Perras v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 067400 (Sep. 20, 2002)

2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11948, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 145
CourtConnecticut Superior Court
DecidedSeptember 20, 2002
DocketNo. 067400
StatusUnpublished

This text of 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11948 (Perras v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 067400 (Sep. 20, 2002)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Connecticut Superior Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Perras v. Allstate Insurance Company, No. 067400 (Sep. 20, 2002), 2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11948, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 145 (Colo. Ct. App. 2002).

Opinion

[EDITOR'S NOTE: This case is unpublished as indicated by the issuing court.]

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION OBJECTION TO REQUEST FOR DISCLOSURE AND PRODUCTION (#102)
I
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This action arises out a claim for uninsured and underinsured motorist benefits. The plaintiff, Timothy Perras, filed an amended four count complaint1 against the defendant, Allstate Insurance Company, alleging breach of contract, bad faith, unfair trade practices, unfair claim settlement practices, reckless and willful misconduct. On April 8, 2002, the defendant filed an objection to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for production. On April 18, 2002, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in response to the defendant's objection. On May 10, 2002, the plaintiff's attorney filed an affidavit stating therein his efforts in attempting to resolve the defendant's discovery objections.

II
ARGUMENT
The defendant objects to the plaintiff's interrogatories and requests for production on the grounds that the requests are irrelevant to the issues pleaded and the answers sought do not concern admissible evidence. In addition, under Practice Book § 13-3(a) the defendant concern admissible evidence. In addition, under Practice Book § 13-3 (a) the defendant argues that a court may not order disclosure of the impressions, conclusions or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation in question.

In response, the plaintiff argues that he is not limited to interrogatories and requests for production set forth in Practice Book Forms 106.10A [amended as 201] and 106.11A [amended as 204] because the cause of action sounds in contract and not in tort. As such, the CT Page 11949 plaintiff contends that the "standard interrogatories" and "standard requests for production" do not apply and, therefore, he is able to file "non-standard" discovery requests in accordance with Practice Book §§13-6 and 13-9 without requesting the court's approval. In addition, the plaintiff argues that the defendant's objections are inadequate and improper in form. Furthermore, the plaintiff notes that the defendant failed to specifically state how each interrogatory and production request is irrelevant or privileged as attorney-client communications and, or work product. Lastly, the plaintiff maintains that all thirty interrogatories and eleven requests for production seek relevant and nonprivileged information from the defendant.

III
LAW
Discovery is generally governed by chapter thirteen of the Practice Book. The present controversy involves Practice Book §§ 13-6(b) and § 13-9 (a). Practice Book § 13-6(b) provides that "[i]n all personal injury actions alleging liability based on the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle . . . the interrogatories served shall be limited to those set forth in Forms 201, 202 and/or 203 of the rules of practice, unless upon motion, the judicial authority determines that such interrogatories are inappropriate or inadequate in the particular action." Similarly, in regard to requests for production, § 13-9 (a) provides that "[i]n all personal injury actions alleging liability based on the operation or ownership of a motor vehicle . . . the requests for production shall be limited to those set forth in Forms 204, 205 and/or 206 of the rules of practice, unless, upon motion, the judicial authority determines that such requests for production are inappropriate or inadequate in the particular action."

The present case is not a personal injury action as contemplated by or within the meaning of §§ 13-6 and 13-9. "An action to recover under an automobile insurance policy . . . is not an action in tort but, rather, an action in contract. The obligation of [an] insurance carrier providing uninsured motorist coverage as a part of its liability insurance coverage on the automobile of the insured person is a contractual obligation arising under the policy of insurance." (Emphasis in original; internal quotation marks omitted.) Mazziotti v. Allstate Ins. Co., 240 Conn. 799,817, 695 A.2d 1010 (1997). "By definition, an underinsured motorist case is a contract action based on the insurance policy issued by the defendant to its insured." Strom v. Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Docket No. 382312 (November 30, 2001, Stevens, J.) (30 Conn.L.Rptr. 725). "[T]he CT Page 11950 design and intent of the standard discovery make it quite plain that in too many respects, this discovery is insufficient to address the issues of an underinsured motorist case." Id. Accordingly, this court agrees with the opinions of other Superior Court judges who have held that parties in uninsured and underinsured motorist cases are not required to obtain the court's permission prior to the filing of nonstandard interrogatories. See Lugo v. National Casualty Insurance, Superior Court, judicial district of New Haven at New Haven (January 30, 2002,Robinson, J.) (31 Conn.L.Rptr. 322); see also Caldwell v. Shelby Ins.Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Ansonia/Milford at Milford, Docket No. 056454 (October 19, 1998, Flynn, J.) (23 Conn.L.Rptr. 302).

The defendant also objects to the plaintiff's discovery request on the ground that the request seeks privileged attorney-client or work product material. The defendant's objection fails to provide specific reasons to the plaintiff's requests. Rather, the defendant pleads a general and overly broad statement that "the judicial authority shall not order disclosure of the mutual impressions, conclusions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." (Defendant's Objection to Plaintiff's Request).

"The attorney/client privilege recognized at common law is not, in fact, a general protection of all transactions that involve an attorney and a client, nor can all of the facts a party knows be immunized from discovery merely by telling them to a lawyer. Rather, what is privileged are the communications between client and attorney when made in confidence for the purpose of seeking or giving legal advice." Strom v.Middlesex Mutual Assurance Co., supra, Superior Court, Docket No. 382312, citing Olson v. Accessory Controls Equipment Corp.,254 Conn. 145, 158, 757 A.2d 14 (2000); Ullman v. State, 230 Conn. 698,713, 647 A.2d 324 (1994); Doyle v. Reeves, 112 Conn. 521, 523,112 Conn. 521

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Related

State v. Hanna
191 A.2d 124 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1963)
Doyle v. Reeves
152 A. 882 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1931)
Ullmann v. State
647 A.2d 324 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1994)
Mazziotti v. Allstate Insurance
695 A.2d 1010 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 1997)
Olson v. Accessory Controls & Equipment Corp.
757 A.2d 14 (Supreme Court of Connecticut, 2000)

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Bluebook (online)
2002 Conn. Super. Ct. 11948, 33 Conn. L. Rptr. 145, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/perras-v-allstate-insurance-company-no-067400-sep-20-2002-connsuperct-2002.