Perrin v. Stuyvesant Ins.

Supreme Court of Louisiana

Perrin v. Stuyvesant Ins.

74 So. 110, 140 La. 812, 1917 La. LEXIS 1441

CourtSupreme Court of Louisiana

DecidedJanuary 15, 1917

DocketNo. 20748

StatusPublished

Cited by7 cases

This text of 74 So. 110 (Perrin v. Stuyvesant Ins.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Louisiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Perrin v. Stuyvesant Ins., 74 So. 110, 140 La. 812, 1917 La. LEXIS 1441 (La. 1917).

Pincite

Opinion

PROVOSTY, J.

[1, 2] This is a suit upon a fire insurance policy, and the defenses are, among others, that, by an express stipulation, the policy was to remain in force “only while” the house insured “was occupied by tenant as a dwelling,” and that it was not so occupied at the time of the fire, nor for some days previously but was vacant, and, moreover, had not, when occupied, been used as a dwelling but as a boarding house or hotel; and again, that, by another express stipulation, the policy should be void “if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership”; and that at the time of the issuance of the policy, and for some time thereafter, the title stood in the state of Louisiana by virtue of a tax sale. There is no denying that the tenant took in boarders, both permanent and transient; but it is said that the same thing was done in all the houses of the village, there being no hotel. Be that as it may, the facts on the other grounds of defense are undisputed, and are fatal to plaintiff’s suit under well-settled law. These grounds of avoiding the contract appear narrow, but they are, all the same, perfectly solid. In Jones & Pickett v. Insurance Co., 132 La. 847, 61 South. 846, the ground was that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against the property since the issuance of the policy; and this was held fatal, although the foreclosure proceedings had been discontinued before the fire, and therefore had in no wise contributed to the fire. See, in the some sense, D’Aigle v. Insurance Co., 136 La. 777, 67 South. 827; Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379, 38 L. Ed. 231; N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. Murtagh, 137 La. 762, 69 South. 165. In a word, the insurance contract has to be enforced as written. The tax sale to the state was subject to redemption, but it did not for that reason any the less convey the title; the title none the less stood in the state so long as the redemption had not taken place. Baker v. Smith, 44 La. Ann. 925, 11 South. 585. See brief of counsel, in this. Baker v. Smith Case, No. 9 of syllabus.

The judgment appealed from is set aside, and the suit is dismissed, at the cost of plaintiff in both courts.

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PROVOSTY, J.

[1, 2] This is a suit upon a fire insurance policy, and the defenses are, among others, that, by an express stipulation, the policy was to remain in force “only while” the house insured “was occupied by tenant as a dwelling,” and that it was not so occupied at the time of the fire, nor for some days previously but was vacant, and, moreover, had not, when occupied, been used as a dwelling but as a boarding house or hotel; and again, that, by another express stipulation, the policy should be void “if the interest of the insured be other than unconditional and sole ownership”; and that at the time of the issuance of the policy, and for some time thereafter, the title stood in the state of Louisiana by virtue of a tax sale. There is no denying that the tenant took in boarders, both permanent and transient; but it is said that the same thing was done in all the houses of the village, there being no hotel. Be that as it may, the facts on the other grounds of defense are undisputed, and are fatal to plaintiff’s suit under well-settled law. These grounds of avoiding the contract appear narrow, but they are, all the same, perfectly solid. In Jones & Pickett v. Insurance Co., 132 La. 847, 61 South. 846, the ground was that foreclosure proceedings had been instituted against the property since the issuance of the policy; and this was held fatal, although the foreclosure proceedings had been discontinued before the fire, and therefore had in no wise contributed to the fire. See, in the some sense, D’Aigle v. Insurance Co., 136 La. 777, 67 South. 827; Imperial Fire Ins. Co. v. Coos County, 151 U. S. 452, 14 Sup. Ct. 379, 38 L. Ed. 231; N. Y. L. Ins. Co. v. Murtagh, 137 La. 762, 69 South. 165. In a word, the insurance contract has to be enforced as written. The tax sale to the state was subject to redemption, but it did not for that reason any the less convey the title; the title none the less stood in the state so long as the redemption had not taken place. Baker v. Smith, 44 La. Ann. 925, 11 South. 585. See brief of counsel, in this. Baker v. Smith Case, No. 9 of syllabus.

The judgment appealed from is set aside, and the suit is dismissed, at the cost of plaintiff in both courts.

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74 So. 110, 140 La. 812, 1917 La. LEXIS 1441, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perrin-v-stuyvesant-ins-la-1917.

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