Smith, C. J.
The sole issues raised in the pleadings are as to the validity of this sale, and if upheld, the
bona fides
and legal efficacy of the mortgage deed.
The record in this case, as in others of which we have had occasion to speak, fails to assign
error in the rulings of the Court,
and compels us to search through the voluminous pages of the report and the testimony taken, as well as among the exceptions to the action of the referee, to ascertain what are his conclusions of law which are reviewable and open to
correction here. The practice cannot be allowed, and if our admonitions are to be disregarded, we shall be constrained to refuse to take cognizance of the cause and dismiss the appeal. The errors alleged to have been committed by
the Court
should be distinctly and plainly pointed out, as those intended to be presented and heard on the appeal.
The objections made on the rulings of the referee as questions of the admissibility of evidence, to-wit: as to the usage of farmers in the employment of laborers and pajdng them wages; the manner in which another employer of defendant Ellis paid his wages; the novelty of providing and securing them by a mortgage deed in advance of their being earned, were properly overruled, since, while their pertinency to the issue of fraud is not very apparent, we do not see how the evidence tended to mislead the referee.
The introduction of the tax books, as tending to show the financial resources of the defendants in an inquiry as to their means of self-support, is, in our opinion, not obnoxious to objection, and its force and effect was for the referee, acting in place of a jury, to pass on and determine.
The defendants insist that no judgments were rendered by the Justice against the defendant Hardison, upon the claims sued on, and that the certified transcripts of such as were docketed and under executions on which the land was sold, were without an original, and were in consequence nullities, the sale passing no title to the purchaser, the attorney and agent of the creditors whose claims he was collecting.
Whatever may have been the legal consequences, if the facts were, as supposed, they are misconceived and incorrectly stated. The Justice’s civil docket shows a service of summons accepted, a trial, and “judgment given against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $4, with interest from the 8th of December, 1852,” &c., in the one case, and a substantially similar entry in the other,
mutatis mu-
tandis,
and these fully sustain the transcripts sent up and docketed in the Superior Court.
II. The defendants except further to the validity of the sale of the land until the personal property levied on, as shown in the Sheriff’s return upon the executions, and shown to have been fully sufficient in value to pay them, had been sold, and the proceeds applied in satisfaction.
The referee finds that in fact no levy was ever made upon the personal goods mentioned in the return, and that the return was thus made upon an inspection of the tax lists and without their ever being in the possession or under the dominion of the officer, these being the constituents of a legal seizure.
The delivery by the debtor of a list of his personal property to the officer, it not being present, is not a levy.
Gilkey
v. Dickerson, 3 Hawks, 293;
Bland
v.
Whitfield,
1 Jones, 122.
The return of a levy made is but prima
facie
evidence of. the fact, and, remarks Pearson, J., in the case cited : “ In regard to land it may be made in the office, although it may be ten miles distant, and the officer has never seen it. In regard to personal property, it is necessary for the officer to go to it,
so as to have it in his power to take it into actual possession
if he chooses.”
See also, as to a sale of an ungathered crop in the field,
Skinner
v.
Skinner,
4 Ired., 175, and
Rives
v.
Porter,
7 Ired., 74, and other cases.
Here the
prima facie
proof is rebutted, and it is shown there never was any levy, and that the goods remained un-interfered with, in the defendant’s hands, and were appropriated by him to his own use.
The imputation of bad faith in the conduct of the officer in making the sale finds no support in the facts found, and the mere fact that an insignificant sum was bid, must be attributed to the dispute about the title, growing out of the
execution of the mortgage, and an unwillingness to buy a lawsuit in buying the land.
But the essential controversy is as to the
bona fides
of the mortgage deed and its sufficiency to pass the title against a creditor pursuing the property under legal process.
