Person v. Clark County Government Center

CourtDistrict Court, D. Nevada
DecidedMay 22, 2025
Docket2:25-cv-00814
StatusUnknown

This text of Person v. Clark County Government Center (Person v. Clark County Government Center) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Nevada primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Person v. Clark County Government Center, (D. Nev. 2025).

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 LAURNETTE PERSON, Case No. 2:25-cv-00814-JCM-EJY

5 Plaintiff, ORDER 6 v.

7 CLARK COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER, 8 Defendant. 9 10 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”) and 11 Complaint. ECF Nos. 1, 1-1. Plaintiff’s IFP is complete and granted below. Plaintiff’s Complaint 12 fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and is therefore dismissed without prejudice, 13 but with leave to amend. 14 I. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT 15 Upon granting a request to proceed in forma pauperis, the Court must screen the complaint 16 under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). In screening the complaint, a court must identify cognizable claims 17 and dismiss claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted 18 or seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). 19 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for failure to state 20 a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 21 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient factual matter, 22 accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 23 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The court liberally construes pro se complaints and may only dismiss them 24 “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which 25 would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 26 556 U.S. at 678). 27 In considering whether the complaint is sufficient to state a claim, all allegations of material 1 v. Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 2 standard under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, 3 a plaintiff must provide more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 4 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. 5 Id. Unless it is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se 6 plaintiff should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s 7 deficiencies. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 8 II. Plaintiff’s Complaint 9 Plaintiff’s Complaint, which appears to be based on some form of harassment and or 10 termination, does not identify a cause of action. Rather, Plaintiff states, based on undisclosed facts, 11 that she is entitled to “$300,000 plus back pay from Aug. 8, 2024” arising from the unalleged 12 wrongful conduct. ECF No. 1-1. Plaintiff references a “Right to sue Letter from EEOC,” but did 13 not attach the Letter or her Charge of Discrimination to her Complaint. Thus, the Court does not 14 have any basis on which to conclude Plaintiff exhausted her administrative remedies, timely brings 15 her claim, or even has a claim recognized under law. 16 Exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to bringing a claim for 17 discrimination, harassment or retaliation based on a person’s protected characteristic. See, by way 18 of example, 42 U.S.C. § 12117(a); Ramirez v. Kingman Hosp. Inc., 374 F. Supp. 3d 832, 854 (D. 19 Ariz. 2019) (citation omitted); Rosseter v. Industrial Light & Magic, Case No. C 08-04545 WHA, 20 2009 WL 764496, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 20, 2009). This rule applies equally to claims filed under 21 Nevada law. Pope v. Motel 6, 114 P.3d 277, 280 (Nev. 2005) (internal citation omitted) (NRS 22 613.420 requires an employee alleging employment discrimination to exhaust his administrative 23 remedies by filing a complaint with NERC before filing a district court action”); Palmer v. State, 24 787 P.2d 803, 804 (Nev. 1990) (citing Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel, 673 P.2d 490 (Nev. 1983)) (the 25 Nevada Supreme Court holds that “an employee claiming discrimination under NRS 613.420 is 26 obligated to file a claim with the NERC and to have that agency adjudicate the claim before it can 27 properly be brought in district court”). Plaintiff has not demonstrated exhaustion of her 1 Plaintiff also fails to state a prima facie case of discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. 2 By way of example only, to state a prima facie claim of race discrimination under Title VII of the 3 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), a plaintiff must allege she: (1) belongs to a class of persons 4 protected by Title VII; (2) performed her job satisfactorily; (3) suffered an adverse employment 5 action; and (4) was treated differently than similarly situated employees who does not belong to the 6 same protected class as Plaintiff. Cornwell v. Electra Cent. Credit Union, 439 F.3d 1018, 1028 (9th 7 Cir. 2006). To state a claim of race harassment, a plaintiff must allege: (1) conduct of a racial nature; 8 (2) that is so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her working environment; 9 and (3) that the conduct was unwelcome. 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e–2(a)(1). To state a prima facie 10 sexual hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show that she experienced: (1) conduct of a 11 sexual nature; (2) that is so severe or pervasive as to alter the terms and conditions of her working 12 environment; and (3) that the conduct was unwelcome. Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 13 (1993); Brooks v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 924 (9th Cir. 2000); Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 14 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991). To state a prima facie discriminatory termination claim under the 15 Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), a plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating: (1) she is 16 a disabled person within the meaning of the ADA; (2) she is a qualified individual; and (3) the 17 defendant terminated her because of a disability. Kennedy v. Applause, 90 F.3d 1477, 1481 (9th Cir. 18 1996). A plaintiff must also “allege how [s]he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” Tyson 19 v. ACRT Services Incorporated, Case No. 23-cv-01889-HSG, 2024 WL 69073, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Jan.

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Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.
510 U.S. 17 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
William Rose, Jr. Orie Reed v. Wells Fargo & Company
902 F.2d 1417 (Ninth Circuit, 1990)
Michael A. Caputo v. Boston Edison Company
924 F.2d 11 (First Circuit, 1991)
Raymond Watison v. Mary Carter
668 F.3d 1108 (Ninth Circuit, 2012)
Kathlyn M. Kennedy v. Applause, Inc.
90 F.3d 1477 (Ninth Circuit, 1996)
Copeland v. Desert Inn Hotel
673 P.2d 490 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1983)
Palmer v. State
787 P.2d 803 (Nevada Supreme Court, 1990)
Pope v. MOTEL 6
114 P.3d 277 (Nevada Supreme Court, 2005)
Scott Nordstrom v. Charles Ryan
762 F.3d 903 (Ninth Circuit, 2014)
Cato v. United States
70 F.3d 1103 (Ninth Circuit, 1995)
Ramirez v. Kingman Hosp. Inc.
374 F. Supp. 3d 832 (D. Arizona, 2019)

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Person v. Clark County Government Center, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/person-v-clark-county-government-center-nvd-2025.