Perry v. Sheldon

75 A. 690, 30 R.I. 426, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 34
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedMarch 18, 1910
StatusPublished

This text of 75 A. 690 (Perry v. Sheldon) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perry v. Sheldon, 75 A. 690, 30 R.I. 426, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 34 (R.I. 1910).

Opinion

Johnson, J.

This is an action of trespass on the case for negligence, brought by Elizabeth Perry, of the town of Warwick, in the county of Kent, against George E. Sheldon, town treasurer of said town of Warwick, for personal injuries claimed to have been suffered by the plaintiff by reason of a defect or want of repair in a certain public highway known as Main *428 street, in Arctic Centre, in the town of Warwick, on the 6th day of October, 1906.

The declaration alleges that Main street is a public highway of the town of Warwick, and that said town, on, to wit, the sixth day of October, 1906, and for a long time prior thereto, failed and neglected to keep said Main street in repair and amended so as to be safe and convenient for travel thereon, but, on the contrary, suffered and permitted said Main street in the portion thereof commonly used for foot travellers, and at a point in said Main street about fifty feet north from the intersection of Curson street with said Main street, on the westerly side of said Main street, in front of property owned by Annie Curson and occupied by M. D. Rinfret as a millinery store, to be and remain in an unsafe and dangerous condition in this, that said highway at the point aforesaid had, prior to that date, been dug up, and a trench about three feet wide and several feet deep was excavated therein for the purpose of, to wit, laying water supply pipes, or pipe or materials of some kind for some purpose, in said highway under the surface thereof, which said excavation had been refilled in an improper, carele'ss, and defective manner, so that the earth and other filling in said excavation was loose, soft, and insufficiently tamped to sustain and support the weight of said plaintiff, although upon the surface of said refilled portion of the street there was nothing to indicate said loose, soft, and untamped condition. And the plaintiff avers that on, to wit, said sixth day of October, while •she was in the proper and careful use of said Main street — -was, to wit — -walking thereon, she stepped upon and into said imperfectly filled portion thereof and immediately sank into and through the soft substance of earth with which said excavation had been filled, and by reason thereof the plaintiff was thrown to the ground and injured.

The case was tried in the Superior Court in Kent county, and on the tenth day of February, 1909, the jury returned a verdict, in favor of the plaintiff, for three thousand five hundred and eighty dollars.

The defendant filed a motion for a new trial on the grounds: First. That the verdict is contrary to the evidence and the *429 weight thereof. Second. That said verdict is contrary to law. Third. That the amount of damages awarded by said verdict is excessive. Fourth. That since the trial in said cause the defendant has discovered new and material evidence, etc.

No affidavit as to new evidence was filed.

The motion for a new trial was heard by the Superior Court, and on March 5, 1909, was denied. March 8, 1909, the defendant excepted to the denial of said motion for a new trial, and filed notice of its intention to prosecute a bill of exceptions. The case is now before us on defendant's bill of exceptions: (1) to certain rulings of the justice presiding at the trial admitting certain evidence, as shown on pages 120, 154, 206, and 320 of the transcript of testimony. (2) To the decision of said justice denying defendant's motion for the direction of a verdict for the defendant, as shown on pages 344, 345, and 346 of the transcript of testimony. (3) To the refusal of said justice to charge the jury as requested by the defendant, as shown on pages 363, 364, 365, and 366 of the transcript of testimony. (4) To the decision of said court denying the defendant’s motion for a new trial.

(1) Considering the exceptions designated (1) in the bill of exceptions, to the admission of testimony: As to the first exception to the admission of testimony, page 120 of the transcript, the question to which objection was made was — “As; highway commissioner, what were your duties?” To this; question no answer was given. After the objection, the following question was asked: “ What were you supposed to do on the highways?” The transcript then proceeds: “The court: What is the objection? Mr. Cosgrove: I don’t think it is the best evidence. The court: If he was highway commissioner of the town of Warwick it may be supposed he knew what his duties; were. If you have any ordinance that defines his duties; you may produce it. Have you an ordinance that defines the duties? Mr. Cosgrove : I don’t think, may it please the court, we are called upon to prove the plaintiff’s case. The court : You may answer the question. Exception taken by Mr. Cosgrove.” The following question was then asked: “What were you supposed to do as highway commissioner, working *430 for the town?” We think the exception is without merit. It was proper to ask the witness what his duties were as highway commissioner, and no exception was taken to the form of the question as finally asked and answered.

(2) As to the second exception to the admission of testimony, page 154 of the transcript, the question excepted to was: “I show you a certified copy of a plat signed by James T. Lockwood, town clerk, having the seal of the town of Warwick, and with the words thereon, 'Warwick, Town Clerk’s Office, February 3rd, 1909, a true copy; attest,’ and ask you if that is a true copy that you have just testified to as being certified to by the town clerk?” To this question Mr. Cosgrove .objected, saying, “I object to that; this paper does not purport to be the official act of the town of Warwick.” “The court: So far as it goes it may be admitted.” This ruling was excepted to by Mr. Cos-grove. This ruling was clearly correct.

(3) As to the third exception to the admission of testimony, p. 206, the question was, “ And how did the physical measurements, the ground, hold out with reference to these figures?” This question was allowed, and exception was taken. A surveyor was being examined as to the highway in question and as to how it compared with the lay-out of the highway from Centre-ville to the Green Manufacturing Company, made in 1822, and had testified that he had made certain measurements on said plat, and as to the measurements made in fixing certain points upon the highway, and had been questioned as to the measurements on the plat of said lay-out. The question was properly allowed. It was proper to allow him to testify how the measurements of the ground held out with reference to the figures on the plat.

(4) As to the fourth exception to the admission of testimony, page 320 of the transcript, the question objected to was: “If you know of any reason why that should not be adopted as the easterly boundary of that lane, please state it.” The surveyor had testified to the location of the fence, as he found it, upon the easterly side of a certain lane shown on the “ Barnes Plat, ” but had said, “ I don’t say it was on the easterly edge of the lane.” He had then been asked: “ It is on the easterly edge of *431

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
75 A. 690, 30 R.I. 426, 1910 R.I. LEXIS 34, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perry-v-sheldon-ri-1910.