The referee finds, and the Court sustains the finding, that the defendant Ellis had no legal claim against his associate as a consideration to support the conveyance, and if there was a debt, it was made with the fraudulent intent of evading his creditors and placing his property beyond their reach. While the recited consideration is that of a present indebtedness of $200 intended to be secured, it was testified by the mortgagor that this sum constituted the wages to be paid to the mortgagee for services in part already rendered and to be thereafter rendered as to the residue, and further that the latter was in his service from some time in the fall of 1876 to August, 1878, when having married the mortgagor’s daughter he moved away.
The exception to the finding that there was no debt due or liability incurred bj? Plardison sufficient as a consideration to support his mortgage against creditors, and that it was but a donation to a stranger, raises the only question we care to consider, which is whether there is
any evidence
to warrant a finding in direct opposition to the testimony that there was a contract for services, to secure which the deed was given; that such services were rendered during a period of about twenty months, and had not been paid for. There was some evidence, however, of the poverty of Ellis and as his means of support were dependent upon his labor, that necessity must have forced him to require payment. However weak may be the grounds of such an inference in opposition to the positive testimony offered on this point, its sufficiency to rebut the testimony is not a question to be here considered ; but belonging to the Court below, is conclusively settled, and we cannot say there is no
evidence and that the testimony ought to have been accepted as proof of the facts.
But the matter becomes unimportant in presence of the further finding that the mortgage, -whether made on a
bona fide
liability or not, was made with an intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the mortgagor, as this would defeat the operation of the conveyance, if known to and participated in by the mortgagee.
Cannon
v.
Young,
89 N. C., 264, and cases therein cited.
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Smith, C. J.
The sole issues raised in the pleadings are as to the validity of this sale, and if upheld, the
bona fides
and legal efficacy of the mortgage deed.
The record in this case, as in others of which we have had occasion to speak, fails to assign
error in the rulings of the Court,
and compels us to search through the voluminous pages of the report and the testimony taken, as well as among the exceptions to the action of the referee, to ascertain what are his conclusions of law which are reviewable and open to
correction here. The practice cannot be allowed, and if our admonitions are to be disregarded, we shall be constrained to refuse to take cognizance of the cause and dismiss the appeal. The errors alleged to have been committed by
the Court
should be distinctly and plainly pointed out, as those intended to be presented and heard on the appeal.
The objections made on the rulings of the referee as questions of the admissibility of evidence, to-wit: as to the usage of farmers in the employment of laborers and pajdng them wages; the manner in which another employer of defendant Ellis paid his wages; the novelty of providing and securing them by a mortgage deed in advance of their being earned, were properly overruled, since, while their pertinency to the issue of fraud is not very apparent, we do not see how the evidence tended to mislead the referee.
The introduction of the tax books, as tending to show the financial resources of the defendants in an inquiry as to their means of self-support, is, in our opinion, not obnoxious to objection, and its force and effect was for the referee, acting in place of a jury, to pass on and determine.
The defendants insist that no judgments were rendered by the Justice against the defendant Hardison, upon the claims sued on, and that the certified transcripts of such as were docketed and under executions on which the land was sold, were without an original, and were in consequence nullities, the sale passing no title to the purchaser, the attorney and agent of the creditors whose claims he was collecting.
Whatever may have been the legal consequences, if the facts were, as supposed, they are misconceived and incorrectly stated. The Justice’s civil docket shows a service of summons accepted, a trial, and “judgment given against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff for the sum of $4, with interest from the 8th of December, 1852,” &c., in the one case, and a substantially similar entry in the other,
mutatis mu-
tandis,
and these fully sustain the transcripts sent up and docketed in the Superior Court.
II. The defendants except further to the validity of the sale of the land until the personal property levied on, as shown in the Sheriff’s return upon the executions, and shown to have been fully sufficient in value to pay them, had been sold, and the proceeds applied in satisfaction.
The referee finds that in fact no levy was ever made upon the personal goods mentioned in the return, and that the return was thus made upon an inspection of the tax lists and without their ever being in the possession or under the dominion of the officer, these being the constituents of a legal seizure.
The delivery by the debtor of a list of his personal property to the officer, it not being present, is not a levy.
