Perry v. Cornell

19 F. Cas. 267, 1 MacA. Pat. Cas. 68
District of Columbia Court of Appeals·Decided July 15, 1847·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

Cranch, J.

There were four conflicting applications for a patent for the improvement:

ist. By John Robertson, on the 9th of September, 1846.

[71]*712d. By Alonzo D. Perry, on the 6th of October, 1846.

3d. By Stephen Parks, Jr., on the 12th of November, 1846; and

4th. By Samuel G. Cornell, on the 21st of December, 1846.

Before the application of Samuel G. Cornell, and while the litigation was going on between the other three applicants, the depositions of twenty-one witnesses had been taken on the part of those applicants, respectively, and, of course, without notice to Mr. Cornell, who had not then made his application. These depositions were returned to the Commissioner of Patents, and objected to by Mr. Cornell’s counsel for want of notice.

The Commissioner, without deciding upon the question of admissibility of the evidence as to Mr. Cornell, awarded to him the priority of invéntion, saying: “The decision of the question raised in reference to the admissibility of testimony is unnecessary to decide; its rejection would not vary the result; the testimony is therefore received, and priority of invention awarded to Samuel G. Cornell March 24th, 1847.”

From this decision Mr. Perry has appealed, and his reasons of appeal are, in effect—

1st. That the evidence does not show that Mr. Cornell was the first to conceive the idea of a machine such as he now claims, but that the plan proved to have been so conceived is essentially different and mechanically inferior to the one claimed and now awarded to him by the Commissioner.

2d. That the evidence on which the decision in favor of Mr. Cornell is based is contradictory, and insufficient to establish his claim even to the conception of the idea of the principle or mode of operation of the machine now sought to be patented; but, on the contrary, shows that the plan said to have been conceived was entirely different; and

3d. That if he did conceive the idea of the principle or mode of operation of a machine substantially similar to the one now claimed, and did describe to the witness such a machine prior to the date of invention claimed by the applicant (Perry), yet it was merely an intellectual invention, based on theory, and not an invention in the meaning of the law.

The Commissioner has laid before me 1 ‘ the original papers and evidence in the case, together with the grounds of his decision, fully set forth in writing, touching all the points involved by the [72] reasons of appeal,” to which my revision must be confined, as provided in the eleventh section of the act of March 3d, 1839, chapter 88, pamphlet edition, pages 75 and 76.

The grounds of the decision of the Commissioner, as set forth in writing, are, in substance'—

“That it is proved by the testimony of William Frost, and confirmed by that of Benjamin Peck, that the said Cornell invented the machine in dispute as early as the summer of 1843 ; and there is no testimony that tends to show that either of the other parties invented it until a considerable time afterwards. ’ ’ That ‘1 it appears by the testimony of Frost that Cornell described the invention to him fully, so that he perfectly understood it; that he repeatedly made draughts representing it in so clear a manner that the said Frost was able to make draughts and estimates of cost, and absolutely did make both with the assistance of Cornell. ’ ’ That “ Cornell made the invention as clearly understood as if the machine had been built and in operation.” It appears, therefore, that he had done all that an inventor as such could do, and nothing remained to complete the machine but the labor of the mechanic, which cannot be confounded with invention.” The greater number of inventions daily patented have never been reduced to. practice.

In the grounds of his decision the Coihmissioner controverts the dictum found in some of the books, that ‘ ‘ he who first reduces an invention to practice is the first inventor” — a dictum which, he says, “although often quoted and reiterated, was not applicable to nor borne out by the case in which it was first pronounced, nor by any of the cases in which it has subsequently been repeated, and which, in the broad terms in which it is announced, is not, and never has been, the law. If by reduction to practice is meant rendering a principle practicable or useful in a new way, and clearly pointing out the manner in which it may be thus made useful, so that any competent mechanic can avail himself of it, then, and in that sense, an invention must be reduced to practice;” but “neither the statutes nor the decisions of the courts require that a machine should be built and used as a part of the invention before the party can be considered an inventor, but that the sense above alluded to is the sense in which the courts have used the phrase ‘ reduction to practice, ’ ’ ’ and the [73] only sense which will reconcile the ‘1 decisions and make them conform to the statutes regulating patent rights.”

The other two applicants' — Mr. Robertson and Mr. Parks— have not appealed; so that the contest is now between Mr. Perry and Mr. Cornell only.

It is admitted that a great and valuable improvement has been made in the old machine for making lead pipe ; and the principal, if not the only, point involved in the reasons of appeal is the question ‘1 which, or whether either, of these two applicants is entitled to receive the patent prayed for ; ’ ’ and this is to be decided by the evidence produced before the Commissioner.' The twenty-one depositions taken in the conflict between Robertson, Perry, and Parks, being taken without notice to Cornell, are not evidence against him, and therefore cannot be considered by the judge upon appeal. The only evidence which he can consider is that which is contained in the depositions of William Frost and Benjamin Peck and in the cross-examination of Mr. Cornell himself by the counsel of Mr. Perry.

The question, then, is, whether the machine described by Mr. Cornell to those two witnesses is substantially the same as that for which he asks a patent.

The improvement consists in the great diminution of the friction of the machine, by which the same effect is produced by a power much less than that which was necessary to work the old machine.

As the question is merely priority of invention, it is not necessary to describe the particular alterations of the old machine which constitute the improvement. It is, however, necessary to examine the testimony to see whether the improvement which Mr. Cornell described to the witness is substantially the same as that for which he now claims a patent.

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Perry v. Cornell, 19 F. Cas. 267, 1 MacA. Pat. Cas. 68 (D.C. 1847).

19 F. Cas. 267 (Perry v. Cornell) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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