as substantive evidence in support of his argument. In Krier, this court rejected DOC’s attempt to supplement the record by attaching a declaration in response to the petitioner’s PRP. 108 Wn. App. at 44-45. DOC cites no authority for the proposition that the same principle applies to petitioners. And even if we were to consider Martinez Loyola’s declarations, our analysis would not change.