Perry v. Motor Vehicles

2004 DNH 072

• Court: District Court, D. New Hampshire
• Decided: April 23, 2004
• Docket: CV-04-046-M
• Status: Published

Opinion

Perry v. Motor Vehicles CV-04-046-M 04/23/04 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF NEW HAMPSHIRE

David A. Perry, Plaintiff

v. Civil No. 04-46 Opinion No. 2004 DNH 072 Virginia C. Beecher, Director, New Hampshire Department of Motor Vehicles, Defendant

O R D E R

In 2000, following his guilty plea, plaintiff was convicted

in state court for driving under the influence of intoxicants,

second offense. Based upon that and prior convictions, he was

certified as a habitual offender. See N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann.

("RSA") 262:19. As part of his criminal sentence, plaintiff's

driver's license was suspended for three years.

Plaintiff was also charged, administratively, with having

refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, as required by New

Hampshire's implied-consent law, RSA 265:84. See also RSA

265:92. His driver's license was automatically suspended for an

additional two years for failing to submit to the test, and that

suspension was upheld by a hearings officer on appeal. Plaintiff then appealed the hearings officer's decision to the New

Hampshire Superior Court, which upheld the suspension. Finally,

plaintiff sought review by the New Hampshire Supreme Court, but

his appeal was declined.

In May of 2003, plaintiff petitioned to have his habitual

offender status removed. See RSA 262:24. Following an

administrative hearing, plaintiff was "de-certified" as a

habitual offender, and the three-year suspension of his driver's

license occasioned by that status was terminated early. The

early termination order did not, however, result in restoration

of plaintiff's driver's license, because the two-year

administrative suspension (for refusing the breathalyzer test)

must, by statute, be served consecutively to any other penalty.

RSA 265:92 II. The hearings officer's order granting relief from

the habitual offender suspension (but enforcing the implied

consent suspension) notified plaintiff of his right to appeal the

decision to the New Hampshire Superior Court.

Plaintiff availed himself of that right and sought judicial

review in the Superior Court by filing a "Petition for Writ of

2 Habeas Corpus, Mandamus, or other Alternative Relief." In that

petition, he directly challenged the constitutionality of the

consecutive (administrative) two-year license suspension under

RSA 265:92, asserting that it constituted "excessive punishment,"

violated his right not to be twice exposed to jeopardy for the

same offense, and violated his rights to due process of law. See

Exhibit E, Defendant's Motion to Dismiss (document no. 6). By

order dated August 12, 2003, the Superior Court concluded that

plaintiff's allegations failed to give rise to any viable

constitutional claims, noting that the administrative suspension

of plaintiff's driver's license was not a criminal penalty, nor

was it imposed in a criminal proceeding. Accordingly, the court

granted the State's motion to dismiss the petition, thereby

denying plaintiff any of the relief he sought.

Plaintiff moved the Superior Court to reconsider its

decision. That motion was denied. He then sought review by the

New Hampshire Supreme Court, which declined to hear his appeal.

Plaintiff moved the Supreme Court to reconsider, but that motion

was also denied. Plaintiff did not seek a writ of certiorari in

the United States Supreme Court but, instead, filed suit in this

3 court, rasing the same constitutional challenges to the

administrative suspension of his driver's license that he

previously raised in state court.

Defendant moves to dismiss on alternative grounds, but one

will suffice. Because plaintiff has already litigated his

federal constitutional claims in the State's courts, those claims

are now barred by the doctrine of res judicata.

As the court of appeals for this circuit has noted, the

preclusive effect of state court judgments is determined by state

law. See N.H. Motor Transp. Ass'n v. Town of Plaistow, 67 F.3d

326, 328 (1st Cir. 1995). Under New Hampshire law, the "doctrine

of res judicata precludes the litigation in a later case of

matters actually litigated, and matters that could have been

litigated, in an earlier action between the same parties for the

same cause of action." In re Alfred P ., 126 N.H. 628, 629

(1985). Having already litigated (and lost) his federal

constitutional challenges to the two-year administrative

suspension of his driver's license in state court, plaintiff is

precluded from relitigating those claims in this court.

4 Parenthetically, the court notes that even if it were to

address plaintiff's claims on the merits, he could not prevail.

Plaintiff's double jeopardy claim is without substance. As noted

above, the administrative forfeiture of a New Hampshire driver's

license is neither a criminal punishment, nor is it the product

of a criminal proceeding. See, e.g.. State v. Drewry, 141 N.H.

514 (1996); State v. Cassady, 140 N.H. 46 (1995). The Double

Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment only prohibits the

imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense,

and is not implicated by proceedings - like those at issue here -

that are not "essentially criminal." Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S.

519, 528 (1975). See also Hudson v. United States, 522 U.S. 93

(1997) .

Plaintiff's "excessive punishment" claim is likewise without

merit. The two-year administrative forfeiture of a driver's

license for failure to comply with the State's implied consent

law is not so excessive or disproportionate as to implicate the

Eighth Amendment's prohibition against excessive fines or cruel

and unusual punishment. See, e.g.. State v. Fitzgerald, 137 N.H.

23 (1993). See also United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321,

5 334 (1998) ("a punitive forfeiture violates the Excessive Fines

Clause if it is grossly disproportional to the gravity of a

defendant's offense.").1

As to plaintiff's claim that his driver's license was

administratively suspended without due process (that is, upon

proof less than that reguired in a criminal proceeding), it too

lacks any merit. The New Hampshire Supreme Court has repeatedly

held that the administrative suspension of a New Hampshire

driver's license is not the product of a criminal proceeding, nor

is the suspension itself a criminal punishment. Conseguently,

the State need not have proved plaintiff's failure to comply with

the implied consent law "beyond a reasonable doubt."

Finally, plaintiff's claim for monetary damages from a state

official is barred by the Eleventh Amendment.

1 New Hampshire law provides that the failure to submit to a breathalyzer test shall result in the administrative suspension of an individual's driver's license for a period of 180 days. If, however, the person has a prior conviction for driving while intoxicated or if that person has previously refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, his or her license shall be suspended for two years. RSA 265:92 I. Plaintiff fell into the latter category.

6 Conclusion

The defendant's motion to dismiss (document no. 6) is

granted. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in accordance

with this order and close the case.

SO ORDERED.

Steven J. McAuliffe United States District Judge

April 23, 2004

cc: David A. Perry Andrew B. Livernois, Esg.