Gilkey
v. Dickerson, 3 Hawks, 293;
Bland
v.
Whitfield,
1 Jones, 122.
The return of a levy made is but prima
facie
evidence of. the fact, and, remarks Pearson, J., in the case cited : “ In regard to land it may be made in the office, although it may be ten miles distant, and the officer has never seen it. In regard to personal property, it is necessary for the officer to go to it,
so as to have it in his power to take it into actual possession
if he chooses.”
See also, as to a sale of an ungathered crop in the field,
Skinner
v.
Skinner,
4 Ired., 175, and
Rives
v.
Porter,
7 Ired., 74, and other cases.
Here the
prima facie
proof is rebutted, and it is shown there never was any levy, and that the goods remained un-interfered with, in the defendant’s hands, and were appropriated by him to his own use.
The imputation of bad faith in the conduct of the officer in making the sale finds no support in the facts found, and the mere fact that an insignificant sum was bid, must be attributed to the dispute about the title, growing out of the
execution of the mortgage, and an unwillingness to buy a lawsuit in buying the land.
But the essential controversy is as to the
bona fides
of the mortgage deed and its sufficiency to pass the title against a creditor pursuing the property under legal process.
The referee finds, and the Court sustains the finding, that the defendant Ellis had no legal claim against his associate as a consideration to support the conveyance, and if there was a debt, it was made with the fraudulent intent of evading his creditors and placing his property beyond their reach. While the recited consideration is that of a present indebtedness of $200 intended to be secured, it was testified by the mortgagor that this sum constituted the wages to be paid to the mortgagee for services in part already rendered and to be thereafter rendered as to the residue, and further that the latter was in his service from some time in the fall of 1876 to August, 1878, when having married the mortgagor’s daughter he moved away.
The exception to the finding that there was no debt due or liability incurred bj? Plardison sufficient as a consideration to support his mortgage against creditors, and that it was but a donation to a stranger, raises the only question we care to consider, which is whether there is
any evidence
to warrant a finding in direct opposition to the testimony that there was a contract for services, to secure which the deed was given; that such services were rendered during a period of about twenty months, and had not been paid for. There was some evidence, however, of the poverty of Ellis and as his means of support were dependent upon his labor, that necessity must have forced him to require payment. However weak may be the grounds of such an inference in opposition to the positive testimony offered on this point, its sufficiency to rebut the testimony is not a question to be here considered ; but belonging to the Court below, is conclusively settled, and we cannot say there is no
evidence and that the testimony ought to have been accepted as proof of the facts.
But the matter becomes unimportant in presence of the further finding that the mortgage, -whether made on a
bona fide
liability or not, was made with an intent to hinder, delay and defraud the creditors of the mortgagor, as this would defeat the operation of the conveyance, if known to and participated in by the mortgagee.
Cannon
v.
Young,
89 N. C., 264, and cases therein cited.
The defendants insist that no evidence appears of the existence of the vitiating element.
We do not concur in this contention, for there is much evidence tending to prove the fraudulent purpose.
The deed falsely sets out a
present indebtedness
evidenced by a bond alleged to be lost; whereas on the testimony it was to secure wages largely to be rendered in the future. It was executed just before the issuing of the warrants which were followed by judgments and executions under which the sale was made, and after being pressed for payment.
The giving such a security under the circumstances which might utterly fail, and even if intended to provide the means of paying the debts would and must be understood to have been meant to put off and delay the payment, and prevent an early disposition of the property and the appropriation of the proceeds thereto.
There are other evidences of fraud apparent in the concurrent acts of the parties and presented in the proofs, from which the illegal purpose is deduced that tended to show, and was evidence, more or less strong, showing the object and effect of the deed, and of these, as facts, the determination vested in the Court below.
These are the prominent rulings pressed in the argument for the appellants, and on which their counsel seem to rely, nor do we discover in the record any error in others.
There is no error, and the judgment must be affirmed.
Affirmed.