Perrow v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co.

178 S.W. 973, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 880
CourtCourt of Appeals of Texas
DecidedMay 26, 1915
DocketNo. 5484.
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 178 S.W. 973 (Perrow v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perrow v. San Antonio & A. P. Ry. Co., 178 S.W. 973, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 880 (Tex. Ct. App. 1915).

Opinion

KEY, C. J.

(after stating the facts as above).

Appellant’s first assignment of error complains because the court refused to give the following special charge requested by him:

“The calls in the field notes contained in the probate proceedings and the deed from J. J. Potts, administrator of O. R. Burke, deceased, to defendant, whereby defendant acquired title to the land described in said proceedings and in said deed, do not, by the calls for the south line of the alley and to run with the south line of said alley, pass to defendant any right to, or interest in, such alley.”

But one proposition is submitted under that assignment, and it reads as follows:

“The owner of land, with an alley or passageway through it not dedicated to public use, passes no right, easement, or servitude in such alley to a grantee to whom he sells the land adjoining such alley by simply calling for a line of the land conveyed to run northwest a given distance to the south line of the alley and thence southeast with the southeast line of such alley, and especially so, when simultaneously, such grantor conveys to another the balance of the land, including the alley by metes and bounds, without making any reference to such alley, such alley not being a way of necessity for the grantee whose deed embraces no part of the alley ; such calls for the alley are merely descriptive and do not amount to a representation that such alley is a public alley or shall be maintained for the use and benefit of the grantee.”

That charge was properly refused for more than one reason. In the first place, it assumes that the alley involved in this case had not been dedicated to public use, which assumption is not sustained by the undisputed testimony. On the contrary, appellee submitted testimony sufficient to support a finding that the alley had been dedicated to public use prior to appellee’s purchase of land adjacent thereto. In the next place, the latter part of that instruction was upon the weight of testimony, because in considering the case the jury had the right to consider the calls for the alley in appellee’s deed as well as all the other testimony in determining whether or not appellant was estopped from denying ap-pellee’s right to have the strip of land in question treated as a public alley.

Appellant’s brief contains several othther assignments of error, all of which present, in different forms and from different angles, the contention that the proof failed to show that the strip of land here involved was a public alley, or that appellee had any legal right to the use of it as such alley. The proof shows that the land upon which the alley in question is located was originally owned by Patrick and Elizabeth Burke, both deceased, who acquired it in 1885-86, and who are the common source of title; they left as their heirs three children, namely, J. J. Burke, T. W. Burke, and C. R. Burke, the latter two being now dead. Both parties deraign title through these three sons and their estates. Appellee acquired title to part of the Burke property January 24, 1911, and its deeds thereto call for the alley in question as a boundary line. Contemporaneously with that sale was a sale of the remainder of the Burke property to appellant, whose deeds call for appellee’s line and do not refer to the alley. In other words, the fee to the land upon which the alley is located was conveyed to and vested in appellant. But if the strip of land in question was a public alley at that time, or if it was represented so to be in such manner as to constitute an estoppel against appellant, appellee was entitled to recover.

In response to special issues the jury found the following facts: That the alley begins at First street and ends at River street, and is 20 feet in width; that the grantors who conveyed lands adjacent to .the alley to appellee knew for what use or purpose appellee was purchasing the property; that they knew at the time that said alley had been used by the public for 20 years or more, and that such use had been open, adverse, and continuous by the public generally; that the owners of the property upon which the alley is situated who sold part of it to appellant and part of it to appellee at the same time, knew of its use as aforesaid by the public as an alley, and intended that it should remain a public alley ; that in leaving such alley open it was the purpose of the owner of the land to afford ingress and egress both for himself and his tenants and for the use of the public; and that such alley had been in use for over 20 years. There were some other findings of fact which we deem it unnecessary to set out. They do not conflict with, but tend to support, the above finding.

Appellant submitted much testimony tending to show that the strip of land in question had never become a public alley, but the appellee submitted testimony to the contrary, and which supports all the findings of the jury. And, if the facts found by the jury were not sufficient to support the judgment rendered for appellee, nevertheless it should not’ be reversed if there was testimony authorizing the court to make such additional findings as were necessary to support the judgment. The court in its decree found that appellee has an easement and servitude *975 in the alley, and appellee submitted testimony which, will support that finding upon two theories, which are: First, that such easement had been acquired by over 20 years’ use of the property as a passway and alley by the public; and, second, that as against the rights of appellee, appellant is estopped from denying that the property in question is a public alley. In support of these propositions, we copy the following correct statement from appellee’s brief:

“The appellee pleaded in part as follows: That it is true the defendant railway company declined to purchase all of said property, because of the fact that there was a public alley 20 feet wide extending from First street to Biver street through said property; and because same had been dedicated to public use and used by the general public as a highway; because same had been used continuously by the public for more than twenty years; and because said property had prior thereto been sold with reference and respect to said alley; and because said alley had been established as a public highway by general dedication and by public use and by implication, and same was in all purposes a legally established alley. And, with this understanding, the said administrator and the several grantors of the defendant and the plaintiff deeded the property to the San Antonio & Arkansas Pass Bailway Company, as hereinafter described, and by their several deeds recognized said alley as a public highway; and that a map showing said alley was made a part of said deeds; and that said purchase was made with respect to said alley, as shown by said map, all of which was known by plaintiff, and said administrator recognized said alley.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
178 S.W. 973, 1915 Tex. App. LEXIS 880, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perrow-v-san-antonio-a-p-ry-co-texapp-1915.