Perry v. Thomas

691 F. Supp. 1323, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17200, 1988 WL 79312
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Alabama
DecidedJuly 5, 1988
DocketNo. CV88-H-270-S
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 691 F. Supp. 1323 (Perry v. Thomas) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Alabama primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perry v. Thomas, 691 F. Supp. 1323, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17200, 1988 WL 79312 (N.D. Ala. 1988).

Opinion

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

HANCOCK, District Judge.

Under a date of November 10, 1987, Bertram N. Perry, who holds the position of Compliance Manager (Supervisory, Equal Opportunity Specialist — Enforcement Manager — GM-360-14) in the Birmingham District Office of EEOC, was given written notice from defendant James H. Troy, who is Director of Office of Programs Operations, of Perry’s proposed discharge for cause. The notice contained eight stated “Reasons” for the discharge, some of which reasons embracing multiple specifications. The notice was amended February 5, 1988, to add one specification to an existing reason and to add two new rea-' sons. The charges, as amended, if only partially true, more than justify the following opinion of Troy expressed in the November 10, 1987 letter:

I have considered that you have no prior discipline of record. However, that fact does not serve to mitigate the seriousness of your misconduct. Your past work record has been considered above average. Your technical knowledge of compliance and investigatory work, under the laws entrusted to the Commission, is considered to be at a level commensurate with your length of service, grade and position. However, your demonstrated inability to effectively lead and manage human resources in the furtherance of this agency’s mission outweighs your above average technical performance record and length of service. The Commission cannot tolerate your abusive attitude and open disdain for its employees and members of the public or cavalier approach to enforcement of the laws the Commission enforces.
In considering the adequacy and effectiveness of an alternate sanction, it is my judgment that there is no viable alternative to your removal from the service. It is my firm belief that you do not possess the qualities to be a constructive manager and leader of the workforce. In fact, your racially and sexually derogatory remarks indicate that you would not make a desirable employee at any level of the workforce. For you to remain in Birmingham where you would continue to be a major antagonist and would prevent what could be a harmonious work environment would only serve to aggravate an already unbearable situation and would not promote the efficiency of the Service.

Plaintiff commenced this action on February 19, 1988, seeking to restrain and enjoin the implementation of the discharge described in the notices. In addition Perry seeks punitive damages from defendant Troy for his alleged wrongful conduct. [1325]*1325The complaint filed in this court seeks to pursue (1) a Title VII race and/or retaliation claim, (2) related claims under 42 U.S. C. §§ 1981, 1985 and 1986, and (3) a “Bivens” type claim predicated upon an alleged infringement of plaintiffs First Amendment right to free speech.

Immediately after receipt of an April 21, 1988 Notice of Final Decision by defendant Charles H. Shanor, General Counsel for EEOC, advising plaintiff of Shanor’s decision (based upon the notices, affidavits submitted in support of the charges, oral and written responses by Perry, and affidavits and other documents submitted by Perry) to remove Perry from his “position and from the Federal service effective April 29, 1988,” plaintiff filed his April 25, 1988 motion for a temporary restraining order and for a preliminary injunction. The request for temporary restraining order was heard April 26, 1988 and was denied as reflected in the April 27, 1988 Memorandum of Decision. In that decision the court reflected its views that (a) plaintiffs complaint failed to state claims upon which relief can be granted under §§ 1981, 1985 or 1986 and (b) this court does not have subject matter jurisdiction of the Title VII claims since Perry has failed to exhaust the administrative remedies afforded to him. The court does not perceive that the June 14, 1988 opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit expresses a different opinion or that plaintiff any longer is seriously seeking relief in this court under § 1981, § 1985, § 1986 or Title VII. Whether or not this perception is correct is relatively immaterial to the issue now before the court, as discussed hereafter.

Also in its April 27, 1988 Memorandum of Decision this court concluded that the complaint failed to state a claim for equitable or legal relief predicated upon Perry’s assertion that the adverse employment action was in violation of his First Amendment right to free speech. Consequently, after obtaining from defendants a “voluntary” postponement until June 15, 1988 of the discharge so that Perry could promptly seek appellate review, this court denied the requested interlocutory injunctive relief. The court of appeals on June 14, 1988 vacated the “order on denial of injunctive relief on the First Amendment claim, with instructions to the District Court, in its consideration of the merits, to determine and to state on remand whether injunctive relief is required, based on traditional considerations.” Perry v. Thomas, 849 F.2d 484 (11th Cir.1988). On June 15, 1988, during a second temporary restraining order hearing, defendants again “volunteered” to postpone implementation of the discharge until after a proposed preliminary injunction hearing on June 27, 1988 (and for a reasonable time thereafter for this court to render its decision). The request for a temporary restraining order was therefore denied; the motion for a preliminary injunction was heard on June 27-29, 1988; and the court now enters its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

In late March of 1987 the Washington office of EEOC received two anonymous letters purporting to be from employees in the Birmingham District Office complaining of abusive conduct by Perry. These letters were brought to the attention of defendant Troy who on April 1, 1987, requested the Washington EEOC Office of Audit immediately to initiate an investigation. The investigation produced a flood of verified evidence (a) that Bertram Perry over an extended period of time had treated numerous employees in the Birmingham District Office, including subordinates, in a grossly abusive and offensive manner and (b) that Bertram Perry time and time again had willfully disregarded basic sensitivities of human beings and the unique mission entrusted to EEOC. The twelve volume adverse action transcript upon which defendant Shanor concluded that Perry should be removed from his position and from the Federal service more than justifies his conclusion. Evidence presented to this court during the three-day hearing does nothing but underscore the correctness of that decision and causes one to wonder how conduct such as Perry’s could be tolerated so long.

As indicated earlier, defendant Troy concluded that Perry did not “possess the qualities to be a constructive manager and [1326]*1326leader of the workforce” and that Perry’s “racially and sexually derogatory remarks indicate” that he “would not make a desirable employee at any level of the workforce.” This court fully agrees. The evidence supporting this conclusion is overwhelming.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Falkowski v. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
691 F. Supp. 1333 (District of Columbia, 1988)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
691 F. Supp. 1323, 1988 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 17200, 1988 WL 79312, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perry-v-thomas-alnd-1988.